Logicians often promise that if formal logic were to be used in the presentation of argument, the... more Logicians often promise that if formal logic were to be used in the presentation of argument, then questions would be discussed in a far more transparent and rational manner than is usually the case. Precise assessment of argument would fortify good argument, and poor argument would be revealed for what it is by the production of clear counterexamples. The logicians' promise is used, in many cases, to motivate the teaching of formal logic. Yet, despite the many who have learnt the formalisms, the promise is largely empty. Very few actually use formal logic in argument. Even amongst logicians it seems that, rather than using the systems already available, of the making of many more systems there is no end. There is endless argument about which of the systems is more likely to capture the notion of good argument. And since the ideal system has not yet been made, so some say, the argument about which is the best system cannot be precise. So, for many, it is much easier to avoid applying logic by mounting up into the heights of metatheory. But some few logicians do toil away, trying to fulfil the logicians' promise. Notable among these was A. N. Prior. Denyer has dedicated his book to the memory of Prior. Denyer's work is an extended exercise in putting formal logic to work in the discussion of the freewill/determinism question. Denyer does not debate the virtues of ranges of formal systems, nor does he mount any expedition into either completeness or decidability, not even in any appendix. He relies on a standard classical approach. He sets out the bones, very bare ones, of a semantics. His work is essentially a work in applied logic. He is t o be commended for his effort. He argues for what he calls hard libertarianism, and against determinism.
logic and propositional axiomatizations, Otter has found publishable results. But for most mathem... more logic and propositional axiomatizations, Otter has found publishable results. But for most mathematical problems of medium difficulty (such as the quadratic formula), Otter and all other theorem provers usually wander astray in a combinatorial explosion of irrelevancies no matter how the flags and parameter are set. The book’s completeness (no prerequisites are needed) andmany exercises make it suitable for use as a text on theorem proving. But theorem proving is usually part of anAI course that gives equal time to logic programming, neural nets, and genetic algorithms. At 551 pages and $88, it is too big and expensive for a supplemental reading text. This book has extensive coverage of the logical foundation of theorem proving but usually without proofs. Kalman does not prove J. A. Robinson’s theorem that most general unifiers always exist but he shows how they are generated, why symbol clashes or occurs checks imply non-unifiability, and how to get Otter to print out most general unifiers. He states but does not prove the many refutational completeness proofs involving resolution, paramodulation, and set of support. The Knuth–Bendix completion procedure is well presented but without the usual theorems about critical pairs, confluence, and termination. Of the texts that cover resolution-based theorem proving with formal proofs, Chang and Lee’s Symbolic logic and mechanical theorem proving (Academic Press, 1973) is the classic. Alexander Leitsch’s The resolution calculus (Springer, 1997) has the most recent references. What proofs there are are done precisely and in full detail—Kleene style. But the mathematics is not elegant. This can be blamed as much on the subject as the author. Automated reasoning does not have the depth, maturity, and beauty of complexity theory. Wos was one of the first to realize that it is primarily an experimental science. Progress depends as much on writing programs to determine what works as on writing papers on what might work. Workers in the field are more impressed with results (such asMcCune’s solution of Robbins’s problem) than with theoretical arguments. There are almost no errors. “6,” “7,” “8” should be “f,” “g,” “h” on pages 434–435. On page 510 “max-weight” should be “max weight.” The other errors (pages 116, 363, 377) are harmless. The index is incomplete. It has “paramodulation” but neither “resolution” nor “binary resolution.” It has “substitution” but not “replacement.” On page 82 Kalman abbreviates “inferred-clause-processing procedure” to “icpp.” This will cause problems for a non-linear reader who encounters this un-indexed abbreviation later in the book. The reason for complaining is that while most readers will be advanced Otter users, the book is far too verbose to be read in its entirety by anyone except beginners. If you need a user’s guide to Otter that goes beyond McCune’s sixty-page reference manual, this is your only choice. Dale Myers Department of Mathematics, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA. [email protected].
