The journal of aesthetics and art criticism/The Journal of aesthetics and art criticism, Jul 5, 2024
The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, n... more The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received Image’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.
The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, n... more The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received Image’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.
This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change an... more This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change and argues that virtue ethics provides a suitable framework for addressing these ethical concerns. We suggest the inclusion of a new virtue, called prospection, which involves cultivating the ability to think and care deeply about the future, navigate its inherent uncertainties constructively, and ensure the availability of sustainable options for future generations. We suggest that thinking and imagining sustainable futures trigger good dispositions towards future humans, non-humans and nature and that ought to be part of the definition of a good life. We posit that fostering this disposition can inspire and motivate present actions that effectively mitigate climate change. Virtue ethics implies an element of timelessness in morality because the future tends to be there by default; with prospection, the future will be there by design, reinforcing its importance in intergenerational ethics.
This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical th... more This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricoeur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered "virtue theories". First, we focus on Anscombe's recovery of Aristotelian "virtue ethics" in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 "Modern Moral Philosophy" has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricoeur's "little ethics", focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing on these two readings of Aristotelian ethics, we discuss issues such as the prospects of "human flourishing", the conception of the subject underlying these accounts and the extent to which the context-dependent traits of human experience-as against an essentialist standpoint-should be taken into account in these theories.
In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms ... more In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspe...
UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 SFRH/BPD/102949/2014This paper discusses the influence and role o... more UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 SFRH/BPD/102949/2014This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricœur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered “virtue theories”. First, we focus on Anscombe’s recovery of Aristotelian “virtue ethics” in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 “Modern Moral Philosophy” has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricœur’s “little ethics”, focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing o...
UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0050 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096The paper proposes a way to u... more UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0050 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame (Williams 1993) establishing a general framework to show how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Wi...
O volume Kant: atitudes, experiências, valores oferece uma série de estudos, reflexões, contribut... more O volume Kant: atitudes, experiências, valores oferece uma série de estudos, reflexões, contributos, que tratam a filosofia kantiana nos seus múltiplos aspectos e que contemplam quer aquilo que ela engendra, quer aquilo que a ela remete. Temáticas tão distintas quanto a da transcendentalidade, a da natureza da representação ou a da comunidade estética são abordadas por referência a pensadores tão díspares quanto Wittgenstein, John McDowell ou Maurice Blanchot. Os textos que integram o volume, escritos em diferentes línguas e provenientes de diversas tradições filosóficas, são da autoria quer de especialistas no pensamento de Kant, quer de investigadores em início de carreira. Cada um deles contribui a seu modo para enriquecer a compreensão do pensamento de Kant e, assim, para, no quadro das atitudes, das experiências e dos valores, evidenciar a sua pertinência nos ensaios de resposta a questões hoje colocadas à filosofia e na colocação de novas questões à filosofia.
The journal of aesthetics and art criticism/The Journal of aesthetics and art criticism, Jul 5, 2024
The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, n... more The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received Image’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.
The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, n... more The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received Image’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.
This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change an... more This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change and argues that virtue ethics provides a suitable framework for addressing these ethical concerns. We suggest the inclusion of a new virtue, called prospection, which involves cultivating the ability to think and care deeply about the future, navigate its inherent uncertainties constructively, and ensure the availability of sustainable options for future generations. We suggest that thinking and imagining sustainable futures trigger good dispositions towards future humans, non-humans and nature and that ought to be part of the definition of a good life. We posit that fostering this disposition can inspire and motivate present actions that effectively mitigate climate change. Virtue ethics implies an element of timelessness in morality because the future tends to be there by default; with prospection, the future will be there by design, reinforcing its importance in intergenerational ethics.
This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical th... more This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricoeur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered "virtue theories". First, we focus on Anscombe's recovery of Aristotelian "virtue ethics" in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 "Modern Moral Philosophy" has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricoeur's "little ethics", focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing on these two readings of Aristotelian ethics, we discuss issues such as the prospects of "human flourishing", the conception of the subject underlying these accounts and the extent to which the context-dependent traits of human experience-as against an essentialist standpoint-should be taken into account in these theories.
In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms ... more In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspe...
UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 SFRH/BPD/102949/2014This paper discusses the influence and role o... more UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 SFRH/BPD/102949/2014This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricœur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered “virtue theories”. First, we focus on Anscombe’s recovery of Aristotelian “virtue ethics” in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 “Modern Moral Philosophy” has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricœur’s “little ethics”, focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing o...
UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0050 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096The paper proposes a way to u... more UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0050 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame (Williams 1993) establishing a general framework to show how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Wi...
O volume Kant: atitudes, experiências, valores oferece uma série de estudos, reflexões, contribut... more O volume Kant: atitudes, experiências, valores oferece uma série de estudos, reflexões, contributos, que tratam a filosofia kantiana nos seus múltiplos aspectos e que contemplam quer aquilo que ela engendra, quer aquilo que a ela remete. Temáticas tão distintas quanto a da transcendentalidade, a da natureza da representação ou a da comunidade estética são abordadas por referência a pensadores tão díspares quanto Wittgenstein, John McDowell ou Maurice Blanchot. Os textos que integram o volume, escritos em diferentes línguas e provenientes de diversas tradições filosóficas, são da autoria quer de especialistas no pensamento de Kant, quer de investigadores em início de carreira. Cada um deles contribui a seu modo para enriquecer a compreensão do pensamento de Kant e, assim, para, no quadro das atitudes, das experiências e dos valores, evidenciar a sua pertinência nos ensaios de resposta a questões hoje colocadas à filosofia e na colocação de novas questões à filosofia.
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