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2014
A great number of existing, emerging and hypothetical technologies offers the possibility of neuroenhancement of human beings, promising (or threatening) to drastically change the lives of citizens. Among them are so called „smart drugs” - psychopharmacological interventions that allegedly boost brain power, and „neuroprosthesis“ - electromagnetic interventions in the brain in the form of interface with computers or even artificial means of augmenting cognition, new brain stimulation technologies that combat pain and control mental focus, and even highly sophisticated neuroimplants with special sensory input or electro-mechanical output. The debate on enhancement in neuroethics, the field of applied ethics analyzing the social, legal and ethical challenges of these technologies, had been sidetracked to a metaphysical argument about human nature. Most arguments against enhancement tend to concentrate on the issue of authenticity or what it means to live according to human nature. The...
Neuro-enhancement can be broadly defined as the attempt to improve the brain's functioning in healthy individuals through the use of both pharmacological and non-pharmacological means. Although the rapid development of these technologies in the last decade has been received with enthusiasm by many, an increasing number of scholars have raised important ethical, moral, social and legal concerns associated with their use. In general lines, these issues can be grouped into six different classes: medical safety and effectiveness, enhancement vs. treatment, distributive justice, coercion, human authenticity, and fairness and the value of achievement. In this paper, I add some ideas to the previous categories and I try to contribute to the neuroethical debate by addressing three issues that have barely received attention on the literature: the re-stigmatization of people with mental health disorders, the depoliticization of sociocultural struggles and the "technocratization of the brain." The legal and policy implications of cognitive enhancers are discussed in the conclusion.
Online Journal of Health Ethics, 2019
The seemingly infinite possibilities of contemporary neuroscience span from the augmentation of memory, executive function, appetite, libido, sleep, and mood, to the maturation and development of emotional health and personality. These prospects hint at the capacity to alter neurocognitive conceptions of reality. They also mark the unavoidable inculcation of nuanced individual responses, perhaps radical, to these "tailormade" perceptions. Hence, there exists certain neuroethical, and even more generally, existential risks within this fascinating and expeditious enterprise. The primary question in the context of present-day neurotechnology is not what can be done, but what should be. To that end, this paper examines the concepts of memory, executive function, and emotional health and personality in the context of neurocognitive enhancement and posits the argument that neurocognitive enhancement can be justified as morally plausible in its potential to edify the caliber of overall cognition, and thus contribute to the ability to make pragmatically, robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (1) promotes general moral character, (2) compliments human nature, and (3) effects a deeper sense of individual and social identity.
TRAMES, 2011
Neuro-enhancement refers to the use of applications of modern neurosciences to make people better – smarter, happier, more sociable etc. This paper consists of analyses on claims concerning unnaturalness of neuro-enhancement. In what sense, if any, is neuro-enhancement unnatural? If neuro-enhancement is unnatural, is its unnaturalness morally noteworthy? Four possible senses of naturalness are analyzed: naturalness as normality, naturalness as suitability, naturalness as belonging, and naturalness as familiarity. None of these interpretations offers sufficient support for the view that neuro-enhancement is morally problematic because of its unnaturalness.
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees, 2016
An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio- and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither "treatments" nor "enhancements" are objectively identifiable apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifications to the body and its performance. The term "enhancement" should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the...