There are several formal systems for persuasive dialogue. Dialogue systems are multi-agent system... more There are several formal systems for persuasive dialogue. Dialogue systems are multi-agent systems, and this contrasts with the general lack of any agency in standard logics other than in the case of epistemic and deontic logics. Dialogue systems have been called logics. A logic usually has a semantics and a proof sys- tem, and questions of soundness and completeness arise. Any dialogue conducted according to the rules of a dialogue logic is a complex process. Dynamic Logic is a logic of processes, with a possible world semantics. This paper is a preliminary exploration of transforming the dialogues of dialogue logic into complex Dynamic Logic processes with emphasis on semantic models. The transformation gives rise to many questions, three of which are discussed. Dialogue logic includes commit- ment sets which behave in a way similar to belief sets and undergo changes during any dialogue. There are issues as to the relationship between belief and commitment, and whether the logics of belief change apply to commitment stores. There is also the issue of the logical nature of the evaluation of dialogues as legal or illegal.
The question of the question in Critical Thinking is the same as in logic at large. The basis on ... more The question of the question in Critical Thinking is the same as in logic at large. The basis on which Critical Thinking is taught is usually the logic of deductive premise-conclusion arguments. The basic elements of the logic are propositional. This approach gives no basis for teaching students to think logically about either questions or commands. At the same time questions and commands are an important part of practical life. In either asking or responding to questions it is easy to commit any of several illogical moves. Although the same applies to commands, this paper will focus on questions. We raise the question of coherent systems in which questions occupy a proper place, systems which could form an appropriate theoretical background for teaching Critical Thinking and propose dialogue logic.
For me, this paper does four interesting things. First, it dumps on the orthodoxy; and second, it... more For me, this paper does four interesting things. First, it dumps on the orthodoxy; and second, it supports commonsense. The conclusion is not the unqualified view that enumerative induction is fine, but that, as a person of commonsense might say, "It all depends." It depends on the background knowledge. That knowledge "about the kind and attribute with respect to which the inference is being made," determines whether an inference by enumerative induction gives a probable conclusion or not, a definite conclusion or not.
International journal of knowledge management, Jul 1, 2021
Three foundational principles are introduced: intelligent systems such as those that would pass t... more Three foundational principles are introduced: intelligent systems such as those that would pass the Turing test should display multi-agent or interactional intelligence; multi-agent systems should be based on conceptual structures common to all interacting agents, machine and human; and multi-agent systems should have an underlying interactional logic such as dialogue logic. In particular, a multi-agent rather than an orthodox analysis of the key concepts of knowledge and belief is discussed. The contrast that matters is the difference between the different questions and answers about the support for claims to know and claims to believe. A simple multi-agent system based on dialogue theory which provides for such a difference is set out.
Inventive Approaches for Technology Integration and Information Resources Management
Recent interest in logics for questions and commands has been prompted partly by a recognition th... more Recent interest in logics for questions and commands has been prompted partly by a recognition that reasoned argument often involves moves that are not truth-evaluable, and partly by the use of questions and commands in most procedural programming. The authors argue that certain methodological issues must be addressed before we can agree on the purpose and nature of logics for questions and commands. They deny that formulas in such logics should correspond to sentences in ordinary language. They consider how formulas should be interpreted, focusing especially on questions. The authors argue that logics designed to capture the conditions for correct reasoning involving questions require a semantics that treats question-answer pairs as values. This emphasis brings to the fore issues about questions in premise-conclusion arguments. In both premise-conclusion and dialogical argumentation, the authors argue that logic should aim to capture moves in reasoning, not facts about sentences.
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, May 18, 1998
Epistemic and doxastic modal logics (Hintikka [1962]), and the logics of theory change and belief... more Epistemic and doxastic modal logics (Hintikka [1962]), and the logics of theory change and belief revision (Alchourr6n et. al. [1985], Giirdenfors [1988]) are used for the representation of belief. Both kinds of logic are omniscient in various ways. We address these delusions of omniscience in this paper. We begin by defining three kinds of omniscience-logical, deductive, and factual. We will then discuss some of the strategies which have been used to dispose of or deflate omniscience. Our main concern will be for the no worries strategies, and the other logics strategy. We then comment on the prospects for omniscience free logics.
