History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 2019
The concept of biodiversity, I argue, is poorly suited as an indicator of conservation value. An ... more The concept of biodiversity, I argue, is poorly suited as an indicator of conservation value. An earlier concept, natural diversity, fits the role better. Natural diversity is broader than biodiversity not only in moving beyond taxonomic categories to encompass other patterns in the tapestry of life, but also in including abiotic, but valuable, aspects of nature. It encompasses, for instance, geological curiosities, natural entities of historical and cultural significance, and parts of nature with unique recreational and aesthetic value. It allows us to capture the idea of a diversity of ecosystem services, many of which are abiotic or have significant abiotic components. I make the case that refocusing conservation science around natural diversity retains many of benefits of using biodiversity as an indicator of value, while avoiding many of biodiversity’s shortcomings. In particular, it provides a framework that highlights the conservation value of many biodiversity “coldspots,” a...
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-... more This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2015
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid ... more Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientific confirmation. I give a justificatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists.
The very idea of novel ecosystems has been controversial in ecology. Critics have complained abou... more The very idea of novel ecosystems has been controversial in ecology. Critics have complained about its imprecision, and that it illicitly smuggles problematic ethical and political values into the science. By labelling a human-modified system a ‘novel ecosystem,‘ they worry, we give policymakers a “license to trash nature.“ The critics are right to be suspicious. I show that proponents of the novel ecosystem concept have been unable to make it both value-free and precise enough to allow for applied use.
Also, the critics are right to be suspicious, because a goal for many proponents of novel ecosystems is to bring new values into applied ecology. But the critics are wrong that this is illicit. I defend a value-laden conception of novel ecosystems, showing that applied ecologists are comfortable with other value-laden concepts (e.g. invasive species), and that the value shift motivating discussion of novel ecosystems is necessary if we want to understand and protect nature in a changing world.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2022
In response to increasing fatigue with the failings of the peer review system, granting agencies ... more In response to increasing fatigue with the failings of the peer review system, granting agencies are beginning to consider lotteries as an alternative. I argue that citizen review, in which non-scientists determine funding allocations, has advantages over both. This is particularly true when it comes to identifying which research is most pursuitworthy.
Supposedly, stubbornness on the part of scientists—an unwillingness to change one’s position on a... more Supposedly, stubbornness on the part of scientists—an unwillingness to change one’s position on a scientific issue even in the face of countervailing evidence—helps efficiently divide scientific labor. Maintaining disagreement is important because it keeps scientists pursuing a diversity of leads rather than all working on the most promising, and stubbornness helps preserve this disagreement. Planck’s observation that “Science progresses one funeral at a time” might therefore be an insight into epistemically beneficial stubbornness on the part of researchers. In conversation with extant formal models, recent empirical research, and a novel agent-based model of my own I explore whether the epistemic goods which stubbornness can secure—disagreement and diversity—are attainable through less-costly methods. I make the case that they are, at least in part, and also use my modeling results to show that if stubbornness is scientifically valuable, it still involves a willingness to change one’s mind.
The chapter defends a limited non-evidential justification of the use of native speaker metalingu... more The chapter defends a limited non-evidential justification of the use of native speaker metalinguistic judgments (intuitions) as data in linguistics. According to this view, intuitions are not a source of scientific evidence, but can be a justified means of appealing to shared background theory. None of the leading defenses of construing metalinguistic judgments as evidence, it is argued, is supported by the preponderance of empirical and philosophical evidence. Instead, intuitions in linguistics serve the function of delimiting what belongs to the shared background and what questions are currently under the microscope. For intuitions to serve this purpose, however, they must be broadly shared. It is likely that some of the more complex and unusual example sentences constructed by linguists don’t actually engender identical judgments across linguists, and in these cases it would be inappropriate to take the linguist’s judgment as accessing the common ground of background beliefs.
Abstract Even if our messages are unlikely to be heard, the threat to our species that contact wi... more Abstract Even if our messages are unlikely to be heard, the threat to our species that contact with extrasolar entities poses means that determining what content to include in Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence (METI) messages presents serious ethical questions. I tackle one of those questions: Should our opening move in interstellar diplomacy be a peaceful overture or a belligerent warning? Those in favor of broadcasting peaceful overtures sometimes argue that the ability to interpret a METI message requires advanced technology and communicative skills, which in turn depends on a suite of social capacities and prosocial attitudes. We can thus assume that any species which receives our message will at least be open to peaceful coexistence. I show that this argument does not hold up under scrutiny because it seriously underestimates just how different an advanced alien intelligence could be from Earth life. An extraterrestrial entity might be similar to us: a society composed of cooperating autonomous individuals. But it could also be an instance of eusocial hive cooperation, or an evolving superindividual, which develops not through natural selection but through learning. These possibilities blow some of the premises of the argument for peaceful overture out of the water. I conclude by making a case that, if we send any message at all, defensive belligerence is the more prudent diplomatic tactic, even in case of serious technological asymmetry.
