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Enzo Nussio

University of Zurich, Switzerland, Political Science, Faculty Member

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I am a Research Professor at the Department of Political Science (University of Zurich) where I lead a Consolidator project called "Decades of Peace". My work focuses on peace, violence, and institutions, mainly in Latin America. Previously, I worked as Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich.

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Ali Ab Ul Hassan

University of Lahore, Lahore Pakistan

Phaidon Vassiliou

Uppsala University

University of Tartu

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Daphna Oyserman

University of Southern California

Karyna Korostelina

George Mason University

Università degli Studi "La Sapienza" di Roma

Magnus Ferguson

University of Chicago

University of Amsterdam

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Papers by Enzo Nussio

How Moral Beliefs Influence Collective Violence. Evidence From Lynching in Mexico

Comparative Political Studies, 2025

How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that... more How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that, first, moral beliefs are influential depending on their salience, as harm avoidance is a common moral concern. The more accessible moral beliefs in decision-making, the more they restrain harmful behavior. Second, moral beliefs are influential depending on their content. Grouporiented moral beliefs can overturn the harm avoidance principle and motivate individuals to favor collective violence. Analysis is based on a representative survey in Mexico City and focuses on a proximate form of collective violence, locally called lynching. Findings support both logics of moral influence. Experimentally induced moral salience reduces favorability to lynching, and group-oriented moral beliefs are related to more favorability. Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality and present it as cheap talk, these findings demonstrate how moral beliefs can both restrain and motivate collective violence.

A Wave of Lynching: Morality and Authority in Post-Tsunami Aceh

Comparative Politics, 2022

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions ca... more Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.

Por qué los rebeldes dejan de luchar? Declive organizacional y deserción en la insurgencia de Colombia 1

Colombia Internacional, 2022

Objetivo/contexto: la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes imp... more Objetivo/contexto: la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes implicaciones para la contrainsurgencia, la terminación de una guerra y la dinámica de reclutamiento. Si bien la investigación existente enfatiza la importancia de motivaciones individuales para la deserción, el declive organizacional, en forma de adversidad militar y financiera, también puede condicionar la deserción. El declive organizacional socava los instrumentos de un grupo para canalizar las preferencias individuales hacia la acción colectiva. Estos instrumentos incluyen los incentivos selectivos, el atractivo ideológico y la coerción. Cuando el poder vinculante de estos instrumentos disminuye, los deseos individuales comienzan a dominar el comportamiento, lo que aumenta la probabilidad de deserción. Metodología: se utiliza la insurgencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) para examinar este argumento con un enfoque multimétodo. Primero, se realiza un análisis cuantitativo para explorar datos únicos sobre más de 19.000 desertores de las FARC reportados entre 2002 y 2017, proporcionados por el Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. Al protegerse contra amenazas a la inferencia causal, el análisis estadístico indica que el declive organizacional impulsa la deserción. En segundo lugar, se lleva a cabo un análisis cualitativo utilizando una gran cantidad de informes detallados sobre entrevistas con desertores realizadas por personal militar colombiano. Conclusiones: los informes demuestran que el declive organizacional debilita los incentivos selectivos, la ideología del grupo y un régimen coercitivo creíble, y fomenta la deserción mediante estos mecanismos. Originalidad: estos hallazgos brindan información clave para los formuladores de políticas, dado que la deserción puede contribuir tanto a poner fin a un conflicto como a acelerar el reclutamiento de nuevos combatientes.

Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia's Insurgency

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

International Security, 2021

Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurg... more Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurgency, war termination, and recruitment dynamics. While existing research stresses the importance of individual motivations for desertion, organizational decline, in the form of military and financial adversity, can also condition desertion. Organizational decline undermines a group's instruments to channel individual preferences into collective action. These instruments include selective incentives, ideological appeal, and coercion. When the binding power of these instruments diminishes, individual desires start to dominate behavior, making desertion more likely. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency is used to examine this argument with a multimethod approach. First, a quantitative analysis employs unique data on more than 19,000 reported FARC deserters from 2002 to 2017, provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense. Guarding against threats to causal inference, statistical analysis indicates that organizational decline drives desertion. Second, a qualitative analysis uses a large body of detailed reports on interviews with deserters conducted by Colombian military personnel. The reports demonstrate that organizational decline weakens selective incentives, group ideology, and a credible coercive regime, and fosters desertion through these mechanisms. These findings provide key insights for policymakers, given that desertion can both contribute to ending conflict and accelerate the recruitment of new combatants.

The Colombian Trap: Another Partial Peace

CSS Analyses, 2020

Even though a series of armed groups have demobilized and violence has declined over recent decad... more

Can Crime Foster Social Participation as Conflict Can?

Social Science Quarterly, 2019

Objective Recent literature indicates that exposure to conflict can foster participation. Scholar... more Objective
Recent literature indicates that exposure to conflict can foster participation. Scholars often point to the social dynamics related to conflict to explain this finding. This article examines individual coping as alternative explanation. It should influence victims of violence independently of the origin of victimization.

Methods
Using data from four survey waves in Colombia conducted between 2013 and 2015 (N = 5,536), victims of conflict actors are compared to victims of common delinquency with fixed effects regression analysis.

Results
Both conflict and crime victims show elevated levels of participation in social organizations across a series of model specifications.

Conclusion
Theories related to the social dynamics of conflict cannot explain why crime victims show similarly elevated levels of participation as conflict victims. Individual coping theory provides an alternative. According to this theory, victims of violence seek support and participation to deal with emotional stress independent of the source of victimization.

