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2017, Journal of Consumer Psychology
AI
Choosing one option often leads to the devaluation of forgone alternatives. This study investigates whether the consumption of the chosen alternative restores the value of the forgone option after a sense of closure is achieved. Findings suggest that while the forgone alternative is devalued during consumption, it rebounds in perceived value once the consumption is deemed complete, challenging traditional views of cognitive dissonance.
Memorandum, 2009
Recent research is exploring the case for cognitive or post-decision dissonance using t he freechoice paradigm of Brehm (1956). Participants are repeatedly faced with a choice between items that they have given the same rating o f liking, t wo items at a time, and it is found that items not chosen in one choice has a lower tendency of being chosen in a subsequent choice against a different alternative item. This tendency is interpreted as evidence for cognitive or post-decision dissonance. I argue that this interpretation of the evidence is invalid. Furthermore, I report a novel expe riment in which participants were specifically asked to compare the items, allowing for a consistent interpretation of the evidence. I find no evidence of post-decision dissonance after a choice between items where one was viewed as more attractive than the other, but potentially some weak evidence of post-decision dissonance after a choice between items viewed as equally attractive.
2010
In response to mounting criticism that their offerings contribute to rising obesity rates, many fast food chains have added healthier options to their menus. While this menu expansion has been beneficial for consumers who tend to make healthier meal choices, its effect is far from ubiquitous. In fact, much of McDonald's recent financial success is not attributed to new healthy menu additions, but rather to increased sales of more indulgent options like burgers and fries (Case 2006). With the increased availability of nutritious menu options, why have more consumers not swapped their french fries for salad? In this paper, we present evidence that for many consumers, the mere presence of such alternatives can, ironically, increase the consumption of the unhealthiest item on the menu. Recent research suggests that individuals license themselves to indulge in temptations when they have previously acted in line with a long-term goal. This research suggests that when individuals focus on their progress towards a focal goal, it allows them to temporarily disengage from that goal to pursue indulgent alternatives (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Related research on the licensing effect shows that prior virtuous behavior-or even intentions to act in such a manner-provides individuals with the rationale for activities and choices that are not in line with long-term goals (Khan and Dhar 2007). We extend this reasoning to suggest that when individuals have the opportunity to engage in a course of action that is consistent with healthy eating goals, the consideration of this option will satisfy the goal-at least temporarily-and, in turn, license them to indulge. Moreover, we suggest that this licensing effect does not merely result in the selection of a less healthy option, but rather the most indulgent option available.
The job choice and post decision attitudes and behavior of 431 accounting students were studied. Data on the attractiveness of working for different firms was shown to be a good predictor of both the job application and the job choice behavior of the individuals. Data collected after the job choice decision was made showed that the chosen firms increased in attractiveness after choice and the rejected firms decreased. After one year of employment, the subjects rated all firms lower in attractiveness than they had before they applied for jobs. It was concluded that attitudes toward firm attractiveness determine job choice behavior and that job choice behavior influences post employment attitudes about firm attractiveness.
Proceedings of the …, 2010
According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called "cognitive dissonance" claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573-594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences.
The sample of 208 students who have just enrolled for the Post graduate program was taken and test was conducted on them to know the dimensions important to make the Job choice. The results of the research prove that the dissonance exists in the behaviour of the students as the result of the test conducted pre post graduation differs from the post employment test.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2013
Recent research is exploring the case for choice-induced changes in preferences using the free-choice paradigm of Brehm (1956). Participants are faced with a choice between items that they have given the same rating of liking, two items at a time, and it is found that an item not chosen in one choice has a lower tendency of being chosen in a subsequent choice. This tendency is interpreted as evidence for choice-induced changes in preferences. I argue that this interpretation of the evidence is invalid. Furthermore, I report a novel experiment in which participants were specifically asked to compare the items, allowing for a consistent interpretation of the evidence. I find no evidence of choice-induced changes in preferences after a choice between items where one was viewed as more attractive than the other, but potentially some weak evidence of changes in preferences after a choice between items viewed as equally attractive. JEL Code: D01.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2014
The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1– Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.
Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, 2010
Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of option choice reversibility on the number of options chosen, total spending, and upset/regret from actions/inaction, using 124 Singaporean adults. Design/methodology/approach -The experiment employs two levels of option choice reversibility: fully reversible without a penalty vs strictly irreversible. Participants add options to a base model or delete options from a full model and are either allowed or not allowed to change options in a condominium purchase scenario. Findings -Compared to participants in the irreversible choice condition, those in the reversible choice select more options and end up with higher total spending. In the irreversible option choice condition, participants anticipate more upset (one aspect of regret) when they take actions than inaction, but in the reversible option choice condition, the reverse is true. Research limitations/implications -The study uses only one decision stimulus, which is a condominium purchase, and the purchase scenario might not be as realistic as an actual purchase decision. Practical implications -Refunds and option change permission policies make consumers feel they can reverse their buying decisions, making them feel the decisions are less risky and thus inducing them to buy more than when no refunds or option change is allowed after purchase. To drive consumers to take actions, marketers should allow consumers to change their mind after making decisions and assure them of such policy. Originality/value -The paper shows the effect of decision reversibility on the total spending (i.e. the total costs of choices made) and extends the theory about omission biases by demonstrating that regrets from actions/inaction depend on decision reversibility.
2004
Although consumers in the real world often make a number of similar choices, most consumer research has focused on preferences when each choice is made in isolation. Present research examines the effects of viewing a choice as one of a series of similar choices rather than as an isolated choice. I propose that viewing a choice in the context of similar future choices provides people with a guilt-reducing justification to exert less self-control in the present choice by allowing them to optimistically believe that they will be able to exercise more self-control in future choices. Specifically, the paper shows that (1) in a choice between a relative vice (e.g., a cookie) and a relative virtue (e.g., a plain fat-free yogurt) the choice share of the vice increases when the decision is presented as one of a series of similar future choices than if the same choice is viewed in isolation, and (2) the overall choice share of a vice increases when decisions are seen in connection with similar future choices. Several additional studies are conducted to validate the proposed role of optimistic beliefs and guilt about future choices as well as the mediating role of guilt in the effect of future choices on current preferences.
Journal of International Marketing, 2020
Research has long established the existence of a global brand halo that benefits global brands by triggering “global equals better” inferences by consumers. Nevertheless, little is known about the conditions under which this halo may or may not be used or about whether and, if so, how it can situationally fade. Drawing from regret theory, the authors posit that anticipating regret can conditionally both attenuate and accentuate consumers’ use of the global brand halo and develop a serial conditional process model to explain the mechanism underlying regret’s influence. The results of two experimental studies show that anticipated regret affects global brand halo use—and subsequently relative preference for global or local brands—by increasing consumers’ need to justify their purchase decision. Whether and how consumers will use the global brand halo depends on consumers’ product category schema, while the intensity of the halo’s use depends on consumers’ maximization tendency. The fi...
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2013
Many important decisions that consumers face involve choosing between options that are unattractive or undesirable-the proverbial "lesser of two evils." Consumers, who face budget or geographical constraints, for example, end up with mostly undesirable consideration sets; yet a choice is necessary. We examine the role of option set desirability in the context of the wellestablished attraction effect. In five studies, we show that the attraction effect occurs in desirable domains but is eliminated when all the options are undesirable (Experiments 1-4). We further find that this asymmetric effect is consistent with a shift in decision makers' processing styles.
2010
According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called "cognitive dissonance" claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573-594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences.
Psychological Science, 2012
The idea that decisions alter preferences has had a considerable influence on the field of psychology and underpins cognitive dissonance theory. Yet it is unknown whether choice-induced changes in preferences are long lasting or are transient manifestations seen in the immediate aftermath of decisions. In the research reported here, we investigated whether these changes in preferences are fleeting or stable. Participants rated vacation destinations before making hypothetical choices between destinations, immediately ...
Journal of Personality, 1970
ACR North American Advances, 2008
After making a choice people preferred positive features of the chosen options and negative features of the forgone ones, presumably to justify their choices. Follow-up results showed that, after choosing, consumers tended to attribute positive features to the chosen products and negative features to the not chosen ones. Based on these beliefs, people changed their attribute importance ratings such that positive features attributed to chosen products and negative features attributed to forgone products became more important. The latter only held when participants were highly confident about their attributions, suggesting a choice-defensive strategy to support their choices.
PLOS Computational Biology, 2019
Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996
E d d i e H a r m o n -J o n e s University of Arizona J a c k W. B r e h m University of Kansas J e f f G r e e n b e r g , L i n d a S i m o n , a n d D a v i d E. N e l s o n University of Arizona
2013
Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post-choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009
for their insightful discussions on the topic.
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