Papers by Oritsegbubemi A Oyowe
Routledge eBooks, Jul 10, 2023
Philosophy East and West, 2018
A sufficiently distinct kind of challenge to the methodological validity of attempts in contempor... more A sufficiently distinct kind of challenge to the methodological validity of attempts in contemporary African philosophy to ground moral-political obligations on a given metaphysics of the self and of nature has been recently put forward by Thaddeus Metz. It is quite unlike the usual focus on the philosophical status of ethnophilosophical inquiry. Instead, it relies heavily on some established philosophical principle, typically attributed to David Hume, and according to which characteristically is-statements may not be derived straightforwardly from ought-statements. More clearly, Metz argues that attempts in African philosophy to ground a set of moral-political obligations on some metaphysics of the self and of nature flouts Hume’s Law and so should be abandoned. In this chapter, I defend the relevant argumentative strategy in African philosophy against the charge that Metz mounts by both contesting his assessment of the sort of derivation African philosophers characteristically undertake and expressing doubt as to whether he is applying a plausible interpretation of Hume’s Law. Moreover, drawing on ideas from John Searle, Frank Hindriks, and Margaret Gilbert, in the field of social ontology, I argue that Metz is unsuccessful in his attempt to drive a wedge between “is” and “ought” claims in the work of contemporary African philosophers—or, at least, the one he refers to.
Philosophy East and West, 2017
This paper critically assesses the supposition that the best way to capture the intuition that th... more This paper critically assesses the supposition that the best way to capture the intuition that the concept of personhood has practical importance is to analyse personhood in terms of multiple selves. It explores the works of David Velleman and, more recently, Stanley Klein in illuminating the multiple self model. The paper argues that the reasons driving belief in multiple selves, and the subsequent conceptual distinctions between selves that David Velleman encourages, has not been sufficiently motivated. Among other things, it makes the point that Velleman's theory of self is plagued with the problem of ambiguity and arbitrariness. It also argues that Stanley Klein's recent attempt to ground the belief in multiple selves in empirical analysis is fraught with difficulties. 3 For more on identity, and specifically how questions of numerical identity and psychological connectedness may come apart, see Derek Parfit (1984). 4 In order to rule out cases in which an actual subject stipulates that a notional past subject who, for instance, witnessed the walls of Jericho falling down is self-same, Velleman adds that genuine "self to self" relations over time are ones that are "unselfconscious", involving no prior psychological act of stipulation (2006a, 198).
African Human Rights Law Journal, 2013
Can an African ubuntu moral theory ground individual freedom and human rights? Although variants ... more Can an African ubuntu moral theory ground individual freedom and human rights? Although variants of ubuntu moral theory answer in the negative, asserting that the duties individuals owe the collective are prior to individual rights (since African thought places more emphasis on the collective), Metz's recent articulation in this Journal of an African ubuntu moral theory promises to ground the liberal ideal of individual liberty. I pursue three distinct lines of argument in establishing the claim that Metz's project fails to convince - that individual freedom and rights cannot be successfully grounded in a moral theory that already regards some extrinsic value (that is, communal harmony) as the most fundamental moral value. First, I suggest that Metz's attempt to ground human rights in his ubuntu moral theory raises the problem of where the fundamental value lies in his theory. That is, in seeking to integrate two potentially-conflicting and non-instrumental values in his...
The paper is based on the hypothesis that received meanings of personhood in any social context a... more The paper is based on the hypothesis that received meanings of personhood in any social context are almost always associated with notions of power. Drawing on some interesting insights from the quite recent history of African philosophy as a counter-colonial practice as well as from available evidence in social anthropology, the paper specifically investigates the link between social power and a widely received conception of personhood namely, the communitarian/ normative conception of personhood. Two central claims are advanced. First, the paper suggests that the search for and the articulation of a distinctive African conception of personhood are strongly motivated by some non-epistemic motive, which the paper identifies as a struggle for power. Second, the paper argues that the communitarian/normative conception of personhood is deeply contingent upon social power differentials among individuals in community and, relatedly, this feature of socially engendered personhood is suffic...
