. The topic of this article is the ontogenetic development of an understanding of perception and ... more . The topic of this article is the ontogenetic development of an understanding of perception and of different subjects’ perspectives. We discuss the importance of alternating and explicating the different perspectives involved in joint object reference in hopes to get a better grip on what is actually meant by the metaphor of “putting oneself in someone else’s mental shoes” and on how such an ability might be acquired. Hegel’s (1820/2009, §260)principle of subjectivity states that no one can ever step outside of her subjective perspective. Thinking about another’s thoughts or perspectives is not first of all a psychological process of getting into or reading someone else’s mind. Rather, it is the internalization of a possible symbolic action qua form, which, like speech, has commonly intelligible content (Hegel 1820/2009, §§110, 111). Our investigations show that an understanding of other persons and their subjective access to the world has its origin in experiences of joint attention and joint action. By jointly acting with others, even infants can acquire practical knowledge of others’ relations to objects. Only much later do children come to understand others’ thoughts that are not actualized in action.
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic tim... more In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and communication with others who are acting on false assumptions. In a second step, children, at preschool age, acquire the capacity to reflect on and arrive at third-personal judgments about a misinformed agent's perspective. This capacity is theoretical and grounded in the ability to "confront" perspectives. It allows children to understand that beliefs can misrepresent the state of the world and to predict what (past, future, or hypothetical) actions follow from these beliefs. We conclude with ideas on how practical perspective-taking develops into theoretical perspective-confronting in early ontogeny.
Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cog- nition and how it differs from... more Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cog- nition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the pre- suppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens' cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reason- ing) as other apes.
Achim Stephan ist Professor für Philosophie der Kognition an der Universität Osnabrück. Sven Walt... more Achim Stephan ist Professor für Philosophie der Kognition an der Universität Osnabrück. Sven Walter ist Professor für Philosophie des Geistes an der Universität Osnabrück. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen National bibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic tim... more In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and communication with others who are acting on false assumptions. In a second step, children, at preschool age, acquire the capacity to reflect on and arrive at third-personal judgments about a misinformed agent's perspective. This capacity is theoretical and grounded in the ability to "confront" perspectives. It allows children to understand that beliefs can misrepresent the state of the world and to predict what (past, future, or hypothetical) actions follow from these beliefs. We conclude with ideas on how practical perspective-taking develops into theoretical perspective-confronting in early ontogeny.
This essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolu... more This essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking. Heyes’ point of departure is the claim that current theories of cultural evolution fail adequately to make a place for the mind. Heyes articulates a cognitive psychology of cultural evolution by explaining how eponymous “cognitive gadgets,” such as imitation, mindreading and language, mental technologies, are “tuned” and “assembled” through social interaction and cultural learning. After recapitulating her explanations for the cultural and psychological origins of these gadgets, we turn to criticisms. Among those, we find Heyes’ use of evolutionary theory confusing on several points of importance; alternative theories of cultural evolution, especially those of the Tomasello group and of Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, are misrepresented; the book neglects joint attention and other forms of intersubjectivity in its explanation of the origins of cognitive gadgets; and, where...
This project is a study on children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and... more This project is a study on children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and reality.
Data from 4-year-old children on their ability to teach others.Teach1 = data set from first exper... more Data from 4-year-old children on their ability to teach others.Teach1 = data set from first experimentTeach 2 = data set from second experiment<br>
This paper summarizes, contrasts, and reviews recent accounts of cultural evolution in our specie... more This paper summarizes, contrasts, and reviews recent accounts of cultural evolution in our species offered by Cecilia Heyes in Cognitive Gadgets, Kevin Laland in Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony, and M...
Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes a... more Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes are covered (e.g., Moll & Khalulyan, 2017). This has been interpreted as a manifestation of their preference for reciprocal interactions. We investigated how 3- to 4-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, n = 12) respond in this situation. Because a lack of interpersonal connectedness and reciprocal communication are core features of this disorder, we predicted that young children with ASD will not make mutual regard a condition for seeing another person and therefore acknowledge being able to see her. Against this prediction, children with ASD gave the same negative answers as a group of TD (n = 36) age-mates. Various interpretations are discussed, including the possibility that some children with ASD are capable of relating to others as second persons.
In his recent book "Becoming Human" Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared i... more In his recent book "Becoming Human" Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion. In this critical essay, we center on three parts of his theory. The first is that children allegedly have to earn the status of "second persons" through the acquisition of collective intentionality at age 3. We make the case that humans take a second-personal stance toward others even as infants. The second point concerns Tomasello's claim that 3-year-olds are group-minded and think in terms of "us" vs. "them". We doubt both that children this young have a clear overview of their in-and out-groups and that they possess the "agonistic spirit" necessary for intergroup competition. Third, due to his focus on collective intentionality and how it might explain 3-year-olds' difficulties with theory of mind problems, Tomasello appears to pay less attention to the crucial conceptual change that allows 4-to 5-year-olds to master such tasks.
We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-uni... more We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or “primary intersubjectivity.” According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9–12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch t...
