International Studies

This study was designed to follow up children's early spontaneous uses of from to mark oblique agents by giving 40 children (aged 2 ; 5-6; I), and 1 0 adults, grammatical and ungrammatical sentences containing from, with, and by to imitate and to repair. As predicted, children's imitations and repairs showed that ( a ) 2-year-olds produce from for agents, and with for instruments in imitation; and (b) as children get older, they shift to by for agents in their repairs, and keep from to mark locative sources. These findings support the hypothesis that when children first try to express oblique agents, before acquisition of conventional by, they choose from for this purpose because agents, as instigators of actions, are conceived of as the source of the action and its result.

Although non-profit organizations in Russia have been growing, the independent sector still faces many obstacles. Despite this, many local NGOs work successfully in social spheres, including work with disadvantaged youth. In this paper, we discuss two recent US-Russia exchange projects, which highlight the importance of intersectoral partnerships and the contribution of informal volunteer movements to strengthening civil society in Russia. We analyze the perception and participation of project participants, integrating quantitative and qualitative information from nine surveys, along with participatory observations and personal communications. The results show a positive effect of collaboration, as well as a strong contribution of informal volunteer movements to developing new programs for youth/children at risk and strengthening civil society in Russia. Local NGOs play an important role in providing needed social services, informal volunteer networks make important contributions, and overall, Russian civil society may be more vibrant than previous scholarship suggests.

Fieldnotcs can be used, and how valuable a resource preliminary exploration into one aspect of Wetan formation of relative clauses. Wetan is one of reportedly five distinct of Wetan, in the Babar Archipelago of Eastern Indonesia (Collins 1983). Referred to as Wetanese by de Josselin de himself, but as Wetan by Blust in his introduction, it is almost certainly a dialect of Wetang, reported by Collins as spoken in eight villages on islands near Wetan. Wctan Fieldnotes is the only source of published information on this language and one of the most extensive sources of data on any Southeastern Maluku language. As such, it will be useful for pursuing areal, and typological issues. Possibly related to the languages of Kisar, Roma, Letiand Luang-Sermata (pp. vii-Ix), a subgrouping of the Maluku branch of Austronesian languages, Wetan represents a little-studied branch of the Austronesian language family. Wetan is also located in the puzzling "hot of remarkable linguistic diversity which encompasses the Papua New Guinea-•Eastern Indonesia region. For instance, five distinct languages are reported spoken on Wetan, an island of approximately 8 by 25 kilometers-perhaps one-twentieth the size of Bali. The book will be of use to anthropologists as well as linguists, both as a pedagogical tool for learning Wetan or related languages, and for the ethnographic information contained implicitly in the texts and vocabulary. FORMAT The book begins with a useful annotated introduction by Robert A. Blust. Sixty-eight authentic texts in Wetan follow, each with a sentence-by-sentence English translation on the facing page. These are followed by 10 pages of footnotes, 53 pages of linguistic notes, a 72-page Wetan-English vocabulary, and a 61-page index to the vocabulary, which is effectively an English-Wetan vocabulary. The Introduction provides background information about the works of de Josselin de Jong, and about the geographic and linguistic area Wetan. Blust proposes a plausible affiliation for Wetan with Roma, Kisar, Leti-Moa, and Luang-Sermata, as a subgrouping of Eastern Maluku. The introduction also contains a useful bibliography of pertinent works. The for the most part folktales, are fascinating and entertaining reading, and provide a wealth of implicit ethnographic, linguistic and historical information. Themes include the origins of rituals, place names and clan relations, as well as descriptions of agriculture, healing, fishing, and other aspects of daily life. Because the English translation has been done REVIEW ARTlCLE 'Ne:'tt he took the rope and again stretched it between Liketupun and Nusiata [and their bouncl:>rv was namedj Ajari.' ranoknana taldiene pe nla nketertarie Ie Uktupenma Ereleini [pe rletni pede witiernni nanni] Ritnie. 'Next he took the rope and stretched it between Liketupuo and Herle [whose boundary was called] Ritnie.• Walpi nlankelr aka Ie Ereleini rna Okpe [rletni pede ira witiemni nanni] lekri. 'Next he laid the rope between Herle and aka [and the name or their boundary wasl Jekri.' J 1 informed and an approach that lets the data speak for themselves. His compromises provide access to the language through both functional and structural routes, explicitly in the case of indexing and section

In Cambodia, orphan dance shows were once popular as a way to preserve endangered art forms and to cultivate children's dignity and well-being. But they came to be seen as exploitative instead, and today are nearly nonexistent. This article examines the confluence of changes that caused this reversal of opinion. The reversal is due to both covert factors such as changes in constructions of childhood, and overt factors such as changes in audience composition. The rise and fall of Cambodian orphan dance shows took place largely within foreign communities, with little local input.

This paper argues that the Egyptian revolution of 25 January 2011 has to be understood in the context of neoliberal economic shift. The two decades of economic liberalisation policies were accompanied by authoritarianism while at the same time these policies opened up opportunities for crony capitalism. Post Mubarak Egypt has witnessed positive developments such as the rise of political parties, independent trade union federations and other social groups aiming to participate in rebuilding a democratic society. The paper explores the potentials for, and challenges against, building a democratic society in Egypt.