The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, 2019
With Neuroethics, Justice and Autonomy, Veljko Dubljevi c seeks to reconceptualise one of the most salient controversies in contemporary neuroethics, that of the regulation of cognitive enhancers, through a political lens. Dubljevi c calls upon his expertise in both neuroethics and political theory to argue for the use of a Rawlsian framework regarding regulation policies of enhancers. Doing so allows for a middle-ground position concerning regulation. He nuances between the two most widely represented perspectives which have shaped the neuroethical debate, total prohibition or laissez-faire. Navigating through political theory, moral theory, and neuroscience, Dubljevi c crafts a concrete policy proposal which will be of interest to academics and policymakers alike. The main point of the book is twofold as it attempts to tackle two of the principal subjects of neuroethical inquiry: first, how technologies arising from new developments in neuroscience are to be regulated in accordance with moral reasoning and second, how empirical findings in neuroscience are to be understood regarding the concepts at play in moral theory (in the present case, the concept of autonomy). Concerning regulations, he draws insights from Rawlsian public reason and proposes a consensual justificatory ground for a regulatory policy acceptable to both pro-and anti-enhancement citizens. Regarding autonomy, he argues for a political notion of the concept as inspired by Rawls' famous conception of justice as political, not metaphysical, claiming that the neuroethical debate has conflated autonomy with the metaphysical concept of free-will. Since regulation policies are inevitably bound to run into concerns for autonomy, the two discussions are indeed fully intertwined. In his attempt to depart from the parochial dichotomy between prohibition and laissez-faire, Dubljevi c argues for a regulation model based on taxation which he dubs the Economic Disincentives Model (EDM). His main concern is to sketch out a policy proposal that is acceptable to both pro-and anti-enhancement citizens, while simultaneously addressing the various potential dangers associated with a laissez-faire type of regulation. Chiefly, in Rawlsian fashion, he is worried that the use of cognitive enhancers for reasons of positional advantage will inevitably lead anti-enhancement citizens to be coerced into enhancing in order to remain competitive in a market-driven environment, thus infringing upon their basic liberties. His EDM calls for various discouraging measures, such as the creation of a licensing process for both producers and users of enhancers, a mandatory course and exam for users, and a requirement to subscribe to an additional medical insurance, all of which are under the supervision of a dedicated governmental agency (p. 10). According to Dubljevi c, adopting this model
AJOB Neuroscience, 2019
This is a pre-publication version. The final version is forthcoming in AJOB Neuroscience.] In Neuroethics at 15: The Current and Future Environment for Neuroethics, the authors identify three main themes that should shape the neuroethical debate for the coming years: 1) the rapid and continuous developments in new technologies; 2) the expanding global scale of the neuroscience landscape, which calls for global guidelines, and 3) the expanding public and private applications of neurotechnologies.
Hastings Center Report, 2015
International Journal of Technoethics, 2015
According to several recent studies, a big chunk of college students in North America and Europe uses so called ‘smart drugs’ to enhance their cognitive capacities aiming at improving their academic performance. With these practices, there comes a certain moral unease. This unease is shared by many, yet it is difficult to pinpoint and in need of justification. Other than simply pointing to the medical risks coming along with using non-prescribed medication, the salient moral question is whether these practices are troubling in and of themselves. In due consideration of empirical insights into the concrete effects of smart drugs on brain and behavior, our attempt is to articulate wherein this moral unease consists and to argue for why the authors believe cognitive enhancement to be morally objectionable. The authors will contend that the moral problem with these practices lies less in the end it seeks, than in the underlying human disposition it expresses and promotes. Some might ask, what is wrong with molding our cognitive capacities to achieve excellence, get a competitive edge, or, as the whim takes us? In all of these occasions, the usage of smart drugs serves a certain goal, a telos. The goal is, broadly speaking, this: outsmarting opponents in an arms race for limited resources and thereby yielding a competitive edge. In plain words: competition is valued higher than cooperation or solidarity. What is wrong with striving for this goal? The authors submit that the question whether people really want to live in a society that promotes the mentality ‘individual competition over societal cooperation’ deserves serious consideration. In developing their answer, the authors draw on an ‘Ethics of Constraint’ framework, arguing that widespread off-label use of smart drugs bears the risk of negative neural/behavioral consequences for the individual that might, in the long run, be accompanied by changing social value orientations for the worse.
Quaestio Iuris - Revista de la Faculdade de Direito - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2022
The invasion of the rights to privacy and intimacy, a result of massiveness achieved by the new information and communication technologies, becomes today a greater threat with the possibility that third parties access our thoughts and manipulate our memory. Technology applied to neuroscience may make this possible in the near future. Although at present the legal regulation of the use of neurotechnologies seems unnecessary, the question becomes relevant when they are used to map and modify the activity of the human brain. The future possibilities of the use of neurotechnologies will affect not only our lifestyle, but the very nature of what we understand today as the human being. In this first article we present the intersections between neurotechnology and law, which generates a new field called Neuro-Law. Along the current legal disruption taking place, we describe the basic characteristics of the proposal to affirm entirely new human rights based on new technologies applied to Neuroscience.
