Books by Aileen Baviera
TRAVERSING THE CHALLENGES: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF MARITIME AND REGIONAL SECURITY, 2017
While the arbitration was absolutely pivotal to the Philippine strategy in dealing with China in ... more While the arbitration was absolutely pivotal to the Philippine strategy in dealing with China in the
South China Sea, it was always just one of several approaches that the Philippine government under Aquino employed. Even after the case had been filed, Manila continued its efforts to seek diplomatic resolution through the ASEAN-China dialogue on a Code of Conduct. It also sought stronger security ties with its traditional ally – the United States – as well as receiving the support of other friendly governments such as Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea for capability-building for maritime security. However, there were two other strategies that the Aquino government chose not to pursue.
One was to engage China in direct dialogue. Refraining from dialogue seems logical if the Philippines feared that China would use this to pressure it into withdrawing from the arbitration case (as China tried to do up to the very last minute). On the other hand, the Aquino government
could have used bilateral dialogue to press China to back down, leveraging support from its allies and its leading role on this issue within ASEAN, if it was interested in preserving its relationship
with China. Without this bilateral platform, however, the arbitration could not be interpreted in
any other way than as a hostile act. The other
In terms of legal importance, the “final and binding” arbitration ruling may be the most significant decision to come out relating to the implementation of UNCLOS as the
“constitution of the oceans”. However, in terms of political-diplomatic utility for a region learning to manage ties with a rising power, or its function of promoting Philippine interests including security and access to resources, it may have a relatively short shelf life.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of pursuing multilateral joint development in the South China Se... more Notwithstanding the difficulties of pursuing multilateral joint development in the South China Sea,
the concept remains an attractive long-term option. It is also quite possibly the only practical one that could
bring about both lasting peace and security, as well as shared wealth from the seas, for the various claimant
countries. Such a scenario can only come about as a result of true compromise and great determination.
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Book Chapter in edited volume by Aileen Baviera
SNew Zealand National Security: Challenges, Trends and Issues, edited by William Hoverd, Nick Nelson and Carl Bradley, 74–89. New Zealand: Massey University Press, 2017. , 2017
The South China Sea has become a major arena for geopolitical competition involving the world’s ... more The South China Sea has become a major arena for geopolitical competition involving the world’s two biggest powers: the United States and China. This situation has been triggered by two developments. First is the rising
power and influence of China, which has translated into new military advances and greater assertiveness in its foreign policy posture in general, but particularly with regard to territorial sovereignty in both the SCS and
the East China Sea. The second development is the change in US policy — its pivot or rebalance to Asia — once it realised that China’s expanding economic and political reach was encroaching on its own influence and its
primacy in Southeast Asia or, more broadly speaking, the Western Pacific.Therefore, on top of the ‘mother of all disputes’ there now exists competition between great powers: issues of navigational freedom, sovereignty, artificial island construction and the rule of law have become proxies for big power interests in the contest between what some analysts would call a revisionist state (China) and one defending a status quo in which
it remains on top (US). Notwithstanding their economic interdependence and the need for strategic cooperation on other fronts, confrontation in the SCS between China and the US has been increasing.The spoils could be very high: hegemonic leadership in the region, the right to determine rules applicable to the seas, and realignments of allegiance by other small and middle powers. How to prevent this
competition from turning into armed conflict, how to uphold rules-based order in the seas, and how to preserve the strategic autonomy of small and middle powers in the process are the challenges that maritime states in the
ASEAN region, including New Zealand and Australia, must face.
Based on a paper presented at an international conference on "Dialogue, Competition and Cooperati... more Based on a paper presented at an international conference on "Dialogue, Competition and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region after China's Accession to WfO", Zhongshan University, 28-29June 2002.
Paper presented at the International Conference on Ethnic Minorities and Great Power Strategies i... more Paper presented at the International Conference on Ethnic Minorities and Great Power Strategies in Asia, 12-14 October 2004, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii.
This paper examines the phenomenon of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on the Philippines, towards an assessment of whether the diaspora plays a significant role in the “security strategy” of China.
Basically, the answer to this question lies in an understanding of (1) what we mean by “the Chinese diaspora” and “the ethnic Chinese”, (2) the history of migration and the evolution of their presence, (3) their relations with the government of their country of residence, and (4) the nature of their ties with China through the years. The paper argues that based on these considerations, the ethnic Chinese minorities in the region have not been and are not likely to be useful as significant instruments for the deliberate advancement of China’s security goals and interests in Southeast Asia, especially if security is understood here in its traditional (realist) sense of a great power China seeking political supremacy in the region, or even military parity with or advantage over other great powers.
This chapter looks closely at the Philippines and explores the forms and modalities by which Chin... more This chapter looks closely at the Philippines and explores the forms and modalities by which Chinese resources and capability have been converted into influence in that developing country.
The method of investigation is through case studies, which process-trace major Philippine policy decisions in which China played an important role. The interests and goals of both China as the influencer and of the Philippines as the subject of influence are examined, with special attention paid to the role that Philippine decision makers and actors played in the construction and mediation of Chinese influence. Were the latter merely objects responding to acts of persuasion, inducement or coercion emanating from China, or were they more active subjects and agents promoting their own interests and strategizing their responses with wider imperatives in mind?
