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Jan Halák

Palacky University, Olomouc, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Address: Prague, Czech Republic

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Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

Rasmus Thybo Jensen

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Boston College

Rachel A Williams

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Dionysis Christias

Academy of Athens

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Pompeu Fabra University

NTNU

Miguel Segundo-Ortin

Utrecht University

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Papers by Jan Halák

On the Importance of a Human-Scale Breadth of View: Reading Tallis' Freedom

Human Affairs, 2022

This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis' book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis... more This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis' book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis' main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment on Tallis' interpretation of several more loosely associated topics from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, I reconsider Tallis' account of intentionality as a factor that opens a distance between the cognizer and the world. Whereas Tallis emphasizes that agency requisitions aspects of the world to achieve its goals, I point out that agency does not determine the meaning of things unidirectionally and independently of all context. A self-controlled agency is provisionally reached through a process of 'deindexicalization' of our passive intentional capacities, that is, by creating and maintaining new, different worldly contexts. Subsequently, I analyze Tallis' description of our intentional relation to spatiotemporally distant possibilities. In my view, Tallis underestimates the extent to which our intentional relation to possibilities is pre-reflexive and pre-predicative and hence independent of propositional attitudes. Finally, I consider Tallis' interpretation of nature and show that it is deeply influenced by the sciences of nature. In contrast, I argue that agency can be properly described only if we understand it as an intervention in a lifeworld already imbued with sense, not merely a physical or material nature.

Gesturing in Language: Merleau-Ponty and Mukařovský at the Phenomenological Limits of Structuralism

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2022

This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure... more This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure's linguistics by linking them to works that were independently elaborated by Jan Mukařovský, Czech structuralist aesthetician and literary theorist. I provide a comparative analysis of the two authors' theories of language and their interpretations of thought as fundamentally determined by language. On this basis, I investigate how they conceive linguistic innovation and its translation into changes in the constituted language and other social codes and institutions. I explain how they elaborate on Saussure's idea of language as a system of oppositions by interpreting cultural innovation as a systematic variation of preestablished social norms and, similarly, linguistic innovation as gesturing within language. Connectedly, I show how Mukařovský's works help clarify Merleau-Ponty's focus on the gestural dimension of language. By discussing the two thinkers' arguments in favour of linguistic innovation, I explore what could be called phenomenological limits of structuralism.

Jak tělu rozumět tělem. Příspěvek fenomenologie k překonání limitů mechanistického paradigmatu ve fyzioterapii

Teorie vědy, 2022

[In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodimen... more [In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the efficiency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body “understands” the practical meaning of a situation. Bodily understanding is then manifested in particular by the ability to adequately differentiate, adapt or vary motor and postural responses to environmental challenges. This change in the conception of embodiment also has important implications for understanding the therapist-patient relationship and the intervention itself. Physiotherapists should draw more on the fact that they are themselves a body and, on this basis, guide the patient’s bodily intentionality towards a more developed understanding of the practical meaning of situations.

Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending the concept of bodily intentionality

by Jan Halák and Petr Kříž

Medical Humanities, 2022

This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable ... more This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutic theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorization of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutic practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body; particularly, his analyses demonstrate that norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable in time and thus do not directly depend on generic physiological structures. In practice, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties and, similarly, patients’ reflective insights into their own motor deficiencies do not necessarily produce meaningful motor improvements. Physiotherapeutic procedures can be understood neither as mechanical manipulations of patients’ machine-like bodies by experts nor as a process of such manipulation by way of instructing patients’ explicit conscious awareness. Rather, physiotherapeutic practice and theory can benefit from the philosophical interpretation of motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Consequently, motor performances addressed in physiotherapy are interpreted as relational features of a living organism coupled with its environment, and motor disorders are approached as failures to optimally manage the motor requirements of a given situation owing to a relative loss of the capacity to structure one’s relation with their environment through motor action. Building on this, we argue that the process of physiotherapy is most effective when understood as a bodily interaction to guide patients toward discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through bodily postures and movements.

