Global Governance Group

This paper evaluates the proliferation of local governments concurrent with Indonesia's 2001 decentralisation. Largely static for decades under the New Order, the number of municipalities (kota) and districts (kabupaten) has increased by half, from 292 before decentralisation to 434 in 2003. Most of the increase is off-Java. This represents a fundamental change in Indonesia's subnational administrative, political and fiscal landscape. We present a new dataset that elucidates the characteristics of these new kota and kabupaten, and review political, fiscal and economic incentives for creating new jurisdictions. We find that geographic dispersion, political and ethnic diversity, natural resource wealth and scope for bureaucratic rent seeking all influence the likelihood of regional splits. Since jurisdictional changes will affect local governance and service delivery, we stress the importance of providing an effective institutional framework for the creation-or future amalgamation-of local governments as part of a strategic approach to consolidating Indonesia's decentralisation.

In recent years, natural and man-made disasters have confronted the international community with its most demanding reconstruction challenges since the aftermath of World War II. Managing the inflow of resources and spending those resources well have proven to be two of the main difficulties in such reconstruction projects, particularly after large-scale disasters. A central dilemma of the public financial management of reconstruction is the need for very high levels of accountability to demonstrate fiduciary credibility, while at the same time ensuring the rapid implementation of recovery programs. This paper identifies options and lessons for managing post-disaster reconstruction finance in three key areas: (i) the establishment of special institutions This paper-a joint product of the East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (EASPR) and the PREM Public Sector (PRMPS) Units-is part of an effort to better understand the economic impacts of natural disasters and to help manage reconstruction processes effectively. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at [email protected], [email protected], and kkaiser@ worldbank.org.

Recent studies of large-scale ''headline" conflicts have excluded consideration of local conflict, in large part due to the absence of representative data at low levels of geographic specification. This paper is a first attempt to correct for that by assessing the incidence, impacts, and patterns of local conflict in Indonesia. We employ a combination of qualitative fieldwork with an exploratory statistical analysis of the 2003 Village Potential Statistics collected by the Bureau of Statistics (Potensi Desa-PODES), which maps conflict across all of Indonesia's villages/neighborhoods. Violent conflict can be observed throughout the archipelago. The qualitative analysis shows that local conflicts vary in form and impacts across districts, and that local factors are key. The quantitative analysis, which excludes high conflict areas of Indonesia, confirms the importance of economic factors, with positive correlations between violent conflict and poverty, inequality, and variables measuring economic development. Clustering of ethnic groups and ill-defined property rights were also positively associated with violence.

The widespread presence of local conflict characterizes many developing countries such as Indonesia. Outbreaks of violent conflict not only have direct costs for lives, livelihoods, and material property, but may also have the potential to escalate further. Recent studies on large-scale "headline" conflicts have tended to exclude the systematic consideration of local conflict, in large part due to the absence of representative data at low levels of geographic specification. This paper is a first attempt to correct for that. We evaluate a unique dataset compiled by the Indonesian government, the periodic Village Potential Statistics (PODES), which seeks to map conflict across all of Indonesia's 69,000 villages/neighborhoods. The data confirm that conflict is prevalent beyond well publicized "conflict regions," and that it can be observed across the archipelago. The data report largely violent conflict in 7.1 percent of Indonesia's lowest administrative tier (rural desa and urban kelurahan). Integrating examples from qualitative fieldwork, we assess issues in the measurement of local conflict for quantitative analysis, and adopt an empirical framework to examine potential associations with poverty, inequality, shocks, ethnic and religious diversity/inequality, and community-level associational and security arrangements. The quantitative analysis shows positive correlations between local conflict and unemployment, inequality, natural disasters, changes in sources of incomes, and clustering of ethnic groups within villages. The institutional variables indicate that the presence of places of worship is associated with less conflict, while the presence of religious groups and traditional culture (adat) institutions are associated with conflict. We conclude by suggesting future areas of research, notably on the role of group inequality and inference, and suggest ways to improve the measurement of conflict in the village census.

