Drafts by Maciej Tarnowski
In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke's Puzzle About Belief (1979) based on Kaplan's... more In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke's Puzzle About Belief (1979) based on Kaplan's metaphysical picture of words (1990, 2011). Although it is widely accepted that providing such a solution was one of the main incentives for the development of Kaplan's theory, it was never presented by Kaplan in a systematic manner and was regarded by many as unsatisfactory. We agree with these critiques, and develop an extension of Kaplan's theory by introducing the notion of "conservative" word uses, as well as arguing for the restriction of Kripke's Disquotational Principle only to such uses. This restriction allows us to solve Kripke's Puzzle by arguing that the assent of the puzzle's protagonist does not allow disquotation and ascription of corresponding inconsistent belief, as it contains the non-conservative use of a proper name. At the end of the paper, we defend two of Kaplan's theses that we find essential for our argument to work: that individuation of word tokens involves taking into account the intention of the speaker, and that different uniquely referring proper names should be regarded as different homonymous words.
Studia Semiotyczne, 2018
[in English]: The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psycholo... more [in English]: The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
Papers by Maciej Tarnowski
Deleted Journal, Feb 1, 2023
In the current debate on the metaphysical grounding of semantic properties Donald Davidson is usu... more In the current debate on the metaphysical grounding of semantic properties Donald Davidson is usually taken to represent interpretationism, a stance according to which the meaning of expressions is metaphysically grounded by the process of assigning them semantic values which maximize certain parameters such as truth or rationality of the speaker. This stance is often contrasted with productivism, which takes circumstances of expression's production, not interpretation, to ground its meaning. In this article, I argue that this widespread understanding of Davidson's thought is false and that given such demarcation Davidson should be regarded as a productivist. To support my claim, I begin by briefly outlining the state of debate on metasemantics and main theses of Davidson's program, and then I present three exegetical arguments against interpretationist reading of Davidson's work. I conclude by reconstructing what I take to be the actual metaphysical picture of semantic properties emerging from Davidson's work.
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Dec 20, 2023
M a c i e j T a r n o w s k i Słowa kluczowe: introspekcja, przejrzystość, B. Russell, samowiedza... more M a c i e j T a r n o w s k i Słowa kluczowe: introspekcja, przejrzystość, B. Russell, samowiedza, wiedza bezpośrednia, wiedza przez opis 1. Wprowadzenie Wiem, że pragnę zrobić sobie w tym momencie przerwę od pisania. Wiem też, że odczuwam odrętwienie nóg i jestem przekonany, że krótki spacer z psem pozwoliłby mi się go pozbyć; wiem, że widzę wyraźnie mojego psa, otaczający mnie pokój czy kubek po wypitej przed chwilą kawie. Wiem więc całkiem dużo o swoim obecnym położeniu, swoich pragnieniach, przekonaniach czy doznaniach. Co więcej, wiem to lepiej niż ktokolwiek, kto mógłby mnie w tym momencie obserwować, zaś nawet jeśli taki obserwator mógłby przypisać mi poprawnie owe stany umysłowe, nie wie on tego, że je posiadam, w taki sam sposób, jak wiem ja. Skąd jednak to wiem? To pytanie, z pozoru trywialne, zawiera w sobie trudne filozoficzne wyzwanie, jakim jest opis naszego sposobu uzyskiwania wiedzy o naszych stanach umysłowych, czyli dokonywania introspekcji. Wśród wielu teorii starających się wyjaśnić genezę samowiedzy i jej szczególny epistemiczny status, niezwykle ciekawą propozycją jest koncepcja Bertranda Russella zawarta w jego uwagach dotyczących przedmiotów tzw. wie-
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021
The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2... more The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vi...
Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria, 2022
Praca powstała w wyniku realizacji projektu badawczego Preludium 20 "Paradoks Moore'a w myśli i j... more Praca powstała w wyniku realizacji projektu badawczego Preludium 20 "Paradoks Moore'a w myśli i języku: ku jednolitej strategii wyjaśnienia", nr 2021/41/N/HS1/01586, finansowanego ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki. Artykuł udostępniony na licencji CC BY 4.0.