Deterring delinquents with information. Evidence from a randomized poster campaign in Bogotá

by Enzo Nussio and Ervyn Norza

PLOS ONE, 2018

In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealin... more In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealing to their apprehension risk perception. A randomized trial was conducted around 154 high crime housing blocks in Bogotá. With support of the Colombian Police, half of the blocks were exposed to a three month poster campaign reporting the number of " arrests around this street block " and half to a no-treatment control condition. The main outcome measure (total registered crime) and secondary outcome measures (calls to the emergency line for thefts and attacks, and minor wrongdoings) were provided by the Police. Additionally , trust in police, security perception, and police performance perception were measured among residents and workers in the treatment and control areas (N = 616) using a post-treatment survey. Measures were analyzed with linear regression analysis and two-sample t-tests. Over the course of the treatment period, premeditated crime was reduced, while spontaneous crime remained unchanged. Overall levels of crime were not significantly altered. Also, a moderate crime reduction is detectable during the first month of the treatment period. The posters were highly visible (93% of respondents in the treated areas recalled them) and positively received (67% " liked " them). Perceptions of security and police among locals improved, though not significantly. Inherent among residents of Bogotá is a pervasive feeling of impunity and low trust in authorities, making the city a hard test case for an offender-targeted advertising campaign. Initial reductions of crime and overall reductions of premeditated crime are thus noteworthy. These results align with key principles of apprehension risk updating theory.

Desmovilizados: Víctimas y Causas de Inseguridad. Estudio de caso sobre el municipio de Tierralta en el departamento de Córdoba

by Juan Munevar and Enzo Nussio

Segundo Informe del Observatorio de DDR y Ley de …, Jan 1, 2009

The Role of Sensation Seeking in Violent Armed Group Participation

An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fightin... more An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fighting for a public good, when they can free-ride and enjoy the same benefits if others take the risk. This logic is particularly important to rationalist theories, which view risk as an inherent cost to violent armed group participation – which has to be offset by selective incentives, peer pressure or coercion. This perspective has widely contributed to the understanding of violent conflict, but ignores key insights from psychology. What if risk is not a cost and instead attractive? In this article, I argue that people with a sensation seeking personality – interested in novel and intense experience and willing to accept risk for the sake of it – are more likely to join armed groups. Preliminary survey evidence comparing voluntarily and forcibly recruited members of Colombian armed groups supports my argument. The re-interpretation of a series of existing studies on Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary fighters illustrates the pervasiveness and varying manifestations of sensation seeking. Personality traits are an under-recognized ingredient in the process of joining armed groups and complement our current understanding, which is mainly determined by contextual conditions and situational motivations.

Ex-Combatants and Post-Conflict Violence: Are Yesterday's Villains Today's Principal Threat?

Demobilized combatants are generally portrayed as threat to security in post-conflict countries. ... more Demobilized combatants are generally portrayed as threat to security in post-conflict countries. In this article, I assess how much ex-combatants actually contribute to violence in the case of demobilized paramilitaries and guerrilla deserters in Colombia. I present evidence that puts the assumed ex-combatant-threat nexus in perspective. First, participation of ex-combatants in violence in Colombia is too small to unsettle overall criminal dynamics. Second, ex-combatants grow older and less interested in violence as well as more interested in family life. And third, criminal organizations that emerged after the paramilitary demobilization have continuously replaced ex-combatants and quickly relied on a new generation of recruits. An obsession with the ex-combatant category may inhibit more focused attention on key populations with high damage potential, like mid-ranking ex-combatants, and a broader inclusion of marginalized youth vulnerable to recruitment. Also, my analysis shows that the continuity of war economies is largely independent from whether ex-combatants or other people exploit criminal rents. Overly focusing on persons, like ex-combatants, instead of dealing with malignant structures might thus produce futile results.

Peace and Violence in Colombia

For Marxist guerillas in Latin America, the end is near. The government of Colombia is negotiatin... more For Marxist guerillas in Latin America, the end is near. The government of Colombia is negotiating with the last of the rebels, FARC and ELN. But a peace agreement will not make the widespread violence disappear, as the criminal underworld is expected to reorganize and everyday violence will continue. The example of urban innovation in Medellín gives reason for hope.

Presencia de desmovilizados e inseguridad en las ciudades. Casos de estudio: Villavicencio, Montería y Bogotá

by Enzo Nussio, Juan Esteban Ugarriza, and Frederic Masse

El Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz (CITpax) es una fundación sin ánimo de lucro que ti... more El Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz (CITpax) es una fundación sin ánimo de lucro que tiene como objetivo contribuir a la prevención y resolución de conflictos, la gestión de crisis y la consolidación de la paz en el marco del respeto y promoción de los derechos humanos y los valores democráticos. CITpax asume que la búsqueda de la paz duradera implica la puesta en práctica de acciones de transformación social, desarrollo y fortalecimiento institucional. Por tanto, pretende buscar soluciones a conflictos nacionales o internacionales a través de la mediación, la facilitación y la elaboración de propuestas-puente, utilizando la diplomacia de segunda vía, también llamada diplomacia paralela, que recurre a actores de la sociedad civil que tienen capacidad de influencia sobre quienes toman las decisiones.

