Theological Studies

The figure finds itself in a grand narrative, in a story in which its role is that of an actor. Becoming an actor on the other hand, entails that it must take up a specific character, that it might become able to participate, coherently, with the plot. The actor then interprets this character’s meaning – where it’s message is its substance. Here, substance is spoken of not as an origin, or a composition of man and some sort. Rather, its permanence in time – entailing a sub-stance.  The figure is being-there in two senses: the first is in the idem, where it is extremely the same all through-out the entire show; ii.) the latter is in the ipse, where there it is self-identical and not being another despite a change of roles – it is what remains despite change.  These two must be mediated upon speaking about what Ricouer calls a narrative identity – this is when both the ipse and the idem is con-textualized. Further, it is within this narrative that a character, upon attributing itself with other characters, can itself be re-figured. In the wide sense, refiguration is a re-figure-action – an improvement. In this paper, I will argue that Paul Ricouer’s refiguration, inserted in his analysis of the narrative identity, does not only guarantee the capability to place the I within a context, but it also highlights the tendency of the I to a self-revealing action. In theatrical lingo, the individual character wants to show the audience its uniqueness, it wants a spotlight. Its actions are not meant only to place the character in a plot, but to give its uniqueness a focus. The re-figuring act is a showcase of individuality. The individual also wants to communicate its boast.

This is what the paper aims to expound: there is fundamentally a compelling force within my ens, in which my being (referring to thingness) is in the verge of becoming forgetful of. There is still a tendency to focus on its thingness rather than its becoming a thing. In so far as being is judged in the criteria of manifesting itself out of nothingness, of becoming something rather than nothing, of revealing itself in the minds of human through action, this cannot be. To see is to believe, not in the literal sense. But rather, we only believe if an object is dynamic, not being capable of locomotion, but dynamic in a sense that it is becoming present. I only notice my pen when it is dynamically becoming a pen, through being there. It is capable of being seen all the time regardless if it is in front of me. And it is only through action that being presents itself, that it is able to stand-out from nothingness. 2 The line of thought in this paper branches out from that of Thomistic Metaphysics which Norris Clarke claims to be existential. The aim is to use Marion’s distance and saturated phenomena to lay once again that illuminating path, in which case, the individual bares again an important and fixed glimpse, an immediate and mandatory looking back of that sight of his be-ing (esse) – which is the act of existing. To put it tersely, it is through Distance that I want to be. This is because the desire of Distance is to participate in the saturated phenomena and as well as to be placed in the spotlight, to be included in the picture, to exist. Through here also that I remember my fundamental metaphysical action – existing. I assert that being does not participate because of an outward call, but more importantly, because of an inward one.

Thomas Aquinas properly categorizes the diversities of man's life, emphasizing its rational capabilities, in two categories: (1) Contemplative; and (2) Active. Of the two, the former is considered to be the more noble in nature. Wherefore, he lists nine arguments to support his claim, eight citations coming from Aristotle, and the final coming from the Lord Himself. In today's context, the contemplative can be attributed to the terms: " cloistered " , " esoteric " , or " too-religious " , while the latter as " adventurous " , " vigorous " , or as choosing the " pro-active " life. As such, the new generation of thinkers, who are the few, and thoroughly-accustomed to critical thinking, are naturally inclined to be called " contemplative " , while at risk to be given a clear-cut separation to the exterior life. In short, it seems that today's intellectuals are at the verge of being labeled as only occupying the interior life. This paper, as if taking water from an ocean, will faithfully try to shed light on Aquinas' conception of the contemplative and active life, in an attempt also to emphasize the co-dependence of each other rather than its separation. Now, thereof understanding Saint Thomas, the happiness of man is the contemplation of divine essence; but happiness essentially consists in the act of the intellect [contemplative], while accidentally on the act of the will [active]. Therefore, happiness consists in both the object of the two forms of life. Hence, I agree that a proper practice of the intellectual life must not stop in the joy of contemplation, but must needs be participating in the active life to overflow that joy, since also it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself. Finally, here lies the nobility of teaching, a form of an active life, yet more excellent than being merely contemplative – since it is a mixture of both. The motivation of this paper rightly follows: (a) to show the co-dependence of contemplation and external action, (b) emphasize the nobility of the mixed life, specifically the profession of teaching, and (c) establish that both ends of the kinds of life are directed to a participation in the life of a charity, as becoming a receiver through contemplation and a giver through acts of charity. I claim that a proper practice of the intellectual life must not stop in the joy of contemplation, but must needs be participating in the active life – so as to overflow the delight that the intellect has received in possessing the knowledge of truth.

