School of Computer Science and Software Engineering

Concurrent signature, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson, is known to just fall short to solve the long standing fair exchange of signature problem without requiring any trusted third party (TTP). The price for not requiring any TTP is that the initial signer is always having some advantage over the matching signer in controlling whether the protocol completes or not, and hence, whether the two ambiguous signatures will bind concurrently to their true signers or not. In this paper, we examine the notion and classify the advantages of the initial signer into three levels, some of which but not all of them may be known in the literature. -Advantage level 0 is the commonly acknowledged fact that concurrent signature is not abuse-free since an initial signer who holds a keystone can always choose to complete or abort a concurrent signature protocol run by deciding whether to release the keystone or not. -Advantage level 1 refers to the fact that the initial signer can convince a third party that both ambiguous signatures are valid without actually making the signatures publicly verifiable. -Advantage level 2 allows the initial signer to convince a third party that the matching signer agrees to commit to a specific message, and nothing else.We stress that advantage level 2 is not about proving the possession of a keystone. Proving the knowledge of a keystone would make the malicious initial signer accountable as this could only be done by the initial signer. We remark that the original security models for concurrent signature do not rule out the aforementioned advantages of the initial signer. Indeed, we show that theoretically, the initial signer always enjoys the above advantages for any concurrent signatures. Our work demonstrates a clear gap between the notion of concurrent signature and optimistic fair exchange (OFE) in which no party enjoys advantage level 1. Furthermore, in a variant known as Ambiguous OFE, no party enjoys advantage level 1 and 2.

Wireless handheld devices which support e-mail and web browsing are increasingly popular. The authenticity of the information received is important, especially for business uses. In server-aided verification (SAV), a substantial part of the verification computation can be offloaded to a powerful but possibly untrusted server. This allows resourceconstrained devices to enjoy the security guarantees provided by cryptographic schemes, such as pairing-based signatures, which may be too heavyweight to verify otherwise.

Enforcing strong authentication is an option to mit- igate phishing. However, existing authentication methods, like traditional digital signatures, require unrealistic full deployment of public key infrastruc- ture(PKI) and destroy email users' privacy in that the identity of an email sender is automatically revealed to the public. There have been some works in the lit- erature, where the technology of deniable authentica- tion is adopted and sender's privacy can be protected. However, the additional computation introduced into the system is obviously a drawback. In this paper, we introduce the notion of online/o†ine authentica- tion into anti-phishing, in order to construct an ef- flcient and secure anti-phishing scheme. It is com- monly known that a generic online/o†ine signature can be constructed with a traditional chameleon func- tion. Nevertheless, a standard chameleon function sufiers from so-called key-exposure attacks. To tackle this issue, we propose an e-cient c...

In this paper, we propose a new ID-based event-oriented linkable ring signature scheme, with an option as revocable-iff-linked. With this option, if a user generates two linkable ring signatures in the same event, everyone can compute his identity from these two signatures. We are the first in the literature to propose such a secure construction in ID-based setting. Even compared with other existing non ID-based schemes, we enjoy significant efficiency improvement, including constant signature size and linking complexity.