In this essay I introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent deba... more In this essay I introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent debate on the notion of function. I discuss some of the desiderata a satisfactory account should fulfill and compare them to the desiderata for a theory of biological functions. Finally, within this general framework, I briefly present the three papers included in this volume. 0. Introduction The notion of function pervades our daily life. We claim that the function of the pancreas is to secrete insulin, that the function of traffic lights is to avoid car crashes and that a function of demonstrations is to express support or opposition to a particular policy. We also routinely employ a range of expressions closely tied to functions. For instance, when we claim that the pancreas is supposed to secrete insulin, that traffic lights are designed to avoid car crashes or that the purpose of a demonstration is to manifest a political view. Nevertheless, despite the ubiquity of functional talk, functions are puzzling entities. For one thing, an entity can have a function and fail to perform it. Thus, we claim that a main cause of diabetes is a dysfunctional pancreas, that during a blackout traffic lights do not work properly or that too often demonstrations fail to achieve their purposes. These items have functions but, for some reason, sometimes fail to carry them out. For another thing, it is often unclear what process endows items with functions. Is it always the same process or are there different ways of acquiring them? What are their essential features? These are still hotly disputed issues in the philosophical arena. For these and other reasons, providing a general theory of functions turns out to be a herculean task. The main goal of this introductory essay is to highlight some of the central issues a theory of function should address, with special emphasis on a topic that has been largely overlooked in the literature, but that some recent papers (including the excellent essays included in this volume) are drawing attention to: the nature of artifactual functions. Accordingly, the paper has three main sections. I first introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent debate on the notion of function. Then, I will discuss some of the desiderata a satisfactory account should comply with and, finally, within this general framework, I will briefly present the three papers included in this volume.
Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an en... more Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game theory. I show how these models can be used to formulate teleosemantics and expand it in new directions.
Resum: La intencionalitat és un element central en la nostra comprensió del món. Diàriament atrib... more Resum: La intencionalitat és un element central en la nostra comprensió del món. Diàriament atribuïm estats intencionals (com ara creences, desitjos o percepcions) per a poder explicar el comportament d'altres agents, i moltes teories filosòfiques hi apel·len per a entendre altres nocions més complexes. Tanmateix, els estats in-tencionals són entitats enigmàtiques. Aquest article explica què és la intencionalitat i per què és tan important i problemàtica alhora. En segon lloc, examina diverses teories naturalistes que intenten mostrar que la intencionalitat és compatible amb una visió científica del món. Finalment, com que totes les propostes existents s'enfronten a dificultats significatives, s'exploren les opcions disponibles en cas que cap dels projectes naturalistes pugui reeixir. Abstract: Intentionality is a central feature of our understanding of the world. We daily attribute intentional states (like beliefs, desires or perceptual states) to explain the behavior of other agents, and many theories appeal to them to understand more complex notions. Nonetheless, intentional states are puzzling entities. This article explains what intentionality is and why it is so important and problematic at the same time. Secondly, it examines various naturalistic theories, which seek to show that intentionality is compatible with a scientific worldview. Finally, given that all extant proposals face significant difficulties, it explores the available options in case no naturalistic theory can succeed.
The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiolog... more The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function.
Darwinian Dilemma purports to show that evolutionary considerations are in tension with realist t... more Darwinian Dilemma purports to show that evolutionary considerations are in tension with realist theories of value, which include moral realism. According to this argument, moral realism can only be defended by assuming an implausible tracking relation between moral attitudes and moral facts. In this essay, I argue that this tracking relation is not as implausible as most people have assumed by showing that the three main objections against it are flawed. Since this is a key premise in the reasoning, I conclude that the Darwinian Dilemma against moral realism can be resisted.
In a series of papers, Nanay (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, forthcoming) has recently put forward and d... more In a series of papers, Nanay (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, forthcoming) has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the 'Modal Theory of Function'. In this paper, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay's notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in science.
Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fa... more Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fact, many biologists and philosophers appeal to some version of Teleosemantics. However, this picture has recently came under attack: while mainstream teleosemantics assumes that representational systems must cooperate, some biologists and philosophers argue that in certain cases signaling can evolve within systems lacking common interest. In this paper I defend the standard view from this objection.
Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render... more Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls 'Infotel-semantics'), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better o than standard teleosemantics.
This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in ... more This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works . More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important diculties, which might have signicant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushm... more One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.
Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accou... more Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality. However, it is widely known that these theories suffer from a major objection: the Indeterminacy Problem. The most common reply to this problem employs the Target of Selection Argument, which is based on Sober's distinction between Selection for and Selection of. Unfortunately, some years ago the Target of Selection Argument came into serious attack in a famous paper by Goode and Griffiths. Since then, the question of the validity of the Target of Selection Argument in the context of the Indeterminacy Problem has remained largely untouched. In this essay, I argue that both the Target of Selection Argument and Goode and Griffiths' criticisms to it misuse Sober's analysis in important respects.
In this paper I discuss a recent theory on functions called Organizational Account. This theory s... more In this paper I discuss a recent theory on functions called Organizational Account. This theory seeks to provide a new dention of function that overcomes the distinction between etiological and dispositional accounts and that could be used in biology as well as in technology. I present a deniton of function that I think captures the intuitions of Organizational Accounts and consider several objections.
In this paper I defend a teleological explanation of normativity, i. e., I argue that what an org... more In this paper I defend a teleological explanation of normativity, i. e., I argue that what an organism (or device) is supposed to do is determined by its etiological function. In particular, I present a teleological account of the normativity that arises in learning processes, and I defend it from some objections.
