Papers by Georgie Statham
Synthese, Jul 29, 2016
I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling thre... more I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling three different ways that chemists are able to manipulate the reaction conditions in order to control the outcome of a reaction. These consist in manipulations to the reaction kinetics, thermodynamics, and whether the kinetics or thermodynamics predominates. It is possible to construct interventionist causal models of all of these kinds of manipulation, and therefore to account for them using Woodward's theory. However, I show that there is an alternate, more illuminating way of thinking about the third kind of reaction control, according to which chemists are thought of as manipulating which causal system is instantiated. I show that our ability to manipulate which system is instantiated is an important part of our ability to control the world, as is therefore especially relevant to interventionism. Thus, considering examples from organic chemistry leads to the identification of an important extension to Woodward's theory. Finally, this investigation into reaction control in organic chemistry also has a more general implication: it suggests that interventionism results in a version of pragmatism about causation.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Oct 30, 2013
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Sep 1, 2017
Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, ... more Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, discussions of these accounts have neglected important questions, including how the context determines the contrasts (or defaults), and what shared knowledge is necessary for this to be possible. I address these questions, using organic chemistry as a case study. Focusing on one example-nucleophilic substitution-I show that the kinds of causal claims that can be made about an organic reaction depend on how the reaction is modelled, and argue that paying attention to the various ways that reactions are modelled has important implications for our understanding of causation. 1 Introduction 2 General Contrastive Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry 3 Deviant Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry 4 Nucleophilic Substitution Reactions 5 The Causal Modelling Tradition 5.1 The type/token distinction 6 Competing Reactions 6.1 Type-and token-causal claims, variables, and values of variables 7 Disambiguation of 'Reaction' 8 Reaction Kinds 9 Specific Reactions 9.1 Specific reactions and token-causal claims 9.2 Specific reactions and type-causal claims 10 Implications 10.1 Kinds of causal claim 10.2 Contrastive and deviant causal claims 10.3 Model relativity
Philosophical Studies, Mar 27, 2017
The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theor... more The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is variable relative. In an influential review, Strevens has accused Woodward’s account of a damaging form of variable relativity, according to which obviously false causal claims can be made true by choosing a depleted variable set. Following McCain, I show that Strevens’ objection doesn’t succeed. However, Woodward also wants to avoid another kind of variable relativity, according to which it can be true that X is a cause of Y in one set of background conditions, but false in another. I show that Woodward’s account is problematically overpermissive, unless there are restrictions on the values that certain variables can take. I formulate a modified account that makes these restrictions explicit, then use it to argue that Woodward’s attempt to avoid relativity to background conditions is misguided. On the best interpretation of the interventionist theory, causal claims are assessed relative to a particular kind of variable set. Thus, I conclude that the theory should be understood as variable relative, in a specific, unproblematic sense.
Synthese, Apr 7, 2018
Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensiti... more Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensitive to normative considerations. Previous work has focused on the concept of actual causation, defending the claim that whether or not some token event c is a cause of another token event e is influenced by both statistical and prescriptive norms. I focus on the policy debate surrounding alternative energies, and use the causal modelling framework to show that in this context, people's normative commitments don't just affect the causal claims they are willing to endorse, but also their understanding of the causal structure. In the context of the alternative energy debate, normative considerations affect our (implicit) understanding of the causal structure by influencing our judgements about which variables should be held fixed, and therefore which variables should be relegated to the background of a causal model. In cases of extreme disagreement, normative commitments can also affect which causal structure we think should be instantiated. Thus, focusing on a new context has revealed a previously unexplored sense in which normative factors are incorporated into causal reasoning.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2018
1 For example, see Cartwright (2007); Cartwright and Efstathiou (2009); Cartwright and Hardie (20... more 1 For example, see Cartwright (2007); Cartwright and Efstathiou (2009); Cartwright and Hardie (2012). 2 From now on, references to 'interventionism' and 'the interventionist theory' should be understood as referring specifically to the Woodwardian version of this theory.
Synthese, 2018
Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensiti... more Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensitive to normative considerations. Previous work has focused on the concept of actual causation, defending the claim that whether or not some token event c is a cause of another token event e is influenced by both statistical and prescriptive norms. I focus on the policy debate surrounding alternative energies, and use the causal modelling framework to show that in this context, people's normative commitments don't just affect the causal claims they are willing to endorse, but also their understanding of the causal structure. In the context of the alternative energy debate, normative considerations affect our (implicit) understanding of the causal structure by influencing our judgements about which variables should be held fixed, and therefore which variables should be relegated to the background of a causal model. In cases of extreme disagreement, normative commitments can also affect which causal structure we think should be instantiated. Thus, focusing on a new context has revealed a previously unexplored sense in which normative factors are incorporated into causal reasoning.
