Women in Philosophy: What is to be Done?

2012

On Saturday, April 28, 2012, the Society for Women in Philosophy (Eastern Division) held its annual conference on women in philosophy at Notre Dame of Maryland University. The Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) dedicates itself to honoring and enabling women philosophers in any field of philosophy, and this year the Eastern Division (ESWIP) conference focused especially on intersectionality. “Intersectionality”, the difficult yet productive attempt to theorize categories such as race, class, gender, disability, and sexuality together, has been a conceptual framework for more than a decade in the U.S. academy, yet it is almost entirely absent as a recognized philosophical theme or framework within the larger discipline of philosophy. Indeed, intersectional scholarship in both analytic and continental philosophy has yet to be recognized in a substantive manner. Intersectional approaches are inherently interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary, drawing on numerous areas of contempora...

Hypatia, 2011

Philosophy has the dubious distinction of attracting and retaining proportionally fewer women than any other field in the humanities, indeed, fewer than in all disciplines but for the most resolutely male-dominated of the sciences. As Marije Altorf notes in her contribution to this cluster, ''the debate on the sparseness of women in philosophy often starts with shocking numbers or with anecdotes about means of exclusion'' (this issue, 388), and certainly there is much to report on this front. It is striking however, that while the contributors to this ''found cluster'' 1 take such evidence as their point of departure, their focus is on questions about the implications of under-representation-not just of women but of diverse peoples of all kinds in philosophy, as Kristie Dotson characterizes the problem-and on devising effective strategies for change. I begin with some of the depressing figures presupposed by the article, the four Musings, and two reviews that make up this cluster, and then briefly identify key themes that cross-cut these discussions. Although those interested in counting find it challenging to assemble robust data on the representation of women in philosophy, current wisdom is that women have earned between 23% and 33% of doctorates in philosophy since 1997 (Van Camp 2010; based on the Survey of Earned Doctorates), and currently make up 21% of those employed teaching philosophy in colleges and universities in the United States (Norlock 2009; from payroll data reported by the National Center for Education Statistics). In some contexts the representation of women is lower: for example, Solomon and Clarke report that women make up just 15% of the membership of the Philosophy of Science Association, with little change in the last five years (Solomon and Clark 2006; 2010); and Van Camp's summary of women faculty in U.S. doctoral programs shows that close to a quarter have 15% or fewer women in tenured or tenure-track positions. 2 These are striking statistics when you consider that women have received more than half the graduate degrees (across all disciplines) granted in the United States since 2004 3 and, by 2006, constituted between a third and half the full-time faculty teaching at U.S. universities and colleges (West and Curtis 2006, 5-7). In the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, mathematics), where the case has been made that the ''needless waste of the

2016

Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.

Hypatia Reviews Online, 2015

What Needs to Change? is a collection of articles addressing the question: "what it is about philosophy-the über-rational discipline-that has left it, along with several of the science, technology, and engineering (STEM) disciplines and a couple of the social science ones (notably economics and political science), lagging well behind a general trend toward improvement in women's representation and standing in academia"? (1) The articles focus on the under-representation of women generally, and are written by professional philosophers in Canada, the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and the US, about the institution of academic philosophy in their specific national contexts. An appendix provides useful empirical data on women in philosophy.

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2014

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly

This paper argues that diversity and uptake are required for objectivity. In philosophy, women are underrepresented with respect to teaching, publishing, and citations. This undermines the objectivity of our research output. To improve women's representation and objectivity in philosophy, we should take steps to increase women's numbers and institute uptake-conducive conditions. In concrete terms, this means fostering an appreciation for diversity, diversifying evaluators, integrating women's contributions into mainstream discourse, and reducing implicit bias.

2015

The low representation (< 30%) of women in philosophy in English-speaking countries has generated much discussion, both in academic circles and the public sphere. It is sometimes suggested (Haslanger 2009) that unconscious biases, acting at every level in the field, may be grounded in gendered schemas of philosophers and in the discipline more widely, and that actions to make philosophy a more welcoming place for women should address such schemas. However, existing data are too limited to fully warrant such an explanation, which therefore will not satisfy those in favor of the status quo or those who argue against the need to address gender imbalance. In this paper, we propose measures to improve the profession that ought to be implemented without referring explicitly to this underrepresentation or to the climate for women and other underrepresented groups. Such recommendations are based on empirical research already carried out in other disciplines and do not rest on whether it is possible to identify the cause of this low representation. We argue that we need not wait for new or better data to ensure that fairer practices are enacted for women, other underrepresented groups, and everybody else, if only out of precaution.

New School for Social Research ♦ Department of Philosophy Lecture invited for the NYC PSWIP 2nd Annual Colloquium Great Men, Little Black Dresses, & The Virtues of Keeping One’s Feet on the Ground: On the Status of Women in Philosophy Wednesday, April 8th 2009, 2-4 PM New School for Social Research Machinist Conference Room, Mezzanine 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003

Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 2000

In introducing the present issue, I clarify in which sense knowledge and philosophy can discriminate and marginalize some individuals. In the first part, I focus on the traditional exclusion of women from philosophy and explore some feminist projects of re-reading the philosophical canon. In my analysis, I pay particular attention to the gender gap in philosophy and the so-called " demographic problem " in academia. In the second part, I examine the best practices for remedying these forms of injustice and promoting diversity in philosophy.