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Books by Aileen Baviera
South China Sea, it was always just one of several approaches that the Philippine government under Aquino employed. Even after the case had been filed, Manila continued its efforts to seek diplomatic resolution through the ASEAN-China dialogue on a Code of Conduct. It also sought stronger security ties with its traditional ally – the United States – as well as receiving the support of other friendly governments such as Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea for capability-building for maritime security. However, there were two other strategies that the Aquino government chose not to pursue.
One was to engage China in direct dialogue. Refraining from dialogue seems logical if the Philippines feared that China would use this to pressure it into withdrawing from the arbitration case (as China tried to do up to the very last minute). On the other hand, the Aquino government
could have used bilateral dialogue to press China to back down, leveraging support from its allies and its leading role on this issue within ASEAN, if it was interested in preserving its relationship
with China. Without this bilateral platform, however, the arbitration could not be interpreted in
any other way than as a hostile act. The other
In terms of legal importance, the “final and binding” arbitration ruling may be the most significant decision to come out relating to the implementation of UNCLOS as the
“constitution of the oceans”. However, in terms of political-diplomatic utility for a region learning to manage ties with a rising power, or its function of promoting Philippine interests including security and access to resources, it may have a relatively short shelf life.
the concept remains an attractive long-term option. It is also quite possibly the only practical one that could
bring about both lasting peace and security, as well as shared wealth from the seas, for the various claimant
countries. Such a scenario can only come about as a result of true compromise and great determination.
Book Chapter in edited volume by Aileen Baviera
power and influence of China, which has translated into new military advances and greater assertiveness in its foreign policy posture in general, but particularly with regard to territorial sovereignty in both the SCS and
the East China Sea. The second development is the change in US policy — its pivot or rebalance to Asia — once it realised that China’s expanding economic and political reach was encroaching on its own influence and its
primacy in Southeast Asia or, more broadly speaking, the Western Pacific.Therefore, on top of the ‘mother of all disputes’ there now exists competition between great powers: issues of navigational freedom, sovereignty, artificial island construction and the rule of law have become proxies for big power interests in the contest between what some analysts would call a revisionist state (China) and one defending a status quo in which
it remains on top (US). Notwithstanding their economic interdependence and the need for strategic cooperation on other fronts, confrontation in the SCS between China and the US has been increasing.The spoils could be very high: hegemonic leadership in the region, the right to determine rules applicable to the seas, and realignments of allegiance by other small and middle powers. How to prevent this
competition from turning into armed conflict, how to uphold rules-based order in the seas, and how to preserve the strategic autonomy of small and middle powers in the process are the challenges that maritime states in the
ASEAN region, including New Zealand and Australia, must face.
This paper examines the phenomenon of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on the Philippines, towards an assessment of whether the diaspora plays a significant role in the “security strategy” of China.
Basically, the answer to this question lies in an understanding of (1) what we mean by “the Chinese diaspora” and “the ethnic Chinese”, (2) the history of migration and the evolution of their presence, (3) their relations with the government of their country of residence, and (4) the nature of their ties with China through the years. The paper argues that based on these considerations, the ethnic Chinese minorities in the region have not been and are not likely to be useful as significant instruments for the deliberate advancement of China’s security goals and interests in Southeast Asia, especially if security is understood here in its traditional (realist) sense of a great power China seeking political supremacy in the region, or even military parity with or advantage over other great powers.
The method of investigation is through case studies, which process-trace major Philippine policy decisions in which China played an important role. The interests and goals of both China as the influencer and of the Philippines as the subject of influence are examined, with special attention paid to the role that Philippine decision makers and actors played in the construction and mediation of Chinese influence. Were the latter merely objects responding to acts of persuasion, inducement or coercion emanating from China, or were they more active subjects and agents promoting their own interests and strategizing their responses with wider imperatives in mind?
South China Sea, it was always just one of several approaches that the Philippine government under Aquino employed. Even after the case had been filed, Manila continued its efforts to seek diplomatic resolution through the ASEAN-China dialogue on a Code of Conduct. It also sought stronger security ties with its traditional ally – the United States – as well as receiving the support of other friendly governments such as Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea for capability-building for maritime security. However, there were two other strategies that the Aquino government chose not to pursue.
