Papers by Tópicos Revista de Filosofía
In addition to the indemonstrables, Stoic logic included a number of reduction rules. In this pap... more In addition to the indemonstrables, Stoic logic included a number of reduction rules. In this paper, I analyze the first one of such rules in order to prove whether it was formally derived from the indemonstrables or the Stoics could raise it from the use of their natural reasoning abilities. Thus, I try to show that there are reasons to support both possibilities and, based on a semantic approach such as that of the mental models theory, to give arguments in this regard.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I argue directly
for the thesis according to which... more The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I argue directly
for the thesis according to which, skepticism and anti-intellectualism associated with Pyrrhonism constitute a radical rejection of what I refer to in this paper as “the Socratic ideal” –a cluster of theses predominant in ancient philosophy. In order to reach this objective I review the main figures in the Pyrrhonian tradition (from Pyrrho to Sextus) showing the evolution of Pyrrhonism from a dogmatic metaphysical position to an anti-dogmatic and anti-intellectualist epistemic stance. In each stage I analyze the way in which its representatives rejected the Socratic ideal and the way in which those rejections meant the introduction of some novel theses on the philosophical scene of Antiquity. Secondly, I use this last point in order to argue indirectly against one of the most widespread readings of Pyrrhonism, namely, that Pyrrhonism was a monolithic movement in which all of its members subscribed to exactly the same theoretical position.
In this paper I analyze the main arguments of Fernando
Savater’s Tauroética. He claims that there... more In this paper I analyze the main arguments of Fernando
Savater’s Tauroética. He claims that there are moral arguments in
favor of bullfighting, and that to support it is a legitimate ethical
option. Here I hold that he is wrong and that his moral arguments
do not have the force he thinks they have—there may be
economic, political or other kind of reasons in favor of bullfighting,
but there are no moral reasons. I argue instead that there
are strong moral reasons against bullfighting because bulls are
objects of moral consideration, i.e. they have a moral status independent of our interests. From this premise—always from an
ethical perspective—I analyze and object to his other arguments.

Fichte uses profusely different versions of the social contract
when drafting his doctrine of rig... more Fichte uses profusely different versions of the social contract
when drafting his doctrine of right in the Foundations of the
Natural Right (1796). This usage, which seems to follow a typical
strategic reasoning of the hobbesian contractarianism, seems
to be at odds with the altruistic reasoning employed in the first
part of the work, in which it deduces the concept of right from
mutual recognition. Here we attempt to demonstrate that there
is no break between the deduction of right and its systematic
application, and that the motive of self-preservation and the use
of contract are in principle compatible with the deduction of
right as technical practical science by Fichte. It will be argued,
however, that the use of the social contract as a tool to develop a
material doctrine of right is problematic, not for the motivations
that are supposed to be attributed to the agents, but for the gap
that this use opens in the methodological presuppositions of the
work and its normative claims.
This paper seeks to elucidate Aquinas's "turn to phantasms" by investigating what he means by "tu... more This paper seeks to elucidate Aquinas's "turn to phantasms" by investigating what he means by "turning". It argues that the key to the underlying conceptual framework of "intellectual turning" is found in two Islamic sources that were immensely influential on thirteenth -century Latin philosophical psychology, and that present specific technical concepts of "turning" as a kind of dependence: the anonymous Liber de causis, and the Persian philosopher Avicenna's Liber de anima. This paper, then, aims at recovering this underlying historical paradigm, by examining how these two key sources conceive of "turning" and how Aquinas incorporates their insights into his account of the "turn to phantasms".