¿Son los guerrilleros diferentes de los paramilitares? Una integración y validación sistemática de estudios motivacionales en Colombia

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

RESUMEN ¿Es el combatiente de grupos de guerrilla y el de grupos paramilitares en el fondo el mis... more RESUMEN ¿Es el combatiente de grupos de guerrilla y el de grupos paramilitares en el fondo el mismo tipo de persona? La evidencia sugiere que ambos atraviesan diferentes tipos de experiencia de guerra y procesos de socialización, y habría que esperar que se comportaran de forma disímil luego de su desmovilización. En este estudio, demostramos que los miembros de grupos de guerrilla y paramilitares en Colombia se mueven por motivaciones claramente distinguibles en su decisión de unirse a sus respectivos grupos, en las que los condicionantes contextuales se mezclan con diferentes lógicas de nivel personal. Nuestro análisis se basa en la integración sistemática de hipótesis relevantes extraídas de estudios previos y una validación de sus hallazgos en una base de datos de 1.485 excombatientes en Colombia.

There is No Pill for Deliberation. Explaining Discourse Quality in Postconflict Communities

Recent experimental research suggests that ordinary citizens are capable of behaving in a democra... more Recent experimental research suggests that ordinary citizens are capable of behaving in a democratic and deliberative way in controversial political debates, given the right instructions. In this study, we test the potential of such instructions in contexts where polarization, conflict and social marginalization levels are high. Using a randomized, controlled experimental design, we test the effect of encouraging members of marginalized and conflict-affected communities in Colombia to live up to the deliberative ideal, including free participation, respect, justification of arguments and orientation toward the common good. Results indicate that deliberative instructions have a positive effect on intervention levels, but fail to increase discourse quality. Moving beyond the experimental conditions, we find that socio-economic differences (especially education and gender), as well as inter-group trust and discussion dynamics, explain much of the variation in discourse quality. Promoting a deliberative democracy under unfavorable conditions might thus require a combination of short-term policy measures aimed at increasing communal trust, long-term efforts to improve schooling levels, and a proper institutional design that ensures constraint-free participation. However, there is no pill yet for deliberation.

The Effect of Perspective-giving on Post-conflict Reconciliation. An Experimental Approach

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

Discussion groups are a promising tool for bridging the divide between former conflict antagonist... more Discussion groups are a promising tool for bridging the divide between former conflict antagonists. However, such groups do not always produce the desired outcome of improved attitudes, even when they meet the conditions generally seen as favoring positive interaction. In this article, we examine specific discussion protocols that mitigate polarization risks while fostering reconciliation. Using a randomized, controlled design, we formed a pool of 429 ex-combatants and members of conflict-affected communities in Colombia. Participants were asked to join heterogeneous groups and discuss their proposals for the future of Colombia. Those who were randomly assigned to a perspective-giving treatment protocol (where they were asked to refer to their personal experience and perspective) consistently improved their inter-group attitudes, and by a proportionally higher percentage than those taking part under argumentation and control conditions. The positive effect was strongest for attitudes held by community members toward ex-combatants.

When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence

by Enzo Nussio and kimberly Howe

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014

The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal... more The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. Using the method of process tracing, this paper explores the case of Córdoba Department, Colombia where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of paramilitary groups (AUC) in 2005. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds support in other AUC dominated regions of Colombia.

Anti-Social Capital in Former Members of Non-State Armed Groups: A Case Study of Colombia

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2014

Illegal organizations, like mafia syndicates, gangs and insurgencies, are often highly cohesive a... more Illegal organizations, like mafia syndicates, gangs and insurgencies, are often highly cohesive and hostile towards the outside world. Such groups cultivate a particular form of “anti-social” capital, which relies on in-group bonding and limits out-group bridging for the purpose of commissioning illicit acts. We argue that experiences within the group leave members with varying intensities of anti-social capital, and that higher intensities lead to significantly weaker relationships with political institutions and civil society, even many years after they exit the group. We test this theory using survey data from 1,485 former members of insurgent and paramilitary groups in Colombia, along with insights from 68 qualitative interviews. We find strong evidence that anti-social capital has individually varying and sticky effects on former members. These effects are pervasive and intense, and exhibit surprising and counterintuitive properties: former members of pro-state militia with higher levels of anti-social capital are systematically less likely to trust political institutions, while members of peasant-based insurgent groups with high levels of anti-social capital are less likely to participate in their communities.

Understanding Unlikely Successes in Urban Violence Reduction

by Enzo Nussio and Kristian Hoelscher

Urban Studies, 2015

The problems of violence in Latin America are often reiterated, yet explanations of how and why v... more The problems of violence in Latin America are often reiterated, yet explanations of how and why violence declines are far less prevalent. Social violence is frequently seen to be exacerbated by the challenges of democratisation, inequality, and urbanisation, yet this article suggests that violence may also be contingent upon the role of institutions. The article explores this contention using a comparative analysis of two cities: Bogotá in Colombia and Recife in Brazil, which have recently seen unusual and marked reductions in lethal violence. Drawing on primary data collection in both cities, case studies suggest that improvements in public security are not consistent with political, economic or demographic conditions, and are instead associated with institutional and social reforms encouraging civic values and commitments to non-violence. While empirical findings are specific to these two cases, the article’s broader theoretical implications plausibly apply to a broader range of cities, and suggest that committed efforts to improve institutions can overcome structural risk factors that foster violence.

Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Colombia

by Enzo Nussio and Oliver Kaplan

What are the determinants of the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In p... more What are the determinants of the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In post-conflict settings around the world there has been growing interest in and reliance upon community-based programs and activities to bring ex-combatants back into society. Implicit in these programs is the theory that the social participation of ex-combatants in the communities where they settle and their acceptance by these communities are helpful for minimizing recidivism to illegal activities and increasing perceptions of security. Participation can help ex-combatants feel socially fulfilled and acceptance by their communities can reduce their needs to maintain social connections to their former armed group networks and bosses. We evaluate individual-level, community-level, and broader security environment predictors of social reintegration using data from a survey of ex-combatants from Colombia. The results suggest that more socially and politically aware ex-combatants in more participatory communities are likely to have an easier time with social reintegration. An implication of this finding is that, to help ex-combatants, reintegration processes should also work to improve the lot of receptor communities.

