Elinor Hållén
I am a philosopher who have explored self-knowledge, self-deception, repression, rationality and intentionality in action in my work, especially as these themes occur in the intersection of Wittgensteinian philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis. I am interested in the practice of philosophy and psychotherapy; in the form, methods (techniques), language – including pictorial language and persuasiveness – used to reveal something to the reader or/and patient, and further in the role that the aesthetic play in Wittgenstein’s and Freud’s work.
Another line of my research is in philosophy of education. Within the project “What Must a Swede Know” (The Swedish Research Council, 2014-17) on Bildung and educational policy I have critically examined the autonomy of Swedish institutionalized popular education (Folkbildning; folkhögskolor och studieförbund).
Another line of my research is in philosophy of education. Within the project “What Must a Swede Know” (The Swedish Research Council, 2014-17) on Bildung and educational policy I have critically examined the autonomy of Swedish institutionalized popular education (Folkbildning; folkhögskolor och studieförbund).
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Books by Elinor Hållén
I boken utforskar de olika författarna några av de mest aktuella frågorna om undervisning i den svenska skolan, högskolan och inom folkbildningen: Vad menas med kvalitet och effektivitet, och hur rättvisande är mätningar och utvärderingar? Hur har marknadsanpassningen av högskolan påverkat rättssäkerheten och likvärdigheten? Vad innebär kunskap och disciplin i skolan, och hur ska elevernas kunskaper i matematik och svenska förbättras?
Författarna representerar olika discipliner och forskningsområden, som utifrån olika synvinklar och med olika fokus försöker härleda utbildningens problem till de idéer om undervisning och skola som styr utbildningspolitiken. Den övergripande frågan är hur man ska kunna se bortom de ideologiska, politiska och ekonomiska intressen som ofta får styra skoldebatten för att på allvar kunna diskutera lösningar på en av vår tids ödesfrågor.
analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in
which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that
this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter
One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else,
the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is
Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving
contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic
action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of
radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson
discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out
of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of selfdeception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of
“ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action
in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I
object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that
Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception
involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of selfdeception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on
illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of selfdeception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of selfknowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems
inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising
because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.
Papers by Elinor Hållén
Talks by Elinor Hållén
I boken utforskar de olika författarna några av de mest aktuella frågorna om undervisning i den svenska skolan, högskolan och inom folkbildningen: Vad menas med kvalitet och effektivitet, och hur rättvisande är mätningar och utvärderingar? Hur har marknadsanpassningen av högskolan påverkat rättssäkerheten och likvärdigheten? Vad innebär kunskap och disciplin i skolan, och hur ska elevernas kunskaper i matematik och svenska förbättras?
Författarna representerar olika discipliner och forskningsområden, som utifrån olika synvinklar och med olika fokus försöker härleda utbildningens problem till de idéer om undervisning och skola som styr utbildningspolitiken. Den övergripande frågan är hur man ska kunna se bortom de ideologiska, politiska och ekonomiska intressen som ofta får styra skoldebatten för att på allvar kunna diskutera lösningar på en av vår tids ödesfrågor.
analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in
which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that
this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter
One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else,
the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is
Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving
contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic
action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of
radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson
discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out
of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of selfdeception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of
“ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action
in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I
object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that
Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception
involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of selfdeception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on
illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of selfdeception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of selfknowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems
inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising
because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.