The Aristotelian praise of the contemplative life in Nicomachean Ethics X was very influential in... more The Aristotelian praise of the contemplative life in Nicomachean Ethics X was very influential in the history of philosophy and its effects go much more beyond the limits of Hellenism and Late Antiquity. Although, it is in Politics VII 1-3 where Aristotle presents the more detailed consideration of the ways of life, in particular, the opposition between the political and philosophical life. The purpose of this work is to reconsider the praise of the contemplative life at the end of NE and to recover the political significance that the ethical preface that precedes the design of the ideal polis has in this discussion in order to show the correspondence that exists between the redefinition of praxis in Pol. VII 3 and the hierarchy of eudaimonia in NE X 7-8.
The ciceronian reflection on friendship is one of the major reference points that link the civic ... more The ciceronian reflection on friendship is one of the major reference points that link the civic virtue and personal interests of realization of the human being in the community. Regain a sense of truth, in accordance with the aesthetic model of amicitia -proposes that Cicero implies sizing in your form more transcendent the provision of human understanding hermeneutics and empathy with the similar. Such is the essential goal of this writing.
In his commentary on the second book of Peter Lombard's Sentences, Aquinas deals with matter from... more In his commentary on the second book of Peter Lombard's Sentences, Aquinas deals with matter from different viewpoints. In this paper, some relevant texts from his Commentary on the distinctions 3, 12, and 18 are analyzed with a threefold aim. First, early Aquinas' doctrine of matter is illustrated, with particular attention to its physical and metaphysical implications. Second, Aquinas' theses are traced back to his Peripatetic sources, in order to show the crucial role played by Avicenna and Averroes in his rethinking of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. Third, Aquinas' thought is put into the context of the debate on matter arisen since the reception of Latin Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. From these threefold perspective, the consistency and originality of early Aquinas' doctrine can be appreciated.
The cultural imposition generated several polemics in New Spain because it involved different pos... more The cultural imposition generated several polemics in New Spain because it involved different positions about cultural diversity, on evangelization particularly. In his Carta al Emperador (1555), Friar Toribio de Benavente pronounced in favor of indigenous' christianization by force but in some passages of his Memoriales, he assures that some prehispanic laws oblige indigenous more than evangelical law. It shows that this apparent contradiction originates in Scotism doctrine on natural law.
If something is usually considered to be remarkable about "The origin of German tragic drama", a ... more If something is usually considered to be remarkable about "The origin of German tragic drama", a book written by Walter Benjamin in order to be a postulant as a teacher at the University, is its conceptual richness and innovation. This essay tries to accomplish two objectives: On the one hand, to understand the sense of one of these notions, that of melancholy, which is so important for Benjamin both in this work and all along his philosophical production. On the other hand, an attempt is made to investigate both implicit and explicit sources used by the philosopher to refer to the term under consideration. This will lead us to deal with classic medicine authors such as Hippocrates and Galen, from the renacentist astrological ideological repertoire such as Ficino and some Freudian proposals about mourning and melancholy.