The widespread presence of local conflict characterizes many developing countries such as Indonesia. Outbreaks of violent conflict not only have direct costs for lives, livelihoods, and material property, but may also have the potential to escalate further. Recent studies on large-scale "headline" conflicts have tended to exclude the systematic consideration of local conflict, in large part due to the absence of representative data at low levels of geographic specification. This paper is a first attempt to correct for that. We evaluate a unique dataset compiled by the Indonesian government, the periodic Village Potential Statistics (PODES), which seeks to map conflict across all of Indonesia's 69,000 villages/neighborhoods. The data confirm that conflict is prevalent beyond well publicized "conflict regions," and that it can be observed across the archipelago. The data report largely violent conflict in 7.1 percent of Indonesia's lowest administrative tier (rural desa and urban kelurahan). Integrating examples from qualitative fieldwork, we assess issues in the measurement of local conflict for quantitative analysis, and adopt an empirical framework to examine potential associations with poverty, inequality, shocks, ethnic and religious diversity/inequality, and community-level associational and security arrangements. The quantitative analysis shows positive correlations between local conflict and unemployment, inequality, natural disasters, changes in sources of incomes, and clustering of ethnic groups within villages. The institutional variables indicate that the presence of places of worship is associated with less conflict, while the presence of religious groups and traditional culture (adat) institutions are associated with conflict. We conclude by suggesting future areas of research, notably on the role of group inequality and inference, and suggest ways to improve the measurement of conflict in the village census.

How effective are public interventions in addressing significant regional disparities in formal manufacturing concentration in a developing economy? We examine the aggregate and sectoral geographic concentration of manufacturing industries for Indonesia, and estimate the impact of factors influencing location choice at the firm level. We distinguish between natural advantage, including infrastructure endowments, wage rates, and natural resource endowments, and production externalities, arising from the co-location of firms in the same or complementary industries. The methodology pays special attention to empirically distinguishing the impact of measured production externalities from unobserved local characteristics. Depending on the sector, we find that a mix of both forms of regional advantage explains the geographic distribution of firms. Based on the estimated location choice model, we illustrate the potential impacts of policy interventions on manufacturing distribution by simulating the effectiveness of transport improvements on relocation of firms. Our findings suggest that improvements in transport infrastructure may only have limited effects in attracting industry to secondary industrial centers outside of Java, especially in sectors already established in leading regions. The findings underscore the challenges for addressing the industrial fortunes of lagging regions, either through local decentralized policy interventions or national policies focused on infrastructure development.

How effective are public interventions in addressing significant regional disparities in formal manufacturing concentration in a developing economy? We examine the aggregate and sectoral geographic concentration of manufacturing industries for Indonesia, and estimate the impact of factors influencing location choice at the firm level. We distinguish between natural advantage, including infrastructure endowments, wage rates, and natural resource endowments, and production externalities, arising from the co-location of firms in the same or complementary industries. The methodology pays special attention to empirically distinguishing the impact of measured production externalities from unobserved local characteristics. Depending on the sector, we find that a mix of both forms of regional advantage explains the geographic distribution of firms. Based on the estimated location choice model, we illustrate the potential impacts of policy interventions on manufacturing distribution by simulating the effectiveness of transport improvements on relocation of firms. Our findings suggest that improvements in transport infrastructure may only have limited effects in attracting industry to secondary industrial centers outside of Java, especially in sectors already established in leading regions. The findings underscore the challenges for addressing the industrial fortunes of lagging regions, either through local decentralized policy interventions or national policies focused on infrastructure development.

This paper presents a methodology to evaluate fiscal decentralization focused on the potential mis-targeting of intergovernmental fiscal equalization transfers. The approach builds on an explicit comparison and the summary measurement of different ("horizontal") allocation distributions across states or localities. Whereas formula based fiscal transfers have the merit of being transparent and promoting revenue predictability in fiscal decentralization, in practice, two challenges emerge: (a) What are the appropriate formula designs given the sub-national data constraints evident in most decentralizing developing countries?, and (b) How costly in terms of mis-targeting to the presumed expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are deviations from these types of benchmark formulas (e.g., due to historical factors or the need to meet establishment costs such as civil service wages)? We illustrate this approach through an assessment of Indonesia's evolving intergovernmental fiscal system, instituted in the 2001 Big Bang decentralization. The discussion comes against Indonesia's recent policy decision to fully fund sub-national civil servant wages as part of the base general allocation grant (DAU) transfers, raising questions about both incentive effects for local governments and potential mis-targeting. We identify potential efficiency losses from the DAU's horizontal misallocation from half a dozen alternative scenarios found in the policy dialogue, ranging from 9 to 30 percent -on the order of USD 3.9 billion -of the overall annual size of this large intergovernmental transfer. The scale of these trade-offs highlights the importance of intergovernmental transfers in more general debates in public finance for decentralized countries.