Synthese, 2016
I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling thre... more I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling three different ways that chemists are able to manipulate the reaction conditions in order to control the outcome of a reaction. These consist in manipulations to the reaction kinetics, thermodynamics, and whether the kinetics or thermodynamics predominates. It is possible to construct interventionist causal models of all of these kinds of manipulation, and therefore to account for them using Woodward's theory. However, I show that there is an alternate, more illuminating way of thinking about the third kind of reaction control, according to which chemists are thought of as manipulating which causal system is instantiated. I show that our ability to manipulate which system is instantiated is an important part of our ability to control the world, as is therefore especially relevant to interventionism. Thus, considering examples from organic chemistry leads to the identification of an important extension to Woodward's theory. Finally, this investigation into reaction control in organic chemistry also has a more general implication: it suggests that interventionism results in a version of pragmatism about causation.
There have recently been a number of important advances in the philosophy of causation, which imp... more There have recently been a number of important advances in the philosophy of causation, which impact our understanding of both the nature of causation and of causal reasoning. Two stand out in particular: First, a large body of work on the way that normative factors can influence causal judgement casts doubt on the intuitive idea that causation is a purely natural relation, independent of human interests and values. Second, the so-called ‘causal modelling framework’—developed by computer scientists and statisticians as a formalism for discovering causal relations—has turned out to be a powerful and extremely fruitful method for representing causal systems. It has also been incorporated into the philosophy of causation as the basis of James Woodward’s influential interventionist (or manipulability) theory (Woodward 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to these recent developments, to show how they are related, and to comment on their relevance to linguistics.
Philosophical Studies, 2017
The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theor... more The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is variable relative. In an influential review, Strevens has accused Woodward’s account of a damaging form of variable relativity, according to which obviously false causal claims can be made true by choosing a depleted variable set. Following McCain, I show that Strevens’ objection doesn’t succeed. However, Woodward also wants to avoid another kind of variable relativity, according to which it can be true that X is a cause of Y in one set of background conditions, but false in another. I show that Woodward’s account is problematically overpermissive, unless there are restrictions on the values that certain variables can take. I formulate a modified account that makes these restrictions explicit, then use it to argue that Woodward’s attempt to avoid relativity to background conditions is misguided. On the best interpretation of the interventionist theory, causal claims are assessed relative to a particular kind of variable set. Thus, I conclude that the theory should be understood as variable relative, in a specific, unproblematic sense.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2016
Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, ... more Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, discussions of these accounts have neglected important questions, including how the context determines the contrasts (or defaults), and what shared knowledge is necessary for this to be possible. I address these questions, using organic chemistry as a case study. Focusing on one example-nucleophilic substitution-I show that the kinds of causal claims that can be made about an organic reaction depend on how the reaction is modelled, and argue that paying attention to the various ways that reactions are modelled has important implications for our understanding of causation. 1 Introduction 2 General Contrastive Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry 3 Deviant Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry 4 Nucleophilic Substitution Reactions 5 The Causal Modelling Tradition 5.1 The type/token distinction 6 Competing Reactions 6.1 Type-and token-causal claims, variables, and values of variables 7 Disambiguation of 'Reaction' 8 Reaction Kinds 9 Specific Reactions 9.1 Specific reactions and token-causal claims 9.2 Specific reactions and type-causal claims 10 Implications 10.1 Kinds of causal claim 10.2 Contrastive and deviant causal claims 10.3 Model relativity
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
In the area of social science, in particular, although we have developed methods for reliably dis... more In the area of social science, in particular, although we have developed methods for reliably discovering the existence of causal relationships, we are not very good at using these to design effective social policy. Cartwright argues that in order to improve our ability to use causal relationships, it is essential to develop a theory of causation that makes explicit the connections between the nature of causation, our best methods for discovering causal relationships, and the uses to which these are put. I argue that Woodward's interventionist theory of causation is uniquely suited to meet Cartwright's challenge. More specifically, interventionist mechanisms can provide the bridge from 'hunting causes' to 'using them', if interventionists (i) tell us more about the nature of these mechanisms, and (ii) endorse the claim that it is these mechanisms—or whatever constitutes them—that make causal claims true. I illustrate how having an understanding of interventionist mechanisms can allow us to put causal knowledge to use via a detailed example from organic chemistry. In a series of works, Nancy Cartwright has observed that we tend to be far better at establishing the existence of causal relationships than effectively using these to manipulate the world, especially in the area of social policy. 1 In her words, we are better at 'hunting causes' than 'using them' (2007). In order to move between these two parts of causal reasoning, we need to use causal knowledge to make accurate predictions about the effects of specific interventions. This is what I dub 'the use problem'. Cartwright argues that in order to overcome the use problem, we need a theory of causation that illuminates the connection between the nature of causal relationships, our best methods for discovering these, and the uses to which these are put. Her challenge to philosophers of causation is therefore to develop such a theory (2007; 2009). I accept Cartwright's challenge , and agree that existing theories of causation fail to meet it. However, I argue that 1 For example, see Cartwright (2007); Cartwright and Efstathiou (2009); Cartwright and Hardie (2012).