Mathematics embodied: Merleau-Ponty on geometry and algebra as fields of motor enaction

Synthese, 2022

This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty's contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathem... more This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty's contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathematical cognition. I first identify the main points of interest in the current discussions of embodied higher cognition and explain how they relate to Merleau-Ponty and his sources, in particular Husserl's late works. Subsequently, I explain these convergences in greater detail by more specifically discussing the domains of geometry and algebra and by clarifying the role of gestalt psychology in Merleau-Ponty's account. Beyond that, I explain how, for Merleau-Ponty, mathematical cognition requires not only the presence and actual manipulation of some concrete perceptible symbols but, more strongly, how it is fundamentally linked to the structural transformation of the concrete configurations of symbolic systems to which these symbols appertain. Furthermore, I fill a gap in the literature by explaining Merleau-Ponty's claim that these structural transformations are operated through motor intentionality. This makes it possible, in turn, to contrast Merleau-Ponty's approach to ontologically idealistic and realistic views on mathematical objects. On Merleau-Ponty's account, mathematical objects are relational entities, that is, gestalts that necessarily imply situated cognizers to whom they afford a specific type of engagement in the world and on whom they depend in their eventual structural transformations. I argue that, by attributing a strongly constitutive role to phenomenal configurations and their motor transformation in mathematical thinking, Merleau-Ponty contributes to clarifying the worldly, historical, and socio-cultural aspects of mathematical truths without compromising what we perceive as their universality, certainty, and necessity.

La parole opérante comme spécification de l’intentionnalité motrice chez Merleau-Ponty

Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 2021

[In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fun... more [In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fundamentally embodied process that is enacted by motor subject situated in natural and cultural environment. More specifically, I exemplify Merleau-Ponty’s interdisciplinary approach to cognition on his interpretations of motor intentionality, operative speech, and mathematical reasoning, which are based on neuropathology, linguistics, and gestalt psychology, respectively. In this analysis, I aim to show that the body is involved in cognition as an operator of the phenomenal structuration of the environment even at the level of linguistic, rational, and abstract experience.

Embodied higher cognition: insights from Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of motor intentionality

Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2021

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty's original account of "higher-order" cognition as fundamentall... more This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty's original account of "higher-order" cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty's account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case of the braininjured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann's syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider's sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty's interpretations, I argue that "higher-order" cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider's intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann's syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process.

Body schema dynamics in Merleau-Ponty

Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka & Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions (pp. 33-51). Oxford University Press, 2021

This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an opera... more This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against which the perceived world stands out as a complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies.

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2021

This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of ... more This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl’s account of the body as a “two‐fold unity” and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject‐object, the view of “my body” as “my object,” the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. Building on this analysis, I explain how Merleau‐Ponty resolves the difficulties raised by Husserl’s account by reversing it. According to Merleau‐Ponty, “flesh” is not a two‐fold reality comprising subjective and objective aspects, but an ontological dimension from which these aspects can be abstracted through specific cognitive operations. Consequently, all subjective and objective aspects, even beyond the boundaries of one’s body, must be understood as founded in the indivisible unity of flesh. I argue that a thorough phenomenological description of the human body requires abandoning Husserl’s concept of Leib because it contributes to perpetuating subject‐object dualism. In contrast, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of flesh reveals the circularity between subject and object and its general ontological significance.

Learning as differentiation of experiential schemas

Jim Parry, Pete Allison (eds.), Experiential Learning and Outdoor Education: Traditions of practice and philosophical perspectives. London: Routledge, 2019

The goal of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of experiential learning that fully deta... more The goal of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of experiential learning that fully detaches itself from the epistemological presuppositions of empiricist and intellectualist accounts of learning. I first introduce the concept of schema as understood by Kant and I explain how it is related to the problems implied by the empiricist and intellectualist frameworks. I then interpret David Kolb’s theory of learning that is based on the concept of learning cycle and represents an attempt to overcome the corresponding drawbacks of these frameworks. I show that Kolb’s theory fails to achieve its goal because it is rooted in some of the fundamental epistemological presuppositions of these frameworks. Subsequently, I present a group of works from phenomenology, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s, in order to show that Kolb’s attempt is insufficient due to a lack of understanding of the problem expressed by Kant via the concept of schema. Finally, I outline an interpretation of experiential learning as differentiation of experiential schemas and explain how it meets the epistemological challenges outlined above.

