Papers by Inkeri Koskinen
Kokkonen, Tomi and Koskinen, Inkeri. 2016. Genres as Real Kinds and Projections: Homeostatic Prop... more Kokkonen, Tomi and Koskinen, Inkeri. 2016. Genres as Real Kinds and Projections: Homeostatic Property Clusters in Folklore and Art. In Koski, K., Frog, and Savolainen, U (eds.) Genre - text - interpretation: Multidisciplinary perspectives on folklore and beyond. Studia Fennica Folkloristica 22. Helsinki: The Finnish Literature Society.
Niin&näin 4/2016. Open access, katso linkki yllä.
Humanistisilla aloilla elää hämmästyttävän sit... more Niin&näin 4/2016. Open access, katso linkki yllä.
Humanistisilla aloilla elää hämmästyttävän sitkeässä kuvitelma, jonka mukaan humanistinen tutkimus ei voisi olla objektiivista. Törmään siihen tavan takaa sekä opettaessani humanististen tieteiden loso aa että keskustellessani humanististen alojen tutkijoiden kanssa. Joskus keskustelukumppanini kyseenalaistavat ajatuksen, että mikään
tiede voisi olla objektiivista. Usein kuitenkin kohtaan myös käsityksen, jonka mukaan luonnontieteiden tuloksia voi kutsua objektiivisiksi mutta humanististen ei. Käsityksellä voi olla valitettavia tiedepoliittisia seurauksia.
Synthese 2016, see link above.
This article focuses on epistemic challenges related to the democ... more Synthese 2016, see link above.
This article focuses on epistemic challenges related to the democratisation of scientific knowledge production, and to the limitations of current social accounts of objectivity. A process of ’democratisation’ can be observed in many scientific and academic fields today. Collaboration with extra-academic agents and the use of extra-academic expertise and knowledge has become common, and researchers are interested in promoting socially inclusive research practices. As this development is particularly prevalent in policy-relevant research, it is important that the new, more democratic forms of research be objective. In social accounts of objectivity only epistemic communities are taken to be able to produce objective knowledge, or the entity whose objectivity is to be assessed is precisely such a community. As I argue, these accounts do not allow for situations where it is not easy to identify the relevant epistemic community. Democratisation of scientific knowledge production can lead to such situations. As an example, I discuss attempts to link indigenous oral traditions to floods and tsunamis that happened hundreds or even thousands of years ago.
Tieteen yhteiskunnallisen vaikuttavuuden käsite on nykyään kohtuuttoman kapea. Tilanne on hermene... more Tieteen yhteiskunnallisen vaikuttavuuden käsite on nykyään kohtuuttoman kapea. Tilanne on hermeneuttisesti epäoikeudenmukainen: etenkin humanistisen tutkimuksen yhteiskunnallinen vaikuttavuus jää näkymättömiin, koska käytettävä vaikuttavuuden käsite ei kata sitä. Tämä hapertaa jopa humanististen alojen itseymmärrystä. Humanistinen tutkimus vaikuttaa kuitenkin konkreettisin tavoin siihen, keitä olemme.
Inkeri Koskinen and Uskali Mäki
Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, see li... more Inkeri Koskinen and Uskali Mäki
Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, see link above.
Doctoral dissertation. Available in Helda (see link above).
Teoksessa Moniulotteinen etnografia, toim. Pilvi Hämeenaho ja Eerika Koskinen-Koivisto. Helsinki ... more Teoksessa Moniulotteinen etnografia, toim. Pilvi Hämeenaho ja Eerika Koskinen-Koivisto. Helsinki : Ethnos, 2014. 128-152.
This is the penultimate version of a paper that has been published in:
Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruph... more This is the penultimate version of a paper that has been published in:
Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (Eds): Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer, 2015. (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_10)
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Jan 1, 2011
The kind of epistemic relativism usually refuted by it's critics is rarely if ever observable in ... more The kind of epistemic relativism usually refuted by it's critics is rarely if ever observable in ethnographic research practices. Instead, methodological conceptual relativism can be recognized in many cases. This has significant practical implications, since the kind of relativism described by it's critics, if rigorously followed, would lead ethnographers conflating ways of argumentation accepted by their informants with ways of argumentation accepted in the academia, whereas the actually practiced forms of relativism do not have such consequences.
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Papers by Inkeri Koskinen
Humanistisilla aloilla elää hämmästyttävän sitkeässä kuvitelma, jonka mukaan humanistinen tutkimus ei voisi olla objektiivista. Törmään siihen tavan takaa sekä opettaessani humanististen tieteiden loso aa että keskustellessani humanististen alojen tutkijoiden kanssa. Joskus keskustelukumppanini kyseenalaistavat ajatuksen, että mikään
tiede voisi olla objektiivista. Usein kuitenkin kohtaan myös käsityksen, jonka mukaan luonnontieteiden tuloksia voi kutsua objektiivisiksi mutta humanististen ei. Käsityksellä voi olla valitettavia tiedepoliittisia seurauksia.
This article focuses on epistemic challenges related to the democratisation of scientific knowledge production, and to the limitations of current social accounts of objectivity. A process of ’democratisation’ can be observed in many scientific and academic fields today. Collaboration with extra-academic agents and the use of extra-academic expertise and knowledge has become common, and researchers are interested in promoting socially inclusive research practices. As this development is particularly prevalent in policy-relevant research, it is important that the new, more democratic forms of research be objective. In social accounts of objectivity only epistemic communities are taken to be able to produce objective knowledge, or the entity whose objectivity is to be assessed is precisely such a community. As I argue, these accounts do not allow for situations where it is not easy to identify the relevant epistemic community. Democratisation of scientific knowledge production can lead to such situations. As an example, I discuss attempts to link indigenous oral traditions to floods and tsunamis that happened hundreds or even thousands of years ago.
Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, see link above.
Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (Eds): Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer, 2015. (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_10)
Humanistisilla aloilla elää hämmästyttävän sitkeässä kuvitelma, jonka mukaan humanistinen tutkimus ei voisi olla objektiivista. Törmään siihen tavan takaa sekä opettaessani humanististen tieteiden loso aa että keskustellessani humanististen alojen tutkijoiden kanssa. Joskus keskustelukumppanini kyseenalaistavat ajatuksen, että mikään
tiede voisi olla objektiivista. Usein kuitenkin kohtaan myös käsityksen, jonka mukaan luonnontieteiden tuloksia voi kutsua objektiivisiksi mutta humanististen ei. Käsityksellä voi olla valitettavia tiedepoliittisia seurauksia.
This article focuses on epistemic challenges related to the democratisation of scientific knowledge production, and to the limitations of current social accounts of objectivity. A process of ’democratisation’ can be observed in many scientific and academic fields today. Collaboration with extra-academic agents and the use of extra-academic expertise and knowledge has become common, and researchers are interested in promoting socially inclusive research practices. As this development is particularly prevalent in policy-relevant research, it is important that the new, more democratic forms of research be objective. In social accounts of objectivity only epistemic communities are taken to be able to produce objective knowledge, or the entity whose objectivity is to be assessed is precisely such a community. As I argue, these accounts do not allow for situations where it is not easy to identify the relevant epistemic community. Democratisation of scientific knowledge production can lead to such situations. As an example, I discuss attempts to link indigenous oral traditions to floods and tsunamis that happened hundreds or even thousands of years ago.
Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, see link above.
Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (Eds): Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer, 2015. (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_10)