The early Chinese writings provide us rich sources for political governance. As one of the oldest civilizations, the Chinese philosophy holds reputation as one of the most cultivated and mature forms of thought. The early philosophical views are outstanding, inasmuch as they effectively produce practical results in governance – and – its finest testimony is manifested in the status of the contemporary Chinese nation. In lieu of this fact, this paper aims to re-visit one of Confucius' immediate reactionaries: Mencius, whose political philosophy cannot be separated to humanism and morality.

Much expository work had already been allotted to understanding Marx's notion of religion. According to the studies, Marx views religion as an " opium " of the people, signifying the social function of organized religion as the product of man's adjustment to the different adversities which befall him by being part of an oppressive economic system. In contrast to religion as the response of man to a higher deity called " God " , Marx disagrees with this theological manner of looking at the subject matter, and instead asserts that religion is a product of social forces, forces which are mainly influenced by economic intentions. Although as a professed atheist, much of Marx philosophy was constructed to critique the economic system which pervaded during his time. His critique of religion was sharp and well accepted during his time, but that does not make him an authority in the philosophy of religion. Hence, we do him injustice by analyzing him absent from his proper field. We accept the premises offered in this distinction, although I also claim that his arguments carry weight in the sociological understanding of the origins of religion. Consequently, I attempt to re-visit his basic positions and concepts, especially located within his notion of historical materialism and the work Towards A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Some specific inquiries we shall consider during the discussion. If his historical materialism is objectively true, then religions who claim to have come from " creation mythologies " are questionable. And if historical materialism sees all historical movements as the product of economic tendencies, then can we not say that the intentions of those who propagate religion, are heavily economic?

Joseph Ratzinger (known as Pope Benedict XVI) made ecumenism, dialogue, and Christian unity one of the primary concerns of his pontificate. As part of his essential thought, he approaches ecumenism from the perspective of a "eucharistic ecclesiology." With parishes & communities centered on the Eucharist, which in itself is the the presence of God Himself, he argues that these sources are a good starting point for dialogue between different Christian Churches. While his thought on this topic couldn't possibly be encapsulated in a short paper (since his pontificate produced a lot of effort in Christian unity). My aim in this project would be to highlight the different tenets that seem essential to grasp a basic understanding of his approach in ecumenism-comprised in the statement "exchange of gifts" which he said on the occasion of his ecumenical meeting at the apostolic journey to cologne.

John Henry Newman (now St. John Henry Newman) a Catholic Theologian from England encased in his book "The Idea of A University" (1852) peculiar thoughts and responses regarding the way university education has been predominantly ran. In this book he sways away from the popular tendency to use education as a means to reduce real human learners into systems and numbers. Despite the dismissive response of Charles Dickens-his contemporary-on the same subject, Newman lays bare his alternative solution through this work. In a more hopeful manner, he argues that the purpose of a university is: i.) to pursue true knowledge as a valuable thing in itself; and ii.) to contribute to students and learners a freedom upon the pursuit of this knowledge-thereby making them truly in liberty for the benefit of the whole society. He writes "The nature or essence of a university is to teach, diffuse, and extend universal knowledge. Knowledge that is discoverable and applicable to all men everywhere and at all times." In fact, this same model of education was normalized at Newman University, Birmingham, England-a university dedicated to the legacy of the late saint. My aim in this paper is to highlight his critical arguments regarding the way university education runs, how learning takes place, and the distinction between philosophical and mechanical knowledge.