This paper examines the transformation of Syrian political economy from 1970 until 2005. I argue that Syria has undergone two important phases of political and economic transformation, from building a centralized state and economy in the early 1970s to embarking on the path of market economy in the early 1990s. With the logic of competitiveness guiding the direction of economic development, the socio-economic changes of the mid-1980s and after have corresponded with an important process of class and state formation. After a brief discussion of the current transition in Syria, the following sections of the paper attempt to provide a critical study of the different strategies for economic development. Section two examines the process of state and economic centralization of the 1970s and 1980s and highlights the contradictions of this period. Section three assesses the impact of economic liberalization through a study of competitiveness in the economic policies of the 1990s and 2000. The final section examines the economic and political impasse that Syria has been faced with. In conclusion, I argue that the current path of market economy as the strategy for capital accumulation has not resolved the socio-economic problems that Syria has faced in the last two decades. This strategy will continue to face contestation by marginalized groups such as factions of the Baath Party, landless peasants, workers and small producers as Syria becomes even more integrated into the regional and global economy.

The Syrian uprising passed its one year mark with the Ba’th regime still in power. Since the beginning of the uprising, however, peaceful protests have declined and have been replaced by armed struggle. What were the factors that determined the course of events since the start of the uprising and how did these factors push Syria towards a civil war? In this paper, I argue that the uprising that began as a result of legitimate grievances of Syrian workers, peasants, activists and intellectuals was appropriated by more organized opposition forces that had the support of powerful Gulf States such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This turn of events marginalized the domestic opposition who were rendered invisible in Western media, which instead promoted the Muslim Brotherhood backed opposition as the only voice of Syrian opposition. This essay offers an analysis of the Syrian uprising by situating the uprising historically and by moving away from the narrative that has been established by the Western media. Part one situates the uprising in the context of economic liberalization policies of Bashar Assad. Part two explores the role of Syrian opposition forces prior and after the Arab Spring. Part three discusses the role of Western and regional powers and their intentions to shape the outcome of the uprising. I conclude by discussing the broader implications of international powers’ responses to the Syrian crisis.

In this paper I argue that the relative unity of domestic and external forces supporting the status quo and the disunity and lack of organization of the protest movement have played an important role in determining the outcome of the first year and potentially the coming years of the revolution. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to propose a new model of economic development that is qualitatively different from the neoliberal model of economic development under Mubarak. External powerful forces such as Saudi Arabia and the US have used their economic leverage to limit progressive economic, political and social changes so far. Consequently, in its first year post Mubarak, Egypt has not witnessed any substantial changes that would have benefited the popular social forces.

In this chapter, I provide a comparative analysis of the political economy of Egypt and Tunisia in the post-Arab uprisings period. Political analysts have concluded that Egypt has reverted to authoritarianism, while Tunisia is holding onto a fragile path of democratic transition. The persistence of neoliberalism in both countries puts this analysis of divergence of the two countries into question. Both countries have re-embarked on a path of economic reform and restructuring, with an eye to attract foreign direct investment to meet the needs of their citizens. From a critical political economy perspective, I argue that there are more qualitative similarities between Egypt and Tunisia that may inform a more complex view of socioeconomic and political developments in the two countries. I discuss the role of important domestic, regional and international actors who have contributed to resuscitating the neoliberal model. Both Egypt and Tunisia are striving to offer new areas of investment by opening up previously protected markets in health, transportation and numerous other sectors of the economy while dismantling the subsidies for food and energy. While the reforms have offered very generous conditions for private investors, there has been little commitment by the Egyptian and Tunisian governments to impose conditionalities on private investors related to labor and social justice. I conclude the chapter by discussing the implications of the return of neoliberalism for unemployment, poverty, and social justice.

Introduction Our understanding of the uprising in the Arab world over the past year has been heavily shaped by the mainstream media, reflecting its powerful role in focusing our attention on the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, while neglecting the uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and parts of Saudi Arabia. The cases that have received coverage from the media have tended to be lumped together and characterized as the uprising of people as a unified social force against monolithic authoritarian regimes. This characterization has, firstly, glossed over the differences that exist within the Arab world; secondly, masked the nature of divisions within the opposition; and, finally, depicted the states in the region as unitary actors without any accounts of political struggles over the state. The case of Syria is a clear example of this particular characterization. The Syrian uprising, which began almost a year ago on March 15, 2011, has been presented through the same lens as the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The Syrian regime has been depicted as a dictatorship backed only by the minority Alawite clan and the opposition has been depicted as a unified group who are all in agreement in terms of their demands. Consequently, the current conflict in Syria is presented by the media and Western policymakers as a legitimate case for humanitarian intervention which has been blocked by Russia and China for the moment. Syria's experience of the Arab Spring is similar to Tunisia and Egypt in some ways; however, it is also similar to Libya in other ways. What began as a genuine protest of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and students against the socioeconomic problems and absence of political freedoms was subverted and manipulated by external forces, both Syrian and non-Syrian. In this talk, I intend to historically contextualize the uprising in Syria. First, I examine Bashar al-Assad's policies over the past decade and establish the relationship between the initial uprising and his policies. Next, I discuss the nature of the opposition in Syria in order to distinguish the opposition that existed inside Syria from the one that the Western world has come to know over the past year. Finally, I discuss the role of Western and regional powers in exploiting the uprising, and their attempts to determine the outcome of the uprising in their own interests. Bashar al-Assad's Reforms By the time Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000, the Syrian economy was faced with a number of challenges, which included a high level of unemployment, a decline in oil revenues, and increasing pressure to liberalize the economy. During the first three years of his rule, administrative and economic reforms topped his agenda. Adopting a neoliberal economic