Papers by Michael McKinsey
Consequences of Reference Failure, 2019
Philosophy in review, 1983
In my paper "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access" (1991a), I argued that an externalist, or ... more In my paper "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access" (1991a), I argued that an externalist, or anti-individualist, view about cognitive properties is inconsistent with the traditional Cartesian view that we all have a privileged non-empirical way of knowing about our own thoughts and other cognitive acts and states. In this paper, I want to clarify both my argument and the specific principles of privileged access and externalism to which the argument does and does not apply. I also want to discuss the main response that has been made to my argument, and defend my view of what the correct response should be.
1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by t... more 1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexical pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their semantic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is incompatible with the principle that we can have privileged, non-empirical knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts. The reaction in question amounts to a dismissive denial of one of my argument=s main premises. This premise, which I defended at length in the paper, is that an externalist thesis regarding a cognitive property should hold that possession of the property by a person logically, or conceptually, implies the existence of objects external to that person. Externalists who defend...
In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the ph... more In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts. One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument. Before discussing the Davies/Wright point, it will be useful to begin with first, a brief restatement of my argument and second, a general assessment of the dialectical situation regarding the argument and its critics.
Consequences of Reference Failure, Nov 11, 2019
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1991
... object. By saying that a state or property is relational, I mean that it essentially involves... more ... object. By saying that a state or property is relational, I mean that it essentially involves some particular object. Examples would be such properties as those of admiring Ollie, living in Detroit, being shorter than Kareem, etc. Since ...
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1978
In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamp... more In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. (I count as single-description theories both “short-for-descriptions” theories of the Frege-Russell sort and what I shall call below “fixed-by-attributes” theories.) In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.
Nous, 2002
In my 1991 paper "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access" I argued that externalism, or anti-in... more In my 1991 paper "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access" I argued that externalism, or anti-individualism, in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the traditional Cartesian principle that we each have privileged access to our own thoughts and other mental acts and states. 1 The argument has since received a gratifying amount of discussion, both pro and con. My aim here is to defend and clarify my argument in light of this discussion, and to clarify the overall conceptual situation regarding the logical relationships that hold between various forms of externalism and privileged access.
Philosophical Studies, 1987
The Philosophical Review, 1971
The Philosophical Review, 1978
They have been the intraoervical application of impure carbolic acid, negative galvanism, and far... more They have been the intraoervical application of impure carbolic acid, negative galvanism, and faradism, and these have been supplemented by prescribing for the patient's home use two quart, very hot douches each night. Great care should be used in all manipulations in these cases to obtain especial cleanliness of all parts and of all instruments, as inflammation is never a factor at the beginning of these cases and is to be scrupulously avoided. In obstinate cases in which the above produce no result discision may be practised, and has proven almost invariably useful. It appears to induce growth, just as a laceration of the cervix produces overgrowth. Any of these methods and many others will al- most invariably stimulate a growth in the uterus if the case is properly chosen, and undoubtedly all of you have seen a growth begin only to a little later cease, and eventually recede, much to your own disgust and your patient's disappointment. This at least has many times been my own expe- rience until recently, when I have been more fortunate. The proper method of correcting this retro- grade tendency was first suggested to me during the treatment of an entirely different condition. Probably all of you have noted that in perform- ing operations in which hemorrhage, directly or indirectly, from the uterine artery is a factor nothing will more' promptly control this arterial hemorrhage than traction on the uterus, down- Ward jf operating through the vagina, upward if through the abdomen. It was while operating to repair a lacerated cervix at the time that I was much exorcised over one of-these cases of faulty growth, that the application of this principle suggested itself. If uterine growth depended ab- solutely upon a free and abundant supply of arte- rial blood, and if even very moderate downward traction shut off or curtailed this supply, and at the same time favored passive, or venous, conges- tion, it seemed to account for all, or nearly all, Past failures. This sagging is of course the in- evitable result of an increase of weight in the uterus, with a weak, also undergrown, set of ligaments to support it. There is a very marked tendency to rétroversion at this period. It is, therefore, at this point that the importance of the ¡'ound ligaments, in fact, all the ligaments, comes mto play. After the uterus has begun to grow -not merely to swell it of course must sag, and the tendency to rétroversion is greatly increased if an mtra-uterine electrode is used, as the uterus is more or less retroverted during treatment. As all of our efforts to cause the uterus to grow have operated by inducing a considerable increased i ; ; ; ; arterial circulation, and as the sagging shuts off this circulation, the inevitable result is to stop the growth. This sagging and rétroversion are to be ac-
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010
There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is... more There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that I will discuss in this paper. Various views consistent with Millianism have been proposed as to how the semantic referents of proper names are determined. These views can be classified into (1) description theories and (2) causal theories, but they can also be classified into (3) social practice theories, on which a name's referent is determined by a social practice involving the referent, and (4) individualistic theories, on which the referent of the use of a name is determined by the speaker's state of mind. Here I argue against social practice theories of the sorts proposed by Kripke and Evans and in favor of an individualistic approach to name reference. I argue that social practice is irrelevant to determining name reference and that, as a consequence, names have no meanings in natural languages. In the second part of the paper I motivate and propose a new form of individualistic theory which incorporates features of both description theories and Evans's social practice theory.
Canadian journal of philosophy, 2005
In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult... more In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does ...
dialectica, 2006
In 'Externalism and A priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue', Mar... more In 'Externalism and A priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue', Maria Lasonen-Aarnio raises an interesting problem for my reductio argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and privileged access. (See McKinsey 1991 and 2002.) I will consider the problem as it arises for the simplest form of my argument, which is based on the closure principle (CA): Closure of apriority under logical implication (CA) Necessarily, for any person x and propositions p and q , if x can know a priori that p , and p logically implies q , then x can know a priori that q. Lasonen-Aarnio considers an instance of my reductio that concerns a thought ascribed by use of the demonstrative pronoun 'that':
Analysis, 1991
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Philosophy in review, 1983
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Papers by Michael McKinsey