Předkládaná práce se věnuje vypracování a rozvinutí etické interpretace skepticismu, přičemž vych... more Předkládaná práce se věnuje vypracování a rozvinutí etické interpretace skepticismu, přičemž vychází z některých klíčových pasážích spisů Sexta Empirica. Po představení převládajícího interpretačního přístupu k Sextovým spisům podrobujeme tento přístup kritice a následně rozvíjíme alternativní výklad, v jehož centru stojí úvaha o příčinách štěstí a neštěstí, kterou na několika místech Sextus prezentuje. Jádrem těchto úvah i předkládané interpretace je přesvědčení o škodlivosti užívání rozumu pro šťastný život - používání rozumu vede totiž podle Sexta k neustálému usilování o něco a vyhýbání se něčemu, a udržuje proto člověka v neklidu a neštěstí. Vzdání se soudu, epoché, je lékem na tento neklid a skeptické argumenty ukazující neodůvodněnost každého soudu mají vzdání se soudu způsobit. Podle předkládané "etické" interpretace zpochybňuje skepticismus centrální roli rozumu při naplňování cíle lidského života, a útočí tak na dvě základní maximy řecké etiky: "Poznej sebe ...
The aim of the thesis is to explain the causes of the creation of the world in Plato’s Timaeus.
... more The aim of the thesis is to explain the causes of the creation of the world in Plato’s Timaeus.
The causes of the creation of the world are manifold. The Demiurge created the world according to an eternal paradigm. The paradigm of the world is an intelligible animal that encompasses everything that is eternal. The Demiurge is the best of eternal beings and created the world as an image of the entirety of eternal beings. What is then the relationship between the Demiurge, who is reason, and the entirety of eternal beings, that reason can comprehend? Timaeus characterizes the eternal being as having no other relationships than those towards itself. On the contrary, the Demiurge is a being that has constitutive relationships towards the world. The entirety of being that consists of both the Demiurge and that, which is in itself, is therefore a being in which reason relates self-contained relationships of that, which reason can comprehend, towards something else, namely becoming.
The world was created in a receptacle as an embodied soul. Each body is a regular geometrical figure with no “matter” inside. Bodies are both in space and they are modifications of space. Souls are in space as well, but their being in space is very different from being of bodies. The soul reflects other forms of beings in speech, and it allows other souls and bodies to be at the same place where it is.
The Demiurge created the world by way of shaping pre-cosmic becoming and by way of animating bodies with rational souls. Reason, in the form of the Demiurge and in the form of rational speech of the soul, encounters different forms of corporeality. These forms of corporeality are forms of necessity. Necessity is not an independent cause inflicting imperfection on the likeness of the world to its intelligible model. It is itself a likeness of the paradigm that reason makes more similar.
The world imitates intelligible structures in the sphere of becoming. The Demiurge imitates the entirety of the intelligible paradigm in space and thus creates a rational living being consisting of body and soul. This living being is the best image of the eternal living being.
According to Václav Havel’s famous essay The Power of powerless life within a lie is at the core ... more According to Václav Havel’s famous essay The Power of powerless life within a lie is at the core of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Life within a lie is characteristic for the great majority of people and is contrasted with life within the truth which is characteristic of dissent movement. In this paper, I will try to shed some light on the concept of “living within a lie.” I will show that Havel develops not one but two concepts of a lie: on the one hand, lie is deliberate pretence; on the other hand, lie is seduction by consumerist values. The first meaning of a lie is derived from Havel’s analysis of the specifics of the Soviet sphere of influence, namely central role of ideology with omnipresent demands on public support of the regime. The second meaning of a lie is heavily influenced by a critical assessment of modern society from the leading figure of the Czech underground movement Ivan Jirous and leading Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. This double meaning of a lie enables Havel to capture both specific problems of living under the communist regime and general problems of living in modern society anywhere in the world. In the final chapters of this paper, I will show that Havel is not clear about how these two meanings of a lie are connected and that there are problems resulting from these unclarities both for Havel’s analysis of the communism and his proposed solution of the crisis.