The Institution of Life in Gehlen and Merleau-Ponty. Searching for the Common Ground for the Anthropological Difference

The goal of our article is to review the widespread anthropological figure, according to which we... more The goal of our article is to review the widespread anthropological figure, according to which we can achieve a better understanding of humans by contrasting them with animals. This originally Herderian approach was elaborated by Arnold Gehlen, who characterized humans as “deficient beings” who become complete through culture. According to Gehlen, humans, who are insufficiently equipped by instincts, indirectly stabilize their existence by creating institutions, i.e., complexes of habitual actions. On the other hand, Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows that corporeal relationship to the world is already indirect because it is based on preestablished and readjusted “standards” or “norms” of interaction with the environment. Merleau-Ponty then calls these norms “institutions” and views culture as readjustment of institutions which operate already on the level of corporeal existence. The anthropological figure of confronting humans and animals thus cannot produce, as in Gehlen, a contrast between an allegedly “direct” relationship to the world in animals and a supposedly “indirect” relationship to the world in humans. The Herderian approach can be meaningfully retained only if interpreted as an invitation to confront the norms of indirect interaction with the world in animals and in people, that is, if viewed as a comparison of their respective institutions.

(CZ) Instituce jako model významu: Gehlen a Merleau-Ponty k otázce antropologie

Cílem článku je přehodnotit stále živou antropologickou figuru, která na otázku po podstatě člově... more Cílem článku je přehodnotit stále živou antropologickou figuru, která na otázku po podstatě člověka odpovídá pomocí jeho srovnání se zvířetem a kulturu vykládá jako prostředek, jímž se od přirozenosti nehotový člověk dotváří. Tento motiv prohloubil A. Gehlen, který v kontrastu ke zvířeti charakterizoval člověka jako „bytost nedostatků“. Morfologicko-instinktivně nedovybavená lidská bytost je podle něj nucena stabilizovat se kulturními institucemi, habitualizovanými soubory jednání. Texty M. Merleau-Pontyho však ukazují, že již tělesné bytosti se ke svému prostředí vztahují vždy nepřímo, na základě určitého „standardu“ či „normy“ interakce, který navíc, jak tvrdí, sám existuje po způsobu instituce (Stiftung, institution). Antropologická figura konfrontující člověka se zvířetem se proto jeví jako smysluplná nikoli tehdy, když po vzoru Gehlena stavíme proti sobě údajně „přímý“ vztah ke světu zvířete a „nepřímý“ člověka, nýbrž jedině pokud nás, jako u Merleau-Pontyho, vede k chápání transformace „nepřímosti“ zvířete v „nepřímost“ člověka, tj. jejich „institucí“.

The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity

Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure, Routledge, 2018

In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further dev... more In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic unity of the body, i.e. the fact there are various possibilities how the practical "diagram" of body schema could be de-differentiated (in pathology) or further refined (via cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems). This chapter summarises Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the notion, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema.

(CZ) "Perception Is Already Expression." Merleau-Ponty's First Collège de France Lectures.

In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new ... more In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and provides an interpretation of the key concepts of “expression” and “body schema”.

Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Subjectivity from the Perspective of Subject-Object Circularity

The phenomenological point of view of the body is usually appreciated for having introduced the n... more The phenomenological point of view of the body is usually appreciated for having introduced the notion of the 'lived' body. We cannot merely analyze and explain the body as one of the elements of the world of objects. We must also describe it, for example, as the center of our perspective on the world, the place where our sensing is 'localized', the agens which directly executes our intentions. However, in Husserl, the idea of the body as lived primarily complements his objectivism: the body (Leib) is an objective and mental reality, a 'double unity', as he writes. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty's later considerations of the body in Phenomenology of Perception tend to the idea of a circular relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions of the body – between the objective and the lived. One of the means to overcome the idea of the body as a site of the correlation between two opposite and complementary realms is, for Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical interpretation of an early neurological notion of 'body schema'. Body schema is neither an idea nor a physiological-physical fact, it is rather a practical diagram of our relationships with the world, an action-based norm in reference to which things make sense. In the recently published preparatory notes for his 1953 courses, Merleau-Ponty dedicates much effort to further developing the notion of body schema, and interprets fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studies various possibilities of how this practical 'diagram' can be de-differentiated (pathology) or further refined (cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems), which shows the fundamentally dynamic unity of the body. This paper summarizes the basic elements of Merleau-Ponty's 1953 renewed philosophical interpretation of the notion of body schema, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and in recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema.

Phenomenology is not phenomenalism. Is there such a thing as phenomenology of sport?

by Ivo Jirásek and Jan Halák

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in ... more Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of
sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation
of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three
types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance
(phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the
discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not
phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe
that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions
that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking.

Phenomenology Is Not Phenomenalism. Is There Such a Thing as Phenomenology of Sport?

by Jan Halák and Ivo Jirásek

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in ... more Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking.

