Many philosophers hold that the human risks associated with the development and use of metaverses... more Many philosophers hold that the human risks associated with the development and use of metaverses arise primarily from their status-they are unreal in ways that make the experiences within them meaningless and thereby less prudentially valuable. This purported unreality is not merely a result of the virtual or intangible nature of metaverses. Rather, it arises from the idea that, regardless of the experiences, interactions, and a ordances of metaverses, what we do in these spaces is somehow di erent and impoverished compared to what we do in the physical world. Those who think this believe that our behavior and interactions within metaverses are inferior to our behaviors and interactions in the physical world in a way that confers less value on the lives of those engaging regularly within metaverses. Some commentators worry that repeated exposure to these impoverished virtual experiences will somehow dehumanize us or make us worse at o ine interactions, and certainly reduce the amount of time we have for more meaningful real-world pursuits. If true, this would be a serious concern for metaverse-evangelists and users. However, in this article we will argue that it is not so-in fact, metaverses are morally relevantly similar to the physical world, and capable of providing most of the experiences and interactions we find in the physical world-whether positive or negative. However, metaverses are not without risks. We claim that the real ethical problem with metaverses arises, in their current instantiation, from the risks involved in their development as commercial enterprises, locking users into particular infrastructures and placing power over the continuation or termination of the metaverse in the hands of a corporate entity that has goals and motivations independent of those of the users of the metaverse.
The inclusive presumption suggests that we should only disenfranchise those whose inclusion will ... more The inclusive presumption suggests that we should only disenfranchise those whose inclusion will undermine democratic values. Most people think we ought not to enfranchise infants. What harm would enfranchised infants do to our democratic institutions? At worst, they would systematically vote badly, choosing the worst of the available options. More plausibly, they would (mostly) fail to cast valid votes, and those who did successfully cast ballots would select randomly among the available options (as do some enfranchised adults). Neither of these possibilities provides good reason to disenfranchise them. I argue that in a well-constructed democratic system, the inclusion of infants (and all other currently disenfranchised citizens) will on balance be positive. To the extent that in extant democratic systems, enfranchising infants will do harm, that is an issue not with the infants, but with the system, and ought to be addressed from that side
There has been a recent resurgence in epistocratic arguments against our democratic institutions.... more There has been a recent resurgence in epistocratic arguments against our democratic institutions. Jason Brennan (2009, 2011, 2016) is a popular representative of the approach. Here, I criticise Brennan’s account and offer an alternative analysis of modern democratic societies. I argue that Brennan has not shown that the currently enfranchised are relevantly incompetent such that they ought to be excluded from the franchise. Further, even had he shown this, his proposed solution suffers from the same injustices he diagnoses in democracies. I consider an alternative means of embracing a restrictive franchise
Generating justice for children via political inclusion
2019 Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, 2019
I argue that the global position of children can be improved by first ensuring them political rep... more I argue that the global position of children can be improved by first ensuring them political representation, through inclusion in democratic process from a young age. Once children are embedded as equal participants in democratic processes, the structural disadvantages they are currently subject to within modern democracies are likely to diminish. Political and social institutions will have greater incentives to act proactively to support children, and children will have the same ability as other citizens to express their approval or disapproval of public actions undertaken on their behalf. The argument is as follows: In a global environment still characterised primarily by independent nation states, democracies provide the most fertile ground for the generation of just institutions. Those institutions work best, for those who are the most active participants in the democracy. Children are, in all states, expressly excluded from active political participation, and as such their voices, desires, needs and rights are marginalised. Political inclusion for children is a first step to address this marginalisation
Thirty years on from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international norm for the ag... more Thirty years on from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international norm for the age of political majority remains set at 18 years of age. With few exceptions, those under 18 are denied access to the single most important component of formal political participation-the right to vote in elections (whether local or national). Practical efforts have primarily been focused on the incremental inclusion of older children into the franchise, via attempts to lower the voting age to sixteen. Theoretical arguments, by contrast, have defended a much more expansive position on the inclusion of children, whether lowering the age to 14, 12, or even eliminating age limits entirely. In this paper, I explore the gap between practice and theory. I argue that proponents of children's enfranchisement should commit to arguing, at the practical level, for drastic changes to our democratic systems, so as, if successful, to enfranchise all those children who have a strong claim to political inclusion, rather than merely those closest to 18 years of age. Such a commitment to the theoretically more defensible (although politically less likely) positions could work to the advantage of children, by making moves such as the lowering of the voting age into the reasonable compromise position, rather than an extreme to be opposed.