In this paper I examine argument for the necessity of the belief in necessity. The argument purpo... more In this paper I examine argument for the necessity of the belief in necessity. The argument purports to establish a fatal dilemma for the modal "nihilist", he who does not believe that at least some proposition is necessary. My main aim is to show that the dilemma that McFetridge's argument poses is not sound, since it has an important limitation, concerning specifically its second horn, which is the more interesting. The second horn poses a kind of transcendental argument: it is necessary to believe in necessity if we are going to be able to reason from counterfactual suppositions. Nevertheless, this argument assumes that counterfactual supposition is an essential activity in our lives, which signals, I claim, a central point around which the modal nihilist would try to reassert her position. Thus, I purport to show that the second horn of McFetridge's argument reveals that the focus of the debate between modal believers and nihilists should move properly from the question about the role of belief in necessity to the question about the role of counterfactual supposition. * Quisiera agradecer los comentarios de dos árbitros anónimos de esta revista. Además quisiera agradecer el generoso apoyo del Proyecto PAPIIT IA400412-2: Epistemología y metafísica de la modalidad, de la DGAPA (UNAM), el cual ha sido muy importante para la elaboración de este trabajo.

In this paper I address an objection to the claim that Rawls's theory is to show concern for hist... more In this paper I address an objection to the claim that Rawls's theory is to show concern for historical injustice. This objection states that such a theory is justified in avoiding concern for historical injustice because of its putative forward-looking character. The objection takes two forms: first, it is argued that there are reasons internal to Rawls's own theory, such as the choice problem modelled by the original position as well as the fact that justice-as-fairness is thought of to be a non-comprehensive conception of justice, which warrant such a putative forward-looking character. Second, it also claimed that there are reasons external to Rawls's theory, having to do with the putative existence of the so-called non-identity problem, which warrant an exclusive forward-looking character not only to Rawls's principles of justice but to any other conception of distributive justice. I will try to show that the stated objection, both in its internal and external presentations, fails.
This paper tries to find wheter any trace of Scotus' thinking can be found in Heidegger's thought... more This paper tries to find wheter any trace of Scotus' thinking can be found in Heidegger's thought. I believe an affirmative answer to this question can be endorsed by reading Heidegger's description of being in Being and Time and its part in the configuration of meaning. I also try to specify Scotus' influence in the notion of Verstehen and briefly suggest the way in which this influence could be traced back to his Habilitationsschrift.
M. Williams' analysis (1999, 2001 and 2004b) of the Prior Grounding Conception (PGC) of epistemic... more M. Williams' analysis (1999, 2001 and 2004b) of the Prior Grounding Conception (PGC) of epistemic justification -a conception allegedly behind the Agrippan trilemma-is reviewed and it is contrasted with the Default Challenge Conception of justification (DChC) -the alternative conception of epistemic justi-
This paper defends reliabilism against the classic demon world victim thought experiment. In doin... more This paper defends reliabilism against the classic demon world victim thought experiment. In doing so, I underscore two of its key alleged intuitions. I then articulate a host of varied responses open to the reliabilist, arguing that these readily available responses provide the reliabilist with a way to either accommodate or reject these initial intuitions about the demon world victim thought experiment, and in a way consistent with reliabilism. Thus, I conclude that the demon world thought experiment does not undercut reliability as the hallmark of epistemic justification.
This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast ... more This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle's work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton's account is after, referred to as 'ordinary weakness of will', is best understood as an unsuccessful a empt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency.

In his book Truth and Method, H.-G. Gadamer promoted the renaissance of Aristotle's practical phi... more In his book Truth and Method, H.-G. Gadamer promoted the renaissance of Aristotle's practical philosophy. In his interpretation, however, practical philosophy tends to be identified with phrónesis, i.e. with practical wisdom. For Aristotle practical philosophy is a scientific knowledge (epistéme), although less rigorous than theoretical philosophy, and uses demonstrations, though its demonstrations are valid in most cases, but not always. Practical philosophy, moreover, employs a dialectical method, consisting in the discussion of different opinions (phainómena) in the light of the most reputed premises (éndoxa). Phrónesis, on the other hand, is a virtue, i.e. an excellence of reason, consisting in the capacity of good deliberation, i.e. of choosing the means which are the most apt to a ain a right goal. Consequently, for Aristotle, the phrónimos (wise man) does not need to be a philosopher, whilst a philosopher, if he wants to a ain the sophía (theoretical wisdom), must be a phrónimos.

The essay focuses on Aristotle's reflections on the human being-on humanity not as given, but in ... more The essay focuses on Aristotle's reflections on the human being-on humanity not as given, but in fact always to come, understood as a task. I highlight the constructive work involved in becoming human and show that, far from construction in its merely techno-mechanical character, at stake is a formative process vastly proceeding in the dark, lacking eidetically clear guidelines. Indeed, it is through such a process, through such a groping, that eidetic clarification, if at all possible, may be accomplished. In the examination of the extraordinary artifact that the human being is, I discuss ma ers pertaining to the indemonstrability of first principles; the architectonic character of ethics and its fundamental function vis-à-vis all other human endeavors, including the scientific disciplines (ethics as first philosophy); the relation between human constitution and nature; and issues of freedom, self-making, and self-overcoming.

This paper argues that from Aristotle's practical philosophy stem two different senses of προαίρε... more This paper argues that from Aristotle's practical philosophy stem two different senses of προαίρεσις, which are related to two different senses of deliberation as well. The first sense of προαίρεσις refers to the particular deliberated choices, where the sought after goal, the desire related to it and the means used in order to a ain it are particular in character and are all circumscribed to the particular situation where choice takes place. On the other hand, the second sense of προαίρεσις refers to those choices linked to goals over the intermediate and long term which, while they might be particular, seek ends that transcend the particularity of the given situation. To the first kind of προαίρεσις corresponds the "descending deliberation", while to the second kind corresponds the "ascending deliberation". Finally, an analysis Recibido: 23-09-2011 . Aceptado: 29-10-2012. *Una primera versión del texto fue presentada en el marco de las "I Jornadas sobre la vigencia de la filosofía práctica aristotélica", organizadas por el Grupo