Victims, Non-victims, and their Opinions on Transitional Justice. Findings from the Colombian Case

by Enzo Nussio, Juan Esteban Ugarriza, and Angelika Rettberg

International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2015

Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differen... more Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differentiate them from non-victims. Based on this premise, they should hold different views from people who have not been directly affected by war about punishing perpetrators of violence, remembering human rights violations, seeking truth, and receiving reparations. The resilience literature, on the other hand, has downplayed the role of traumatic experiences in shaping people’s views and rather stressed their ability to cope with adversity. In this article, we ask whether there are any differences in attitudes towards transitional justice mechanisms between victims and non-victims, using a representative sample of the Colombian population (N=1843, of which 315 are conflict victims). We find almost no statistically significant differences. Psychological resilience among victims may account for this counterintuitive finding. However, we suggest that social desirability biases, a pervasive impact of the long conflict beyond the victim/non-victim divide, and social proximity between victims and perpetrators may also be relevant explanations. Our results are relevant for scholars and policymakers, as they question elements of common (yet untested) wisdom about the political and social impact of violence on individuals’ attitudes and about the prospects of peaceful coexistence.

How Moral Beliefs Influence Collective Violence. Evidence From Lynching in Mexico

Comparative Political Studies, 2025

How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that... more How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that, first, moral beliefs are influential depending on their salience, as harm avoidance is a common moral concern. The more accessible moral beliefs in decision-making, the more they restrain harmful behavior. Second, moral beliefs are influential depending on their content. Grouporiented moral beliefs can overturn the harm avoidance principle and motivate individuals to favor collective violence. Analysis is based on a representative survey in Mexico City and focuses on a proximate form of collective violence, locally called lynching. Findings support both logics of moral influence. Experimentally induced moral salience reduces favorability to lynching, and group-oriented moral beliefs are related to more favorability. Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality and present it as cheap talk, these findings demonstrate how moral beliefs can both restrain and motivate collective violence.

A Wave of Lynching: Morality and Authority in Post-Tsunami Aceh

Comparative Politics, 2022

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions ca... more Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.

Por qué los rebeldes dejan de luchar? Declive organizacional y deserción en la insurgencia de Colombia 1

Colombia Internacional, 2022

Objetivo/contexto: la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes imp... more Objetivo/contexto: la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes implicaciones para la contrainsurgencia, la terminación de una guerra y la dinámica de reclutamiento. Si bien la investigación existente enfatiza la importancia de motivaciones individuales para la deserción, el declive organizacional, en forma de adversidad militar y financiera, también puede condicionar la deserción. El declive organizacional socava los instrumentos de un grupo para canalizar las preferencias individuales hacia la acción colectiva. Estos instrumentos incluyen los incentivos selectivos, el atractivo ideológico y la coerción. Cuando el poder vinculante de estos instrumentos disminuye, los deseos individuales comienzan a dominar el comportamiento, lo que aumenta la probabilidad de deserción. Metodología: se utiliza la insurgencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) para examinar este argumento con un enfoque multimétodo. Primero, se realiza un análisis cuantitativo para explorar datos únicos sobre más de 19.000 desertores de las FARC reportados entre 2002 y 2017, proporcionados por el Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. Al protegerse contra amenazas a la inferencia causal, el análisis estadístico indica que el declive organizacional impulsa la deserción. En segundo lugar, se lleva a cabo un análisis cualitativo utilizando una gran cantidad de informes detallados sobre entrevistas con desertores realizadas por personal militar colombiano. Conclusiones: los informes demuestran que el declive organizacional debilita los incentivos selectivos, la ideología del grupo y un régimen coercitivo creíble, y fomenta la deserción mediante estos mecanismos. Originalidad: estos hallazgos brindan información clave para los formuladores de políticas, dado que la deserción puede contribuir tanto a poner fin a un conflicto como a acelerar el reclutamiento de nuevos combatientes.

Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia's Insurgency

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

International Security, 2021

Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurg... more Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurgency, war termination, and recruitment dynamics. While existing research stresses the importance of individual motivations for desertion, organizational decline, in the form of military and financial adversity, can also condition desertion. Organizational decline undermines a group's instruments to channel individual preferences into collective action. These instruments include selective incentives, ideological appeal, and coercion. When the binding power of these instruments diminishes, individual desires start to dominate behavior, making desertion more likely. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency is used to examine this argument with a multimethod approach. First, a quantitative analysis employs unique data on more than 19,000 reported FARC deserters from 2002 to 2017, provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense. Guarding against threats to causal inference, statistical analysis indicates that organizational decline drives desertion. Second, a qualitative analysis uses a large body of detailed reports on interviews with deserters conducted by Colombian military personnel. The reports demonstrate that organizational decline weakens selective incentives, group ideology, and a credible coercive regime, and fosters desertion through these mechanisms. These findings provide key insights for policymakers, given that desertion can both contribute to ending conflict and accelerate the recruitment of new combatants.

The Colombian Trap: Another Partial Peace

CSS Analyses, 2020

Even though a series of armed groups have demobilized and violence has declined over recent decad... more

Can Crime Foster Social Participation as Conflict Can?

Social Science Quarterly, 2019

Objective Recent literature indicates that exposure to conflict can foster participation. Scholar... more Objective
Recent literature indicates that exposure to conflict can foster participation. Scholars often point to the social dynamics related to conflict to explain this finding. This article examines individual coping as alternative explanation. It should influence victims of violence independently of the origin of victimization.

