Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationship... more Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the following three features: (i) the same work content or domain of activity; (ii) the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or (iii) the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one's work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them.
Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors... more Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussed how to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly. Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms of both reasons and reasons to require: A is required to φ iff (i) A has most reason to φ, and (ii) there is most reason to require A to φ. This promising proposal faces two open questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A to φ if A has most reason to φ, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons play in generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue that the key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moral explanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriate responses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained in terms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.
Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any non-consequentialist moral theory. Many au... more Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any non-consequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral value. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps to reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism.
A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentia... more A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories is to unravel the background assumptions of the respective views and discuss their plausibility. This paper discusses a background assumption of onsequentialism that has not been noticed so far. Consequentialists claim that morality is about maximizing the impersonal good, and the background assumption is that an appropriate response to the impersonal good is necessarily a response to the impersonal good as a whole. In this paper, I argue that we should understand the impersonal good as a complex good, and that an appropriate responses to a complex good need not be a response to that good as whole. This constitutes a novel objection against consequentialism.
Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that... more Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsi-cally good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good. Sacrifices are normatively relevant: whenever an agent makes a sacrifice or bears the risk of doing so, this has an impact on her practical reasons. But the sacrifices of an agent can also be normatively relevant for others: when A makes a sacrifice, then this can have an impact on the reasons of B, either by giving new B reasons for action or altering the strength of B's existing reasons for specific courses of action. For example, if A sacrifices her life in order to save B's life, then B ought not continue living his life as if nothing has happened. Rather, B has reason to respond to that sacrifice, not only through his thoughts and attitudes, but also through the way how he lives his life. I will refer to this phenomenon as the other-regarding normative impact of sacrifices. 1 Such other-regarding normative impact is an underappreciated feature of sacrifices insofar as most authors who work on sacrifices discuss what impact a sacrifice has on the normative situation of the agent who makes that sacrifice. This is especially clear in the context of demandingness in ethics. 2 Many authors assume that an act that involves great sacrifice on behalf of the agent (or that implies a significant risk of involving a great sacrifice) ceases to be obligatory. For example, if I can save another person's life by pressing a button while I sit in my comfortable armchair, it seems reasonable to suppose that I am required to do so. But if pressing the button will give me a lethal
A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationsh... more A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one’s friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted.
Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral... more Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account for the phenomenon that some acts are supererogatory when performed on behalf of a stranger but obligatory when performed on behalf of a loved one. This paper offers a novel view of associative duties, according to which such duties arise because relationships serve as indirect intensifiers of moral reasons: they decrease the cost to the agent that certain acts imply, and this increases the relative weight of the reasons that speak in favour of the act in an all-things-considered judgement. This reconciles moral egalitarianism and associative duties in a promising way: the moral worth of a person always generates the same moral reasons, but due to differences in the cost to the agent, these reasons sometimes amount to obligations and sometimes do not.
Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationship... more Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the following three features: (i) the same work content or domain of activity; (ii) the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or (iii) the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one's work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them.
Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors... more Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussed how to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly. Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms of both reasons and reasons to require: A is required to φ iff (i) A has most reason to φ, and (ii) there is most reason to require A to φ. This promising proposal faces two open questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A to φ if A has most reason to φ, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons play in generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue that the key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moral explanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriate responses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained in terms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.
Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any non-consequentialist moral theory. Many au... more Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any non-consequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral value. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps to reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism.
A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentia... more A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories is to unravel the background assumptions of the respective views and discuss their plausibility. This paper discusses a background assumption of onsequentialism that has not been noticed so far. Consequentialists claim that morality is about maximizing the impersonal good, and the background assumption is that an appropriate response to the impersonal good is necessarily a response to the impersonal good as a whole. In this paper, I argue that we should understand the impersonal good as a complex good, and that an appropriate responses to a complex good need not be a response to that good as whole. This constitutes a novel objection against consequentialism.
Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that... more Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsi-cally good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good. Sacrifices are normatively relevant: whenever an agent makes a sacrifice or bears the risk of doing so, this has an impact on her practical reasons. But the sacrifices of an agent can also be normatively relevant for others: when A makes a sacrifice, then this can have an impact on the reasons of B, either by giving new B reasons for action or altering the strength of B's existing reasons for specific courses of action. For example, if A sacrifices her life in order to save B's life, then B ought not continue living his life as if nothing has happened. Rather, B has reason to respond to that sacrifice, not only through his thoughts and attitudes, but also through the way how he lives his life. I will refer to this phenomenon as the other-regarding normative impact of sacrifices. 1 Such other-regarding normative impact is an underappreciated feature of sacrifices insofar as most authors who work on sacrifices discuss what impact a sacrifice has on the normative situation of the agent who makes that sacrifice. This is especially clear in the context of demandingness in ethics. 2 Many authors assume that an act that involves great sacrifice on behalf of the agent (or that implies a significant risk of involving a great sacrifice) ceases to be obligatory. For example, if I can save another person's life by pressing a button while I sit in my comfortable armchair, it seems reasonable to suppose that I am required to do so. But if pressing the button will give me a lethal
A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationsh... more A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one’s friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted.
Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral... more Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account for the phenomenon that some acts are supererogatory when performed on behalf of a stranger but obligatory when performed on behalf of a loved one. This paper offers a novel view of associative duties, according to which such duties arise because relationships serve as indirect intensifiers of moral reasons: they decrease the cost to the agent that certain acts imply, and this increases the relative weight of the reasons that speak in favour of the act in an all-things-considered judgement. This reconciles moral egalitarianism and associative duties in a promising way: the moral worth of a person always generates the same moral reasons, but due to differences in the cost to the agent, these reasons sometimes amount to obligations and sometimes do not.
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Papers by Jörg Löschke