Proceedings 14th International Conference on ICT, Society and Human Beings (ICT 2021), the 18th International Conference Web Based Communities and Social Media (WBC 2021), 2021
Good friendships improve our lives. But philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists ... more Good friendships improve our lives. But philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists disagree about the nature of friendship and the value of virtual friendships. Recent technological advances and global crises highlight the importance of answering the question: can virtual friendships be good? We argue against accounts of friendship that suggest virtual relationships are necessarily deficient, focusing on rejecting the requirements of physical proximity and complete authenticity for friendship. We propose a more inclusive account of friendship that focusses on positive intentions and experiences. We also discuss examples of virtual friendships that highlight their advantages in modern times, especially their ability to promote intercultural cohesion. Finally, we suggest implications to help guide individual and collective decisions about friendship in a way that improves wellbeing.
Abstract How we should behave online is an issue that is deceptively complex. The online communit... more Abstract How we should behave online is an issue that is deceptively complex. The online community, whether in a professional or a personal context, is much broader than the communities in which all but the youngest of us grew up. As such, the standards of propriety in this space can differ, in ways unexpected and dramatic, from those we are used to. In this chapter I ask whether and when we are under an obligation to conform to the expectations of the dominant groups within the online communities we participate in, and argue that there are at least some times when it is defensible to conform to one’s own local norms and expectations rather than subordinating these to the broader online community.
Both epistocrats and lottocrats claim that democracy itself is problematic. They set themselves t... more Both epistocrats and lottocrats claim that democracy itself is problematic. They set themselves the task of providing a plausible alternative system. However, many of the problems they identify arise not from democracy as such, but from certain instantiations of it. When and how people vote; how many people choose not to vote; and how much the people who do vote know, are all subjects of criticism in this literature. In this paper I outline a democratic system which retains features such as majority rule and secrecy regarding the expressed preferences of citizens, but eliminates voting. I argue that this approach can achieve many of the benefits ascribed to epistocratic or lottocratic systems without importing their flaws
Playing right: Some virtual wrongs are real wrongs
Many computer games ask us to act in ways which would be morally unconscionable, were we to so ac... more Many computer games ask us to act in ways which would be morally unconscionable, were we to so act in the physical world. Within the game world, these actions are seen as unproblematic. As such, simple translations of concepts such as assault and murder from the physical to the virtual fail. Killing an opponent in World of Warcraft is not morally equivalent to killing someone in the physical world. However, this does not mean that virtual murder is impossible. Rather, the social reality of particular game-worlds is distinct from, but connected to, the social reality in which we operate in the physical world. In this paper, I examine the ways in which immoral conduct can occur in virtual environments. I discuss the particular problems of the ‘magic circle’ model of gaming in the context of online, massively interactive computer gaming as popularised by World of Warcraft, Rift, Aion. (Castronova 2005, Zimmerman 2012) The most important of these problems is perhaps the lack of distinction many participants in these worlds make between their avatars and themselves. (Lehdonvirta, 2010) This connection between the virtual and physical worlds enables us to generate a moral framework for guiding action within virtual worlds. With this background established, I argue that it is the subversion of game mechanics and intentions which generates the wrongness of particular types of action within virtual worlds
Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from th... more Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from the franchise. It is appealed to by states and theorists alike to justify excluding young people (under 18) and many people with cognitive disability from the franchise. Defenders of this exclusion claim that no wrong is done by this exclusion and that states gain some significant benefits from this restricting of the franchise. I have argued elsewhere that political exclusion as currently practiced in modern liberal democratic states in fact causes significant harms, as it excludes some people who have the relevant capacity for political participation. Here, I argue that the exclusion of incapable actors prevents no significant harms to democratic outcomes, and that it confers no significant democratic benefits on the states practising this exclusion. As such, I argue that we ought to heavily modify and perhaps even abandon the capacity standard for political inclusion.
