Papers by Neal Tognazzini
The Routledge Companion to Free Will, eds. Griffith, Levy, and Timpe, forthcoming.
The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93: 127-138., 2015
Many object to libertarianism by arguing that it manages to solve one problem of luck only by fal... more Many object to libertarianism by arguing that it manages to solve one problem of luck only by falling prey to another . According to this objection, there is something freedom-undermining about the very circumstances that the libertarian thinks are required for freedom. However, it has proved difficult to articulate precisely what it is about these circumstances that is supposed to undermine freedom—the absence of certain sorts of explanations has perhaps been the most common complaint. In this paper, however, I argue that recent work on the metaphysics of ontological dependence provides the resources for formulating the luck objection in its strongest form.
*The Journal of Value Inquiry* 48: 677-689., 2014
*The Nature of Moral Responsibility*, eds. Clarke, McKenna, and Smith, Oxford University Press., 2015
Analytic philosophers have a tendency to forget that they are human beings, and one of the reason... more Analytic philosophers have a tendency to forget that they are human beings, and one of the reasons that P. F. Strawson's 1962 essay, "Freedom and Resentment", has been so influential is that it promises to bring discussions of moral responsibility back down to earth. Strawson encouraged us to "keep before our minds…what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal relationships", which is, after all, the context in which questions about responsibility arise in the first place. In this essay I explore what we can learn about ordinary interpersonal relationships from three works of literature -Shakespeare's King Lear, Jane Austen's Persuasion, and Graham Greene's The End of the Affair. My intention is to try to heed Strawson's advice without imposing upon the data any particular theoretical agenda, and my hope is that the data collected will prove useful for future theorizing about responsibility.
forthcoming in Being, Freedom and Method: Themes from van Inwagen, ed. John Keller, Oxford University Press
A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to d... more A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to do otherwise) has been around for millennia; it can be traced back to Origen.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Apr 2014
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 88, No. 2, Mar 2014
Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 2, Jan 2014
The most prominent recent attack on compatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility is t... more The most prominent recent attack on compatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility is the so-called manipulation argument, which presents an allegedly responsibility-undermining manipulation case and then points out that the relevant facts of that case are no different from the facts that obtain in an ordinary deterministic world. In a recent article in this journal, however, Matt King presents a dilemma for proponents of this argument, according to which the argument either leads to a dialectical stalemate or else begs the question. In this paper I clarify the structure of the manipulation argument and construct a response to King's dilemma.
Philosophia, Vol. 41, No. 4, Dec 2013
One of the most influential accounts of blame—the affective account—takes its cue from P.F. Straw... more One of the most influential accounts of blame—the affective account—takes its cue from P.F. Strawson’s discussion of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone, on this account, is to target her with resentment, indignation, or (in the case of self-blame) guilt. Given the connection between these emotions and the demand for regard that is arguably central to morality, the affective account is quite plausible. Recently, however, George Sher has argued that the affective account of blame, as understood both by Strawson himself and by contemporary Strawsonians, is inadequate because it cannot make sense of blameworthiness. In this paper I defend the affective account of blame against several of Sher’s arguments for this conclusion. In the process, I clarify the Strawsonian account of moral responsibility, and I discuss how the affective account of blame ought to be understood and articulated.
Analysis, Vol. 73, No. 1, Jan 2013
Final version published in Analysis http://philpapers.org/rec/FISTLO-2
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013
The notion of responsibility is vexed, both conceptually and metaphysically. It is invoked in a b... more The notion of responsibility is vexed, both conceptually and metaphysically. It is invoked in a bewildering variety of contexts, and in many of those contexts its very possibility is questioned. Ordinary language is not of much help: people can be responsible, become responsible, and be held responsible; they can have responsibilities, claim responsibility, take responsibility – and the list of verbs goes on. Our “modern scientific worldview” is often thought to undermine responsibility, yet we regret that politicians and teenagers don't take it more seriously. It is, like most philosophically interesting concepts, remarkably easy to use but dreadfully difficult to understand. In this essay, I offer what little help I can.Keywords:agency;ethics;metaphysics;philosophy;responsibilityagency;ethics;metaphysics;philosophy;responsibility
ch. 1 of *Blame: Its Nature and Norms*, ed. Coates & Tognazzini, Oxford University Press, 2013
Philosophy Compass, Vol. 7, No. 3, Mar 2012
Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophe... more Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the free will problem. In this article we first survey and categorize recent accounts of the nature of blame – is it action, belief, emotion, desire, or something else? – and then we look at several proposed requirements on appropriate blame that look beyond the transgressor himself, considerations that will form part of a full account of the ethics of blame.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 82, No. 2, Mar 2011
Our aim in this paper is to put the concept of moral responsibility under a microscope. At the lo... more Our aim in this paper is to put the concept of moral responsibility under a microscope. At the lowest level of magnification, it appears unified. But Gary Watson has taught us that if we zoom in, we will find that moral responsibility has two faces: attributability and accountability. 1 It is one thing to talk about the connection the agent has with her action;
The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 88, Nos. 1-2, Apr 2011
Final version in The Modern Schoolman http://philpapers.org/rec/TOGUSI
Social Theory & Practice, Vol. 37, No. 1, Jan 2011
*Time and Identity*, edited by Campbell, O’Rourke, and Silverstein, MIT Press, 2010
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 80, No. 3, May 2010
Decisive counterexamples to substantive philosophical theses are few and far between. It is relat... more Decisive counterexamples to substantive philosophical theses are few and far between. It is relatively uncontroversial that Gettier (1963) gave us one. It is much more controversial whether Frankfurt (1969) did. Indeed, there is a huge literature surrounding so-called Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs), with no clear consensus one way or the other.
The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 14, No. 1, Mar 2010
In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle o... more In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by presenting and defending a different, but related, principle, which he calls the “Principle of Avoidable Blame.” According to this principle, one is blameworthy for performing an act only if one could instead have behaved in an entirely blameless manner. Otsuka claims that although Frankfurt-cases do undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not undermine the Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this brief paper, we offer a critical discussion of the core of Otsuka’s argument, especially the claim that his favored principle cannot be refuted by Frankfurt-cases. We do not believe that Otsuka has offered good reason to suppose that the Principle of Avoidable Blame—and the related incompatibilism—fares any better than the original Principle of Alternative Possibilities.
Nous, Vol. 43, No. 3, Sep 2009
The Past! the dark, unfathfom'd retrospect!
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Papers by Neal Tognazzini