Logicians often promise that if formal logic were to be used in the presentation of argument, the... more Logicians often promise that if formal logic were to be used in the presentation of argument, then questions would be discussed in a far more transparent and rational manner than is usually the case. Precise assessment of argument would fortify good argument, and poor argument would be revealed for what it is by the production of clear counterexamples. The logicians' promise is used, in many cases, to motivate the teaching of formal logic. Yet, despite the many who have learnt the formalisms, the promise is largely empty. Very few actually use formal logic in argument. Even amongst logicians it seems that, rather than using the systems already available, of the making of many more systems there is no end. There is endless argument about which of the systems is more likely to capture the notion of good argument. And since the ideal system has not yet been made, so some say, the argument about which is the best system cannot be precise. So, for many, it is much easier to avoid applying logic by mounting up into the heights of metatheory. But some few logicians do toil away, trying to fulfil the logicians' promise. Notable among these was A. N. Prior. Denyer has dedicated his book to the memory of Prior. Denyer's work is an extended exercise in putting formal logic to work in the discussion of the freewill/determinism question. Denyer does not debate the virtues of ranges of formal systems, nor does he mount any expedition into either completeness or decidability, not even in any appendix. He relies on a standard classical approach. He sets out the bones, very bare ones, of a semantics. His work is essentially a work in applied logic. He is t o be commended for his effort. He argues for what he calls hard libertarianism, and against determinism.
logic and propositional axiomatizations, Otter has found publishable results. But for most mathem... more logic and propositional axiomatizations, Otter has found publishable results. But for most mathematical problems of medium difficulty (such as the quadratic formula), Otter and all other theorem provers usually wander astray in a combinatorial explosion of irrelevancies no matter how the flags and parameter are set. The book’s completeness (no prerequisites are needed) andmany exercises make it suitable for use as a text on theorem proving. But theorem proving is usually part of anAI course that gives equal time to logic programming, neural nets, and genetic algorithms. At 551 pages and $88, it is too big and expensive for a supplemental reading text. This book has extensive coverage of the logical foundation of theorem proving but usually without proofs. Kalman does not prove J. A. Robinson’s theorem that most general unifiers always exist but he shows how they are generated, why symbol clashes or occurs checks imply non-unifiability, and how to get Otter to print out most general unifiers. He states but does not prove the many refutational completeness proofs involving resolution, paramodulation, and set of support. The Knuth–Bendix completion procedure is well presented but without the usual theorems about critical pairs, confluence, and termination. Of the texts that cover resolution-based theorem proving with formal proofs, Chang and Lee’s Symbolic logic and mechanical theorem proving (Academic Press, 1973) is the classic. Alexander Leitsch’s The resolution calculus (Springer, 1997) has the most recent references. What proofs there are are done precisely and in full detail—Kleene style. But the mathematics is not elegant. This can be blamed as much on the subject as the author. Automated reasoning does not have the depth, maturity, and beauty of complexity theory. Wos was one of the first to realize that it is primarily an experimental science. Progress depends as much on writing programs to determine what works as on writing papers on what might work. Workers in the field are more impressed with results (such asMcCune’s solution of Robbins’s problem) than with theoretical arguments. There are almost no errors. “6,” “7,” “8” should be “f,” “g,” “h” on pages 434–435. On page 510 “max-weight” should be “max weight.” The other errors (pages 116, 363, 377) are harmless. The index is incomplete. It has “paramodulation” but neither “resolution” nor “binary resolution.” It has “substitution” but not “replacement.” On page 82 Kalman abbreviates “inferred-clause-processing procedure” to “icpp.” This will cause problems for a non-linear reader who encounters this un-indexed abbreviation later in the book. The reason for complaining is that while most readers will be advanced Otter users, the book is far too verbose to be read in its entirety by anyone except beginners. If you need a user’s guide to Otter that goes beyond McCune’s sixty-page reference manual, this is your only choice. Dale Myers Department of Mathematics, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA. [email protected].
