Papers, Chapters, Entries, Critical Reviews by Daniel Howard-Snyder
Religious Studies, 2023
Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a vir... more Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. However, philosophers commonly assign either very little value to faith in God or significant negative value, or even view it as a vice. Progress in assessing whether and when faith in God can be valuable or disvaluable, virtuous or vicious, rational or irrational, or otherwise apt or inapt requires understanding what faith in God is. This Special Issue on the normative appraisal of faith in God for Religious Studies includes nine articles, from a diverse range of perspectives, which explore issues related to the core questions 'What is faith in God?' and 'What normative questions about faith in God need to be addressed?' In this Introduction, we briefly introduce each article.
Religious Studies, 2023
We assess John Bishop’s theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expresse... more We assess John Bishop’s theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it. However, in the end, our reflections lead us to propose a modified theory, one that avoids our concerns while remaining consonant with some of his guiding thoughts about the nature of Christian faith in God. We also briefly examine three normative issues Bishop’s views present.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2022
How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So... more How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn to contemporary theories of trust. They are not of one voice. Still, we can use them to indicate ways in which trust and faith might both differ from and resemble each other. This is what we do. Along the way, we evaluate substantive issues related to these possible differences and similarities.
The Cambridge Companion to Religious Epistemology , 2022
Faith in God conflicts with reason—or so we’re told. We focus on two arguments for this conclusio... more Faith in God conflicts with reason—or so we’re told. We focus on two arguments for this conclusion. After evaluating three criticisms of them, we identify an assumption they share, namely that faith in God requires belief that God exists. Whether the assumption is true depends on what faith is. We sketch a theory of faith that allows for both faith in God without belief that God exists, and faith in God while in belief-cancelling doubt God’s existence. We then argue that our theory, unlike the theory of Thomas Aquinas, makes sense of four central items of faith-data: (i) pístis in the Synoptics, (ii) ʾemunāh in the Hebrew scriptures, (iii) exemplars of faith in God, including Abraham, Jesus, and Mother Teresa, and (iv) the widespread experience of people of faith today. We close by assessing revisions of the two arguments we began with, revisions that align with our theory of faith, and find them dubious, at best.
Faith and Philosophy, 2022
Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to addr... more Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We then turn to relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness with an eye toward exhibiting some of the ways in which, on our theory, faith and faithfulness can be valuable and disvaluable. We then extend the theory to other manifestations of faith and faithfulness, propose a way to unify them under a theory of faith and faithfulness simpliciter, and sketch how they can be neo-Aristotelian virtues and vices. We close with our solution to the value problem and avenues for further research.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2022
In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challeng... more In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value of faith in relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, how the Christian and Hebrew scriptures portray pístis and ʾĕmûnāh, and the character of faith as it is often expressed in popular secular venues.
Religious Studies, 2021
What are faith and faithfulness, and how are they related? We consider two views that express ver... more What are faith and faithfulness, and how are they related? We consider two views that express very different answers to these questions. On our view, faith and faithfulness are distinct and yet complement each other. Faith is resilient reliance and faithfulness is resilient reliability, both of which involve conative and/or affective elements. In contrast, while Jonathan Kvanvig also holds that faith involves conative and/or affective elements, he identifies faith with a disposition to act in service of an ideal in the face of difficulty. However, this view of faith leads to some puzzling claims about how faith relates to faithfulness. We evaluate several claims suggested by what Kvanvig says, arguing both that his view loses sight of the distinctness of faith and faithfulness and that the inferences he wants to draw from faithfulness or faithful behaviour to faith are unjustified. Instead, we aim to show how the insights he calls to our attention can be better accommodated and explained by a more comprehensive, unified theory of faith and faithfulness and their relations.