Bodies are shown to be related to something else from the very beginning of Timaeus’
speech. The... more Bodies are shown to be related to something else from the very beginning of Timaeus’
speech. The original twofold distinction between being and becoming is later on expanded
by the addition of a third kind. In this paper, I try to shed some light on the
relationship between bodies and the third kind. In the passage dealing with the three
kinds (48a–53b) relationship between bodies and the third kind has three prominent
facets. First, bodies are “in” the third kind as in a receptacle or container. Second, bodies
are modifications of the third kind and therefore parts of the third kind are bodies
themselves. Third, bodies are modifications of the third kind that do not prevent
other modifications from taking place. At the end of the section 48a–53b, the third
kind is identified with space, and starting from line 53b bodies are shown to have a
geometrical nature. From this perspective, we can see how the first two facets of the
relationship of bodies to the third kind are materialized: a geometrical figure is both
in space and it is a modification of space. However, Timaeus’ third characterization
of this relationship cannot be explained from this perspective. This inconsistency is
due to the different connotations of bodies in both passages. In the passage dealing
with the three kinds, bodies are shown to be an utterly dependent image of the eternal
paradigm in the receptacle. In the passage dealing with geometrical nature of bodies,
body is shown to be an independent and self-sufficient geometrical structure. Neither
of these connotations should be rejected, and it is clear that Plato wants us to think
about body as an image of eternal being, whose specific independence has a geometrical
nature.
Předkládaná práce se věnuje vypracování a rozvinutí etické interpretace skepticismu, přičemž vych... more Předkládaná práce se věnuje vypracování a rozvinutí etické interpretace skepticismu, přičemž vychází z některých klíčových pasážích spisů Sexta Empirica. Po představení převládajícího interpretačního přístupu k Sextovým spisům podrobujeme tento přístup kritice a následně rozvíjíme alternativní výklad, v jehož centru stojí úvaha o příčinách štěstí a neštěstí, kterou na několika místech Sextus prezentuje. Jádrem těchto úvah i předkládané interpretace je přesvědčení o škodlivosti užívání rozumu pro šťastný život - používání rozumu vede totiž podle Sexta k neustálému usilování o něco a vyhýbání se něčemu, a udržuje proto člověka v neklidu a neštěstí. Vzdání se soudu, epoché, je lékem na tento neklid a skeptické argumenty ukazující neodůvodněnost každého soudu mají vzdání se soudu způsobit. Podle předkládané "etické" interpretace zpochybňuje skepticismus centrální roli rozumu při naplňování cíle lidského života, a útočí tak na dvě základní maximy řecké etiky: "Poznej sebe ...
The aim of the thesis is to explain the causes of the creation of the world in Plato’s Timaeus.
... more The aim of the thesis is to explain the causes of the creation of the world in Plato’s Timaeus.
The causes of the creation of the world are manifold. The Demiurge created the world according to an eternal paradigm. The paradigm of the world is an intelligible animal that encompasses everything that is eternal. The Demiurge is the best of eternal beings and created the world as an image of the entirety of eternal beings. What is then the relationship between the Demiurge, who is reason, and the entirety of eternal beings, that reason can comprehend? Timaeus characterizes the eternal being as having no other relationships than those towards itself. On the contrary, the Demiurge is a being that has constitutive relationships towards the world. The entirety of being that consists of both the Demiurge and that, which is in itself, is therefore a being in which reason relates self-contained relationships of that, which reason can comprehend, towards something else, namely becoming.
The world was created in a receptacle as an embodied soul. Each body is a regular geometrical figure with no “matter” inside. Bodies are both in space and they are modifications of space. Souls are in space as well, but their being in space is very different from being of bodies. The soul reflects other forms of beings in speech, and it allows other souls and bodies to be at the same place where it is.
The Demiurge created the world by way of shaping pre-cosmic becoming and by way of animating bodies with rational souls. Reason, in the form of the Demiurge and in the form of rational speech of the soul, encounters different forms of corporeality. These forms of corporeality are forms of necessity. Necessity is not an independent cause inflicting imperfection on the likeness of the world to its intelligible model. It is itself a likeness of the paradigm that reason makes more similar.
The world imitates intelligible structures in the sphere of becoming. The Demiurge imitates the entirety of the intelligible paradigm in space and thus creates a rational living being consisting of body and soul. This living being is the best image of the eternal living being.