. The topic of this article is the ontogenetic development of an understanding of perception and ... more . The topic of this article is the ontogenetic development of an understanding of perception and of different subjects’ perspectives. We discuss the importance of alternating and explicating the different perspectives involved in joint object reference in hopes to get a better grip on what is actually meant by the metaphor of “putting oneself in someone else’s mental shoes” and on how such an ability might be acquired. Hegel’s (1820/2009, §260)principle of subjectivity states that no one can ever step outside of her subjective perspective. Thinking about another’s thoughts or perspectives is not first of all a psychological process of getting into or reading someone else’s mind. Rather, it is the internalization of a possible symbolic action qua form, which, like speech, has commonly intelligible content (Hegel 1820/2009, §§110, 111). Our investigations show that an understanding of other persons and their subjective access to the world has its origin in experiences of joint attention and joint action. By jointly acting with others, even infants can acquire practical knowledge of others’ relations to objects. Only much later do children come to understand others’ thoughts that are not actualized in action.
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic tim... more In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and communication with others who are acting on false assumptions. In a second step, children, at preschool age, acquire the capacity to reflect on and arrive at third-personal judgments about a misinformed agent&#39;s perspective. This capacity is theoretical and grounded in the ability to &quot;confront&quot; perspectives. It allows children to understand that beliefs can misrepresent the state of the world and to predict what (past, future, or hypothetical) actions follow from these beliefs. We conclude with ideas on how practical perspective-taking develops into theoretical perspective-confronting in early ontogeny.
Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cog- nition and how it differs from... more Michael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cog- nition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the pre- suppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens' cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reason- ing) as other apes.
Achim Stephan ist Professor für Philosophie der Kognition an der Universität Osnabrück. Sven Walt... more Achim Stephan ist Professor für Philosophie der Kognition an der Universität Osnabrück. Sven Walter ist Professor für Philosophie des Geistes an der Universität Osnabrück. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen National bibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic tim... more In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and communication with others who are acting on false assumptions. In a second step, children, at preschool age, acquire the capacity to reflect on and arrive at third-personal judgments about a misinformed agent's perspective. This capacity is theoretical and grounded in the ability to "confront" perspectives. It allows children to understand that beliefs can misrepresent the state of the world and to predict what (past, future, or hypothetical) actions follow from these beliefs. We conclude with ideas on how practical perspective-taking develops into theoretical perspective-confronting in early ontogeny.
This essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolu... more This essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking. Heyes’ point of departure is the claim that current theories of cultural evolution fail adequately to make a place for the mind. Heyes articulates a cognitive psychology of cultural evolution by explaining how eponymous “cognitive gadgets,” such as imitation, mindreading and language, mental technologies, are “tuned” and “assembled” through social interaction and cultural learning. After recapitulating her explanations for the cultural and psychological origins of these gadgets, we turn to criticisms. Among those, we find Heyes’ use of evolutionary theory confusing on several points of importance; alternative theories of cultural evolution, especially those of the Tomasello group and of Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, are misrepresented; the book neglects joint attention and other forms of intersubjectivity in its explanation of the origins of cognitive gadgets; and, where...
This project is a study on children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and... more This project is a study on children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and reality.
Data from 4-year-old children on their ability to teach others.Teach1 = data set from first exper... more Data from 4-year-old children on their ability to teach others.Teach1 = data set from first experimentTeach 2 = data set from second experiment<br>
This paper summarizes, contrasts, and reviews recent accounts of cultural evolution in our specie... more This paper summarizes, contrasts, and reviews recent accounts of cultural evolution in our species offered by Cecilia Heyes in Cognitive Gadgets, Kevin Laland in Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony, and M...
Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes a... more Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes are covered (e.g., Moll & Khalulyan, 2017). This has been interpreted as a manifestation of their preference for reciprocal interactions. We investigated how 3- to 4-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, n = 12) respond in this situation. Because a lack of interpersonal connectedness and reciprocal communication are core features of this disorder, we predicted that young children with ASD will not make mutual regard a condition for seeing another person and therefore acknowledge being able to see her. Against this prediction, children with ASD gave the same negative answers as a group of TD (n = 36) age-mates. Various interpretations are discussed, including the possibility that some children with ASD are capable of relating to others as second persons.
In his recent book "Becoming Human" Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared i... more In his recent book "Becoming Human" Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion. In this critical essay, we center on three parts of his theory. The first is that children allegedly have to earn the status of "second persons" through the acquisition of collective intentionality at age 3. We make the case that humans take a second-personal stance toward others even as infants. The second point concerns Tomasello's claim that 3-year-olds are group-minded and think in terms of "us" vs. "them". We doubt both that children this young have a clear overview of their in-and out-groups and that they possess the "agonistic spirit" necessary for intergroup competition. Third, due to his focus on collective intentionality and how it might explain 3-year-olds' difficulties with theory of mind problems, Tomasello appears to pay less attention to the crucial conceptual change that allows 4-to 5-year-olds to master such tasks.
We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-uni... more We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or “primary intersubjectivity.” According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9–12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch t...
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