In the Metaphysics of the Shifa, Avicenna distinguishes three ways in which universals are said. ... more In the Metaphysics of the Shifa, Avicenna distinguishes three ways in which universals are said. The second sense is puzzling since Avicenna explains that universals are said of what it is permissible to say of many, even if it is not a condition that these many should exist in actuality, and he illustrates this kind of universals with the "heptagonal house". In its nature this universal can be said of many, but it does not follow necessarily that these many must exist--not even one of them. This second case deals with a less common type of universal, since such universals may have either only one instantiation or even none at all. The example of the heptagonal house is not traditional, as Greek sources, such as Porphyry and Simplicius, use the phoenix instead. In this paper Thérèse-Anne Druart explores in depth the use of this particular illustration, namely, the "heptagonal house".
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Papers by Tópicos Revista de Filosofía
for the thesis according to which, skepticism and anti-intellectualism associated with Pyrrhonism constitute a radical rejection of what I refer to in this paper as “the Socratic ideal” –a cluster of theses predominant in ancient philosophy. In order to reach this objective I review the main figures in the Pyrrhonian tradition (from Pyrrho to Sextus) showing the evolution of Pyrrhonism from a dogmatic metaphysical position to an anti-dogmatic and anti-intellectualist epistemic stance. In each stage I analyze the way in which its representatives rejected the Socratic ideal and the way in which those rejections meant the introduction of some novel theses on the philosophical scene of Antiquity. Secondly, I use this last point in order to argue indirectly against one of the most widespread readings of Pyrrhonism, namely, that Pyrrhonism was a monolithic movement in which all of its members subscribed to exactly the same theoretical position.
Savater’s Tauroética. He claims that there are moral arguments in
favor of bullfighting, and that to support it is a legitimate ethical
option. Here I hold that he is wrong and that his moral arguments
do not have the force he thinks they have—there may be
economic, political or other kind of reasons in favor of bullfighting,
but there are no moral reasons. I argue instead that there
are strong moral reasons against bullfighting because bulls are
objects of moral consideration, i.e. they have a moral status independent of our interests. From this premise—always from an
ethical perspective—I analyze and object to his other arguments.
when drafting his doctrine of right in the Foundations of the
Natural Right (1796). This usage, which seems to follow a typical
strategic reasoning of the hobbesian contractarianism, seems
to be at odds with the altruistic reasoning employed in the first
part of the work, in which it deduces the concept of right from
mutual recognition. Here we attempt to demonstrate that there
is no break between the deduction of right and its systematic
application, and that the motive of self-preservation and the use
of contract are in principle compatible with the deduction of
right as technical practical science by Fichte. It will be argued,
however, that the use of the social contract as a tool to develop a
material doctrine of right is problematic, not for the motivations
that are supposed to be attributed to the agents, but for the gap
that this use opens in the methodological presuppositions of the
work and its normative claims.
for the thesis according to which, skepticism and anti-intellectualism associated with Pyrrhonism constitute a radical rejection of what I refer to in this paper as “the Socratic ideal” –a cluster of theses predominant in ancient philosophy. In order to reach this objective I review the main figures in the Pyrrhonian tradition (from Pyrrho to Sextus) showing the evolution of Pyrrhonism from a dogmatic metaphysical position to an anti-dogmatic and anti-intellectualist epistemic stance. In each stage I analyze the way in which its representatives rejected the Socratic ideal and the way in which those rejections meant the introduction of some novel theses on the philosophical scene of Antiquity. Secondly, I use this last point in order to argue indirectly against one of the most widespread readings of Pyrrhonism, namely, that Pyrrhonism was a monolithic movement in which all of its members subscribed to exactly the same theoretical position.
Savater’s Tauroética. He claims that there are moral arguments in
favor of bullfighting, and that to support it is a legitimate ethical
option. Here I hold that he is wrong and that his moral arguments
do not have the force he thinks they have—there may be
economic, political or other kind of reasons in favor of bullfighting,
but there are no moral reasons. I argue instead that there
are strong moral reasons against bullfighting because bulls are
objects of moral consideration, i.e. they have a moral status independent of our interests. From this premise—always from an
ethical perspective—I analyze and object to his other arguments.
when drafting his doctrine of right in the Foundations of the
Natural Right (1796). This usage, which seems to follow a typical
strategic reasoning of the hobbesian contractarianism, seems
to be at odds with the altruistic reasoning employed in the first
part of the work, in which it deduces the concept of right from
mutual recognition. Here we attempt to demonstrate that there
is no break between the deduction of right and its systematic
application, and that the motive of self-preservation and the use
of contract are in principle compatible with the deduction of
right as technical practical science by Fichte. It will be argued,
however, that the use of the social contract as a tool to develop a
material doctrine of right is problematic, not for the motivations
that are supposed to be attributed to the agents, but for the gap
that this use opens in the methodological presuppositions of the
work and its normative claims.