Methods
Using data from four survey waves in Colombia conducted between 2013 and 2015 (N = 5,536), victims of conflict actors are compared to victims of common delinquency with fixed effects regression analysis.

Results
Both conflict and crime victims show elevated levels of participation in social organizations across a series of model specifications.

Conclusion
Theories related to the social dynamics of conflict cannot explain why crime victims show similarly elevated levels of participation as conflict victims. Individual coping theory provides an alternative. According to this theory, victims of violence seek support and participation to deal with emotional stress independent of the source of victimization.

Deterring delinquents with information. Evidence from a randomized poster campaign in Bogotá

by Enzo Nussio and Ervyn Norza

PLOS ONE, 2018

In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealin... more In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealing to their apprehension risk perception. A randomized trial was conducted around 154 high crime housing blocks in Bogotá. With support of the Colombian Police, half of the blocks were exposed to a three month poster campaign reporting the number of " arrests around this street block " and half to a no-treatment control condition. The main outcome measure (total registered crime) and secondary outcome measures (calls to the emergency line for thefts and attacks, and minor wrongdoings) were provided by the Police. Additionally , trust in police, security perception, and police performance perception were measured among residents and workers in the treatment and control areas (N = 616) using a post-treatment survey. Measures were analyzed with linear regression analysis and two-sample t-tests. Over the course of the treatment period, premeditated crime was reduced, while spontaneous crime remained unchanged. Overall levels of crime were not significantly altered. Also, a moderate crime reduction is detectable during the first month of the treatment period. The posters were highly visible (93% of respondents in the treated areas recalled them) and positively received (67% " liked " them). Perceptions of security and police among locals improved, though not significantly. Inherent among residents of Bogotá is a pervasive feeling of impunity and low trust in authorities, making the city a hard test case for an offender-targeted advertising campaign. Initial reductions of crime and overall reductions of premeditated crime are thus noteworthy. These results align with key principles of apprehension risk updating theory.

Desmovilizados: Víctimas y Causas de Inseguridad. Estudio de caso sobre el municipio de Tierralta en el departamento de Córdoba

by Juan Munevar and Enzo Nussio

Segundo Informe del Observatorio de DDR y Ley de …, Jan 1, 2009

The Role of Sensation Seeking in Violent Armed Group Participation

An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fightin... more An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fighting for a public good, when they can free-ride and enjoy the same benefits if others take the risk. This logic is particularly important to rationalist theories, which view risk as an inherent cost to violent armed group participation – which has to be offset by selective incentives, peer pressure or coercion. This perspective has widely contributed to the understanding of violent conflict, but ignores key insights from psychology. What if risk is not a cost and instead attractive? In this article, I argue that people with a sensation seeking personality – interested in novel and intense experience and willing to accept risk for the sake of it – are more likely to join armed groups. Preliminary survey evidence comparing voluntarily and forcibly recruited members of Colombian armed groups supports my argument. The re-interpretation of a series of existing studies on Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary fighters illustrates the pervasiveness and varying manifestations of sensation seeking. Personality traits are an under-recognized ingredient in the process of joining armed groups and complement our current understanding, which is mainly determined by contextual conditions and situational motivations.

Ex-Combatants and Post-Conflict Violence: Are Yesterday's Villains Today's Principal Threat?

Demobilized combatants are generally portrayed as threat to security in post-conflict countries. ... more Demobilized combatants are generally portrayed as threat to security in post-conflict countries. In this article, I assess how much ex-combatants actually contribute to violence in the case of demobilized paramilitaries and guerrilla deserters in Colombia. I present evidence that puts the assumed ex-combatant-threat nexus in perspective. First, participation of ex-combatants in violence in Colombia is too small to unsettle overall criminal dynamics. Second, ex-combatants grow older and less interested in violence as well as more interested in family life. And third, criminal organizations that emerged after the paramilitary demobilization have continuously replaced ex-combatants and quickly relied on a new generation of recruits. An obsession with the ex-combatant category may inhibit more focused attention on key populations with high damage potential, like mid-ranking ex-combatants, and a broader inclusion of marginalized youth vulnerable to recruitment. Also, my analysis shows that the continuity of war economies is largely independent from whether ex-combatants or other people exploit criminal rents. Overly focusing on persons, like ex-combatants, instead of dealing with malignant structures might thus produce futile results.

Peace and Violence in Colombia

For Marxist guerillas in Latin America, the end is near. The government of Colombia is negotiatin... more For Marxist guerillas in Latin America, the end is near. The government of Colombia is negotiating with the last of the rebels, FARC and ELN. But a peace agreement will not make the widespread violence disappear, as the criminal underworld is expected to reorganize and everyday violence will continue. The example of urban innovation in Medellín gives reason for hope.

Presencia de desmovilizados e inseguridad en las ciudades. Casos de estudio: Villavicencio, Montería y Bogotá

by Enzo Nussio, Juan Esteban Ugarriza, and Frederic Masse

El Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz (CITpax) es una fundación sin ánimo de lucro que ti... more El Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz (CITpax) es una fundación sin ánimo de lucro que tiene como objetivo contribuir a la prevención y resolución de conflictos, la gestión de crisis y la consolidación de la paz en el marco del respeto y promoción de los derechos humanos y los valores democráticos. CITpax asume que la búsqueda de la paz duradera implica la puesta en práctica de acciones de transformación social, desarrollo y fortalecimiento institucional. Por tanto, pretende buscar soluciones a conflictos nacionales o internacionales a través de la mediación, la facilitación y la elaboración de propuestas-puente, utilizando la diplomacia de segunda vía, también llamada diplomacia paralela, que recurre a actores de la sociedad civil que tienen capacidad de influencia sobre quienes toman las decisiones.