(FR) Le mouvement ou la chair : deux conceptions de la profondeur ontologique selon Patočka et Merleau-Ponty

L'un et l'autre, Patocka et Merleau-Ponty conçoivent le monde non seulement comme Objet, mais com... more L'un et l'autre, Patocka et Merleau-Ponty conçoivent le monde non seulement comme Objet, mais comme un champ d'une profondeur phénoménale et ontologique irréductible. Le concept de mouvement chez Patocka et celui de chair chez Merleau-Ponty sont deux figures concrètes de cette profondeur, et dans cette mesure, ils sont compris chez les deux auteurs respectivement comme ce qui est à l'origine de chaque étant singulier pour autant qu'il se détache sur le fond du monde comme une totalité ouverte. Toutefois, la position des deux concepts par rapport aux catégories traditionnelles de la métaphysique semble être radicalement différente. L'auteur développe la thèse selon laquelle le concept patockien de mouvement est profondément enraciné dans les oppositions classiques et partant en dépend d'une manière cruciale, tandis que le concept merleau-pontyen de chair permet de comprendre ces oppositions comme des abstractions produites par ségrégation à partir du champ originaire de présence. Afin d'établir ces points, l'auteur propose une interprétation de la compréhension respective des deux philosophes des concepts d'horizon, de monde, de mouvement et de chair.

(CZ) Visibility as Originating Presence. On a Central Conceptual Circuit of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy

In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expression... more In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expressional circuit with the concept of “visibility”, a variation on the concept of “flesh” (chair). The aim of this article is to show that a consistent interpretation of this circuit necessarily leads us to a consideration of the concept of visibility as a systematically privileged viewpoint for the interpretation of all Merleau-Ponty’s more particular discussions. The concept of visibility, or flesh, summarises Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the proper cohesion of the “horizon” or “field” is prior to that which is objectively and individually thinkable within it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s pivotal idea is set down not just from the phenomenological viewpoint, or in particular instances, but rather quite generally and in an ontological sense. The article offers an analysis of the lexis related to the concept of visibility, characterises Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenon from its perspective and summarises its ontological consequences, using the example of two central themes i.e. the relation between subject and object and the relation between the empirical and ideal.

(CZ) Merleau-Ponty's Ontological Interpretation of Husserl's Conception of the Body as A "Double Unity"

Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of... more Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of his own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object – I observe the “consequential parallel” between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl’s example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of
a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh (chair) as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for an original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy.

On the Importance of a Human-Scale Breadth of View: Reading Tallis' Freedom

Human Affairs, 2022

This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis' book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis... more This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis' book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis' main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment on Tallis' interpretation of several more loosely associated topics from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, I reconsider Tallis' account of intentionality as a factor that opens a distance between the cognizer and the world. Whereas Tallis emphasizes that agency requisitions aspects of the world to achieve its goals, I point out that agency does not determine the meaning of things unidirectionally and independently of all context. A self-controlled agency is provisionally reached through a process of 'deindexicalization' of our passive intentional capacities, that is, by creating and maintaining new, different worldly contexts. Subsequently, I analyze Tallis' description of our intentional relation to spatiotemporally distant possibilities. In my view, Tallis underestimates the extent to which our intentional relation to possibilities is pre-reflexive and pre-predicative and hence independent of propositional attitudes. Finally, I consider Tallis' interpretation of nature and show that it is deeply influenced by the sciences of nature. In contrast, I argue that agency can be properly described only if we understand it as an intervention in a lifeworld already imbued with sense, not merely a physical or material nature.

Gesturing in Language: Merleau-Ponty and Mukařovský at the Phenomenological Limits of Structuralism

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2022

This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure... more This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure's linguistics by linking them to works that were independently elaborated by Jan Mukařovský, Czech structuralist aesthetician and literary theorist. I provide a comparative analysis of the two authors' theories of language and their interpretations of thought as fundamentally determined by language. On this basis, I investigate how they conceive linguistic innovation and its translation into changes in the constituted language and other social codes and institutions. I explain how they elaborate on Saussure's idea of language as a system of oppositions by interpreting cultural innovation as a systematic variation of preestablished social norms and, similarly, linguistic innovation as gesturing within language. Connectedly, I show how Mukařovský's works help clarify Merleau-Ponty's focus on the gestural dimension of language. By discussing the two thinkers' arguments in favour of linguistic innovation, I explore what could be called phenomenological limits of structuralism.

