It was late October in 1792, and in the Swiss town of Porrentruy, a revolutionary group was meeting. Its president, a man named Guinens, addressed his fellow members with a grandiose statement: ‘Citizens, brothers and friends’.
The fact is that Guinens was not a citizen, and nor, most likely, were any of his brothers and friends (let alone his sisters, for whom he had not a word to spare). Technically speaking, they were all subjects of the local bishop, who through the vagaries of mediaeval patchwork sovereignty had come to rule the town. In most of the rest of Switzerland, a ‘citizen’ was not something a radical like Guinens would aspire to be: the term denoted a member of the patrician class, marked out by their special legal privileges, their right to stand for office, and their haughty attitude towards the non-citizen masses. But something had recently transpired that was due to shape the course not only of Guinens’s life, but of the following two centuries of world history.
A little over a year before, France had promulgated a new constitution, under which everyone born to a French father on the country’s soil had become a citizen. And not in the Swiss sense – these citizens were not proud local potentates but equals before the law, marked out by their enjoyment of identical ‘natural’ rights and the entitlement to participate in political life, to make the laws that bound them (if only through representatives). Now that status was on the march across Europe. When Guinens made his speech, French troops – French citizen-soldiers – had already occupied Porrentruy. Within a few months, he would become a citizen just like them – first of the ‘Rauracian’ sister Republic, and later of France itself, as his hometown was absorbed into the victorious revolutionary state. And amidst all this geopolitical flux, what it meant to be a citizen was changing rapidly.
We have often been inclined to regard 1789 as the cradle of modern citizenship. And when we think about what it means for us to be citizens, we tend to settle on two ideas that the Revolution seems to have bequeathed us: the ability to choose our own leaders, and a set of rights guaranteed for us by the state. But look around. Seventy per cent of the world’s population lives in autocratic states without either a vote or any hope of having their rights honoured. Nonetheless, we still recognise them as citizens of their states. In the democratic world, too, both these facets of citizenship look ever weaker. We vote infrequently and with, it seems, ever decreasing satisfaction with the results, ever falling confidence that they represent our genuine civic and collective will. Rights to speech, protest, civil disobedience, have all been steadily diluted by paranoid states armed with anti-terror legislation – to the point where pensioners holding up signs outside Parliament can be arrested as terrorists.
In such conditions, does it still mean anything to call ourselves citizens? Are we witnessing the death of citizenship as we once knew and (if we were lucky) experienced it? Or was this outcome already contained within the logic of citizenship? That is the question my new book, Citizens of a New Enlightened Age, sets out to answer. I argue that the French Revolution, rather than bequeathing us a kind of modern, liberal citizenship, actually created something more like what we are coming to see today: a status whose political role varies from highly limited to non-existent, and whose associated rights are at best conditional and precarious. I call this ‘Napoleonic citizenship’, but it began to form long before le petit caporal crowned himself and Joséphine in Notre Dame.

Indeed, the dilution of the political aspect of citizenship can be traced back to the very start of the Revolution. As the Estates-General met in 1789 and the Third Estate waged war on the prerogatives of the clergy and nobility, the language of citizenship proved to be the deadliest weapon in its arsenal. But this was not the classical notion of the citizen as a political actor, like the citizens of ancient Athens or republican Rome. The vision they were conjuring up was that of the citizenry as a plane of moral and legal equals – one with which the special privileges of the First and Second Estates were incompatible. The constitutional order that the freshly-constituted National Assembly subsequently instated would divide the country into voting ‘active’ citizens and non-voting ‘passive’ citizens – including women, the very poor, and the under-24s. It also sought to restrict the part that even the active citizens would play in politics by banning them from deliberating on political manners when they met to vote.
The Assembly did not have it all its own way, however. Women found ways of asserting their right to political life, either by demanding the vote or by redefining the meaning of political participation to include the raising of republican children. Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just managed to vote in 1790 and 1791, despite being under the minimum age, because of an inattentive clerk – who presumably was haunted for the rest of his days with the thought of how many lives he might have saved had he nipped the young man’s burgeoning political interests in the bud.