¿Son los guerrilleros diferentes de los paramilitares? Una integración y validación sistemática de estudios motivacionales en Colombia

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

RESUMEN ¿Es el combatiente de grupos de guerrilla y el de grupos paramilitares en el fondo el mis... more RESUMEN ¿Es el combatiente de grupos de guerrilla y el de grupos paramilitares en el fondo el mismo tipo de persona? La evidencia sugiere que ambos atraviesan diferentes tipos de experiencia de guerra y procesos de socialización, y habría que esperar que se comportaran de forma disímil luego de su desmovilización. En este estudio, demostramos que los miembros de grupos de guerrilla y paramilitares en Colombia se mueven por motivaciones claramente distinguibles en su decisión de unirse a sus respectivos grupos, en las que los condicionantes contextuales se mezclan con diferentes lógicas de nivel personal. Nuestro análisis se basa en la integración sistemática de hipótesis relevantes extraídas de estudios previos y una validación de sus hallazgos en una base de datos de 1.485 excombatientes en Colombia.

There is No Pill for Deliberation. Explaining Discourse Quality in Postconflict Communities

Recent experimental research suggests that ordinary citizens are capable of behaving in a democra... more Recent experimental research suggests that ordinary citizens are capable of behaving in a democratic and deliberative way in controversial political debates, given the right instructions. In this study, we test the potential of such instructions in contexts where polarization, conflict and social marginalization levels are high. Using a randomized, controlled experimental design, we test the effect of encouraging members of marginalized and conflict-affected communities in Colombia to live up to the deliberative ideal, including free participation, respect, justification of arguments and orientation toward the common good. Results indicate that deliberative instructions have a positive effect on intervention levels, but fail to increase discourse quality. Moving beyond the experimental conditions, we find that socio-economic differences (especially education and gender), as well as inter-group trust and discussion dynamics, explain much of the variation in discourse quality. Promoting a deliberative democracy under unfavorable conditions might thus require a combination of short-term policy measures aimed at increasing communal trust, long-term efforts to improve schooling levels, and a proper institutional design that ensures constraint-free participation. However, there is no pill yet for deliberation.

The Effect of Perspective-giving on Post-conflict Reconciliation. An Experimental Approach

by Enzo Nussio and Juan Esteban Ugarriza

Discussion groups are a promising tool for bridging the divide between former conflict antagonist... more Discussion groups are a promising tool for bridging the divide between former conflict antagonists. However, such groups do not always produce the desired outcome of improved attitudes, even when they meet the conditions generally seen as favoring positive interaction. In this article, we examine specific discussion protocols that mitigate polarization risks while fostering reconciliation. Using a randomized, controlled design, we formed a pool of 429 ex-combatants and members of conflict-affected communities in Colombia. Participants were asked to join heterogeneous groups and discuss their proposals for the future of Colombia. Those who were randomly assigned to a perspective-giving treatment protocol (where they were asked to refer to their personal experience and perspective) consistently improved their inter-group attitudes, and by a proportionally higher percentage than those taking part under argumentation and control conditions. The positive effect was strongest for attitudes held by community members toward ex-combatants.

When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence

by Enzo Nussio and kimberly Howe

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014

The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal... more The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. Using the method of process tracing, this paper explores the case of Córdoba Department, Colombia where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of paramilitary groups (AUC) in 2005. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds support in other AUC dominated regions of Colombia.

Anti-Social Capital in Former Members of Non-State Armed Groups: A Case Study of Colombia

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2014

Illegal organizations, like mafia syndicates, gangs and insurgencies, are often highly cohesive a... more Illegal organizations, like mafia syndicates, gangs and insurgencies, are often highly cohesive and hostile towards the outside world. Such groups cultivate a particular form of “anti-social” capital, which relies on in-group bonding and limits out-group bridging for the purpose of commissioning illicit acts. We argue that experiences within the group leave members with varying intensities of anti-social capital, and that higher intensities lead to significantly weaker relationships with political institutions and civil society, even many years after they exit the group. We test this theory using survey data from 1,485 former members of insurgent and paramilitary groups in Colombia, along with insights from 68 qualitative interviews. We find strong evidence that anti-social capital has individually varying and sticky effects on former members. These effects are pervasive and intense, and exhibit surprising and counterintuitive properties: former members of pro-state militia with higher levels of anti-social capital are systematically less likely to trust political institutions, while members of peasant-based insurgent groups with high levels of anti-social capital are less likely to participate in their communities.

Understanding Unlikely Successes in Urban Violence Reduction

by Enzo Nussio and Kristian Hoelscher

Urban Studies, 2015

The problems of violence in Latin America are often reiterated, yet explanations of how and why v... more The problems of violence in Latin America are often reiterated, yet explanations of how and why violence declines are far less prevalent. Social violence is frequently seen to be exacerbated by the challenges of democratisation, inequality, and urbanisation, yet this article suggests that violence may also be contingent upon the role of institutions. The article explores this contention using a comparative analysis of two cities: Bogotá in Colombia and Recife in Brazil, which have recently seen unusual and marked reductions in lethal violence. Drawing on primary data collection in both cities, case studies suggest that improvements in public security are not consistent with political, economic or demographic conditions, and are instead associated with institutional and social reforms encouraging civic values and commitments to non-violence. While empirical findings are specific to these two cases, the article’s broader theoretical implications plausibly apply to a broader range of cities, and suggest that committed efforts to improve institutions can overcome structural risk factors that foster violence.

Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Colombia

by Enzo Nussio and Oliver Kaplan

What are the determinants of the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In p... more What are the determinants of the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In post-conflict settings around the world there has been growing interest in and reliance upon community-based programs and activities to bring ex-combatants back into society. Implicit in these programs is the theory that the social participation of ex-combatants in the communities where they settle and their acceptance by these communities are helpful for minimizing recidivism to illegal activities and increasing perceptions of security. Participation can help ex-combatants feel socially fulfilled and acceptance by their communities can reduce their needs to maintain social connections to their former armed group networks and bosses. We evaluate individual-level, community-level, and broader security environment predictors of social reintegration using data from a survey of ex-combatants from Colombia. The results suggest that more socially and politically aware ex-combatants in more participatory communities are likely to have an easier time with social reintegration. An implication of this finding is that, to help ex-combatants, reintegration processes should also work to improve the lot of receptor communities.

Victims, Non-victims, and their Opinions on Transitional Justice. Findings from the Colombian Case

by Enzo Nussio, Juan Esteban Ugarriza, and Angelika Rettberg

International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2015

Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differen... more Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differentiate them from non-victims. Based on this premise, they should hold different views from people who have not been directly affected by war about punishing perpetrators of violence, remembering human rights violations, seeking truth, and receiving reparations. The resilience literature, on the other hand, has downplayed the role of traumatic experiences in shaping people’s views and rather stressed their ability to cope with adversity. In this article, we ask whether there are any differences in attitudes towards transitional justice mechanisms between victims and non-victims, using a representative sample of the Colombian population (N=1843, of which 315 are conflict victims). We find almost no statistically significant differences. Psychological resilience among victims may account for this counterintuitive finding. However, we suggest that social desirability biases, a pervasive impact of the long conflict beyond the victim/non-victim divide, and social proximity between victims and perpetrators may also be relevant explanations. Our results are relevant for scholars and policymakers, as they question elements of common (yet untested) wisdom about the political and social impact of violence on individuals’ attitudes and about the prospects of peaceful coexistence.

Understanding Ex-Combatants. Central Themes in the Lives of Former Paramilitaries in Colombia

To date, the growing body of literature about Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)... more To date, the growing body of literature about Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) has focused primarily on questions of policy design. It has widely neglected the beneficiaries of policy and their lives beyond DDR programmes. The present study intends to balance this shortcoming by systematically describing the individual perspective of ex-combatants. Through a series of 62 interviews with former Colombian paramilitaries, the themes that are central to their lives are identified. The selection of the interviewees and the interview analysis draw on grounded theory. The goal of this inductive approach is to build a substantive theory that consists of interrelated categories grounded in qualitatively collected data. According to the present analysis, the central themes in the ex-combatants’ lives are the emotional legacies stemming from their involvement in war, strategies to overcome security challenges and economic difficulties, as well as a pact with the state, stigma within communities and a disrupted family life. Some preliminary policy implications complement the empirical analysis of this study. The interviewed former combatants demobilised together with their units of the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC). The AUC were a paramilitary federation mostly financed through drug-trafficking who fought against leftist guerrilla groups. After negotiating with the Colombian government, 31’671 members of the AUC demobilised between 2003 and 2006. Since that time, they have received support from a national reintegration programme.

La vida después de la desmovilización. Percepciones, emociones y estrategias de exparamilitares en Colombia

La desmovilización de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) entre los años 2003 y 2006 ha des... more La desmovilización de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) entre los años 2003 y 2006 ha despertado emociones encontradas entre los colombianos. Debates controversiales sobre “falsas desmovilizaciones”, ley de Justicia y Paz, escándalo de la “parapolítica” y el surgimiento de bandas relacionadas con el paramilitarismo han llenado las primeras páginas de los periódicos colombianos. El presente libro toma distancia de la actualidad y propone un análisis a fondo de las percepciones, emociones y estrategias de los individuos que se desmovilizaron de algún bloque paramilitar, elemento que ha faltado tanto en Colombia como en la literatura internacional sobre procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración. Mediante un amplio número de entrevistas analizadas con el método de grounded theory (“teoría fundamentada”) se identifican los temas centrales en las vidas de los excombatientes. Los desmovilizados conviven con legados emocionales de la guerra como el arrepentimiento, el orgullo o el resentimiento; enfrentan desafíos de seguridad por ser expuestos a la violencia de enemigos y compañeros previos; tratan de superar dificultades económicas a menudo con la ayuda del programa gubernamental de reintegración; entienden su relación con el Estado como un pacto que implica deberes para ambas partes; tienen que lidiar con el estigma de ser desmovilizados dentro de sus comunidades, y, muchas veces, llevan una vida familiar perturbada. Esta perspectiva centrada en los excombatientes tiene implicaciones para el diseño de la política pública de reintegración y contribuye a un entendimiento más diferenciado de su situación más allá de simples prejuicios y generalizaciones.

Booknote: Themnér, Anders (2011) Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships. New York: Routledge.