Jak tělu rozumět tělem. Příspěvek fenomenologie k překonání limitů mechanistického paradigmatu ve fyzioterapii

Teorie vědy, 2022

[In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodimen... more [In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the efficiency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body “understands” the practical meaning of a situation. Bodily understanding is then manifested in particular by the ability to adequately differentiate, adapt or vary motor and postural responses to environmental challenges. This change in the conception of embodiment also has important implications for understanding the therapist-patient relationship and the intervention itself. Physiotherapists should draw more on the fact that they are themselves a body and, on this basis, guide the patient’s bodily intentionality towards a more developed understanding of the practical meaning of situations.

Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending the concept of bodily intentionality

by Jan Halák and Petr Kříž

Medical Humanities, 2022

This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable ... more This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutic theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorization of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutic practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body; particularly, his analyses demonstrate that norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable in time and thus do not directly depend on generic physiological structures. In practice, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties and, similarly, patients’ reflective insights into their own motor deficiencies do not necessarily produce meaningful motor improvements. Physiotherapeutic procedures can be understood neither as mechanical manipulations of patients’ machine-like bodies by experts nor as a process of such manipulation by way of instructing patients’ explicit conscious awareness. Rather, physiotherapeutic practice and theory can benefit from the philosophical interpretation of motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Consequently, motor performances addressed in physiotherapy are interpreted as relational features of a living organism coupled with its environment, and motor disorders are approached as failures to optimally manage the motor requirements of a given situation owing to a relative loss of the capacity to structure one’s relation with their environment through motor action. Building on this, we argue that the process of physiotherapy is most effective when understood as a bodily interaction to guide patients toward discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through bodily postures and movements.

Mathematics embodied: Merleau-Ponty on geometry and algebra as fields of motor enaction

Synthese, 2022

This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty's contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathem... more This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty's contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathematical cognition. I first identify the main points of interest in the current discussions of embodied higher cognition and explain how they relate to Merleau-Ponty and his sources, in particular Husserl's late works. Subsequently, I explain these convergences in greater detail by more specifically discussing the domains of geometry and algebra and by clarifying the role of gestalt psychology in Merleau-Ponty's account. Beyond that, I explain how, for Merleau-Ponty, mathematical cognition requires not only the presence and actual manipulation of some concrete perceptible symbols but, more strongly, how it is fundamentally linked to the structural transformation of the concrete configurations of symbolic systems to which these symbols appertain. Furthermore, I fill a gap in the literature by explaining Merleau-Ponty's claim that these structural transformations are operated through motor intentionality. This makes it possible, in turn, to contrast Merleau-Ponty's approach to ontologically idealistic and realistic views on mathematical objects. On Merleau-Ponty's account, mathematical objects are relational entities, that is, gestalts that necessarily imply situated cognizers to whom they afford a specific type of engagement in the world and on whom they depend in their eventual structural transformations. I argue that, by attributing a strongly constitutive role to phenomenal configurations and their motor transformation in mathematical thinking, Merleau-Ponty contributes to clarifying the worldly, historical, and socio-cultural aspects of mathematical truths without compromising what we perceive as their universality, certainty, and necessity.

La parole opérante comme spécification de l’intentionnalité motrice chez Merleau-Ponty

Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 2021

[In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fun... more [In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fundamentally embodied process that is enacted by motor subject situated in natural and cultural environment. More specifically, I exemplify Merleau-Ponty’s interdisciplinary approach to cognition on his interpretations of motor intentionality, operative speech, and mathematical reasoning, which are based on neuropathology, linguistics, and gestalt psychology, respectively. In this analysis, I aim to show that the body is involved in cognition as an operator of the phenomenal structuration of the environment even at the level of linguistic, rational, and abstract experience.

Embodied higher cognition: insights from Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of motor intentionality

Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2021

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty's original account of "higher-order" cognition as fundamentall... more This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty's original account of "higher-order" cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty's account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case of the braininjured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann's syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider's sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty's interpretations, I argue that "higher-order" cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider's intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann's syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process.

Body schema dynamics in Merleau-Ponty

Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka & Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions (pp. 33-51). Oxford University Press, 2021

This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an opera... more This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against which the perceived world stands out as a complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies.