According to Václav Havel’s famous essay The Power of powerless life within a lie is at the core ... more According to Václav Havel’s famous essay The Power of powerless life within a lie is at the core of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Life within a lie is characteristic for the great majority of people and is contrasted with life within the truth which is characteristic of dissent movement. In this paper, I will try to shed some light on the concept of “living within a lie.” I will show that Havel develops not one but two concepts of a lie: on the one hand, lie is deliberate pretence; on the other hand, lie is seduction by consumerist values. The first meaning of a lie is derived from Havel’s analysis of the specifics of the Soviet sphere of influence, namely central role of ideology with omnipresent demands on public support of the regime. The second meaning of a lie is heavily influenced by a critical assessment of modern society from the leading figure of the Czech underground movement Ivan Jirous and leading Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. This double meaning of a lie enables Havel to capture both specific problems of living under the communist regime and general problems of living in modern society anywhere in the world. In the final chapters of this paper, I will show that Havel is not clear about how these two meanings of a lie are connected and that there are problems resulting from these unclarities both for Havel’s analysis of the communism and his proposed solution of the crisis.
Bodies are shown to be related to something else from the very beginning of Timaeus’
speech. The... more Bodies are shown to be related to something else from the very beginning of Timaeus’
speech. The original twofold distinction between being and becoming is later on expanded
by the addition of a third kind. In this paper, I try to shed some light on the
relationship between bodies and the third kind. In the passage dealing with the three
kinds (48a–53b) relationship between bodies and the third kind has three prominent
facets. First, bodies are “in” the third kind as in a receptacle or container. Second, bodies
are modifications of the third kind and therefore parts of the third kind are bodies
themselves. Third, bodies are modifications of the third kind that do not prevent
other modifications from taking place. At the end of the section 48a–53b, the third
kind is identified with space, and starting from line 53b bodies are shown to have a
geometrical nature. From this perspective, we can see how the first two facets of the
relationship of bodies to the third kind are materialized: a geometrical figure is both
in space and it is a modification of space. However, Timaeus’ third characterization
of this relationship cannot be explained from this perspective. This inconsistency is
due to the different connotations of bodies in both passages. In the passage dealing
with the three kinds, bodies are shown to be an utterly dependent image of the eternal
paradigm in the receptacle. In the passage dealing with geometrical nature of bodies,
body is shown to be an independent and self-sufficient geometrical structure. Neither
of these connotations should be rejected, and it is clear that Plato wants us to think
about body as an image of eternal being, whose specific independence has a geometrical
nature.
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Papers by Ondřej Krása
The causes of the creation of the world are manifold. The Demiurge created the world according to an eternal paradigm. The paradigm of the world is an intelligible animal that encompasses everything that is eternal. The Demiurge is the best of eternal beings and created the world as an image of the entirety of eternal beings. What is then the relationship between the Demiurge, who is reason, and the entirety of eternal beings, that reason can comprehend? Timaeus characterizes the eternal being as having no other relationships than those towards itself. On the contrary, the Demiurge is a being that has constitutive relationships towards the world. The entirety of being that consists of both the Demiurge and that, which is in itself, is therefore a being in which reason relates self-contained relationships of that, which reason can comprehend, towards something else, namely becoming.
The world was created in a receptacle as an embodied soul. Each body is a regular geometrical figure with no “matter” inside. Bodies are both in space and they are modifications of space. Souls are in space as well, but their being in space is very different from being of bodies. The soul reflects other forms of beings in speech, and it allows other souls and bodies to be at the same place where it is.
The Demiurge created the world by way of shaping pre-cosmic becoming and by way of animating bodies with rational souls. Reason, in the form of the Demiurge and in the form of rational speech of the soul, encounters different forms of corporeality. These forms of corporeality are forms of necessity. Necessity is not an independent cause inflicting imperfection on the likeness of the world to its intelligible model. It is itself a likeness of the paradigm that reason makes more similar.
