According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the thr... more According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.
PlATo's ProTAgorAs The hedonisT josh wilburn i n the final section of Plato's Protagoras, socrate... more PlATo's ProTAgorAs The hedonisT josh wilburn i n the final section of Plato's Protagoras, socrates famously invokes a version of hedonism that renders the terms "pleasant" and "good" (along with "painful" and "bad") interchangeable (353c-357e). on the basis of this hedonistic identification of pleasure and the good, socrates confronts, first, the Many's view that knowledge is often "dragged around" by pleasure and other emotional states, and second, Protagoras' claim that courage is "entirely different" from knowledge and the rest of the virtues. socrates' use of hedonism is noteworthy and puzzling: in this critical scene from the Protagoras, he invokes it to defend two philosophical commitments that are evidently important to him, and that Plato takes very seriously-the supremacy of knowledge and the unity of the virtues. Yet socrates relies on hedonism in no other Platonic dialogue, and it seems even to conflict both with the views his character expresses elsewhere, as well as with Plato's own settled philosophical positions. Consequently, the issue of hedonism's precise role in the dialogue has been much discussed by commentators, with the controversy often focused on the question: To whom does the hedonism of the dialogue rightly belong? some interpreters have argued that socrates' endorsement of the view is sincere, and that Plato, at least in the Protagoras, deems it a position worth considering. 1 others have argued that socrates' appeal to hedonism is entirely ad hominem: he invokes it only for the sake of argument, and only because he takes it to be the (perhaps implicit) view of his interlocutors-of the Many (the interpretation most explored and emphasized by commentators), or of Protagoras, or of both. 2
Plato and the Divided Self contains fifteen essays that track the development of Plato's triparti... more Plato and the Divided Self contains fifteen essays that track the development of Plato's tripartite theory of the soul throughout the course of his career, as well as the use of that theory among some later Platonists. This excellent volume, which was edited by Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain (who contribute a brief introduction), usefully includes an index locorum, footnotes (rather than the less convenient endnotes), and an extensive bibliography. It is divided into four parts that correspond roughly to 'stages' in the development and use of Plato's theory of tripartition.
Peterson's book addresses a familiar puzzle in Platonic scholarship: in dialogues such as the Apo... more Peterson's book addresses a familiar puzzle in Platonic scholarship: in dialogues such as the Apology and Euthyphro, the depicted Socrates disavows wisdom and avoids advancing views of his own, focusing instead on elenctic examination of his interlocutors' positions. In dialogues such as the Republic and Phaedo, however, Socrates no longer scrutinizes the views of his interlocutors, but rather seems to advocate ambitious philosophical theses of his own. The question is, how can we explain the shift? The traditional response is to understand changes in the depicted Socrates as indicative of changes the author. We eventually find a doctrinal Socrates who no longer engages in elenchus, the view goes, because we eventually have a doctrinal Plato who no longer thinks the elenctic method is the best.
J o S h W i l b u r n * in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the "sp... more J o S h W i l b u r n * in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the "spirited" part of the soul as the "ally of reason": like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit's distinctive "job" in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual's own soul. 1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason's faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched over and guarded against. in the Timaeus, the spirited part of the soul-or "the part which shares in courage and spirited anger," as Timaeus refers to it-is once again depicted as having a supportive relationship with the reasoning part. Timaeus describes it as being "naturally superior" to the appetitive part, and he explains that the gods placed it in the chest, near the head (the bodily location of the reasoning part), so that it would be able to "hear" the reports and commands issued by the reasoning part, and so that it might help reason restrain the appetitive part if the latter should become unruly (69e-70b). There are two noteworthy features of Timaeus's characterization. First, it is clear that some sort of intra-psychic "communication" takes place between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul. in order to respond to the reports and commands of reason, spirit must first in some sense understand them ('understand' here carrying no specific theoretical weight yet). Through what psychological mechanism does this communication occur, however? While recent commentators have provided some illuminating discussions of intra-psychic communication in the Timaeus, those discussions have focused overwhelmingly on the question how reason communicates with appetite (a topic that the dialogue itself treats in somewhat
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 43, 2012
I book of Plato's Laws the unnamed Athenian Visitor, seeking to shed some light on the notion ... more I book of Plato's Laws the unnamed Athenian Visitor, seeking to shed some light on the notion of being 'stronger or weaker than oneself', offers an image: we are all like puppets crafted by the gods, he suggests, pulled in opposite directions by the 'cords' within us. We are pulled towards vice by 'iron' cords associated with feelings of pleasure and pain, and we are pulled towards virtue by a 'golden' cord associated with reasoning and law ( - ). The standard interpretation of this passage takes it to be an explanation of what goes on inside an agent in a case of akratic action-that is, roughly, a case in which the agent performs some action while believing, and despite believing, that it would be best for her not to perform it. If the person's iron cords prevail, this interpretation has it, then the person ends up performing an akratic action. The standard view, then, is that in the puppet passage, and in the dialogue as a whole, Plato accepts that agents can and sometimes do act akratically. In
According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the thr... more According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.