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2021

This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of ... more This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl’s account of the body as a “two‐fold unity” and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject‐object, the view of “my body” as “my object,” the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. Building on this analysis, I explain how Merleau‐Ponty resolves the difficulties raised by Husserl’s account by reversing it. According to Merleau‐Ponty, “flesh” is not a two‐fold reality comprising subjective and objective aspects, but an ontological dimension from which these aspects can be abstracted through specific cognitive operations. Consequently, all subjective and objective aspects, even beyond the boundaries of one’s body, must be understood as founded in the indivisible unity of flesh. I argue that a thorough phenomenological description of the human body requires abandoning Husserl’s concept of Leib because it contributes to perpetuating subject‐object dualism. In contrast, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of flesh reveals the circularity between subject and object and its general ontological significance.

Learning as differentiation of experiential schemas

Jim Parry, Pete Allison (eds.), Experiential Learning and Outdoor Education: Traditions of practice and philosophical perspectives. London: Routledge, 2019

The goal of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of experiential learning that fully deta... more The goal of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of experiential learning that fully detaches itself from the epistemological presuppositions of empiricist and intellectualist accounts of learning. I first introduce the concept of schema as understood by Kant and I explain how it is related to the problems implied by the empiricist and intellectualist frameworks. I then interpret David Kolb’s theory of learning that is based on the concept of learning cycle and represents an attempt to overcome the corresponding drawbacks of these frameworks. I show that Kolb’s theory fails to achieve its goal because it is rooted in some of the fundamental epistemological presuppositions of these frameworks. Subsequently, I present a group of works from phenomenology, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s, in order to show that Kolb’s attempt is insufficient due to a lack of understanding of the problem expressed by Kant via the concept of schema. Finally, I outline an interpretation of experiential learning as differentiation of experiential schemas and explain how it meets the epistemological challenges outlined above.

The Institution of Life in Gehlen and Merleau-Ponty. Searching for the Common Ground for the Anthropological Difference

The goal of our article is to review the widespread anthropological figure, according to which we... more The goal of our article is to review the widespread anthropological figure, according to which we can achieve a better understanding of humans by contrasting them with animals. This originally Herderian approach was elaborated by Arnold Gehlen, who characterized humans as “deficient beings” who become complete through culture. According to Gehlen, humans, who are insufficiently equipped by instincts, indirectly stabilize their existence by creating institutions, i.e., complexes of habitual actions. On the other hand, Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows that corporeal relationship to the world is already indirect because it is based on preestablished and readjusted “standards” or “norms” of interaction with the environment. Merleau-Ponty then calls these norms “institutions” and views culture as readjustment of institutions which operate already on the level of corporeal existence. The anthropological figure of confronting humans and animals thus cannot produce, as in Gehlen, a contrast between an allegedly “direct” relationship to the world in animals and a supposedly “indirect” relationship to the world in humans. The Herderian approach can be meaningfully retained only if interpreted as an invitation to confront the norms of indirect interaction with the world in animals and in people, that is, if viewed as a comparison of their respective institutions.

(CZ) Instituce jako model významu: Gehlen a Merleau-Ponty k otázce antropologie

Cílem článku je přehodnotit stále živou antropologickou figuru, která na otázku po podstatě člově... more Cílem článku je přehodnotit stále živou antropologickou figuru, která na otázku po podstatě člověka odpovídá pomocí jeho srovnání se zvířetem a kulturu vykládá jako prostředek, jímž se od přirozenosti nehotový člověk dotváří. Tento motiv prohloubil A. Gehlen, který v kontrastu ke zvířeti charakterizoval člověka jako „bytost nedostatků“. Morfologicko-instinktivně nedovybavená lidská bytost je podle něj nucena stabilizovat se kulturními institucemi, habitualizovanými soubory jednání. Texty M. Merleau-Pontyho však ukazují, že již tělesné bytosti se ke svému prostředí vztahují vždy nepřímo, na základě určitého „standardu“ či „normy“ interakce, který navíc, jak tvrdí, sám existuje po způsobu instituce (Stiftung, institution). Antropologická figura konfrontující člověka se zvířetem se proto jeví jako smysluplná nikoli tehdy, když po vzoru Gehlena stavíme proti sobě údajně „přímý“ vztah ke světu zvířete a „nepřímý“ člověka, nýbrž jedině pokud nás, jako u Merleau-Pontyho, vede k chápání transformace „nepřímosti“ zvířete v „nepřímost“ člověka, tj. jejich „institucí“.