There are several formal systems for persuasive dialogue. Dialogue systems are multi-agent system... more There are several formal systems for persuasive dialogue. Dialogue systems are multi-agent systems, and this contrasts with the general lack of any agency in standard logics other than in the case of epistemic and deontic logics. Dialogue systems have been called logics. A logic usually has a semantics and a proof sys- tem, and questions of soundness and completeness arise. Any dialogue conducted according to the rules of a dialogue logic is a complex process. Dynamic Logic is a logic of processes, with a possible world semantics. This paper is a preliminary exploration of transforming the dialogues of dialogue logic into complex Dynamic Logic processes with emphasis on semantic models. The transformation gives rise to many questions, three of which are discussed. Dialogue logic includes commit- ment sets which behave in a way similar to belief sets and undergo changes during any dialogue. There are issues as to the relationship between belief and commitment, and whether the logics of belief change apply to commitment stores. There is also the issue of the logical nature of the evaluation of dialogues as legal or illegal.
The question of the question in Critical Thinking is the same as in logic at large. The basis on ... more The question of the question in Critical Thinking is the same as in logic at large. The basis on which Critical Thinking is taught is usually the logic of deductive premise-conclusion arguments. The basic elements of the logic are propositional. This approach gives no basis for teaching students to think logically about either questions or commands. At the same time questions and commands are an important part of practical life. In either asking or responding to questions it is easy to commit any of several illogical moves. Although the same applies to commands, this paper will focus on questions. We raise the question of coherent systems in which questions occupy a proper place, systems which could form an appropriate theoretical background for teaching Critical Thinking and propose dialogue logic.
For me, this paper does four interesting things. First, it dumps on the orthodoxy; and second, it... more For me, this paper does four interesting things. First, it dumps on the orthodoxy; and second, it supports commonsense. The conclusion is not the unqualified view that enumerative induction is fine, but that, as a person of commonsense might say, "It all depends." It depends on the background knowledge. That knowledge "about the kind and attribute with respect to which the inference is being made," determines whether an inference by enumerative induction gives a probable conclusion or not, a definite conclusion or not.
International journal of knowledge management, Jul 1, 2021
Three foundational principles are introduced: intelligent systems such as those that would pass t... more Three foundational principles are introduced: intelligent systems such as those that would pass the Turing test should display multi-agent or interactional intelligence; multi-agent systems should be based on conceptual structures common to all interacting agents, machine and human; and multi-agent systems should have an underlying interactional logic such as dialogue logic. In particular, a multi-agent rather than an orthodox analysis of the key concepts of knowledge and belief is discussed. The contrast that matters is the difference between the different questions and answers about the support for claims to know and claims to believe. A simple multi-agent system based on dialogue theory which provides for such a difference is set out.
Inventive Approaches for Technology Integration and Information Resources Management
Recent interest in logics for questions and commands has been prompted partly by a recognition th... more Recent interest in logics for questions and commands has been prompted partly by a recognition that reasoned argument often involves moves that are not truth-evaluable, and partly by the use of questions and commands in most procedural programming. The authors argue that certain methodological issues must be addressed before we can agree on the purpose and nature of logics for questions and commands. They deny that formulas in such logics should correspond to sentences in ordinary language. They consider how formulas should be interpreted, focusing especially on questions. The authors argue that logics designed to capture the conditions for correct reasoning involving questions require a semantics that treats question-answer pairs as values. This emphasis brings to the fore issues about questions in premise-conclusion arguments. In both premise-conclusion and dialogical argumentation, the authors argue that logic should aim to capture moves in reasoning, not facts about sentences.
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, May 18, 1998
Epistemic and doxastic modal logics (Hintikka [1962]), and the logics of theory change and belief... more Epistemic and doxastic modal logics (Hintikka [1962]), and the logics of theory change and belief revision (Alchourr6n et. al. [1985], Giirdenfors [1988]) are used for the representation of belief. Both kinds of logic are omniscient in various ways. We address these delusions of omniscience in this paper. We begin by defining three kinds of omniscience-logical, deductive, and factual. We will then discuss some of the strategies which have been used to dispose of or deflate omniscience. Our main concern will be for the no worries strategies, and the other logics strategy. We then comment on the prospects for omniscience free logics.
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Papers by Roderic Girle