Papers by John M Nicholas
PsycCRITIQUES, 1978
What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery.- The Associatio... more What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery.- The Association of Images.- Images, Propositions, and Knowledge.- Mental Imagery and the Problems of Cognitive Representation: A Computer Simulation Approach.- The Separation and Integration of Related Semantic Information.- Interactions Between Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Intelligence.- Concerning Imagery.- Holonomy and Structure in the Organization of Perception.- On the Distinction Between the Phenomenal and the Physical Object.- Unconscious Inference and Judgment in Perception.- To Know Your Own Mind.- The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception.- Can Psychology Do Without Private Data?.
The typical Cartesian collection contains papers which treat the problems arising out of Descarte... more The typical Cartesian collection contains papers which treat the problems arising out of Descartes's philosophy as though they and it appeared for the first time in a recent journal. The approach of this collection is quite different. The eight contributors concentrate on problems faced by Cartesianism which are of historical significance. Without denigrating the importance of the technique of exploiting the texts in a manner that appeals to contemporary philosophical interests, the contributors show how Cartesianism was shaped over time by the criticism it received. This criticism took place in many areas - politics, theology, natural science, and metaphysics - and its scope is reflected in this collection of papers. The efforts of advocates of Cartesianism to produce a biography of Descartes, and the political difficulties they faced, are no less a part of the problems of Cartesianism than are the difficulties alleged against the Cartesian ontology of thought and extension in ...
Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, 2005
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1979
Centaurus, 1978
When one considers the complex system of historical events which is labelled "The ScientXc Revolu... more When one considers the complex system of historical events which is labelled "The ScientXc Revolution", it is difficult to keep all the details of the rich panorama firmly in one's gaze. Naturally, the historian resorts at times to broad generalizations, and mnemonic simplifications in order, in encapsulated form, to communicate the character of the Revolution. And one of the most widely acceptable generalizations concerning the Revolution, in particular concerning the culmination of the formulation of the New Dynamics which came in the course of the 17th century to provide a foundation for the Copernican world system, is that the crucial Lex ZI of Isaac Newton's Principia was an expression of the recognition of the collapse of the Aristotelean restriction of the concept of dynamical state narrowly to the condition of rest. Quite properly Newton's dynamical theories are seen as the mature fruits of the revolutionary achievements of Galileo, and of Descartes, with the turning point in the transition being the development of the Principle of Inertia which not only conserved the Aristotelean characterization of rest as a state but also demanded that uniform rectilinear motion be digdied with that status. An immediate consequence of the recognition of the inertial law was the relinquishing of the Aristotelean view that although rest did not require causal explanation, motion did. What the inertial law achieved was the planting of both rest and uniform motion on the same dynamical plane, giving them, as it were, dynamical panty. This being the case, it was proper to ask, where do causes apply if neither to rest nor to uniform motion? The natural response to this question was, inevitably, that causes, now in the guise offorces, applied to changes of state, that is changes of motion or rest. The principle which grounded this answer was of course the traditional one which even the Aristoteleans had shared: causes applied to changes of state. What was essentially different, however, was
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science discussion is full of interesting insights. As it st... more Studies in History and Philosophy of Science discussion is full of interesting insights. As it stands, I fear it leaves too much implicit, placing a far too heavy burden on the reader. I can see where Yolton's book will be of lasting use to the student, as a companion to the Essay, and to the scholar pursuing certain lines of research. One of its strongest points derives from Yolton's historical awareness, not treating Locke as an isolated phenomenon in the history of philosophy, but as having some real connection with the intellectual activity going on around him. There is a lot of good material in this book. It is unfortunate that it does not hang together in a more distinctive way.
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 1995
The immense value of the book is its motivational aspect. It is hard to read without being convin... more The immense value of the book is its motivational aspect. It is hard to read without being convinced that economics has yet to overcome difficulties of implementation, if not of principle, in establishing scientific credentials. Most notably, Mayer reports on the repeated complaints in the profession that there is a general unwillingness either to do or to reward the hard slog of data collection. This has been a continual refrain in academic economics over many decades from and, no doubt, before Lord Beveridge's 1937 retirement address to the London School of Economics, bemoaning the lack of any prominent counterparts in the economics tradition to astronomy's or physics' celebrated contributors of decisively valuable data. Mayer's message has been heard before, but his writing here, and in his prior more specialized publications in economic methodology, forcefully reminds economics' would-be Keplers that they will not flourish scientifically without their Tycho Brahes.
The familiar arguments against Sense Datum Theory (SDT) are wrong-headed. What kinds of real diff... more The familiar arguments against Sense Datum Theory (SDT) are wrong-headed. What kinds of real difficulties and new questions do we face if we adopt SDT, for example, in looking for a locus in the brain at which colours, and other phenomenal qualities, are assembled in a Phenomenal Array? If we initially formulate SDT in a relatively simple minded --Naive --way, what kinds of issues do we encounter? I offer some illustrations of likely issues, and also examine in a beginning way, how SDT might have to be less Naive.
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1989
Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, 1984
Scrutinizing Science, 1988
A sketch of issues which face 'naive' SDT. 'Naively' conceived, the 'Phenomenal Array' (the senso... more A sketch of issues which face 'naive' SDT. 'Naively' conceived, the 'Phenomenal Array' (the sensory display which we mistake for the external world's distal stimuli) is a unitary area in the brain made available to awareness and attention in a unitary way. First issue: where could the Phenomenal Array be, either cortically or subcortically? Second issue: is it possible, contrary to all our intuitions, that the Phenomenal Array is two-dimensional?
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Papers by John M Nicholas