The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity

Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure, Routledge, 2018

In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further dev... more In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic unity of the body, i.e. the fact there are various possibilities how the practical "diagram" of body schema could be de-differentiated (in pathology) or further refined (via cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems). This chapter summarises Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the notion, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema.

(CZ) "Perception Is Already Expression." Merleau-Ponty's First Collège de France Lectures.

In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new ... more In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and provides an interpretation of the key concepts of “expression” and “body schema”.

Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Subjectivity from the Perspective of Subject-Object Circularity

The phenomenological point of view of the body is usually appreciated for having introduced the n... more The phenomenological point of view of the body is usually appreciated for having introduced the notion of the 'lived' body. We cannot merely analyze and explain the body as one of the elements of the world of objects. We must also describe it, for example, as the center of our perspective on the world, the place where our sensing is 'localized', the agens which directly executes our intentions. However, in Husserl, the idea of the body as lived primarily complements his objectivism: the body (Leib) is an objective and mental reality, a 'double unity', as he writes. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty's later considerations of the body in Phenomenology of Perception tend to the idea of a circular relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions of the body – between the objective and the lived. One of the means to overcome the idea of the body as a site of the correlation between two opposite and complementary realms is, for Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical interpretation of an early neurological notion of 'body schema'. Body schema is neither an idea nor a physiological-physical fact, it is rather a practical diagram of our relationships with the world, an action-based norm in reference to which things make sense. In the recently published preparatory notes for his 1953 courses, Merleau-Ponty dedicates much effort to further developing the notion of body schema, and interprets fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studies various possibilities of how this practical 'diagram' can be de-differentiated (pathology) or further refined (cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems), which shows the fundamentally dynamic unity of the body. This paper summarizes the basic elements of Merleau-Ponty's 1953 renewed philosophical interpretation of the notion of body schema, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and in recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema.

Phenomenology is not phenomenalism. Is there such a thing as phenomenology of sport?

by Ivo Jirásek and Jan Halák

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in ... more Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of
sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation
of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three
types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance
(phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the
discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not
phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe
that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions
that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking.

Phenomenology Is Not Phenomenalism. Is There Such a Thing as Phenomenology of Sport?

by Jan Halák and Ivo Jirásek

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in ... more Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking.

(FR) Le mouvement ou la chair : deux conceptions de la profondeur ontologique selon Patočka et Merleau-Ponty

L'un et l'autre, Patocka et Merleau-Ponty conçoivent le monde non seulement comme Objet, mais com... more L'un et l'autre, Patocka et Merleau-Ponty conçoivent le monde non seulement comme Objet, mais comme un champ d'une profondeur phénoménale et ontologique irréductible. Le concept de mouvement chez Patocka et celui de chair chez Merleau-Ponty sont deux figures concrètes de cette profondeur, et dans cette mesure, ils sont compris chez les deux auteurs respectivement comme ce qui est à l'origine de chaque étant singulier pour autant qu'il se détache sur le fond du monde comme une totalité ouverte. Toutefois, la position des deux concepts par rapport aux catégories traditionnelles de la métaphysique semble être radicalement différente. L'auteur développe la thèse selon laquelle le concept patockien de mouvement est profondément enraciné dans les oppositions classiques et partant en dépend d'une manière cruciale, tandis que le concept merleau-pontyen de chair permet de comprendre ces oppositions comme des abstractions produites par ségrégation à partir du champ originaire de présence. Afin d'établir ces points, l'auteur propose une interprétation de la compréhension respective des deux philosophes des concepts d'horizon, de monde, de mouvement et de chair.

(CZ) Visibility as Originating Presence. On a Central Conceptual Circuit of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy

In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expression... more In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expressional circuit with the concept of “visibility”, a variation on the concept of “flesh” (chair). The aim of this article is to show that a consistent interpretation of this circuit necessarily leads us to a consideration of the concept of visibility as a systematically privileged viewpoint for the interpretation of all Merleau-Ponty’s more particular discussions. The concept of visibility, or flesh, summarises Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the proper cohesion of the “horizon” or “field” is prior to that which is objectively and individually thinkable within it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s pivotal idea is set down not just from the phenomenological viewpoint, or in particular instances, but rather quite generally and in an ontological sense. The article offers an analysis of the lexis related to the concept of visibility, characterises Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenon from its perspective and summarises its ontological consequences, using the example of two central themes i.e. the relation between subject and object and the relation between the empirical and ideal.