Debating African Philosophy, 2018
Philosophical Papers, 2018
Abstract We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Me... more Abstract We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. Schechtman sees this aspect as expanding the scope of personhood to infants and those who are severely mentally disabled. Menkiti thinks that there is a line to be drawn at some point between those humans that are persons and those who are not. We consider the cases offered in questioning how the dispute between the two views should be resolved.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2016
This paper critically assesses the supposition that the best way to capture the intuition that th... more This paper critically assesses the supposition that the best way to capture the intuition that the concept of personhood has practical importance is to analyse personhood in terms of multiple selves. It explores the works of David Velleman and, more recently, Stanley Klein in illuminating the multiple self model. The paper argues that the reasons driving belief in multiple selves, and the subsequent conceptual distinctions between selves that David Velleman encourages, has not been sufficiently motivated. Among other things, it makes the point that Velleman's theory of self is plagued with the problem of ambiguity and arbitrariness. It also argues that Stanley Klein's recent attempt to ground the belief in multiple selves in empirical analysis is fraught with difficulties. 3 For more on identity, and specifically how questions of numerical identity and psychological connectedness may come apart, see Derek Parfit (1984). 4 In order to rule out cases in which an actual subject stipulates that a notional past subject who, for instance, witnessed the walls of Jericho falling down is self-same, Velleman adds that genuine "self to self" relations over time are ones that are "unselfconscious", involving no prior psychological act of stipulation (2006a, 198).
Research in African Literatures, 2014
The idea that African discourse on the self evinces two distinct though related views of personho... more The idea that African discourse on the self evinces two distinct though related views of personhood (“metaphysical” and “normative”) has gained currency in recent years. Although both views are recognized, the normative view, rather than the metaphysical one, is held by many to be germane to African thought. I discuss an attempt by Ikuenobe to locate the normative view of personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and to thereby glean support for it. I argue that Achebe’s fiction is mute on matters concerning personhood and offers no support whatsoever for the normative view. I further argue that the considerations that occupy Ikuenobe and, more generally, proponents of the normative view have little or nothing to do with personhood, but offer some insight into what these concerns really are, which can help reach a decision as to the relative importance of the two views.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2010
ABSTRACT
Philosophical Papers, 2013
Abstract Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the... more Abstract Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the other standing theories, which he examines and consequently rejects. This paper examines the performance of his theory on cases of commissurotomy or the split-brain syndrome. Available experimental data concerning these cases seem to suggest that a single mind can divide into two independent streams in ways that are incompatible with our intuitive notion of mind. This phenomenon poses unique problems for McMahan's theory that we are essentially minds. I attempt to use his considered response to these cases as a weapon against his own embodied mind theory by highlighting some of the tensions in McMahan's response. In particular, I argue that in reaching his conclusion McMahan admits to something quite contrary to the very spirit of his own theory and that it is a powerful point in its support that one of the theories McMahan rejects can deal very well with these cases.
Philosophia, 2012
Jeff McMahan's impressive recent defence of the embodied mind theory of personal identity in his ... more Jeff McMahan's impressive recent defence of the embodied mind theory of personal identity in his highly acclaimed work The Ethics of Killing has undoubtedly reawakened belief that physical continuity is a necessary component of the relation that matters in our self-interested concern for the future. My aim in this paper is to resist this belief in a somewhat roundabout way. I want to address this belief in a somewhat roundabout way by revisiting a classic defence of the belief that enormous changes in the contents of a person's psychology does not preclude justified fear of future pain. I have in mind Bernard Williams' The Self and the Future (1970) in which he argues, against the psychological view, that physical continuity is necessary for survival. I examine Williams' second thought experiment which ostensibly supports that intuition and afterwards defend two related claims. First, I argue that a close examination of the second thought experiment reveals that one's prior commitments to a particular criterion of personal identity can influence one's response to that thought experiment. Second, I argue that Williams' second thought experiment is set out in questionbegging terms. I do not claim, however, that the intuition under consideration lacks justification; I only claim that Williams' second thought experiment does not provide the needed support.
Human Rights Review, 2014
The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to de... more The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to develop more plausible conceptions of human rights whose philosophical foundations are closely aligned with culture-specific ideas about human nature and/or dignity. This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. Along the way, it distinguishes between two meanings of the term African contending that to the extent that the practice of prizing the ‘community’ higher than any other value is definitive of African, the idea of African human rights remains suspect.
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
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Papers by Oritsegbubemi A Oyowe