In der modernen demokratischen Praxis gelten Alphabetisierungstests und andere Mechanismen, um Bü... more In der modernen demokratischen Praxis gelten Alphabetisierungstests und andere Mechanismen, um Bürgerinnen und Bürger vom aktiven Wahlrecht auszuschließen, weithin und zurecht als verpönt. Dennoch scheinen zumindest einige Testformen ein probates Mittel darzustellen, um die Urteilsfähigkeit von Menschen mit bestimmten Defiziten zu erfassten. Die Rede ist von Tests, die in den Einzelfällen durchgeführt werden, in denen es darum geht, ob jemand wegen mangelnder Urteilsfähigkeit unter Vormundschaft gestellt werden soll. Hier einen ‚Urteilsfähigkeitstest' durchzuführen ist in vielen Ländern gängige Praxis. Könnten diese Tests einen Ausweg darstellen im Hinblick auf die festgefahrenen Positionen Für und Gegen ein Minderjährigenwahlrecht? Um praktikabel zu sein, muss ein solches Eignungstestregime, erstens, die Probleme mit historisch belasteten Vorschlägen für solche Tests umgehen. Es muss, zweitens, greifbare Vorteile für die Zusammensetzung der politischen Gemeinschaft, des Demos, mit sich bringen. In diesem Beitrag diskutiere ich einen Vorschlag für ein Eignungstestregime, welches nur auf junge Menschen angewendet wird, die gegenwärtig von politischer Beteiligung ausgeschlossen sind, und behaupte, dass ein solches Regime in diesem Kontext beide der genannten Bedingungen erfüllt. Im zweiten Abschnitt diskutiere ich den Status junger Menschen in demokratischen Staaten. Dazu verweise ich auf das Ausmaß, in dem junge Menschen vom Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen werden, und analysiere die Begründungen und Argumente, die dieser Exklusion zugrunde liegen. Wie ich zeigen werde, beruht die beste verfügbare Begründung auf einem bestimmten Verständnis von ‚Eignung' und somit auf der Behauptung, dass junge Menschen deshalb vom aktiven Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen sind, weil sie nicht dazu in der Lage seien, dieses wahrzunehmen. Im dritten Abschnitt lege ich dar, was es bedeutet, ein in relevanter Hinsicht ‚fähiger' Bürger eines demokratischen Staates zu sein. Der Maßstab hierfür ist-sowohl in der Theorie als auch in der Praxis bei Entmündigungsprozessen-minimal. In der Praxis erfolgt, zurecht, eine Angleichung nach unten. Wenn irgendeine Person als ‚fähig' angesehen wird, so bedeutet dies, dass auch jede andere Bürgerin, die dieselben Eigenschaften aufweist, gleichermaßen als ‚fähig' angesehen werden muss-Eignung ist ein einheitlicher Maßstab. Im vierten Abschnitt mache ich einen Vorschlag für ein Eignungstestregime mit sehr begrenzter Reichweite. Er ist nur auf diejenigen jungen Menschen anzuwenden, die gegenwärtig von
Capacity testing the youth: a proposal for broader enfranchisement
Journal of Youth Studies, 2012
Abstract In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for... more Abstract In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably constrained capacity testing regime is not simply ...
The reality of friendship within immersive virtual worlds
Ethics and Information Technology, 2011
Abstract In this article I examine a recent development in online communication, the immersive vi... more Abstract In this article I examine a recent development in online communication, the immersive virtual worlds of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs). I argue that these environments provide a distinct form of online experience from the experience available through earlier generation forms of online communication such as newsgroups, chat rooms, email and instant messaging. The experience available to participants in MMORPGs is founded on shared activity, while the experience of earlier ...
Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are exclude... more Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilised by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilise capacity testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity testing against common objections.
