The article introduces a distinction between weak and strong counterfactual power and shows that ... more The article introduces a distinction between weak and strong counterfactual power and shows that as far as the metaphysical aspect of choice is concerned, T. Merricks's examples do not undermine the proposition that strong counterfactual power over a fact suffices for having a genuine choice about that fact. This is relevant to debates about logical fatalism, theological incompatibilism and nomological (determinism) incompatibilism. If strong counterfactual power is sufficient for having a choice, then in each of the main arguments for the mentioned stances, the negation of the argument's conclusion entails the negation of its key premise. It is further argued that those key premises cannot be justified by the fixity of the past because the latter holds only to the extent warranted by the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence between the past and the future. Therefore, the pastness of such facts as that propositions about our acts were true before we were born, and that God believed then that we would perform those acts, does not provide any reason to believe that we do not have a choice about those facts. Fatalists and incompatibilists assume in their arguments something that has yet to be justified.
This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a 'law-breaking event' than that adopte... more This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a 'law-breaking event' than that adopted by D. Lewis who identifies this concept with the notion of an event that falsifies the laws of nature in his sense of 'falsification'. It is pointed out that the broader definition is the key to answering C. Ginet's objection against local miracle compatibilism. It also allows a neutral reconstruction of one of the disagreements underlying the compatibilism debate about the ability to do otherwise, i.e., the disagreement over nomological possibility of alternative action in a deterministic world. Under this reconstruction, neither the incompatibilist nor the compatibilist can take advantage of the concept of a law-breaking event to show that their opponent's view is false.
To bolster his consequence argument against David Lewis's rejoinder, Peter van Inwagen uses the c... more To bolster his consequence argument against David Lewis's rejoinder, Peter van Inwagen uses the concept of miracle. He claims that the Lewisian compatibilist must admit that under determinism, we possess the ability to work miracles par excellence, that is, not just in some purely technical sense of the term. The article argues that van Inwagen's definition of a 'miracle' is too broad even if it is interpreted merely as an explication of one component often thought to be inherent in the religious concept of miracle, namely the concept of an event that breaks the laws of nature. Nomological effects of miracles are not miracles themselves.
The article introduces a distinction between weak and strong counterfactual power and shows that ... more The article introduces a distinction between weak and strong counterfactual power and shows that as far as the metaphysical aspect of choice is concerned, T. Merricks's examples do not undermine the proposition that strong counterfactual power over a fact suffices for having a genuine choice about that fact. This is relevant to debates about logical fatalism, theological incompatibilism and nomological (determinism) incompatibilism. If strong counterfactual power is sufficient for having a choice, then in each of the main arguments for the mentioned stances, the negation of the argument's conclusion entails the negation of its key premise. It is further argued that those key premises cannot be justified by the fixity of the past because the latter holds only to the extent warranted by the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence between the past and the future. Therefore, the pastness of such facts as that propositions about our acts were true before we were born, and that God believed then that we would perform those acts, does not provide any reason to believe that we do not have a choice about those facts. Fatalists and incompatibilists assume in their arguments something that has yet to be justified.
This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a 'law-breaking event' than that adopte... more This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a 'law-breaking event' than that adopted by D. Lewis who identifies this concept with the notion of an event that falsifies the laws of nature in his sense of 'falsification'. It is pointed out that the broader definition is the key to answering C. Ginet's objection against local miracle compatibilism. It also allows a neutral reconstruction of one of the disagreements underlying the compatibilism debate about the ability to do otherwise, i.e., the disagreement over nomological possibility of alternative action in a deterministic world. Under this reconstruction, neither the incompatibilist nor the compatibilist can take advantage of the concept of a law-breaking event to show that their opponent's view is false.
To bolster his consequence argument against David Lewis's rejoinder, Peter van Inwagen uses the c... more To bolster his consequence argument against David Lewis's rejoinder, Peter van Inwagen uses the concept of miracle. He claims that the Lewisian compatibilist must admit that under determinism, we possess the ability to work miracles par excellence, that is, not just in some purely technical sense of the term. The article argues that van Inwagen's definition of a 'miracle' is too broad even if it is interpreted merely as an explication of one component often thought to be inherent in the religious concept of miracle, namely the concept of an event that breaks the laws of nature. Nomological effects of miracles are not miracles themselves.
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