Synthese
Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensiti... more Recently, there has been a large amount of support for the idea that causal claims can be sensitive to normative considerations. Previous work has focused on the concept of actual causation, defending the claim that whether or not some token event c is a cause of another token event e is influenced by both statistical and prescriptive norms. I focus on the policy debate surrounding alternative energies, and use the causal modelling framework to show that in this context, people's normative commitments don't just affect the causal claims they are willing to endorse, but also their understanding of the causal structure. In the context of the alternative energy debate, normative considerations affect our (implicit) understanding of the causal structure by influencing our judgements about which variables should be held fixed, and therefore which variables should be relegated to the background of a causal model. In cases of extreme disagreement, normative commitments can also affect which causal structure we think should be instantiated. Thus, focusing on a new context has revealed a previously unexplored sense in which normative factors are incorporated into causal reasoning.
Philosophical Studies, 2017
The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theor... more The aim of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is variable relative. In an influential review, Strevens has accused Woodward’s account of a damaging form of variable relativity, according to which obviously false causal claims can be made true by choosing a depleted variable set. Following McCain, I show that Strevens’ objection doesn’t succeed. However, Woodward also wants to avoid another kind of variable relativity, according to which it can be true that X is a cause of Y in one set of background conditions, but false in another. I show that Woodward’s account is problematically overpermissive, unless there are restrictions on the values that certain variables can take. I formulate a modified account that makes these restrictions explicit, then use it to
argue that Woodward’s attempt to avoid relativity to background conditions is misguided. On the best interpretation of the interventionist theory, causal claims are assessed relative to a particular kind of variable set. Thus, I conclude that the theory should be understood as variable relative, in a specific, unproblematic sense.
Synthese, 2016
I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling thre... more I apply James Woodward's interventionist theory of causation to organic chemistry, modelling three different ways that chemists are able to manipulate the reaction conditions in order to control the outcome of a reaction. These consist in manipulations to the reaction kinetics, thermodynamics, and whether the kinetics or thermodynamics predominates. It is possible to construct interventionist causal models of all of these kinds of manipulation, and therefore to account for them using Woodward's theory. However, I show that there is an alternate, more illuminating way of thinking about the third kind of reaction control, according to which chemists are thought of as manipulating which causal system is instantiated. I show that our ability to manipulate which system is instantiated is an important part of our ability to control the world, as is therefore especially relevant to interventionism. Thus, considering examples from organic chemistry leads to the identification of an important extension to Woodward's theory. Finally, this investigation into reaction control in organic chemistry also has a more general implication: it suggests that interventionism results in a version of pragmatism about causation.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 2017
Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, ... more Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, discussions of these accounts have neglected important questions, including how the context determines the contrasts (or defaults), and what shared knowledge is necessary for this to be possible. I address these questions, using organic chemistry as a case study. Focusing on one example—nucleophilic substitution—I show that the kinds of causal claims that can be made about an organic reaction depend on how the reaction is modelled, and argue that paying attention to the various ways that reactions are modelled has important implications for our understanding of causation.
Book Reviews by Georgie Statham
Uploads
Papers by Georgie Statham
argue that Woodward’s attempt to avoid relativity to background conditions is misguided. On the best interpretation of the interventionist theory, causal claims are assessed relative to a particular kind of variable set. Thus, I conclude that the theory should be understood as variable relative, in a specific, unproblematic sense.
Book Reviews by Georgie Statham
argue that Woodward’s attempt to avoid relativity to background conditions is misguided. On the best interpretation of the interventionist theory, causal claims are assessed relative to a particular kind of variable set. Thus, I conclude that the theory should be understood as variable relative, in a specific, unproblematic sense.