Many philosophers hold that the human risks associated with the development and use of metaverses... more Many philosophers hold that the human risks associated with the development and use of metaverses arise primarily from their status-they are unreal in ways that make the experiences within them meaningless and thereby less prudentially valuable. This purported unreality is not merely a result of the virtual or intangible nature of metaverses. Rather, it arises from the idea that, regardless of the experiences, interactions, and a ordances of metaverses, what we do in these spaces is somehow di erent and impoverished compared to what we do in the physical world. Those who think this believe that our behavior and interactions within metaverses are inferior to our behaviors and interactions in the physical world in a way that confers less value on the lives of those engaging regularly within metaverses. Some commentators worry that repeated exposure to these impoverished virtual experiences will somehow dehumanize us or make us worse at o ine interactions, and certainly reduce the amount of time we have for more meaningful real-world pursuits. If true, this would be a serious concern for metaverse-evangelists and users. However, in this article we will argue that it is not so-in fact, metaverses are morally relevantly similar to the physical world, and capable of providing most of the experiences and interactions we find in the physical world-whether positive or negative. However, metaverses are not without risks. We claim that the real ethical problem with metaverses arises, in their current instantiation, from the risks involved in their development as commercial enterprises, locking users into particular infrastructures and placing power over the continuation or termination of the metaverse in the hands of a corporate entity that has goals and motivations independent of those of the users of the metaverse.
The inclusive presumption suggests that we should only disenfranchise those whose inclusion will ... more The inclusive presumption suggests that we should only disenfranchise those whose inclusion will undermine democratic values. Most people think we ought not to enfranchise infants. What harm would enfranchised infants do to our democratic institutions? At worst, they would systematically vote badly, choosing the worst of the available options. More plausibly, they would (mostly) fail to cast valid votes, and those who did successfully cast ballots would select randomly among the available options (as do some enfranchised adults). Neither of these possibilities provides good reason to disenfranchise them. I argue that in a well-constructed democratic system, the inclusion of infants (and all other currently disenfranchised citizens) will on balance be positive. To the extent that in extant democratic systems, enfranchising infants will do harm, that is an issue not with the infants, but with the system, and ought to be addressed from that side
There has been a recent resurgence in epistocratic arguments against our democratic institutions.... more There has been a recent resurgence in epistocratic arguments against our democratic institutions. Jason Brennan (2009, 2011, 2016) is a popular representative of the approach. Here, I criticise Brennan’s account and offer an alternative analysis of modern democratic societies. I argue that Brennan has not shown that the currently enfranchised are relevantly incompetent such that they ought to be excluded from the franchise. Further, even had he shown this, his proposed solution suffers from the same injustices he diagnoses in democracies. I consider an alternative means of embracing a restrictive franchise
Generating justice for children via political inclusion
2019 Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, 2019
I argue that the global position of children can be improved by first ensuring them political rep... more I argue that the global position of children can be improved by first ensuring them political representation, through inclusion in democratic process from a young age. Once children are embedded as equal participants in democratic processes, the structural disadvantages they are currently subject to within modern democracies are likely to diminish. Political and social institutions will have greater incentives to act proactively to support children, and children will have the same ability as other citizens to express their approval or disapproval of public actions undertaken on their behalf. The argument is as follows: In a global environment still characterised primarily by independent nation states, democracies provide the most fertile ground for the generation of just institutions. Those institutions work best, for those who are the most active participants in the democracy. Children are, in all states, expressly excluded from active political participation, and as such their voices, desires, needs and rights are marginalised. Political inclusion for children is a first step to address this marginalisation
Thirty years on from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international norm for the ag... more Thirty years on from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international norm for the age of political majority remains set at 18 years of age. With few exceptions, those under 18 are denied access to the single most important component of formal political participation-the right to vote in elections (whether local or national). Practical efforts have primarily been focused on the incremental inclusion of older children into the franchise, via attempts to lower the voting age to sixteen. Theoretical arguments, by contrast, have defended a much more expansive position on the inclusion of children, whether lowering the age to 14, 12, or even eliminating age limits entirely. In this paper, I explore the gap between practice and theory. I argue that proponents of children's enfranchisement should commit to arguing, at the practical level, for drastic changes to our democratic systems, so as, if successful, to enfranchise all those children who have a strong claim to political inclusion, rather than merely those closest to 18 years of age. Such a commitment to the theoretically more defensible (although politically less likely) positions could work to the advantage of children, by making moves such as the lowering of the voting age into the reasonable compromise position, rather than an extreme to be opposed.
