In ‘Evil is Still Evidence: Comments on Almeida’ Robert Bass presents three objections to the cen... more In ‘Evil is Still Evidence: Comments on Almeida’ Robert Bass presents three objections to the central argument (ENE) in my ‘Evil is Not Evidence’. The first objection is that ENE is invalid. According to the second objection, it is a consequence of ENE that there can be no evidence for or against a posteriori necessities. The third objection is that, contrary to ENE, the likelihood of certain necessary identities varies with the evidence we have for them. In this reply I explain why ENE has exactly none of the implications described by Bass. I argue in the concluding section that there is a modal solution to the epistemological problems presented by ENE.
observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, wi... more observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of any kind, including the gods from Adonai to Zeus. Lewontin, it is worth noting, does not say that such explanations preclude such a role. It is the central aim of Theism and Explanation to consider, on the contrary, whether explanations of material phenomena might include a role for divine action.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory exp... more Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent's character can still be under the control of, or ‘up to’, the agent. The ‘luck problem’ has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved.
God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of aff... more God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of affairs obtains. Unrestricted actualization ensures, inter alia, that, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world—whether or not those worlds include libertarian free agents—and can actualize any possible future—whether or not that future is open. Chapter 11 addresses a series of thoughtful objections from Bruce Langtry on the possibility of unrestricted actualization (Chapter 10 in this volume).
The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of aff... more The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or K σρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And K σρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
I provide the account of divine creation found in multiverse theorists Donald Turner, Klaas Kraay... more I provide the account of divine creation found in multiverse theorists Donald Turner, Klaas Kraay, and Tim O'Connor. I show that the accounts Kraay and Turner offer are incoherent. God does not survey all possible worlds and necessarily actualize those universes in the (on balance) good worlds or the worthy worlds. If God necessarily actualizes the multiverse, we have no idea which universes are parts of that multiverse. I show next that Tim O'Connor's multiverse account of creation is also incoherent. I argue that a preferable multiverse would include a much greater variety of universes than are included in Turner, Kraay or O'Connor. In the last section I offer some concluding remarks.
The free will defense is a theistic strategy for rejecting a certain argument for the non-existen... more The free will defense is a theistic strategy for rejecting a certain argument for the non-existence of God. The argument, sometimes called the "logical problem of evil," insists that it is logically impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly benevolent God to co-exist with evil. Since evil clearly exists, the argument goes, God does not. The free will defense responds by claiming that, since free will is very good indeed, a God with all the characteristics in question might co-exist with evil-provided that the evil was brought about by (other) free creatures and God could not have prevented the evil without making his creatures unfree. It is commonly believed (although, perhaps, seldom argued) that the free will defense only works if the creatures in question have a sort of freedom incompatible with determinism. I used to believe this. I now think it is wrong. There are at least some versions of compatibilism which can, with the help of certain plausible theses about what God can do, respond to the atheist's argument with a version of the free will defense.
I consider the most serious problem for the traditional account of divine creation in theistic ac... more I consider the most serious problem for the traditional account of divine creation in theistic actualism. According to van Inwagen's modal collapse argument, ultimate explanation entails that gratitude to God for one's existence is totally inappropriate. Ultimately, the actual world, and everything in it, is self-explanatory, and not a consequence of divine creation. I argue that van Inwagen's argument is unsound. It is consistent with an ultimate explanation for the world that the actual world is contingently necessary. If God actualizes the world as a matter of contingent necessity, then gratitude to God for one's existence is perfectly appropriate. It is true that we exist as a matter of necessity, but that necessary existence is just a contingent fact. There are possible worlds in which we fail to exist altogether
Assuming divine command theory is true, there are no moral limits on the commands God can issue. ... more Assuming divine command theory is true, there are no moral limits on the commands God can issue. Nevertheless there are no possible worlds in which divine command theory is true and God commands cruelty for its own sake or the sacrifice of ten-year-olds in a gruesome ritual, or anything of the kind. The main conclusion of the argument is that God cannot command the morally horrible not because of God's moral perfection or God's lack of power, of God's kindness, etc., but because commanding the morally horrible entails a contradiction. I show that the argument is an instance of a valid and uncontroversial counterfactual sequent. Divine command theory entails that there are commands that even an omnipotent and morally unconstrained being cannot issue
In ‘Evil is Still Evidence: Comments on Almeida’ Robert Bass presents three objections to the cen... more In ‘Evil is Still Evidence: Comments on Almeida’ Robert Bass presents three objections to the central argument (ENE) in my ‘Evil is Not Evidence’. The first objection is that ENE is invalid. According to the second objection, it is a consequence of ENE that there can be no evidence for or against a posteriori necessities. The third objection is that, contrary to ENE, the likelihood of certain necessary identities varies with the evidence we have for them. In this reply I explain why ENE has exactly none of the implications described by Bass. I argue in the concluding section that there is a modal solution to the epistemological problems presented by ENE.
observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, wi... more observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of any kind, including the gods from Adonai to Zeus. Lewontin, it is worth noting, does not say that such explanations preclude such a role. It is the central aim of Theism and Explanation to consider, on the contrary, whether explanations of material phenomena might include a role for divine action.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory exp... more Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent's character can still be under the control of, or ‘up to’, the agent. The ‘luck problem’ has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved.
God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of aff... more God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of affairs obtains. Unrestricted actualization ensures, inter alia, that, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world—whether or not those worlds include libertarian free agents—and can actualize any possible future—whether or not that future is open. Chapter 11 addresses a series of thoughtful objections from Bruce Langtry on the possibility of unrestricted actualization (Chapter 10 in this volume).
The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of aff... more The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or K σρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And K σρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
I provide the account of divine creation found in multiverse theorists Donald Turner, Klaas Kraay... more I provide the account of divine creation found in multiverse theorists Donald Turner, Klaas Kraay, and Tim O'Connor. I show that the accounts Kraay and Turner offer are incoherent. God does not survey all possible worlds and necessarily actualize those universes in the (on balance) good worlds or the worthy worlds. If God necessarily actualizes the multiverse, we have no idea which universes are parts of that multiverse. I show next that Tim O'Connor's multiverse account of creation is also incoherent. I argue that a preferable multiverse would include a much greater variety of universes than are included in Turner, Kraay or O'Connor. In the last section I offer some concluding remarks.
The free will defense is a theistic strategy for rejecting a certain argument for the non-existen... more The free will defense is a theistic strategy for rejecting a certain argument for the non-existence of God. The argument, sometimes called the "logical problem of evil," insists that it is logically impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly benevolent God to co-exist with evil. Since evil clearly exists, the argument goes, God does not. The free will defense responds by claiming that, since free will is very good indeed, a God with all the characteristics in question might co-exist with evil-provided that the evil was brought about by (other) free creatures and God could not have prevented the evil without making his creatures unfree. It is commonly believed (although, perhaps, seldom argued) that the free will defense only works if the creatures in question have a sort of freedom incompatible with determinism. I used to believe this. I now think it is wrong. There are at least some versions of compatibilism which can, with the help of certain plausible theses about what God can do, respond to the atheist's argument with a version of the free will defense.
I consider the most serious problem for the traditional account of divine creation in theistic ac... more I consider the most serious problem for the traditional account of divine creation in theistic actualism. According to van Inwagen's modal collapse argument, ultimate explanation entails that gratitude to God for one's existence is totally inappropriate. Ultimately, the actual world, and everything in it, is self-explanatory, and not a consequence of divine creation. I argue that van Inwagen's argument is unsound. It is consistent with an ultimate explanation for the world that the actual world is contingently necessary. If God actualizes the world as a matter of contingent necessity, then gratitude to God for one's existence is perfectly appropriate. It is true that we exist as a matter of necessity, but that necessary existence is just a contingent fact. There are possible worlds in which we fail to exist altogether
Assuming divine command theory is true, there are no moral limits on the commands God can issue. ... more Assuming divine command theory is true, there are no moral limits on the commands God can issue. Nevertheless there are no possible worlds in which divine command theory is true and God commands cruelty for its own sake or the sacrifice of ten-year-olds in a gruesome ritual, or anything of the kind. The main conclusion of the argument is that God cannot command the morally horrible not because of God's moral perfection or God's lack of power, of God's kindness, etc., but because commanding the morally horrible entails a contradiction. I show that the argument is an instance of a valid and uncontroversial counterfactual sequent. Divine command theory entails that there are commands that even an omnipotent and morally unconstrained being cannot issue
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