This paper presents a methodology to evaluate fiscal decentralization focused on the potential mis-targeting of intergovernmental fiscal equalization transfers. The approach builds on an explicit comparison and the summary measurement of different ("horizontal") allocation distributions across states or localities. Whereas formula based fiscal transfers have the merit of being transparent and promoting revenue predictability in fiscal decentralization, in practice, two challenges emerge: (a) What are the appropriate formula designs given the sub-national data constraints evident in most decentralizing developing countries?, and (b) How costly in terms of mis-targeting to the presumed expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are deviations from these types of benchmark formulas (e.g., due to historical factors or the need to meet establishment costs such as civil service wages)? We illustrate this approach through an assessment of Indonesia's evolving intergovernmental fiscal system, instituted in the 2001 Big Bang decentralization. The discussion comes against Indonesia's recent policy decision to fully fund sub-national civil servant wages as part of the base general allocation grant (DAU) transfers, raising questions about both incentive effects for local governments and potential mis-targeting. We identify potential efficiency losses from the DAU's horizontal misallocation from half a dozen alternative scenarios found in the policy dialogue, ranging from 9 to 30 percent -on the order of USD 3.9 billion -of the overall annual size of this large intergovernmental transfer. The scale of these trade-offs highlights the importance of intergovernmental transfers in more general debates in public finance for decentralized countries.

Recent studies of large-scale “headline” conflicts have excluded consideration of local conflict, in large part due to the absence of representative data at low levels of geographic specification. This paper is a first attempt to correct for that by assessing the incidence, impacts, and patterns of local conflict in Indonesia. We employ a combination of qualitative fieldwork with an exploratory statistical analysis of the 2003 Village Potential Statistics collected by the Bureau of Statistics (Potensi Desa-PODES), which maps conflict across all of Indonesia’s villages/neighborhoods. Violent conflict can be observed throughout the archipelago. The qualitative analysis shows that local conflicts vary in form and impacts across districts, and that local factors are key. The quantitative analysis, which excludes high conflict areas of Indonesia, confirms the importance of economic factors, with positive correlations between violent conflict and poverty, inequality, and variables measuring economic development. Clustering of ethnic groups and ill-defined property rights were also positively associated with violence.

The paper considers the process of discovery for subsoil resources, including both hard minerals and hydrocarbons and estimates its magnitude in recent years, as derived from the sum of extraction and changes in proven reserves. Spurred on by technology change and strong market conditions, discovery has been substantial for most minerals. The value of discovered reserves is high relative to the costs of exploration, particularly when low social discount rates are used to value potential production in the future. Discovery is therefore valuable and should be considered as adding to national wealth through increases in proven reserves. Many countries can continue to generate resource rents far longer than indicated by current reserve estimates and this has implications for decisions on how to plan to spend or save rents. With the high response of discovery to prices and technology, environmental constraints (climate change, water) are more likely than the actual exhaustion of resource deposits to limit resource-based development.

This paper analyzes environmental expenditures in Indonesia -a significant newly industrializing economy -reported at the plant level comprising all 23 thousand manufacturing establishments with more than 20 employees. Since compliance is barely enforced, pollution abatement expenditures are effectively voluntary in nature. This allows us to test whether foreign owned firms expend more due to a technology that adheres to stricter Western standards or whether the predominant effect is that both foreign and domestic exporting companies are more environmentally conscious due to better technology transfer or green consumerism in the Western countries. If so, this would contradict conventional wisdom that environmental expenditures reduce competitiveness and that increased levels of foreign direct investment or export-orientation in manufacturing will necessarily pre-empt firms from behaving in a "greener" fashion.

This paper analyzes environmental expenditures in Indonesia -a significant newly industrializing economy -reported at the plant level comprising all 23 thousand manufacturing establishments with more than 20 employees. Since compliance is barely enforced, pollution abatement expenditures are effectively voluntary in nature. This allows us to test whether foreign owned firms expend more due to a technology that adheres to stricter Western standards or whether the predominant effect is that both foreign and domestic exporting companies are more environmentally conscious due to better technology transfer or green consumerism in the Western countries. If so, this would contradict conventional wisdom that environmental expenditures reduce competitiveness and that increased levels of foreign direct investment or export-orientation in manufacturing will necessarily pre-empt firms from behaving in a "greener" fashion.

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Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 17 16 15 14 This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.