Religious Studies, 2023
In this article, I consider the cases of religious Moorean propositions of the form 'd, but I don... more In this article, I consider the cases of religious Moorean propositions of the form 'd, but I don't believe that d' and 'd, but I believe that ∼d', where d is a religious dogma, proposition, or part of a creed. I argue that such propositions can be genuinely and rationally asserted and that this fact poses a problem for traditional analysis of religious assertion as an expression of faith and of religious faith as entailing belief. In the article, I explore the possibility of undermining these commonly held assumptions and argue that the assertability of religious Moorean propositions can be justified by an account of faith as an intention to form religious beliefs. In the end, I also consider the consequences of such a stance, especially concerning the debate on the ethics of religious belief and doxastic voluntarism.
Axiomathes, 2023
In the current debate on the metaphysical grounding of semantic properties Donald Davidson is usu... more In the current debate on the metaphysical grounding of semantic properties Donald Davidson is usually taken to represent interpretationism, a stance according to which the meaning of expressions is metaphysically grounded by the process of assigning them semantic values which maximize certain parameters such as truth or rationality of the speaker. This stance is often contrasted with productivism, which takes circumstances of expression's production, not interpretation, to ground its meaning. In this article, I argue that this widespread understanding of Davidson's thought is false and that given such demarcation Davidson should be regarded as a productivist. To support my claim, I begin by briefly outlining the state of debate on metasemantics and main theses of Davidson's program, and then I present three exegetical arguments against interpretationist reading of Davidson's work. I conclude by reconstructing what I take to be the actual metaphysical picture of semantic properties emerging from Davidson's work.
Synthese
In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, w... more In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, which is an asymmetry in ascription of intentionality of negative and positive side-effects of an action performed by a group agent. We successfully replicate two studies originally conducted by Michael and Szigeti (Philos Explor 22:44–61, 2019), who observed this effect and provide empirical evidence of the existence of two related effects—Group Epistemic and Doxastic Knobe Effects—which show analogous asymmetry with respect to knowledge and belief ascriptions. We explain how the existence of the Group Knobe Effect and its epistemic and doxastic counterparts affects the philosophical debate on collective agency and intentionality and supports the intuitiveness of realism about collective agency among laypeople. We also critically assess the reasoning presented by Michael and Szigeti (2019) in favor of the realist-collectivist interpretation of their results (as opposed to the realist-dis...
Synthese, 2022
In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, w... more In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, which is an asymmetry in ascription of intentionality of negative and positive side-effects of an action performed by a group agent. We successfully replicate two studies originally conducted by Michael and Szigeti (Philos Explor 22:44-61, 2019), who observed this effect and provide empirical evidence of the existence of two related effects-Group Epistemic and Doxastic Knobe Effects-which show analogous asymmetry with respect to knowledge and belief ascriptions. We explain how the existence of the Group Knobe Effect and its epistemic and doxastic counterparts affects the philosophical debate on collective agency and intentionality and supports the intuitiveness of realism about collective agency among laypeople. We also critically assess the reasoning presented by Michael and Szigeti (2019) in favor of the realist-collectivist interpretation of their results (as opposed to the realist-distributivist interpretation). We argue that a thorough analysis of both their data and our new findings shows a rather wide range of differing intuitions among laypeople regarding the status of groups as agents. These results show that while some laypeople may have realist-collectivist intuitions, the contrary realist-distrubutivist intuitions are also widespread and the claim that the majority of laypeople hold collectivist intuitions regarding group agency is unjustified.
