Papers by Miriam Schoenfield
The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy-based approach to epistemology to the case of high... more The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy-based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one’s beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy-based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness – a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one’s doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of an important result by Greaves and Wallace for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The generalization I provide will, among other things, allow us to apply the result to cases of self-locating evidence. In the second stage I develop an alternative framework. Very roughly, what distinguishes the traditional approach from the alternative one is that, on the traditional picture, we’re interested in evaluating the expected accuracy of conforming to an update-procedure. On the alternative picture that I develop, instead of considering how good an update procedure is as a plan to conform to, we consider how good it is as a plan to make. I show how, given the use of strictly proper scoring rules, the alternative picture vindicates calibrationism: a view according to which higher order evidence should have a significant impact on our beliefs. I conclude with some thoughts about why higher order evidence poses a serious challenge for standard ways of thinking about rationality.
Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I s... more Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I show that their result only applies to a restricted range of cases. I then show that the update-procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in general is one in which, upon learning P, we conditionalize, not on P, but on the proposition that we learned P. After proving this result, I provide further generalizations of it and show that “accuracy-first” epistemologists are committed to KK-like iteration principles and to the existence of a class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true.
The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evid... more The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one’s credences should be calibrated to one’s expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is the only constraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution.
It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence (“incomplete” or “non-specific... more It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence (“incomplete” or “non-specific” evidence), agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.
The aim of this paper is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vag... more The aim of this paper is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory.
In this paper, I explore how we can bridge rationality and accuracy. In part I, I describe a pri... more In this paper, I explore how we can bridge rationality and accuracy. In part I, I describe a prima facie plausible answer to the “bridging question” and show that it can do important explanatory work. In part II, I argue that higher order evidence considerations pose a serious problem for the claims and arguments I developed in part I. I then describe an alternative answer to the bridging question that accommodates and explains conciliatory views about higher order evidence. The alternative answer appeals to the idea that the principles of rationality aren’t the ones that are the best to follow – they are the ones that are the best to try to follow. I conclude by showing that many of the difficulties that arise in trying to explain how rationality and accuracy are connected can be resolved by distinguishing two notions of epistemic rationality, each corresponding to a different way in which we care about accuracy.
Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent’s internal states that expla... more Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent’s internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing? Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds. I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims. Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the way in which we expect them to act as causal mediators between states of the world, on the one hand, and our beliefs and actions on the other.
This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy. I show how t... more This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy. I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one. Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called “parity” (as well as for cases in which agents have incomplete preferences or imprecise credences). The problem with the all of the decision theories that have been defended to account for parity is that they are committed to a claim I call unanimity: when all of the functions in the set agree that an agent ought to do A, then an agent ought to do A. A decision theory committed to unanimity violates the constraint I defend in this paper. Thus, if parity exists, a new approach to decision theory is necessary.
In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than o... more In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences.
A central question in epistemology is: which beliefs are rational? However, I intend to argue tha... more A central question in epistemology is: which beliefs are rational? However, I intend to argue that the notion of rationality is, in fact, a conflation of two quite different notions: the notion of what we ought to believe and the notion of what the evidence supports. I also think that many of the problems that epistemologists face can be solved by distinguishing these two notions. I will say more about these notions later in the paper, but for now, the crucial point to note is that what beliefs we ought to have depends, in part, on our cognitive capacities, whereas what beliefs the evidence supports does not. In this paper, I will focus on how this distinction can be used to address some puzzling issues that arise with regard to the question of how precise our doxastic attitudes should be.
Drafts by Miriam Schoenfield
In the past few years permissivism - the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than ... more In the past few years permissivism - the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response - has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it.
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Papers by Miriam Schoenfield
Drafts by Miriam Schoenfield