Brennan Hughes
Phone: 6158150433
Address: London, Kentucky
Address: London, Kentucky
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Papers by Brennan Hughes
One answer is found in the anthropological “survivals” known as “uncleanness” and “taboos.” These visceral, often subconscious, feelings function to preserve order, the status quo, and class distinctions. Despite the gains made in civil rights, nonwhites and the underclass remain “the other,” and they threaten to “contaminate” the majority population. Crime itself, as a threat to social stability, has become charged with a powerful ability to attract and repel. Crime and criminals are described using terms for dirt and feces. The majority culture’s response to crime (which is linked with its unconscious response to the lower class and minorities) is to expel such pollution into sealed containers called prisons. The ritualism of civic religion completes the purification process.
Deeply felt taboos also persist concerning sex and drugs. While marijuana possession and use harms no one but the user, marijuana is historically taboo on account of its association with minorities and radicals. Incest is criminalized and sex with minors is hyper-punished because they violate deeply felt sexual taboos.
I argue that one promising solution is to help people develop a stronger taboo (through education) that can cancel out the dehumanizing taboos toward criminals (just as the taboo against homophobia has supplanted the taboo against homosexuality). We will continue to overpunish until hyper-punishment itself becomes repulsive.
It is unfortunate that many courts have effectively read the word "corruptly" out of the statute. The culprit is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sun-Diamond. In that case, the Court distinguished bribery from illegal gratuities, and explained that the difference between the two was that bribery entailed a specific quid pro quo agreement. I argue that the Sun-Diamond Court’s silence on the corrupt intent element does not mean that the corrupt intent element is satisfied by the mere existence of a quid pro quo.
Instead, I focus on the Supreme Court’s stated preference in Sun-Diamond and Skilling that federal anti-corruption laws should be narrowly construed. Bribery laws must be read narrowly because they threaten to capture a great deal of benign political activity, such as logrolling, vote-trading, and campaign contributions by special interest groups. The corrupt intent element functions to effectively narrow these potentially overinclusive anti-corruption laws by requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted with an evil mind. Although the precise contours of moral corruption will vary case-by-case, the corrupt intent element requires prosecutors to argue a theory of why a given quid pro quo was corrupt and therefore illegal.
To add more meat to the bones of corrupt intent, I make a brief detour through political theory to note how one’s political philosophy will affect one’s determination of whether a given quid pro quo (especially one involving a campaign contribution) is corrupt. I also explain that because bribery is effectively a lesser-included offense of Hobbs Act extortion and "honest services" mail or wire fraud, the corrupt intent element should carry over into these crimes.
Drafts by Brennan Hughes
One answer is found in the anthropological “survivals” known as “uncleanness” and “taboos.” These visceral, often subconscious, feelings function to preserve order, the status quo, and class distinctions. Despite the gains made in civil rights, nonwhites and the underclass remain “the other,” and they threaten to “contaminate” the majority population. Crime itself, as a threat to social stability, has become charged with a powerful ability to attract and repel. Crime and criminals are described using terms for dirt and feces. The majority culture’s response to crime (which is linked with its unconscious response to the lower class and minorities) is to expel such pollution into sealed containers called prisons. The ritualism of civic religion completes the purification process.
Deeply felt taboos also persist concerning sex and drugs. While marijuana possession and use harms no one but the user, marijuana is historically taboo on account of its association with minorities and radicals. Incest is criminalized and sex with minors is hyper-punished because they violate deeply felt sexual taboos.
I argue that one promising solution is to help people develop a stronger taboo (through education) that can cancel out the dehumanizing taboos toward criminals (just as the taboo against homophobia has supplanted the taboo against homosexuality). We will continue to overpunish until hyper-punishment itself becomes repulsive.
It is unfortunate that many courts have effectively read the word "corruptly" out of the statute. The culprit is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sun-Diamond. In that case, the Court distinguished bribery from illegal gratuities, and explained that the difference between the two was that bribery entailed a specific quid pro quo agreement. I argue that the Sun-Diamond Court’s silence on the corrupt intent element does not mean that the corrupt intent element is satisfied by the mere existence of a quid pro quo.
Instead, I focus on the Supreme Court’s stated preference in Sun-Diamond and Skilling that federal anti-corruption laws should be narrowly construed. Bribery laws must be read narrowly because they threaten to capture a great deal of benign political activity, such as logrolling, vote-trading, and campaign contributions by special interest groups. The corrupt intent element functions to effectively narrow these potentially overinclusive anti-corruption laws by requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted with an evil mind. Although the precise contours of moral corruption will vary case-by-case, the corrupt intent element requires prosecutors to argue a theory of why a given quid pro quo was corrupt and therefore illegal.
To add more meat to the bones of corrupt intent, I make a brief detour through political theory to note how one’s political philosophy will affect one’s determination of whether a given quid pro quo (especially one involving a campaign contribution) is corrupt. I also explain that because bribery is effectively a lesser-included offense of Hobbs Act extortion and "honest services" mail or wire fraud, the corrupt intent element should carry over into these crimes.