Many experts have warned that environmental degradation is increasing the likelihood of future pa... more Many experts have warned that environmental degradation is increasing the likelihood of future pandemics like COVID-19, as habitat loss and poaching increase close contact between wildlife and people. This fact has been framed as a reason to increase wildlife conservation efforts. We have many good reasons to step up conservation efforts, but arguments for doing so on the basis of pandemic prevention are rhetorically, ethically, and empricially flawed.
The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity... more The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity, has gained substantial currency across the academy and with the broader public. Within the earth sciences, however, the question of the Anthropocene is hotly debated, recognized as a question that gets at both the foundations of geological science and issues of broad philosophical importance. For example, official recognition of the Anthropocene requires us to find a way to use the methods of historical science to make predictions. It also involves determining the role that political motivations should play in establishing scientific kinds. I bring the perspective of philosophy of science to bear on these questions, ultimately arguing that formal recognition of the Anthropocene should be indefinitely deferred. 1A New Epoch 1.1Criteria for designating a new epoch2The Future Geologist’s Perspective 2.1Climate change2.2The fossil record, excluding humans2.3The human fossil record2.4Direct...
A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer (Biol Philos, 2017) provides compelling arguments that... more A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer (Biol Philos, 2017) provides compelling arguments that biodiversity is either a natural kind or a pragmatically-valid scientific entity. I call into question three of these arguments. The first argument contends that biodiversity is a Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC). I respond that there is no plausible homeostatic mechanism that would make biodiversity an HPC natural kind. The second argument proposes that biodiversity is a multiply-realizable functional kind. I respond that there is no shared function to ground this account. The final, and strongest, argument, is that biodiversity is an ineliminable explanans and explanandum in various subdisciplines of biology. I argue that once we look at the details of the relevant research, not only does biodiversity in a broad sense not function in explanatory roles, but we must eliminate biodiversity in favor of more specific concepts in order to make sense of the leading explanations in contemporary ecology and conservation science.
The reproduction of cultural systems in cases where cultural group selection may occur is typical... more The reproduction of cultural systems in cases where cultural group selection may occur is typically incomplete, with only certain cultural traits being adopted by less successful cultural groups. Why a particular trait and not another is transmitted might not be explained by cultural group selection. We explore this issue through the case of religious syncretism.
We question the need to explain the onset of agriculture by appealing to the second type of multi... more We question the need to explain the onset of agriculture by appealing to the second type of multilevel selection (MLS2). Unlike eusocial insect colonies, human societies do not exhibit key features of evolutionary individuals. If we avoid the mistake of equating Darwinian fitness with health and quality of life, the adoption of agriculture is almost certainly explicable in terms of individual-level selection and individual rationality.
We argue that Smaldino has not established that group-level traits constitute a unit of selection... more We argue that Smaldino has not established that group-level traits constitute a unit of selection distinct from selection on individuals, as group-level traits are neither replicators nor interactors. Moreover, we argue that Wimsatt's analysis of emergence and aggregativity supports an understanding of group-level and other emergent traits as explanatorily reducible to the individual level.
The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity... more The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity, has gained substantial currency across the academy and with the broader public. Within the earth sciences, however, the question of the Anthropocene is hotly debated, recognized as a question that gets at both the foundations of geological science and issues of broad philosophical importance. For example, official recognition of the Anthropocene requires us to find a way to use the methods of historical science to make predictions. It also involves determining the role that political motivations should play in establishing scientific kinds. I bring the perspective of philosophy of science to bear on these questions, ultimately arguing that formal recognition of the Anthropocene should be indefinitely deferred. 1A New Epoch 1.1Criteria for designating a new epoch2The Future Geologist’s Perspective 2.1Climate change2.2The fossil record, excluding humans2.3The human fossil record2.4Direct...
Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid ... more Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientific confirmation. I give a justificatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists.