Proceedings 14th International Conference on ICT, Society and Human Beings (ICT 2021), the 18th International Conference Web Based Communities and Social Media (WBC 2021), 2021
Good friendships improve our lives. But philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists ... more Good friendships improve our lives. But philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists disagree about the nature of friendship and the value of virtual friendships. Recent technological advances and global crises highlight the importance of answering the question: can virtual friendships be good? We argue against accounts of friendship that suggest virtual relationships are necessarily deficient, focusing on rejecting the requirements of physical proximity and complete authenticity for friendship. We propose a more inclusive account of friendship that focusses on positive intentions and experiences. We also discuss examples of virtual friendships that highlight their advantages in modern times, especially their ability to promote intercultural cohesion. Finally, we suggest implications to help guide individual and collective decisions about friendship in a way that improves wellbeing.
Abstract How we should behave online is an issue that is deceptively complex. The online communit... more Abstract How we should behave online is an issue that is deceptively complex. The online community, whether in a professional or a personal context, is much broader than the communities in which all but the youngest of us grew up. As such, the standards of propriety in this space can differ, in ways unexpected and dramatic, from those we are used to. In this chapter I ask whether and when we are under an obligation to conform to the expectations of the dominant groups within the online communities we participate in, and argue that there are at least some times when it is defensible to conform to one’s own local norms and expectations rather than subordinating these to the broader online community.
Both epistocrats and lottocrats claim that democracy itself is problematic. They set themselves t... more Both epistocrats and lottocrats claim that democracy itself is problematic. They set themselves the task of providing a plausible alternative system. However, many of the problems they identify arise not from democracy as such, but from certain instantiations of it. When and how people vote; how many people choose not to vote; and how much the people who do vote know, are all subjects of criticism in this literature. In this paper I outline a democratic system which retains features such as majority rule and secrecy regarding the expressed preferences of citizens, but eliminates voting. I argue that this approach can achieve many of the benefits ascribed to epistocratic or lottocratic systems without importing their flaws
Playing right: Some virtual wrongs are real wrongs
Many computer games ask us to act in ways which would be morally unconscionable, were we to so ac... more Many computer games ask us to act in ways which would be morally unconscionable, were we to so act in the physical world. Within the game world, these actions are seen as unproblematic. As such, simple translations of concepts such as assault and murder from the physical to the virtual fail. Killing an opponent in World of Warcraft is not morally equivalent to killing someone in the physical world. However, this does not mean that virtual murder is impossible. Rather, the social reality of particular game-worlds is distinct from, but connected to, the social reality in which we operate in the physical world. In this paper, I examine the ways in which immoral conduct can occur in virtual environments. I discuss the particular problems of the ‘magic circle’ model of gaming in the context of online, massively interactive computer gaming as popularised by World of Warcraft, Rift, Aion. (Castronova 2005, Zimmerman 2012) The most important of these problems is perhaps the lack of distinction many participants in these worlds make between their avatars and themselves. (Lehdonvirta, 2010) This connection between the virtual and physical worlds enables us to generate a moral framework for guiding action within virtual worlds. With this background established, I argue that it is the subversion of game mechanics and intentions which generates the wrongness of particular types of action within virtual worlds
Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from th... more Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from the franchise. It is appealed to by states and theorists alike to justify excluding young people (under 18) and many people with cognitive disability from the franchise. Defenders of this exclusion claim that no wrong is done by this exclusion and that states gain some significant benefits from this restricting of the franchise. I have argued elsewhere that political exclusion as currently practiced in modern liberal democratic states in fact causes significant harms, as it excludes some people who have the relevant capacity for political participation. Here, I argue that the exclusion of incapable actors prevents no significant harms to democratic outcomes, and that it confers no significant democratic benefits on the states practising this exclusion. As such, I argue that we ought to heavily modify and perhaps even abandon the capacity standard for political inclusion.
