Papers by Jaan Kangilaski
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Dec 1, 2008
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth... more My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Kunne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Kunne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Kunne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.
Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2008
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth... more My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.
essentially a form of deflationism. In the heart of his account is the following schema, meant to... more essentially a form of deflationism. In the heart of his account is the following schema, meant to be a general definition of propositional truth: (MOD) ∀x (x is true → ∃p (x = [p] & p)).1 How should it be understood? Especially, what does the propositional quantification mean? (I am ignoring the possible formal difficulties with such non-standard quantification and concentrating on the question whether it can be made sense in natural language.) A semi-formal rendering of (MOD), relatively close to the natural language, is the following, according to Künne: (mod) ∀x (x is true → For some ways things may be said to be, x is the proposition that things are that way, and things are that way). My claim in the paper is that Künne's account faces a dilemma: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible. First horn of the dilemma: (mod) invokes quantification over ways things may be said to be – entities that are quite similar to states of affairs (or facts) postulated in...
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deationary at-titude to truth,... more My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deationary at-titude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in (Künne 2003). I introduce the deationary theories of truth in the rst part of my paper and present briey the views of a more familiar deationist, Paul Horwich, as a “stepping-stone ” to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview ofKünne’s theory and in the nal part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest aer all or it is incomprehensible.
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deationary attitude to truth,... more My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in (Künne 2003). I introduce the deationary theories of truth in the rst part of my paper and present briey the views of a more familiar deationist, Paul Horwich, as a “stepping-stone” to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview ofKünne’s theory and in the nal part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest aer all or it is incomprehensible.
Dialectica, 2013
The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truthcondi... more The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truthcondition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. If the premise is understood in the sense required for the argument to go through then it should be rejected by a deflationist.
Akadeemia, 2015, nr 3, lk 504-520, Mar 2015
Akadeemia, 2014, nr 4, lk 617-626, Apr 2014
Filosoofia ja analüüs: Analüütilise filosoofia seminar 20. Koost. B. Mölder, J. Kangilaski. Tartu: EYS Veljesto Kirjastus, 2011, lk 131-146, Jul 2011
Tegelen siinses artiklis küsimusega, kas deflatsiooniline tõekäsitlus 1 sobib kokku tõetingimusli... more Tegelen siinses artiklis küsimusega, kas deflatsiooniline tõekäsitlus 1 sobib kokku tõetingimusliku tähendusteooriaga. Deflatsionismi järgi on tõemõiste üsna triviaalne ning täidab üksnes teatavat puhtloogilist otstarvet. Tõetingimusliku tähendusteooria järgi seisneb meie lausete 2 tähendus (vähemalt osalt) nende tõetingimusis. 3 Eriti viimaseil aastakümneil on deflatsionism olnud päris populaarne vaade tõele, pärineb see aga vähemasti Frank Ramsey töödest 1920. aastail. Tõetingimuslikku tähendusekäsitust kaitsesid esimesena Frege ja varane Wittgenstein, ent tõeliselt õitsele on see puhkenud pärast 1960. aastaid, tänu nii Donald Davidsoni programmile kui võimalike maailmade semantikale, mis mõlemad arendavad süstemaatiliselt arusaama, et lause tähendus on (vähemalt) selle tõetingimus.
20. sajandi mõttevoolud. Toim. E. Annus. Tallinn - Tartu: TÜ Kirjastus, 2009, lk 505-517, 2009
Ameerika filosoof Donald Herbert Davidson (1917 tõuseb ana lüütilises filosoofiatraditsioonis esi... more Ameerika filosoof Donald Herbert Davidson (1917 tõuseb ana lüütilises filosoofiatraditsioonis esile üsna erandlikult süstemaatilise ja laiahaardelise mõtlejana. ühelt poolt tegeles ta väga paljude teemadega keelefilosoofiast eetikani ja filosoofia ajaloost vaimufilosoofiani, teiselt poolt aga on suurem osa tema tööst olnud kantud ühtsest programmist, mida võiks ehk kutsuda ühe ta artikli pealkirja järgi: mõtlemise ja tegevuse ühendteooria.
Studia Philosophica Estonica Vol. 1.2 (2008), Special Issue "Truth" (Part II), edited by Daniel Cohnitz, Dec 2008
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth... more My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.
Püsimatu metaphysicus: Madis Kõiv 75. Koost. J. Kangilaski, B. Mölder, V. Palge. Tartu: EYS Veljesto Kirjastus, 2004, lk 235-245, Dec 2004
Tiidus ja tõdõ. Märgütüisi / Arutlusi teadusest ja tõest. Toim. J. Kangilaski, E. Kasak. Võro: Võro Instituut, 1998, lk 70-76, 1998
Thesis Chapters by Jaan Kangilaski
Unpublished MA thesis, University of Tartu, 2001
In the present thesis I try to show that proper names, being a distinctive class of expressions i... more In the present thesis I try to show that proper names, being a distinctive class of expressions in natural language, have both reference – an object we use them to designate, or their bearer – and sense, i.e. the “route” to the reference. The basic idea behind this distinction is derived from Frege. Focusing on Kripke’s arguments against the “description theory of names” and on his own influential “causal theory of names” I try to show that although Kripke has certainly made an important contribution to the theory of reference of proper names, at the same time it is quite clear that his ideas do not refute, but are complementary to, the Fregean conception of sense and reference.
The main moral of the “new theory of reference” is that reference is determined in the first place by the social interaction of people, the theory thus gives new and valuable insights into our ordinary use of names, namely the idea of the social character of sense. As a general paradigm, however, we may well hold on to the old distinction between sense and reference, even if it needs amendments to accommodate the ideas of Kripke, Putnam, Dummett, Evans and others.
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Papers by Jaan Kangilaski
Thesis Chapters by Jaan Kangilaski
The main moral of the “new theory of reference” is that reference is determined in the first place by the social interaction of people, the theory thus gives new and valuable insights into our ordinary use of names, namely the idea of the social character of sense. As a general paradigm, however, we may well hold on to the old distinction between sense and reference, even if it needs amendments to accommodate the ideas of Kripke, Putnam, Dummett, Evans and others.
The main moral of the “new theory of reference” is that reference is determined in the first place by the social interaction of people, the theory thus gives new and valuable insights into our ordinary use of names, namely the idea of the social character of sense. As a general paradigm, however, we may well hold on to the old distinction between sense and reference, even if it needs amendments to accommodate the ideas of Kripke, Putnam, Dummett, Evans and others.