Religious Studies, 2022
What is faith? This question is especially important for Christians since the New Testament is st... more What is faith? This question is especially important for Christians since the New Testament is stuffed with the idea that God prizes faith as a human response to God, an idea affirmed by other religious traditions as well. Moreover, this question is important for all of us because faith plays a defining role in relationships we all value highly, namely relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, which permeate society and even extend into the grand project of human inquiry, the project of understanding ourselves, our world, and our place in the world. It behooves us, therefore, to get clear on what faith is. Lara Buchak has done as much as anyone recently to answer our question in a sensible and instructive fashion. As it turns out, her writings reveal two theories of faith, an early one and a later one (or, if you like, two versions of the same theory). In what follows, we aim to do three things. First, we will state and assess Buchak's early theory, highlighting both its good-making and bad-making features. Second, we will do the same for her later theory, noting improvements on the early one. Third, we will mark various choice points in theorizing about faith, and we will argue for specific choices at those points, culminating in what we regard as a better, alternative theory of faith. Our critical aims, therefore, are ultimately constructive. By theorizing about faith with Lara Buchak, we aim to contribute to our common understanding of what faith is.
Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 2020
As philosophers, the four of us were delighted to participate in the aforementioned projects on i... more As philosophers, the four of us were delighted to participate in the aforementioned projects on intellectual humility. Those projects have helped us think through some of the issues surrounding the topic. Perhaps more importantly, they enabled us to establish lasting professional relationships with one another, and with several of our collaborators in psychology. It is uncommon for philosophers to work and write together; most philosophical work is single-authored. As a team of four, we were able to generate a view that none of us could have generated alone, and that even the sum of us working independently could not have generated. We are grateful to the visionaries, team leaders, PI's, and the John Templeton Foundation for making these projects possible. Below, we address what we see as our four main philosophical contributions to the interdisciplinary work of the overall team. First, we argued for a definition of intellectual humility via the method of philosophical analysis. Second, our analysis of the virtue of intellectual humility allows us to distinguish it from the closely related virtue of open-mindedness. Third, our analysis of the virtue of intellectual humility drew a contrast between it and two different vices-the 'go-to' vice of arrogance and the overlooked vice of servility. Fourth, in addition to collaborating with the overall team of psychologists, we worked on a specific project with Wade Rowatt, Megan Haggard, and their group of psychologists to develop a measure of intellectual humility.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, edited by Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, 2020
In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape.... more In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape. But not everyone thinks faith is a virtue, theological or otherwise. Indeed, depending on how we understand it, faith may well conflict with the virtues. In this chapter we will focus on the virtue of humility. Does faith conflict with humility, or are they in concord? In what follows, we will do five things. First, we will sketch a theory of the virtue of humility. Second, we will summarize a common view of faith, arguably held by Thomas Aquinas among others, and we will argue that Thomistic faith is not an intellectual virtue and that it conflicts with humility in the domain of inquiry. Third, we will plump for an older view of faith, one that predates Aquinas by at least 1500 years, Markan faith. Fourth, we will argue that Markan faith is an intellectual virtue and it is in concord with humility in the domain of inquiry. Fifth, we will argue that Markan faith, unlike Thomistic faith, is a personal virtue and that it is in concord with humility in the domain of personal relationships, both human-human and human-divine.
The T&T Clark Companion to Analytic Theology, edited by James Arcadi and James Turner, 2020
Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially univer... more Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year, they meet powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and the basic Christian story (BCS, for short) in particular. What they learned at home or church seems much less plausible to them, and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don't make me believe the BCS is false, I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don't have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can't, unless I'm a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. What should we say to them? Some will say "Get out!", welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We'd like to explore a different response. We begin by affirming the integrity these Christians display by aiming to live in accordance with their best judgment. Further, we can address the basis of their doubt. But we suspect that many of them-perhaps quite rightly-will still be in enough doubt to cancel belief. They have a problem, a practical problem: should I sacrifice my integrity to stay in, or should I preserve my integrity and get out? Call this the problem of the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Christians in the West generally have an interest in responding to this problem, not least because of the plummeting population of youth in the Church, many of whom leave precisely because of their doubt. For those of us who are not in doubt and who deem the grounds for the BCS adequate for belief, there is still the matter of relating well to those who think otherwise. We suspect that a satisfying response will require Christian communities to rethink what authentic participation requires cognitively, and to find ways to encourage doubters-young and old-to participate with integrity despite their doubt. Notice that the problem presupposes that if you have enough doubt to cancel belief, then you can't have faith. We propose to examine this presupposition. Toward that end, we will assess three theories of faith, plump for one of them, and then apply it to the problem of the trajectory.
