Philosophy & Humanistic Studies

In this book, Hannes Charen presents an alternative examination of kinship structures in political theory.
Employing a radically transdisciplinary approach, On the Politics of Kinship is structured in a series of six theoretical vignettes or frames. Each chapter frames a figure, aspect, or relational context of the family or kinship. Some chapters are focused on a critique of the family as a state-sanctioned institution, while others cautiously attempt to recast kinship in a way to reimagine mutual obligation through the generation of kinship practices understood as a perpetually evolving set of relational responses to finitude. In doing so, Charen considers the ways in which kinship is a plastic social response to embodied exposure, both concealed and made more evident in the bloated, feeble, and broken individualities and nationalities that seem to dominate our social and political landscape today.
On the Politics of Kinship will be of interest to political theorists, feminists, anthropologists, and social scientists in general.

The anti-psychiatrists in the 1960's, specifically Thomas Szasz, have claimed that mental illness does not exist. This argument was based on a specific definition of physical disease that, Szasz argued, could not be applied to mental illness. Thus, by problematizing mental illness, the spotlight had turned to physical disease. Since then, philosophers of medicine have proposed definitions applying both to pathophysiological and psychopathological conditions. This paper analyzes prominent naturalist definitions which aim to provide value free accounts of pathological conditions, as well as normative accounts which propose value-laden accounts. The approaches surveyed differ not only in terms of value, but also in terms of their perspective. This perspective concerns whether the concept of health, illness or disease/disorder is emphasized. The emphasis on health or illness is holistic as it looks at the human being as a whole, while focus on disease or disorder is analytic as it considers part functions. I will here argue in favor of holism and will propose a definition of mental health based on Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of Gustave Flaubert.

The anti-psychiatrists in the 1960's, specifically Thomas Szasz, have claimed that mental illness does not exist. This argument was based on a specific definition of physical disease that, Szasz argued, could not be applied to mental illness. Thus, by problematizing mental illness, the spotlight had turned to physical disease. Since then, philosophers of medicine have proposed definitions applying both to pathophysiological and psychopathological conditions. This paper analyzes prominent naturalist definitions which aim to provide value free accounts of pathological conditions, as well as normative accounts which propose value-laden accounts. The approaches surveyed differ not only in terms of value, but also in terms of their perspective. This perspective concerns whether the concept of health, illness or disease/disorder is emphasized. The emphasis on health or illness is holistic as it looks at the human being as a whole, while focus on disease or disorder is analytic as it considers part functions. I will here argue in favor of holism and will propose a definition of mental health based on Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of Gustave Flaubert.

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativ-ism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. 1

This paper explores Herbert Mason’s rendition of Gilgamesh as a work that navigates the loss of friendship, and self, in terms of Gaston Bachelard’s concept of ‘poetic space’. In the first section I foreground the relationship between Enkidu and Gilgamesh in terms of Hegelian recognition. I argue that this recognition informs both the depth of their friendship and Gilgamesh’s sense of loss upon Enkidu’s demise. In the second section, using the work of Victor Turner, I develop a notion of Gilgamesh as a figure undergoing a liminal passage as he searches for immortality. In the concluding section I show that Bachelardian spaces underlie Mason’s poetic representation of Gilgamesh as a liminal figure.

In this work I develop what I call the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement. I argue that there is a kind of apparent intractable disagreement, embodied in recent disputes between internalists and externalists about epistemic justification, which calls for an explanation. I claim that such disagreement suggests adopting some form of antirealism about justification, construed as the denial of a single objective property denoted by ‘justification’. To that end, I argue that each of the following antirealist positions about justification fails to explain meta-epistemic disagreement: nihilism, an ambiguity view, contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. In the final chapter I suggest a form of pluralism about justification that vindicates epistemic realism and addresses the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement.

Richard Sylvan, a vanguard in the field of environmental philosophy published a book in 1994 with David Bennett titled The Greening of Ethics. Nearly twenty-five years later, where the environmental situation of our world is even more serious, and where some governments deny the existence and negative effects of human caused climate change, the greening of ethics is even more urgent. In this paper, I will revisit Sylvan’s and Bennett’s work arguing that their approach to environmental ethics should be one that is advocated. I consider the most salient features of their approach, how this translates into practice but also offer an analysis as to why some governments have reached an impasse in regard to implementing environmental policies, and why environmental ethics still remains on the margins. In the final section of this paper, I will discuss what an effective practice would mean. The greening of ethics begins with the understanding of ethics itself, and how limiting the understa...