The world imitates intelligible structures in the sphere of becoming. The Demiurge imitates the entirety of the intelligible paradigm in space and thus creates a rational living being consisting of body and soul. This living being is the best image of the eternal living being.
speech. The original twofold distinction between being and becoming is later on expanded
by the addition of a third kind. In this paper, I try to shed some light on the
relationship between bodies and the third kind. In the passage dealing with the three
kinds (48a–53b) relationship between bodies and the third kind has three prominent
facets. First, bodies are “in” the third kind as in a receptacle or container. Second, bodies
are modifications of the third kind and therefore parts of the third kind are bodies
themselves. Third, bodies are modifications of the third kind that do not prevent
other modifications from taking place. At the end of the section 48a–53b, the third
kind is identified with space, and starting from line 53b bodies are shown to have a
geometrical nature. From this perspective, we can see how the first two facets of the
relationship of bodies to the third kind are materialized: a geometrical figure is both
in space and it is a modification of space. However, Timaeus’ third characterization
of this relationship cannot be explained from this perspective. This inconsistency is
due to the different connotations of bodies in both passages. In the passage dealing
with the three kinds, bodies are shown to be an utterly dependent image of the eternal
paradigm in the receptacle. In the passage dealing with geometrical nature of bodies,
body is shown to be an independent and self-sufficient geometrical structure. Neither
of these connotations should be rejected, and it is clear that Plato wants us to think
about body as an image of eternal being, whose specific independence has a geometrical
nature.
The causes of the creation of the world are manifold. The Demiurge created the world according to an eternal paradigm. The paradigm of the world is an intelligible animal that encompasses everything that is eternal. The Demiurge is the best of eternal beings and created the world as an image of the entirety of eternal beings. What is then the relationship between the Demiurge, who is reason, and the entirety of eternal beings, that reason can comprehend? Timaeus characterizes the eternal being as having no other relationships than those towards itself. On the contrary, the Demiurge is a being that has constitutive relationships towards the world. The entirety of being that consists of both the Demiurge and that, which is in itself, is therefore a being in which reason relates self-contained relationships of that, which reason can comprehend, towards something else, namely becoming.
The world was created in a receptacle as an embodied soul. Each body is a regular geometrical figure with no “matter” inside. Bodies are both in space and they are modifications of space. Souls are in space as well, but their being in space is very different from being of bodies. The soul reflects other forms of beings in speech, and it allows other souls and bodies to be at the same place where it is.
The Demiurge created the world by way of shaping pre-cosmic becoming and by way of animating bodies with rational souls. Reason, in the form of the Demiurge and in the form of rational speech of the soul, encounters different forms of corporeality. These forms of corporeality are forms of necessity. Necessity is not an independent cause inflicting imperfection on the likeness of the world to its intelligible model. It is itself a likeness of the paradigm that reason makes more similar.
The world imitates intelligible structures in the sphere of becoming. The Demiurge imitates the entirety of the intelligible paradigm in space and thus creates a rational living being consisting of body and soul. This living being is the best image of the eternal living being.
speech. The original twofold distinction between being and becoming is later on expanded
by the addition of a third kind. In this paper, I try to shed some light on the
relationship between bodies and the third kind. In the passage dealing with the three
kinds (48a–53b) relationship between bodies and the third kind has three prominent
facets. First, bodies are “in” the third kind as in a receptacle or container. Second, bodies
are modifications of the third kind and therefore parts of the third kind are bodies
themselves. Third, bodies are modifications of the third kind that do not prevent
other modifications from taking place. At the end of the section 48a–53b, the third
kind is identified with space, and starting from line 53b bodies are shown to have a
geometrical nature. From this perspective, we can see how the first two facets of the
relationship of bodies to the third kind are materialized: a geometrical figure is both
in space and it is a modification of space. However, Timaeus’ third characterization
of this relationship cannot be explained from this perspective. This inconsistency is
due to the different connotations of bodies in both passages. In the passage dealing
with the three kinds, bodies are shown to be an utterly dependent image of the eternal
paradigm in the receptacle. In the passage dealing with geometrical nature of bodies,
body is shown to be an independent and self-sufficient geometrical structure. Neither
of these connotations should be rejected, and it is clear that Plato wants us to think
about body as an image of eternal being, whose specific independence has a geometrical
nature.