Journal of Peace Research

Nussio - Role of Sensation Seeking 2017.pdf

An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fightin... more An important puzzle in the study of political violence is why individuals risk their life fighting for a public good, when they can free-ride and enjoy the same benefits if others take the risk. This logic is particularly important to rationalist theories, which view risk as an inherent cost to violent armed group participation – which has to be offset by selective incentives, peer pressure or coercion. This perspective has widely contributed to the understanding of violent conflict, but ignores key insights from psychology. What if risk is not a cost and instead attractive? In this article, I argue that people with a sensation seeking personality – interested in novel and intense experience and willing to accept risk for the sake of it – are more likely to join armed groups. Preliminary survey evidence comparing voluntarily and forcibly recruited members of Colombian armed groups supports my argument. The re-interpretation of a series of existing studies on Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary fighters illustrates the pervasiveness and varying manifestations of sensation seeking. Personality traits are an under-recognized ingredient in the process of joining armed groups and complement our current understanding, which is mainly determined by contextual conditions and situational motivations.

Victims, non-victims, and their opinions on transitional justice: Evidence from the Colombian case

by Angelika Rettberg and Enzo Nussio

International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2015

Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differen... more Victims of armed conflict are often seen as driven by trauma-related stark emotions that differentiate them from non-victims. Based on this premise, they should hold different views from people who have not been directly affected by war about punishing perpetrators of violence, remembering human rights violations, seeking truth, and receiving reparations. The resilience literature, on the other hand, has downplayed the role of traumatic experiences in shaping people’s views and rather stressed their ability to cope with adversity. In this article, we ask whether there are any differences in attitudes towards transitional justice mechanisms between victims and non-victims, using a representative sample of the Colombian population (N=1843, of which 315 are conflict victims). We find almost no statistically significant differences. Psychological resilience among victims may account for this counterintuitive finding. However, we suggest that social desirability biases, a pervasive impact of the long conflict beyond the victim/non-victim divide, and social proximity between victims and perpetrators may also be relevant explanations. Our results are relevant for scholars and policymakers, as they question elements of common (yet untested) wisdom about the political and social impact of violence on individuals’ attitudes and about the prospects of peaceful coexistence.

La fuerza centrífuga del posconflicto: las FARC-EP entre la unidad y la desintegración

Spanish Abstract: Cuando los conflictos armados terminan, algunos grupos armados ilegales se conv... more Spanish Abstract: Cuando los conflictos armados terminan, algunos grupos armados ilegales se convierten en organizaciones políticas legales. Si bien en algunos casos no cambian los intentos de tomar el poder o de promover reformas en el escenario democrático, la dinámica interna cambia debido a la desaparición de la disciplina militar. La resultante fuerza centrífuga del posconflicto genera una serie de transformaciones internas: del centro, el cual es el partido u organización política, algunos excombatientes seguirán siendo parte activa mientras que otros se alejarán o renunciarán a estar vinculados con la nueva agrupación. Aparte de las preferencias individuales y del contexto político nacional, creemos que existen al menos tres factores que exacerban o moderan este proceso: las oportunidades rivales que se presentan a los excombatientes, el apoyo local que se deriva en buena medida de la actividad en el conflicto y el nivel de liderazgo integrativo, ejercido no solamente por la cúpula sino también por los antiguos mandos medios. Ilustramos estas dinámicas con el caso del tránsito de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) a la Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC), que inició su proceso de desarme en el año 2017. (Este artículo es parte del manuscrito “Implementación del acuerdo de paz con la(s) FARC: balance e implicaciones" compilado por Erin McFee y Angelika Rettberg)

English Abstract: When armed conflicts come to an end, some illegal armed groups transform into legal political organizations. While they do not necessarily change their intention to take power or promote reforms in the democratic arena, internal dynamics shift due to the loss of military discipline. The resulting centrifugal force in the post-conflict period generates a series of internal transformations: some ex-combatants stay in the center, which is the party or the political movement, whereas others distance themselves from the new organization. Beyond individual preferences and the national political context, we argue that there are at least three factors that drive this process: new rival opportunities, both legal and illegal, which arise for ex-combatants; local support which is mainly derived from activities during conflict; and the level of integrative leadership, which is exercised not only by high-ranking commanders but also by former mid-level officers. We illustrate these dynamics with the transition from the insurgency Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) to the political movement Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC), which started in 2017.

How ideology channels indeterminate emotions into armed mobilization

PS Political Science & Politics, 2017

Scholars have pointed to the importance of resentment (Petersen 2002), hatred (Kaufman 2001), fea... more Scholars have pointed to the importance of resentment (Petersen 2002), hatred (Kaufman 2001), fear (McDoom 2012), and moral outrage (Wood 2003) to explain the emergence of civil war and the participation of individuals in violent groups. These qualitative analyses have been complemented by aggregate-level studies about grievances and indignation (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Costalli and Ruggeri 2015). Broadly speaking, emotions act as mechanisms in a causal chain according to this literature. They are the result of a shock or changed structural condition and can then contribute to certain action tendencies associated with behavioral manifestations including armed mobilization. In the present essay, my objective is to synthesize and develop existing literature by using a dialectical approach. Initially, I adopt the thesis that emotions, understood as individually held mental states, contribute to armed mobilization. According to this individual level perspective, we should observe that the connection between shocks and emotions, and emotions and action tendencies have a certain regularity across individuals. However, in reality both connections are indeterminate and volatile. This brings me to a second thesis: group-based emotions contribute to armed mobilization. On a group level, ideology as a specific kind of collective frame can act as connecting piece that channels meandering emotions into a given direction and prescribes a corresponding behavioral response. But individuals within groups can still have a multitude of mixed emotions. As synthesis, I thus argue that group-based emotions contribute to armed mobilization, but that their effect across individuals remains indeterminate. As a result of this reasoning, one could empirically observe a “net effect” of shocks on emotions and ensuing action tendencies associated with armed mobilization. This conceptual innovation takes on board both the notion of indeterminacy, based on an individual level understanding of emotion, and the concept of collective frames, necessary for group-based emotions.