S U M M A R Y : The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psycho... more S U M M A R Y : The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
Argumenta, 2022
The paper considers the hypothesis that proper names are simple demonstratives. In the first part... more The paper considers the hypothesis that proper names are simple demonstratives. In the first part, I provide the general motivation for an indexical treatment of proper names as well as assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing indexical accounts. The second part is devoted to proposing a new account that treats proper names as simple demonstratives, where referents are determined by the speaker's referential intention. In my proposal, I use the hybrid approach toward indexical expressions developed by Wolfgang Künne (1992) and Stefano Predelli (2006). I argue that this approach allows countering many of the problems haunting existing indexical accounts of proper names. I also consider the two possible objections: the Humpty-Dumpty objection to intentionalism regarding demonstrative reference (Gorvett 2005) and García-Carpintero's (2018) argument against indexicalism from misdescription of linguistic competence of proper name users. I show how the proposed approach may counter them. The considerations concerning this problem also demonstrate how the treatment of proper names as hybrid demonstratives may allow solving the problems posed by the "Madagascar argument" to the causal-chain theory of proper name reference (Evans 1973) as well as explain the presence of predicative uses of proper names in natural language (Burge 1973).
Studia z Historii Filozofii, 2021
Pojęcie woli powszechnej użyte przez Jana Jakuba Rousseau w Umowie społecznej 1 (dalej: US) jako ... more Pojęcie woli powszechnej użyte przez Jana Jakuba Rousseau w Umowie społecznej 1 (dalej: US) jako uzasadnienie wprowadzonej przez niego koncepcji umowy społecznej stwarza niewątpliwie trudności w interpretacji. Świadczyć o tym może wielość zaprezentowanych sposobów jego odczytania: od uznania jej za podstawową ideę liberalizmu po prototalitarne pojęcie uzasadniające dyktaturę 2 . Żadna z tych etykietek nie pasuje do koncepcji and some concepts in game theory as well as Marquis de Condorcet's "Jury Theorem". I will show that the vision of fair democratic procedures proposed by Rousseau adequately reflects the conclusions drawn from the adduced theorems.
The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principl... more The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
Avant, 2021
Jedną z najbardziej popularnych i kontrowersyjnych tez we współczesnej filozoficznej analizie psy... more Jedną z najbardziej popularnych i kontrowersyjnych tez we współczesnej filozoficznej analizie psychologii potocznej i przypisywania przekonań jest założenie racjonalności podmiotu, zgodnie z którym każde przypisanie nastawienia sądzeniowego musi być poprzedzone założeniem racjonalności proceduralnej interpretowanego podmiotu. Wydaje się, że założenie to podważają badania w psychologii, socjologii i ekonomii, które dostarczają przykładów nieracjonalnych zachowań. Celem tego artykułu jest przedstawienie problemów napotykanych przez założenie o racjonalności i zaoferowanie alternatywnego modelu dla teorii interpretacji opartej na badaniach nad „szybkimi i oszczędnymi heurystykami” prowadzonymi w psychologii poznawczej. Identyfikuję dwie heurystyki: Heurystykę Podobieństwa i Heurystykę Uwłasnosłowienia, które wydają się grać kluczową rolę w przypisywaniu przekonań. Argumentuję, że podany model jest zarazem bardziej psychologicznie prawdopodobny i bardziej efektywny w wyjaśnianiu przypadków nieracjonalności.
Filozofia Nauki, 2020
WHAT THEORY OF ACTION? ON MICHAŁ BARCZ'S MECHANICS OF ACTIONS This is a review of Michał Barcz's ... more WHAT THEORY OF ACTION? ON MICHAŁ BARCZ'S MECHANICS OF ACTIONS This is a review of Michał Barcz's book Mechanika działań. Filozoficzny spór wokół przyczynowej teorii działania (Mechanics of Actions: Philosophical Dispute over the Causal Theory of Action). The book discusses various causal accounts of intentional action and presents several arguments against them. The review focuses on accuracy in presentation of different causal theories of action and soundness of arguments presented against them by the author. At the end, I discuss some methodological issues raised by the book.