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, eds. Mark Alfano, Micahel Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, 2020
True story: when the female members of a colleague’s research lab learned of his plans to study h... more True story: when the female members of a colleague’s research lab learned of his plans to study humility, they remarked: “Humility is exactly what you need more of, if you’re a white male!” Subtext: humility is uncalled for when you’re oppressed. Frederick Douglass observed something similar with respect to the horrific source of oppression that was American slavery:
With a book in my hand so redolent of the principles of liberty, and with a perception of my own human nature and of the facts of my past and present experience, I was equal to a contest with the religious advocates of slavery, whether white or black; for blindness in this matter was not confined to the white people. I have met, at the south, many good, religious colored people who were under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility. I could entertain no such nonsense as this…. (Douglass 1892, 104-105)
Humility seems the last thing the enslaved need. More generally, and to put it mildly, humility seems to be an inappropriate response for the oppressed toward their oppressors. It seems inappropriate elsewhere too. If you find yourself accosted by a neo-Nazi who advocates reinstating the Final Solution, humility seems like the wrong response, just as it does when you’re evangelized by a flat-earther. In sum, humility seems inappropriate as a response in a variety of contexts. But how can this be? If humility is a virtue, and if to act virtuously is to act well, how can it ever be inappropriate to act humbly?
To sharpen this puzzle, we’ll use the phrase “contexts of disparity” to capture interactions in which people differ dramatically along a normative dimension, where some are in the right and others are in the wrong. If you’re an oppressed person interacting with your oppressor, or if you’re buttonholed by neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, you are in a context of disparity. In each case, you differ dramatically from others along a normative dimension—social power in the case of oppression, moral credentials in the case of neo-Nazism, and epistemic credentials in the case of flat-earthism—and you are in the right and they are in the wrong. To be sure, there are important differences across different “contexts of disparity”. For instance, the oppressed are harmed systematically (and often horrifically) whereas those who face wielders of heinous or ridiculous views may be harmed in one-off ways or even not harmed at all. In terms of harm, then, some contexts of disparity are utterly unimportant compared to others. Nonetheless, the concept of “contexts of disparity” captures something important these interactions all share: due to a dramatic normative difference, humility seems to misadvise those who are in the right about how to respond to those who are in the wrong.
Again we wonder: how can this be? Is it because humility is not a virtue, as Hume (1751/1975) argued? Or is it instead that genuine virtues sometimes misadvise us? Or, if they never misadvise us, are they nonetheless sometimes unimportant or irrelevant or silent? Or might it so happen that humility gives us correct advice after all, even when we are in the right in contexts of disparity? This thicket of questions entangles us; what follows is our attempt to work through it.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion (Wiley-Blackwell) edited by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, 2020
A 10k word entry focused on the nature, value, and rationality of relational faith.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes t... more On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it’s false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this essay, I state three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to criticism of them.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2017
Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. ... more Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance.
Religious Studies, 2019
Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate 'fictionalists' and on what f... more Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate 'fictionalists' and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists— atheistic and agnostic—and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory.
Religious Studies, 2018
Part of an author-meets-critics symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pis... more Part of an author-meets-critics symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford 2015). I survey Morgan's thoughts about the relationship between pistis/fides, on the one hand, and propositional belief, on the other hand. Published in Religious Studies (2018).
Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury), 2018
I defend Epistemological Foundationalism. Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in: ... more I defend Epistemological Foundationalism. Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in: Steven B. Cowan (editor), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury 2018).
Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury), 2018
I critique Kevin McCain's and Ted Poston's "Beliefs Are Justified by Coherence". Intended audienc... more I critique Kevin McCain's and Ted Poston's "Beliefs Are Justified by Coherence". Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in Steven B. Cowan (ed), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury 2018)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016
What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing sev... more What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, (ii) developing our own account, (iii) offering two reasons for our account, and (iv) meeting two objections and solving one puzzle. (This paper is co-authored with Dennis Whitcomb as first author, Heather Battaly as second, Jason Baehr as third, and Dan Howard-Snyder as fourth.)