(CZ) Merleau-Ponty's Ontological Interpretation of Husserl's Conception of the Body as A "Double Unity"

Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of... more Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of his own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object – I observe the “consequential parallel” between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl’s example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of
a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh (chair) as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for an original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy.

"Vnímání je již vyjadřování". Merleau-Pontyho přednášky na College de France z roku 1953

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Řeč, dějinnost, příroda. Shrnutí přednášek z Collège de France (1952-1960)

Czech translation of Merleau-Ponty's Résumés de cours, Paris: Gallimard 1968. Translation, textua... more

M. Merleau-Ponty: Proměna vnímání a zkušenost pravdy. Podklady ke kandidatuře na Collège de France

M. Merleau-Ponty, The Transformation of Perception and the Experience of Truth. Materials for Mer... more M. Merleau-Ponty, The Transformation of Perception and the Experience of Truth. Materials for Merleau-Ponty’s Candidature to the Collège de France.

Merleau-Ponty was elected to the Collège de France in 1952 and stayed there until his death in 1961. The preparatory notes for his teaching, which have been successively published since the end of the 1990s, helped to bring an increased attention to his work and transformed his position in contemporary philosophical thought. This volume comprises two of Merleau-Ponty’s texts from 1951 which are directly related to his candidature to the Collège: Publications and Working Projects – Teaching Plan and An Unpublished Text by Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s main goal for his teaching at the Collège was to reform our idea of the subject and, correlatively, of being. In these texts for the candidature, Merleau-Ponty firstly summarizes his previous works (Structure of Behavior, Phenomenology of Perception) and explains how the phenomenology of perception and embodiment has to be complemented with a study of pre-linguistic expression (Prose of the World). Only with the help of such an analysis, claims Merleau-Ponty, will we understand how a situated, perceiving bodily subject can transcend her particular perspective and gain access to a meaning valid not only for herself, but for everyone. Pre-linguistic expression, such as painting or bodily gesture, is still a perceptible phenomenon, but it already frees us from the limitations of our individual situation by articulating a meaning not accessible in simply passive perception. Moreover, if this phenomenological interpretation of perception and expression is valid, we must transform our idea of subjectivity in general, because we are forced no longer to consider these experiences as a kind of rudimentary rational knowledge and, in turn, to change our idea of rational understanding or “intelligence”. The role of the latter in our experience must be understood, Merleau-Ponty believes, as a “transformation” of our perceptual experience, i.e. it must be situated on the same continuum as perception, but also considered as a specific form of our access to meaning. It must be shown more precisely that the relationship between rational understanding and language is analogical to the relationship between the body and perceptual understanding, and that each of these agents of meaning mediate it in a different way. The texts for the candidature thus link Merleau-Ponty’s early and later ambitions and clearly show how different and often seemingly unconnected aspects of his work form an integrated system of philosophical thought. The two texts by Merleau-Ponty are preceded by an introduction by Jan Halák, the translator, in which the historico-philosophical context of his candidature is explained.

Smysl filosofického tázání. Dva texty k Viditelnému a neviditelnému

Czech translation of two Merleau-Ponty's texts linked to the Visible and the Inivisible: the medi... more

Primát vnímání a jeho filosofické důsledky

Czech translation of Merleau-Ponty's Le primat de la perception et ses conséquences philosophiques.

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS: Enactivism and Phenomenology: State of the Dialog

by Jan Halák and Jan Puc

We invite conference paper submissions that explore historical, methodological, and systematic li... more

Conference Program: Merleau-Ponty at the Collège de France

In the last twenty years, the international perception of Merleau-Ponty's work has undergone a ra... more In the last twenty years, the international perception of Merleau-Ponty's work has undergone a radical change thanks to the publication of the preparatory manuscripts for his Collège de France lectures. An analysis of these materials in connection with the Visible and the Invisible shows that if finished, the positive part of the Merleau-Ponty's last work would stand on a firm basis of phenomenologically oriented studies of very concrete materials, much like the Phenomenology of Perception. This conference aims to provide a space to discuss the interconnection between Merleau-Ponty's lectures from the fifties on the one hand, and his published writings on the other. In particular, we aim to explore Merleau-Ponty's contribution to our understanding of corporeality, consciousness and subjectivity, Nature, and language and expression. Beyond this, the presentations aim to elucidate the relationships between Merleau-Ponty's thought and several of his philosophical and non-philosophical inspirators (such as Schilder, von Uexküll, or Sartre) and successors (Lacan).