All this culminated in the radical turn of mid-1792, when passive citizens voted illegally in defiance of the Assembly and the Jacobins swept to power, overturning the limited franchise and introducing near-universal manhood suffrage. But the anti-political bent of the Revolution persisted. The new government feared that the French people were citizens in name only: while they had been made formally free in law, they had not yet absorbed the self-denying mentality that was necessary for a true virtuous citizen. A ‘good’ citizen, in this understanding, must be orientated towards the well-being of the public as a whole, and away from their own private interests.
This obsession with the need to create ‘good citizens’ resulted in an absolute intolerance of political opposition, because anyone who contested a state that was steering towards the public good must be a bad citizen, putting their own sectional interest ahead of the nation. The culmination of this principle was the Terror, an effort to purge the bad citizens from French society. In the aftermath of this traumatic event, the new Thermidorian regime looked to create a new kind of citizen. The fear now was that the French people had in essence gone mad, driven to insanity by the twin experiences of royal and Robespierrean despotism.
To this, they had two answers. The first was to reform the national language. Radical clergyman Henri Grégoire took the lead here, introducing a sweeping programme to make everyone speak standard French. The principle was that the dialects or patois spoken by two-thirds of French people were not rational enough to convey modern, Enlightened ideas, and so their speakers were still mired in ancien régime servility and obscurantism. Paris-based revolutionaries were similarly unfavourable towards the non-French languages current in parts of the country – it was suggested indeed that the Corsicans had risen up against the revolutionary government because they still spoke Italian, a backward and thoroughly irrational language. If they were taught to speak standard French, they would be able to absorb and recommunicate revolutionary ideas, which would create a more stable social base for the revolutionary state.
The second answer was to dilute citizens’ opportunities to deliberate, since in their present condition, letting them come together and discuss politics would only lead to the kind of chaos the country had seen in 1792. Constitutionalists tinkered with proposals to have citizens vote individually and privately, rather than in the traditional ‘primary assemblies’ where a whole commune came together to cast their votes in public. One politician, François-Xavier Lanthenas, translator of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man into French, pleaded with his compatriots that if they did not feel they could vote solely in line with their individual judgement, and without being swayed by the rhetoric of their fellows, they should abstain from elections. (Not necessarily bad advice even today.)
The result of all this was an ideal of the citizen whose political role was drastically reduced. Rather than coming together to discuss with his (the citoyenne still did not get a look in at this stage) fellows and then vote according to their rational deliberations, the citizen was to be cajoled and disciplined into fulfilling his electoral duty as infrequently and with as minimal fuss as should be possible.
That is part one of my story. Part two traces another trend in the Revolution that reverberates today: the growing precariousness of rights.
The French citizen was definitionally also a soldier – in a country still under the sway of ancient Greece and Rome, it could not be otherwise. But a life of soldiering was an uneasy fit with the kind of citizenship France hoped to construct.After all, a soldier had no right to make the laws that bound him: he was under a military code set by someone else. He was under the arbitrary authority of another person, namely his commanding officer. And he did not have – to name just some of the new liberties of the citizen – freedom of movement or a free choice of his occupation, unless he wanted to be shot for desertion. One volunteer captured this contradiction in a cheeky verse:
‘Before, in the depths of slavery,
I at least had my liberty;
Free today through my courage,
I am in captivity!’
So declaring the citizen a soldier had an immediate impact on the guarantee underpinning his rights: it made clear that these could be suspended if the state found this to be in its interests.