2021
Neuro rights, the new human rights The human mind has been a subject matter of study in psychology, law, science, philosophy and other disciplines. [i] By definition, its potential is power, abilities and capacities including perception, knowledge, sensation, memory, belief, imagination, emotion, mood, appetite, intention, and action.[ii] In terms of role, it creates and shapes societal morality, culture, peace and democracy. Today, a rapidly advancing science-technology-artificial intelligence (AI) landscape is able to reach into the inner realms of the human mind. Technology, particularly neurotechnology enables access to the human mind for research, treatment and other purposes. This enabling feature is now a growing concern. Lenka and Andorno write, while the body can easily be subject to domination and control by others, the mind, along with thoughts, beliefs and convictions, are to a large extent beyond external constraint. Yet, with advances in neural engineering, brain imaging and pervasive neurotechnology, the mind might no longer be such unassailable fortress… emerging neurotechnologies have the potential to allow access to at least some components of mental information.[iii]
An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio-and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither " treatments " nor " enhancements " are objectively identifi able apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifi cations to the body and its performance. The term " enhancement " should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the easy answer, as augmented persons may not cooperate with either decommissioning or displacement into unaccommodating societies. We conclude by indicating how our four principles of self-creativity, nonobsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship establish a neuroethics beyond normal that is better prepared for a future in which humans and their societies are going so far beyond normal.
Life Sciences, Society and Policy, 2017
Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analyzing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.
Social Communication
The classical distinction between the natural and the artificial is gradually losing its original sharpness. Biotechnology can be used not only for therapeutic purposes but also to enhance human cognitive, emotional, moral, or physical abilities. This article discusses three of the most important socio-ethical issues related to the impact of neuroenhancement on individuals and on society. It closely examines threats to the principle of autonomy in the case of two selected technologies for neuroenhancement: the Brain – Computer Interface and gene technologies applied to the enhancement of other beings. The article also discusses the influence of social pressure on autonomous decision-making by individuals and whether social pressure is a sufficient reason for not accepting neuroenhancement. Finally, within the context of many concerns about the widening of social inequality as the result of the spread of enhancement practices, this article examines whether such disparities can be avo...
Biolaw Journal, 2020
Several neurotechnological devices that are in use today can both collect signals from the brain electro activity and send impulses to the brain. Thus, it is possible to intervene on brain activity in order to modify it and to transform it into usable and reproducible signals. This new kind of man-machine connection is going to have a deep impact on legal categories. This paper focuses on the notion of mental integrity and the consequent changes within its semantic field. What provides the guiding thread is the current debate on personal identity and autonomy of Deep Brain Stimulation patients. The conclusion outlines the possible philosophical background of the issues at stake.
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2008
The idea of enhancing our mental functions through medical means makes many people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains tinkers with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. Many of the standard arguments against neuroenhancements-that they are unsafe, that they violate the distinction between therapy and enhancements, that they undermine equality, and that they will be used coercively-fail to show why the use of any such technologies is wrong in principle. Two other objections-the arguments that such changes undermine our integrity and that they prevent us from living authentic lives-will condemn only a few of the uses that are proposed. The result is that very few uses of these drugs are morally suspect and that most uses are morally permissible.
2016
Cap part d'aquesta publicació, incloent-hi el disseny de la coberta, no pot ser reproduïda, emmagatzenada, ni transmesa de cap manera, ni per cap mitjà (elèctric, químic, mecànic, òptic, de gravació o bé fotocòpia) sense autorització prèvia de la marca editorial.
Brain and Cognition, 2002
Emerging neurotechnologies, including psychopharmaceuticals, brain stimulation, implantable brain chips, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and brain imaging raise a number of ethical questions. One of the most contentious is the proper role of these technologies in improving or increasing mental and neurological traits and skills in those with no identifiable pathology. The ''enhancement'' debate centers around a number of concerns and philosophical approaches to the proper role of medicine, therapeutics, and desirable human qualities. Arguements for and against neurological enhancement are reviewed, and historical and social perspectives are offered.
2013
The debate about the ethical aspects surrounding the brain is growing these days and consequently the sciences directly related to it cov- ered by neurosciences. Neuroethics is a recent field linked to the intersection of bioethics and neuroscience, and its advances raise ethical questions. The aim of this article is to verify and to comment important aspects of neuro- ethics. It was accomplished to critically review the literature. Ethics applied to areas related to neurosciences needs criteria that will serve as reference to consider variables and judge circumstances; the recent advances in neu- roscience raise important ethical questions that need to be discussed and observed by Neuroethics; there is a need to define the boundaries between the use of technologies and therapies to treat an ill patient and usages only to improve the performance of normal healthy individuals. Recent progress on cognitive neuroscience brings important ethical, practical, technological, philosophical,...
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