One was to engage China in direct dialogue. Refraining from dialogue seems logical if the Philippines feared that China would use this to pressure it into withdrawing from the arbitration case (as China tried to do up to the very last minute). On the other hand, the Aquino government
could have used bilateral dialogue to press China to back down, leveraging support from its allies and its leading role on this issue within ASEAN, if it was interested in preserving its relationship
with China. Without this bilateral platform, however, the arbitration could not be interpreted in
any other way than as a hostile act. The other
In terms of legal importance, the “final and binding” arbitration ruling may be the most significant decision to come out relating to the implementation of UNCLOS as the
“constitution of the oceans”. However, in terms of political-diplomatic utility for a region learning to manage ties with a rising power, or its function of promoting Philippine interests including security and access to resources, it may have a relatively short shelf life.
the concept remains an attractive long-term option. It is also quite possibly the only practical one that could
bring about both lasting peace and security, as well as shared wealth from the seas, for the various claimant
countries. Such a scenario can only come about as a result of true compromise and great determination.
power and influence of China, which has translated into new military advances and greater assertiveness in its foreign policy posture in general, but particularly with regard to territorial sovereignty in both the SCS and
the East China Sea. The second development is the change in US policy — its pivot or rebalance to Asia — once it realised that China’s expanding economic and political reach was encroaching on its own influence and its
primacy in Southeast Asia or, more broadly speaking, the Western Pacific.Therefore, on top of the ‘mother of all disputes’ there now exists competition between great powers: issues of navigational freedom, sovereignty, artificial island construction and the rule of law have become proxies for big power interests in the contest between what some analysts would call a revisionist state (China) and one defending a status quo in which
it remains on top (US). Notwithstanding their economic interdependence and the need for strategic cooperation on other fronts, confrontation in the SCS between China and the US has been increasing.The spoils could be very high: hegemonic leadership in the region, the right to determine rules applicable to the seas, and realignments of allegiance by other small and middle powers. How to prevent this
competition from turning into armed conflict, how to uphold rules-based order in the seas, and how to preserve the strategic autonomy of small and middle powers in the process are the challenges that maritime states in the
ASEAN region, including New Zealand and Australia, must face.
This paper examines the phenomenon of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on the Philippines, towards an assessment of whether the diaspora plays a significant role in the “security strategy” of China.
Basically, the answer to this question lies in an understanding of (1) what we mean by “the Chinese diaspora” and “the ethnic Chinese”, (2) the history of migration and the evolution of their presence, (3) their relations with the government of their country of residence, and (4) the nature of their ties with China through the years. The paper argues that based on these considerations, the ethnic Chinese minorities in the region have not been and are not likely to be useful as significant instruments for the deliberate advancement of China’s security goals and interests in Southeast Asia, especially if security is understood here in its traditional (realist) sense of a great power China seeking political supremacy in the region, or even military parity with or advantage over other great powers.
The method of investigation is through case studies, which process-trace major Philippine policy decisions in which China played an important role. The interests and goals of both China as the influencer and of the Philippines as the subject of influence are examined, with special attention paid to the role that Philippine decision makers and actors played in the construction and mediation of Chinese influence. Were the latter merely objects responding to acts of persuasion, inducement or coercion emanating from China, or were they more active subjects and agents promoting their own interests and strategizing their responses with wider imperatives in mind?
network project and a railway project; and Philippine reactions to China’s execution of three Filipino drug mules.
The purpose of this Primer is to make available in a single updated volume a simplified and objective rendering of the historical background, current conditions, pertinent issues and policy questions regarding the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea.
It is intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes. The questions and answers are framed from a Filipino perspective that focuses on information that the authors
considered to be most important and of interest to citizens of this country, rather than information that may be highlighted by various foreign authors, organizations or governments. The contents are not intended as advocacy of any particular position or policy recommendation.
ASEAN has come a long way in building
the foundations and the main pillars of
Southeast Asia’s regional community. Its
brand of open regionalism – inclusive,
moderate, flexible, and tolerant – has served
its member states well, albeit arguably at
some cost to ASEAN’s collective impact
and credibility. Yet ASEAN has survived
inter-state wars, political pressure from
big powers, civil conflicts, economic crises,
pandemics, environmental challenges,
and more.
The next 50 years may be no different, or
they may be more difficult given shifting
geopolitical configurations, but ASEAN
is bound to persist in simultaneously
working to bring order to its own house
while trying to be friendly and useful to
its neighbours. In the meantime, 2025 is
the next milestone that ASEAN can look
forward to, and redoubling efficiency and
fortifying credibility are amongst the major
tasks ahead.
country’s relations with China? There is little consensus on this, partly because of the lack of a shared strategic worldview. On the one hand, we want to use China’s economic strength for our own national development; on the other hand, our territorial disputes with China are our greatest national external security concern, particularly amidst doubts about the strength of US commitment to our defense. Because we cannot ignore either dimension of our relations with China, a “hedging” strategy – combining power balancing behavior with accommodation of China – seems the prudent thing to do.
From Arroyo to Aquino to Duterte, however, successive
governments’ China policies have instead been like swinging pendulums. One government sees only a China threat; another chooses to see only a China opportunity. Neither the swings away from, nor the swings towards China have provided satisfactory solutions.Indeed, the strategies we take to defend Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity must be weighed carefully against the risks entailed, the prospects of success, and the long term repercussions on the region. For the Philippines, the primordial goals as we relate to China are to minimize risks or threats, and to maximize opportunities for our welfare and security. Both are important, as we do not wish China to become an enemy (which can happen if we over-estimate the risks), nor do we wish to become her client-state (if we overstate the opportunities).
through ADMM or ‘minus X’ arrangements, into an autonomous and cohesive bloc that is a
constant advocate and activist for regional maritime security.