A similar result emerged from wrangling over what it really meant to be French. Before the Revolution and in its early stages, it had been common to believe that to become French, one only had to will it – and a number of prominent foreign sympathisers with the Revolution were duly granted honorary French citizenship in 1792. One of these was granted to Friedrich Schiller, who in fact opposed the radical turn of the Revolution. He would not receive it, however, until 1798, because the French postal service, apparently not knowing how to reach him, had simply dispatched it in the general direction of his hometown of Weimar with the address ‘To Monsieur Gilles’, a somewhat rough approximation of the German writer’s name.1
By the end of the decade, however, the French state was less and less willing to wait for people to want to be French. The annexation of various territories on its borders, most dramatically of Belgium in 1798, was a demonstration of its power to impose French citizenship on millions of people at a time with a stroke of a pen. This came to be expressed as the legal principle that the French state could make anyone a citizen whether or not they wanted to be French. One Irishman, Terence Macmahon, discovered this to his cost in 1803 when he went to court to get a divorce overturned, and found himself – presumably to his surprise and consternation – declared a French citizen against his will. Equally importantly, if the state could make Macmahon a citoyen malgré lui, it could also strip its people of their citizenship against their will.
Nowhere was this principle felt so starkly as in the French colonies, where, in 1793-94, the French state – bowing to the pressure exerted by a widespread revolt across Haiti, then named Saint-Domingue – formally bestowed citizenship on almost a million Black enslaved people. Then, a decade later, Napoleon used the power of his autocratic state to reimpose slavery on that same group of people. The citizens of Haiti, rejecting this prerogative, rose up once again and, under their newly-constituted republic, embarked on their own experiment with citizenship, which they would associate strictly with Blackness.
Back in the metropole, the imperial boomerang was delivering a short, sharp shock to the already battered and bruised French citizen. The name of this shock was the Code civil.
While this document is – partly through the efforts of one G. W. F. Hegel – widely thought of as an Enlightened and rational text, the Code civil had deeply authoritarian elements. Among these was a drastic expansion in the number of crimes to be punished with an ancient penalty known as mort civile – civil death. Once reserved for only the most serious political crimes, above all treason, civil death could now be imposed on those convicted of, among other faults, robbery, forgery of French currency, fraudulent bankruptcy, performing an unauthorised marriage, and ‘unprovoked castration’. (For those looking to castrate someone, it was thus worth finding a good pretext.) In practice, civil death meant the complete loss of all one’s rights, including – and this was a Napoleonic innovation – property rights. This change rendered the rights of citizenship entirely conditional on good behaviour and the will of the state. We are still feeling the effects of that today.
Napoleon also continued the steady purging of political content from citizenship, but in this he had some surprising helpers: early liberals Germaine de Staël and Benjamin Constant. Both believed citizens must have some political voice, but they also denied that this was the essence of citizenship. The citizen, rather, was he or she who had complete and unconditional enjoyment of their rights. Political participation was desirable only insofar as it contributed to this end – and it could easily be jettisoned, as Constant proved when he collaborated with Napoleon to draft the Acte additionnel aux constitutions de l’Empire in 1815. In Hegel’s account, Napoleon was the world spirit on horseback, bringing rationality to Europe first at the point of a bayonet and then at the nib of a pen. By redrawing its borders and redrafting its laws, he is supposed to have ushered in modernity.
My suggestion is that this role was double-edged. The rights-based liberal citizenship that he exported from France was accompanied by its own shadow: a precarious and reactionary citizenship that converted rights back into privileges at the mercy of raison d’état.
Today, I suggest, the true heir of revolutionary France may be China, where ‘Napoleonic citizenship’ has reached its apogee: a nearly non-existent political role and conditional enjoyment of rights. And the rest of the world seems to be bending towards that pole. On the other hand, there may be an alternative path. Revolutionary upheavals like the Arab Spring prove there is still an appetite for a different, more participatory mode of citizenship. Perhaps the world can yet emerge from the shadow of the Code civil.
– Samuel Harrison
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- Schmidt, Alexander. ‘The Liberty of the Ancients? Friedrich Schiller and Aesthetic Republicanism’. History of Political Thought 30, no. 2 (2009): 286–314. ↩︎









