PlATo's ProTAgorAs The hedonisT josh wilburn i n the final section of Plato's Protagoras, socrate... more PlATo's ProTAgorAs The hedonisT josh wilburn i n the final section of Plato's Protagoras, socrates famously invokes a version of hedonism that renders the terms "pleasant" and "good" (along with "painful" and "bad") interchangeable (353c-357e). on the basis of this hedonistic identification of pleasure and the good, socrates confronts, first, the Many's view that knowledge is often "dragged around" by pleasure and other emotional states, and second, Protagoras' claim that courage is "entirely different" from knowledge and the rest of the virtues. socrates' use of hedonism is noteworthy and puzzling: in this critical scene from the Protagoras, he invokes it to defend two philosophical commitments that are evidently important to him, and that Plato takes very seriously-the supremacy of knowledge and the unity of the virtues. Yet socrates relies on hedonism in no other Platonic dialogue, and it seems even to conflict both with the views his character expresses elsewhere, as well as with Plato's own settled philosophical positions. Consequently, the issue of hedonism's precise role in the dialogue has been much discussed by commentators, with the controversy often focused on the question: To whom does the hedonism of the dialogue rightly belong? some interpreters have argued that socrates' endorsement of the view is sincere, and that Plato, at least in the Protagoras, deems it a position worth considering. 1 others have argued that socrates' appeal to hedonism is entirely ad hominem: he invokes it only for the sake of argument, and only because he takes it to be the (perhaps implicit) view of his interlocutors-of the Many (the interpretation most explored and emphasized by commentators), or of Protagoras, or of both. 2
Plato and the Divided Self contains fifteen essays that track the development of Plato's triparti... more Plato and the Divided Self contains fifteen essays that track the development of Plato's tripartite theory of the soul throughout the course of his career, as well as the use of that theory among some later Platonists. This excellent volume, which was edited by Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain (who contribute a brief introduction), usefully includes an index locorum, footnotes (rather than the less convenient endnotes), and an extensive bibliography. It is divided into four parts that correspond roughly to 'stages' in the development and use of Plato's theory of tripartition.
Peterson's book addresses a familiar puzzle in Platonic scholarship: in dialogues such as the Apo... more Peterson's book addresses a familiar puzzle in Platonic scholarship: in dialogues such as the Apology and Euthyphro, the depicted Socrates disavows wisdom and avoids advancing views of his own, focusing instead on elenctic examination of his interlocutors' positions. In dialogues such as the Republic and Phaedo, however, Socrates no longer scrutinizes the views of his interlocutors, but rather seems to advocate ambitious philosophical theses of his own. The question is, how can we explain the shift? The traditional response is to understand changes in the depicted Socrates as indicative of changes the author. We eventually find a doctrinal Socrates who no longer engages in elenchus, the view goes, because we eventually have a doctrinal Plato who no longer thinks the elenctic method is the best.
J o S h W i l b u r n * in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the "sp... more J o S h W i l b u r n * in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the "spirited" part of the soul as the "ally of reason": like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit's distinctive "job" in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual's own soul. 1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason's faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched over and guarded against. in the Timaeus, the spirited part of the soul-or "the part which shares in courage and spirited anger," as Timaeus refers to it-is once again depicted as having a supportive relationship with the reasoning part. Timaeus describes it as being "naturally superior" to the appetitive part, and he explains that the gods placed it in the chest, near the head (the bodily location of the reasoning part), so that it would be able to "hear" the reports and commands issued by the reasoning part, and so that it might help reason restrain the appetitive part if the latter should become unruly (69e-70b). There are two noteworthy features of Timaeus's characterization. First, it is clear that some sort of intra-psychic "communication" takes place between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul. in order to respond to the reports and commands of reason, spirit must first in some sense understand them ('understand' here carrying no specific theoretical weight yet). Through what psychological mechanism does this communication occur, however? While recent commentators have provided some illuminating discussions of intra-psychic communication in the Timaeus, those discussions have focused overwhelmingly on the question how reason communicates with appetite (a topic that the dialogue itself treats in somewhat
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 43, 2012
I book of Plato's Laws the unnamed Athenian Visitor, seeking to shed some light on the notion ... more I book of Plato's Laws the unnamed Athenian Visitor, seeking to shed some light on the notion of being 'stronger or weaker than oneself', offers an image: we are all like puppets crafted by the gods, he suggests, pulled in opposite directions by the 'cords' within us. We are pulled towards vice by 'iron' cords associated with feelings of pleasure and pain, and we are pulled towards virtue by a 'golden' cord associated with reasoning and law ( - ). The standard interpretation of this passage takes it to be an explanation of what goes on inside an agent in a case of akratic action-that is, roughly, a case in which the agent performs some action while believing, and despite believing, that it would be best for her not to perform it. If the person's iron cords prevail, this interpretation has it, then the person ends up performing an akratic action. The standard view, then, is that in the puppet passage, and in the dialogue as a whole, Plato accepts that agents can and sometimes do act akratically. In
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