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Papers, Chapters, Entries, Critical Reviews by Daniel Howard-Snyder
With a book in my hand so redolent of the principles of liberty, and with a perception of my own human nature and of the facts of my past and present experience, I was equal to a contest with the religious advocates of slavery, whether white or black; for blindness in this matter was not confined to the white people. I have met, at the south, many good, religious colored people who were under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility. I could entertain no such nonsense as this…. (Douglass 1892, 104-105)
Humility seems the last thing the enslaved need. More generally, and to put it mildly, humility seems to be an inappropriate response for the oppressed toward their oppressors. It seems inappropriate elsewhere too. If you find yourself accosted by a neo-Nazi who advocates reinstating the Final Solution, humility seems like the wrong response, just as it does when you’re evangelized by a flat-earther. In sum, humility seems inappropriate as a response in a variety of contexts. But how can this be? If humility is a virtue, and if to act virtuously is to act well, how can it ever be inappropriate to act humbly?
To sharpen this puzzle, we’ll use the phrase “contexts of disparity” to capture interactions in which people differ dramatically along a normative dimension, where some are in the right and others are in the wrong. If you’re an oppressed person interacting with your oppressor, or if you’re buttonholed by neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, you are in a context of disparity. In each case, you differ dramatically from others along a normative dimension—social power in the case of oppression, moral credentials in the case of neo-Nazism, and epistemic credentials in the case of flat-earthism—and you are in the right and they are in the wrong. To be sure, there are important differences across different “contexts of disparity”. For instance, the oppressed are harmed systematically (and often horrifically) whereas those who face wielders of heinous or ridiculous views may be harmed in one-off ways or even not harmed at all. In terms of harm, then, some contexts of disparity are utterly unimportant compared to others. Nonetheless, the concept of “contexts of disparity” captures something important these interactions all share: due to a dramatic normative difference, humility seems to misadvise those who are in the right about how to respond to those who are in the wrong.
Again we wonder: how can this be? Is it because humility is not a virtue, as Hume (1751/1975) argued? Or is it instead that genuine virtues sometimes misadvise us? Or, if they never misadvise us, are they nonetheless sometimes unimportant or irrelevant or silent? Or might it so happen that humility gives us correct advice after all, even when we are in the right in contexts of disparity? This thicket of questions entangles us; what follows is our attempt to work through it.
With a book in my hand so redolent of the principles of liberty, and with a perception of my own human nature and of the facts of my past and present experience, I was equal to a contest with the religious advocates of slavery, whether white or black; for blindness in this matter was not confined to the white people. I have met, at the south, many good, religious colored people who were under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility. I could entertain no such nonsense as this…. (Douglass 1892, 104-105)
Humility seems the last thing the enslaved need. More generally, and to put it mildly, humility seems to be an inappropriate response for the oppressed toward their oppressors. It seems inappropriate elsewhere too. If you find yourself accosted by a neo-Nazi who advocates reinstating the Final Solution, humility seems like the wrong response, just as it does when you’re evangelized by a flat-earther. In sum, humility seems inappropriate as a response in a variety of contexts. But how can this be? If humility is a virtue, and if to act virtuously is to act well, how can it ever be inappropriate to act humbly?
To sharpen this puzzle, we’ll use the phrase “contexts of disparity” to capture interactions in which people differ dramatically along a normative dimension, where some are in the right and others are in the wrong. If you’re an oppressed person interacting with your oppressor, or if you’re buttonholed by neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, you are in a context of disparity. In each case, you differ dramatically from others along a normative dimension—social power in the case of oppression, moral credentials in the case of neo-Nazism, and epistemic credentials in the case of flat-earthism—and you are in the right and they are in the wrong. To be sure, there are important differences across different “contexts of disparity”. For instance, the oppressed are harmed systematically (and often horrifically) whereas those who face wielders of heinous or ridiculous views may be harmed in one-off ways or even not harmed at all. In terms of harm, then, some contexts of disparity are utterly unimportant compared to others. Nonetheless, the concept of “contexts of disparity” captures something important these interactions all share: due to a dramatic normative difference, humility seems to misadvise those who are in the right about how to respond to those who are in the wrong.
Again we wonder: how can this be? Is it because humility is not a virtue, as Hume (1751/1975) argued? Or is it instead that genuine virtues sometimes misadvise us? Or, if they never misadvise us, are they nonetheless sometimes unimportant or irrelevant or silent? Or might it so happen that humility gives us correct advice after all, even when we are in the right in contexts of disparity? This thicket of questions entangles us; what follows is our attempt to work through it.
