Meaning and Being : Bhartṛhari' s Meta-Ontology

1981

The Buddhist logicians hold that concepts do not refer to the real in a direct way. Jnānasrīmitra established the non-reference of the concepts to the real on the ground that the content of a concept is common to both the existence and non-existence (bhāvābhāvasādhāranya) of the real The term "bhāvābhāvasādhāranya" which entails the possibility of the affirmative and negative usage of the word has two meanings: one is the unreality of the object in ontological contexts, and the other the non-reference to the real in epistemological contexts

Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Although many definitions of services have been proposed in Service Science and Service Engineering, essentialities of the notion of "service" remain unclear. Especially, some existing definitions of service are similar to the definition of function of artifacts, and there is no clear distinction between them. Thus, aiming at an ontological conceptualization of service, we have made an ontological investigation into the distinction between service and artifact function. In this article, we reveal essential properties of service and propose a model and a definition of service. Firstly, we extract 42 properties of service from 15 articles in different disciplines in order to find out fundamental concepts of service. Then we show that the notion of function shares the extracted foundational concepts of service and thus point out the necessity of the distinction between them. Secondly, we propose a multi-layered model of services, which is based on the conceptualization of goal-oriented effects at the base-level and at the upper-level. Thirdly, based on the model, we clarify essential properties of service which can distinguish artifact function. The conceptualization of upper-effects (upper-service) enables us to show that upper-services include various effects such as sales and manufacturing. Lastly, we propose a definition of the notion of service based on the essential properties and show its validity using some examples.

Transactions of the Japanese Society For Artificial Intelligence, 2005

The main aim of this paper is to propose an appropriate logical system that is suitable to describe the notion of IS-A link as well as is-a link. The most important point to be realized is that those relations are not set thoretical ones. They connect two 'general names' to construct a proposition, so that what is needed for proper descriptions of the relations in question is a theory of general names. It will be shown that is-a is a logical unit of axiomatically determined behaviour. The axiom concerning is-a relation was established by S. Leśniewski who named his theory of general names ontology. Today 'ontology' has also become a common term for AI researchers. I intend to make it clear that there is a close connection between 'ontology' used by Leśniewski and by AI researchers, even though they developed quite independently. I wish to stress that ontology created by Leśniewski is a system of syllogistic equipped with singular propositions and the theory of quantification. To make this point clear, I proposed a fragment of syllogism that I called MO(minimal ontology). This paper includes comments and examples articulating the logical power of ontology. 'IS-A(is-a)' 'IS-A(is-a)'

1990

2006

1988

The Annals of the Research Project Center For the Comparative Study of Logic, 2009

Eizō Jōhō Media Gakkaishi, 2013

2014

Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 2016