Civitas. Studia z Filozofii Polityki, 2018
Mamy, jako fi lozofowie i fi lozofki, pewien kłopot z tradycją. Niezależnie od tego, po której st... more Mamy, jako fi lozofowie i fi lozofki, pewien kłopot z tradycją. Niezależnie od tego, po której stronie sporu stajemy: czy bliżej nam do liberalnego anything goes, czy też do konserwatywnego ubóstwienia dawnych, "dobrze ufundowanych" praktyk i przekonań, pytanie o to, czym właściwie jest tradycja, którą atakujemy lub której bronimy, jest pytaniem niewygodnym. Głównym zamiarem pracy Pawła Grada zatytułowanej O pojęciu tradycji. Studium krytyczne kultury pamięci jest zadanie tego niewygodnego pytania oraz próba udzielenia na nie nietrywialnej odpowiedzi. Już pod tym względem jest to książka cenna. Jest ona cenna tym bardziej, że-podobnie jak samo pojęcie tradycji-podąża w poprzek wszelkich fi lozofi cznych osi podziału. Nie jest to książka wsobna, pisana z perspektywy wybranego przez autora stanowiska fi lozofi cznego-wręcz przeciwnie. Każdy z głównych nurtów współczesnego dyskursu dotyczącego "tradycji" czy "społecznej praktyki" otrzymuje na stronach pracy Grada przynajmniej chwilę uwagi. Jest to zatem książka poruszająca się między wieloma biegunami: współczesnym liberalizmem a konserwatyzmem, heglowską historiozofi ą i jej postmodernistyczną krytyką, etyką protestancką i katolicką, analityczną fi lozofi ą języka a teorią komunikacji Habermasa i (nawet) Jacques'em Derridą. To zderzenie sprawia, że niezależnie od prywatnej afi liacji książkę czyta się bardzo dobrze i umożliwia ona spojrzenie na zagadnienie tradycji z wielu perspektyw.
Filozofia Nauki
In this article, I investigate the relation between the concept of object-dependent thoughts (ODT... more In this article, I investigate the relation between the concept of object-dependent thoughts (ODTs) and the semantics of complex demonstratives. I begin by showing that a strong syntactic version of ODTs proposed by Adams and colleagues suffers from problems similar to those plaguing several semantic theories . Next, I turn to Eros Corazza's counterproposal of perspectival thoughts and investigate whether it can provide us with promised explanatory benefits. I conclude by formulating an alternative picture of ODTs based on Evans' work and showing that it successfully handles the problems posed for semantics of complex demonstratives. In order to do this, I introduce and defend a view of individual perceptive concepts that may serve as a mental counterpart of demonstration.
Avant. Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies, 2021
Jedną z najbardziej popularnych i kontrowersyjnych tez we współczesnej filozoficznej analizie psy... more Jedną z najbardziej popularnych i kontrowersyjnych tez we współczesnej filozoficznej analizie psychologii potocznej i przypisywania przekonań jest założenie racjonalności podmiotu, zgodnie z którym każde przypisanie nastawienia sądzeniowego musi być poprzedzone założeniem racjonalności proceduralnej interpretowanego podmiotu. Wydaje się, że założenie to podważają badania w psychologii, socjologii i ekonomii, które dostarczają przykładów nieracjonalnych zachowań. Celem tego artykułu jest przedstawienie problemów napotykanych przez założenie o racjonalności i zaoferowanie alternatywnego modelu dla teorii interpretacji opartej na badaniach nad „szybkimi i oszczędnymi heurystykami” prowadzonymi w psychologii poznawczej. Identyfikuję dwie heurystyki: Heurystykę Podobieństwa i Heurystykę Uwłasnosłowienia, które wydają się grać kluczową rolę w przypisywaniu przekonań. Argumentuję, że podany model jest zarazem bardziej psychologicznie prawdopodobny i bardziej efektywny w wyjaśnianiu przypadków nieracjonalności.
Uploads
Drafts by Maciej Tarnowski
Papers by Maciej Tarnowski