In der modernen demokratischen Praxis gelten Alphabetisierungstests und andere Mechanismen, um Bü... more In der modernen demokratischen Praxis gelten Alphabetisierungstests und andere Mechanismen, um Bürgerinnen und Bürger vom aktiven Wahlrecht auszuschließen, weithin und zurecht als verpönt. Dennoch scheinen zumindest einige Testformen ein probates Mittel darzustellen, um die Urteilsfähigkeit von Menschen mit bestimmten Defiziten zu erfassten. Die Rede ist von Tests, die in den Einzelfällen durchgeführt werden, in denen es darum geht, ob jemand wegen mangelnder Urteilsfähigkeit unter Vormundschaft gestellt werden soll. Hier einen ‚Urteilsfähigkeitstest' durchzuführen ist in vielen Ländern gängige Praxis. Könnten diese Tests einen Ausweg darstellen im Hinblick auf die festgefahrenen Positionen Für und Gegen ein Minderjährigenwahlrecht? Um praktikabel zu sein, muss ein solches Eignungstestregime, erstens, die Probleme mit historisch belasteten Vorschlägen für solche Tests umgehen. Es muss, zweitens, greifbare Vorteile für die Zusammensetzung der politischen Gemeinschaft, des Demos, mit sich bringen. In diesem Beitrag diskutiere ich einen Vorschlag für ein Eignungstestregime, welches nur auf junge Menschen angewendet wird, die gegenwärtig von politischer Beteiligung ausgeschlossen sind, und behaupte, dass ein solches Regime in diesem Kontext beide der genannten Bedingungen erfüllt. Im zweiten Abschnitt diskutiere ich den Status junger Menschen in demokratischen Staaten. Dazu verweise ich auf das Ausmaß, in dem junge Menschen vom Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen werden, und analysiere die Begründungen und Argumente, die dieser Exklusion zugrunde liegen. Wie ich zeigen werde, beruht die beste verfügbare Begründung auf einem bestimmten Verständnis von ‚Eignung' und somit auf der Behauptung, dass junge Menschen deshalb vom aktiven Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen sind, weil sie nicht dazu in der Lage seien, dieses wahrzunehmen. Im dritten Abschnitt lege ich dar, was es bedeutet, ein in relevanter Hinsicht ‚fähiger' Bürger eines demokratischen Staates zu sein. Der Maßstab hierfür ist-sowohl in der Theorie als auch in der Praxis bei Entmündigungsprozessen-minimal. In der Praxis erfolgt, zurecht, eine Angleichung nach unten. Wenn irgendeine Person als ‚fähig' angesehen wird, so bedeutet dies, dass auch jede andere Bürgerin, die dieselben Eigenschaften aufweist, gleichermaßen als ‚fähig' angesehen werden muss-Eignung ist ein einheitlicher Maßstab. Im vierten Abschnitt mache ich einen Vorschlag für ein Eignungstestregime mit sehr begrenzter Reichweite. Er ist nur auf diejenigen jungen Menschen anzuwenden, die gegenwärtig von
Capacity testing the youth: a proposal for broader enfranchisement
Journal of Youth Studies, 2012
Abstract In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for... more Abstract In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably constrained capacity testing regime is not simply ...
The reality of friendship within immersive virtual worlds
Ethics and Information Technology, 2011
Abstract In this article I examine a recent development in online communication, the immersive vi... more Abstract In this article I examine a recent development in online communication, the immersive virtual worlds of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs). I argue that these environments provide a distinct form of online experience from the experience available through earlier generation forms of online communication such as newsgroups, chat rooms, email and instant messaging. The experience available to participants in MMORPGs is founded on shared activity, while the experience of earlier ...
Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are exclude... more Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilised by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilise capacity testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity testing against common objections.
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