Features all original essays that explore the various forms of the problems of evil, offering theistic responses that attempt to explain evil as well as discussion of the challenges facing such explanations.
Includes section introductions with a historical essay that traces the developments of the issues explored.
Acknowledges the fact that there are many problems of evil, some of which apply only to those who believe in concepts such as hell and some of which apply to non-theists.
Represents views from the various religious traditions, including Hindu, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim.
Table of Contents
Notes on contributors ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiv
Part I Problems of Evil 1
1 A brief history of problems of evil 3
Michael W. Hickson
2 The logical problem of evil: mackie and plantinga 19
Daniel Howard-Snyder
3 A new logical problem of evil 34
J.L. Schellenberg
4 Rowe’s evidential arguments from evil 49
Graham Oppy
5 Explanation and the problem of evil 67
Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty
6 A carnapian argument from evil 83
Richard Otte
7 The experience of evil and support for atheism 98
Jerome Gellman
8 The problem of animal pain and suffering 113
Robert Francescotti
9 Hell and the problem of evil 128
Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug
10 The problem of apparently morally abhorrent divine commands 144
Wesley Morriston
11 God because of evil: An ad hominem argument from evil for belief in God 160
Marilyn McCord Adams
Part II Theodicies 175
12 A brief history of theodicy 177
René van Woudenberg
13 Counterpart and appreciation theodicies 192
Justin P. McBrayer
14 Free will and soul-making theodicies 205
Daniel Speak
15 The connection-building theodicy 222
Robin Collins
16 Best possible world theodicy 236
Hud Hudson
17 Providence and theodicy 251
Thomas P. Flint
18 A christian theodicy 266
Laura W. Ekstrom
19 Toward an Indian theodicy 281
Purushottama Bilimoria
20 Earth’s epistemic fruits for harmony with God: an Islamic theodicy 296
Mohammad Ali Mobini
21 On constructing a Jewish theodicy 309
David Shatz
22 Feminism and the problem of evil 326
Beverley Clack
23 Process theism and theodicies for problems of evil 340
James A. Keller
24 Theodicy in a vale of tears 349
Evan Fales
25 Antitheodicy 363
N.N. Trakakis
Part III Skeptical Responses 377
26 A brief history of skeptical responses to evil 379
T.M. Rudavsky
27 Peter van Inwagen’s defense 396
Meghan Sullivan
28 A defense without free will 411
Derk Pereboom
29 Skeptical theism, CORNEA, and common sense epistemology 426
Thomas D. Senor
30 The moral skepticism objection to skeptical theism 444
Stephen Maitzen
31 The global skepticism objection to skeptical theism 458
Ian Wilks
32 Theistic objections to skeptical theism 468
David O’Connor
33 Skeptical theism and the “too much skepticism” objection 482
Michael C. Rea
Index 507
Author Information
Justin P. McBrayer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fort Lewis College, Colorado. He has authored numerous papers in philosophy of religion and ethics, including “CORNEA and Inductive Skepticism” (2009), “Skeptical Theism” (2010), “A Limited Defense of Moral Perception” (2010), “Skepticism about the Argument from Divine Hiddenness” (2011), and “Christianity, Homosexual Sex, and Sexism” (2012).
Daniel Howard-Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. He is co-author of The Power of Logic (2013, 5th Ed.), and editor or co-editor of various publications including The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (1996), and Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2002).
Reviews
“This volume is an outstanding and comprehensive collection of essays of high quality on aspects of one of the greatest problems in intellectual history: The Problem of Evil. The editors have covered the usual territory well, and they have also included essays that broaden the scope of the book considerably. Highly recommended.”
—John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
"An impressive list of contributors, writing from a variety of perspectives. The volume nicely summarizes the history of the field and advances the discussion with some superb, groundbreaking work."
—Thomas M. Crisp, Biola University
“The editors, Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder, are to be congratulated on this stimulating, balanced and comprehensive collection. It is a first-rate resource both for students and for researchers.”
—Peter Forrest, University of New England
"This splendid collection of essays both represents important recent developments and breaks new ground. Theologians as well as philosophers will appreciate this resource for what it is: the best one available."
—Thomas H. McCall, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Contributors include William P. Alston, Paul Draper, Richard M. Gale, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Bruce Russell, Eleonore Stump, Richard G. Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen John Wykstra.