In this essay I introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent deba... more In this essay I introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent debate on the notion of function. I discuss some of the desiderata a satisfactory account should fulfill and compare them to the desiderata for a theory of biological functions. Finally, within this general framework, I briefly present the three papers included in this volume. 0. Introduction The notion of function pervades our daily life. We claim that the function of the pancreas is to secrete insulin, that the function of traffic lights is to avoid car crashes and that a function of demonstrations is to express support or opposition to a particular policy. We also routinely employ a range of expressions closely tied to functions. For instance, when we claim that the pancreas is supposed to secrete insulin, that traffic lights are designed to avoid car crashes or that the purpose of a demonstration is to manifest a political view. Nevertheless, despite the ubiquity of functional talk, functions are puzzling entities. For one thing, an entity can have a function and fail to perform it. Thus, we claim that a main cause of diabetes is a dysfunctional pancreas, that during a blackout traffic lights do not work properly or that too often demonstrations fail to achieve their purposes. These items have functions but, for some reason, sometimes fail to carry them out. For another thing, it is often unclear what process endows items with functions. Is it always the same process or are there different ways of acquiring them? What are their essential features? These are still hotly disputed issues in the philosophical arena. For these and other reasons, providing a general theory of functions turns out to be a herculean task. The main goal of this introductory essay is to highlight some of the central issues a theory of function should address, with special emphasis on a topic that has been largely overlooked in the literature, but that some recent papers (including the excellent essays included in this volume) are drawing attention to: the nature of artifactual functions. Accordingly, the paper has three main sections. I first introduce the question of artifactual functions in the context of the recent debate on the notion of function. Then, I will discuss some of the desiderata a satisfactory account should comply with and, finally, within this general framework, I will briefly present the three papers included in this volume.
Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an en... more Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game theory. I show how these models can be used to formulate teleosemantics and expand it in new directions.
Resum: La intencionalitat és un element central en la nostra comprensió del món. Diàriament atrib... more Resum: La intencionalitat és un element central en la nostra comprensió del món. Diàriament atribuïm estats intencionals (com ara creences, desitjos o percepcions) per a poder explicar el comportament d'altres agents, i moltes teories filosòfiques hi apel·len per a entendre altres nocions més complexes. Tanmateix, els estats in-tencionals són entitats enigmàtiques. Aquest article explica què és la intencionalitat i per què és tan important i problemàtica alhora. En segon lloc, examina diverses teories naturalistes que intenten mostrar que la intencionalitat és compatible amb una visió científica del món. Finalment, com que totes les propostes existents s'enfronten a dificultats significatives, s'exploren les opcions disponibles en cas que cap dels projectes naturalistes pugui reeixir. Abstract: Intentionality is a central feature of our understanding of the world. We daily attribute intentional states (like beliefs, desires or perceptual states) to explain the behavior of other agents, and many theories appeal to them to understand more complex notions. Nonetheless, intentional states are puzzling entities. This article explains what intentionality is and why it is so important and problematic at the same time. Secondly, it examines various naturalistic theories, which seek to show that intentionality is compatible with a scientific worldview. Finally, given that all extant proposals face significant difficulties, it explores the available options in case no naturalistic theory can succeed.
The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiolog... more The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function.
Darwinian Dilemma purports to show that evolutionary considerations are in tension with realist t... more Darwinian Dilemma purports to show that evolutionary considerations are in tension with realist theories of value, which include moral realism. According to this argument, moral realism can only be defended by assuming an implausible tracking relation between moral attitudes and moral facts. In this essay, I argue that this tracking relation is not as implausible as most people have assumed by showing that the three main objections against it are flawed. Since this is a key premise in the reasoning, I conclude that the Darwinian Dilemma against moral realism can be resisted.
In a series of papers, Nanay (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, forthcoming) has recently put forward and d... more In a series of papers, Nanay (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, forthcoming) has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the 'Modal Theory of Function'. In this paper, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay's notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in science.
Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fa... more Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fact, many biologists and philosophers appeal to some version of Teleosemantics. However, this picture has recently came under attack: while mainstream teleosemantics assumes that representational systems must cooperate, some biologists and philosophers argue that in certain cases signaling can evolve within systems lacking common interest. In this paper I defend the standard view from this objection.
Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render... more Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls 'Infotel-semantics'), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better o than standard teleosemantics.
This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in ... more This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works . More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important diculties, which might have signicant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushm... more One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.
Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accou... more Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality. However, it is widely known that these theories suffer from a major objection: the Indeterminacy Problem. The most common reply to this problem employs the Target of Selection Argument, which is based on Sober's distinction between Selection for and Selection of. Unfortunately, some years ago the Target of Selection Argument came into serious attack in a famous paper by Goode and Griffiths. Since then, the question of the validity of the Target of Selection Argument in the context of the Indeterminacy Problem has remained largely untouched. In this essay, I argue that both the Target of Selection Argument and Goode and Griffiths' criticisms to it misuse Sober's analysis in important respects.
In this paper I discuss a recent theory on functions called Organizational Account. This theory s... more In this paper I discuss a recent theory on functions called Organizational Account. This theory seeks to provide a new dention of function that overcomes the distinction between etiological and dispositional accounts and that could be used in biology as well as in technology. I present a deniton of function that I think captures the intuitions of Organizational Accounts and consider several objections.
In this paper I defend a teleological explanation of normativity, i. e., I argue that what an org... more In this paper I defend a teleological explanation of normativity, i. e., I argue that what an organism (or device) is supposed to do is determined by its etiological function. In particular, I present a teleological account of the normativity that arises in learning processes, and I defend it from some objections.
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