History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 2019
The concept of biodiversity, I argue, is poorly suited as an indicator of conservation value. An ... more The concept of biodiversity, I argue, is poorly suited as an indicator of conservation value. An earlier concept, natural diversity, fits the role better. Natural diversity is broader than biodiversity not only in moving beyond taxonomic categories to encompass other patterns in the tapestry of life, but also in including abiotic, but valuable, aspects of nature. It encompasses, for instance, geological curiosities, natural entities of historical and cultural significance, and parts of nature with unique recreational and aesthetic value. It allows us to capture the idea of a diversity of ecosystem services, many of which are abiotic or have significant abiotic components. I make the case that refocusing conservation science around natural diversity retains many of benefits of using biodiversity as an indicator of value, while avoiding many of biodiversity’s shortcomings. In particular, it provides a framework that highlights the conservation value of many biodiversity “coldspots,” a...
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-... more This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2015
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid ... more Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientific confirmation. I give a justificatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists.
The very idea of novel ecosystems has been controversial in ecology. Critics have complained abou... more The very idea of novel ecosystems has been controversial in ecology. Critics have complained about its imprecision, and that it illicitly smuggles problematic ethical and political values into the science. By labelling a human-modified system a ‘novel ecosystem,‘ they worry, we give policymakers a “license to trash nature.“ The critics are right to be suspicious. I show that proponents of the novel ecosystem concept have been unable to make it both value-free and precise enough to allow for applied use.
Also, the critics are right to be suspicious, because a goal for many proponents of novel ecosystems is to bring new values into applied ecology. But the critics are wrong that this is illicit. I defend a value-laden conception of novel ecosystems, showing that applied ecologists are comfortable with other value-laden concepts (e.g. invasive species), and that the value shift motivating discussion of novel ecosystems is necessary if we want to understand and protect nature in a changing world.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2022
In response to increasing fatigue with the failings of the peer review system, granting agencies ... more In response to increasing fatigue with the failings of the peer review system, granting agencies are beginning to consider lotteries as an alternative. I argue that citizen review, in which non-scientists determine funding allocations, has advantages over both. This is particularly true when it comes to identifying which research is most pursuitworthy.
Supposedly, stubbornness on the part of scientists—an unwillingness to change one’s position on a... more Supposedly, stubbornness on the part of scientists—an unwillingness to change one’s position on a scientific issue even in the face of countervailing evidence—helps efficiently divide scientific labor. Maintaining disagreement is important because it keeps scientists pursuing a diversity of leads rather than all working on the most promising, and stubbornness helps preserve this disagreement. Planck’s observation that “Science progresses one funeral at a time” might therefore be an insight into epistemically beneficial stubbornness on the part of researchers. In conversation with extant formal models, recent empirical research, and a novel agent-based model of my own I explore whether the epistemic goods which stubbornness can secure—disagreement and diversity—are attainable through less-costly methods. I make the case that they are, at least in part, and also use my modeling results to show that if stubbornness is scientifically valuable, it still involves a willingness to change one’s mind.
The chapter defends a limited non-evidential justification of the use of native speaker metalingu... more The chapter defends a limited non-evidential justification of the use of native speaker metalinguistic judgments (intuitions) as data in linguistics. According to this view, intuitions are not a source of scientific evidence, but can be a justified means of appealing to shared background theory. None of the leading defenses of construing metalinguistic judgments as evidence, it is argued, is supported by the preponderance of empirical and philosophical evidence. Instead, intuitions in linguistics serve the function of delimiting what belongs to the shared background and what questions are currently under the microscope. For intuitions to serve this purpose, however, they must be broadly shared. It is likely that some of the more complex and unusual example sentences constructed by linguists don’t actually engender identical judgments across linguists, and in these cases it would be inappropriate to take the linguist’s judgment as accessing the common ground of background beliefs.
Abstract Even if our messages are unlikely to be heard, the threat to our species that contact wi... more Abstract Even if our messages are unlikely to be heard, the threat to our species that contact with extrasolar entities poses means that determining what content to include in Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence (METI) messages presents serious ethical questions. I tackle one of those questions: Should our opening move in interstellar diplomacy be a peaceful overture or a belligerent warning? Those in favor of broadcasting peaceful overtures sometimes argue that the ability to interpret a METI message requires advanced technology and communicative skills, which in turn depends on a suite of social capacities and prosocial attitudes. We can thus assume that any species which receives our message will at least be open to peaceful coexistence. I show that this argument does not hold up under scrutiny because it seriously underestimates just how different an advanced alien intelligence could be from Earth life. An extraterrestrial entity might be similar to us: a society composed of cooperating autonomous individuals. But it could also be an instance of eusocial hive cooperation, or an evolving superindividual, which develops not through natural selection but through learning. These possibilities blow some of the premises of the argument for peaceful overture out of the water. I conclude by making a case that, if we send any message at all, defensive belligerence is the more prudent diplomatic tactic, even in case of serious technological asymmetry.
Many experts have warned that environmental degradation is increasing the likelihood of future pa... more Many experts have warned that environmental degradation is increasing the likelihood of future pandemics like COVID-19, as habitat loss and poaching increase close contact between wildlife and people. This fact has been framed as a reason to increase wildlife conservation efforts. We have many good reasons to step up conservation efforts, but arguments for doing so on the basis of pandemic prevention are rhetorically, ethically, and empricially flawed.
The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity... more The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity, has gained substantial currency across the academy and with the broader public. Within the earth sciences, however, the question of the Anthropocene is hotly debated, recognized as a question that gets at both the foundations of geological science and issues of broad philosophical importance. For example, official recognition of the Anthropocene requires us to find a way to use the methods of historical science to make predictions. It also involves determining the role that political motivations should play in establishing scientific kinds. I bring the perspective of philosophy of science to bear on these questions, ultimately arguing that formal recognition of the Anthropocene should be indefinitely deferred. 1A New Epoch 1.1Criteria for designating a new epoch2The Future Geologist’s Perspective 2.1Climate change2.2The fossil record, excluding humans2.3The human fossil record2.4Direct...
A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer (Biol Philos, 2017) provides compelling arguments that... more A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer (Biol Philos, 2017) provides compelling arguments that biodiversity is either a natural kind or a pragmatically-valid scientific entity. I call into question three of these arguments. The first argument contends that biodiversity is a Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC). I respond that there is no plausible homeostatic mechanism that would make biodiversity an HPC natural kind. The second argument proposes that biodiversity is a multiply-realizable functional kind. I respond that there is no shared function to ground this account. The final, and strongest, argument, is that biodiversity is an ineliminable explanans and explanandum in various subdisciplines of biology. I argue that once we look at the details of the relevant research, not only does biodiversity in a broad sense not function in explanatory roles, but we must eliminate biodiversity in favor of more specific concepts in order to make sense of the leading explanations in contemporary ecology and conservation science.
The reproduction of cultural systems in cases where cultural group selection may occur is typical... more The reproduction of cultural systems in cases where cultural group selection may occur is typically incomplete, with only certain cultural traits being adopted by less successful cultural groups. Why a particular trait and not another is transmitted might not be explained by cultural group selection. We explore this issue through the case of religious syncretism.
We question the need to explain the onset of agriculture by appealing to the second type of multi... more We question the need to explain the onset of agriculture by appealing to the second type of multilevel selection (MLS2). Unlike eusocial insect colonies, human societies do not exhibit key features of evolutionary individuals. If we avoid the mistake of equating Darwinian fitness with health and quality of life, the adoption of agriculture is almost certainly explicable in terms of individual-level selection and individual rationality.
We argue that Smaldino has not established that group-level traits constitute a unit of selection... more We argue that Smaldino has not established that group-level traits constitute a unit of selection distinct from selection on individuals, as group-level traits are neither replicators nor interactors. Moreover, we argue that Wimsatt's analysis of emergence and aggregativity supports an understanding of group-level and other emergent traits as explanatorily reducible to the individual level.
The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity... more The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity, has gained substantial currency across the academy and with the broader public. Within the earth sciences, however, the question of the Anthropocene is hotly debated, recognized as a question that gets at both the foundations of geological science and issues of broad philosophical importance. For example, official recognition of the Anthropocene requires us to find a way to use the methods of historical science to make predictions. It also involves determining the role that political motivations should play in establishing scientific kinds. I bring the perspective of philosophy of science to bear on these questions, ultimately arguing that formal recognition of the Anthropocene should be indefinitely deferred. 1A New Epoch 1.1Criteria for designating a new epoch2The Future Geologist’s Perspective 2.1Climate change2.2The fossil record, excluding humans2.3The human fossil record2.4Direct...
Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid ... more Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientific confirmation. I give a justificatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists.
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Papers by Carlos Santana
Also, the critics are right to be suspicious, because a goal for many proponents of novel ecosystems is to bring new values into applied ecology. But the critics are wrong that this is illicit. I defend a value-laden conception of novel ecosystems, showing that applied ecologists are comfortable with other value-laden concepts (e.g. invasive species), and that the value shift motivating discussion of novel ecosystems is necessary if we want to understand and protect nature in a changing world.
Also, the critics are right to be suspicious, because a goal for many proponents of novel ecosystems is to bring new values into applied ecology. But the critics are wrong that this is illicit. I defend a value-laden conception of novel ecosystems, showing that applied ecologists are comfortable with other value-laden concepts (e.g. invasive species), and that the value shift motivating discussion of novel ecosystems is necessary if we want to understand and protect nature in a changing world.