Humans are often termed “cognitive misers” for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outsi... more Humans are often termed “cognitive misers” for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outside the laboratory people often show preference for low-effort tasks and are willing to forgo financial reward to avoid more demanding alternatives. Mental effort, however, does not seem to be ubiquitously avoided: people play crosswords, board games, and read novels, all as forms of leisure. While such activities undoubtedly require effort, the type of cognitive demands they impose appear markedly different from the tasks typically used in mental-effort research (e.g., N-Back, demand selection tasks, vigilance tasks). We investigate the effect disparate demands such as rule discovery compared to rule implementation have on people’s aversion to or preference for increased mental effort. Across four experiments using three different tasks (i.e., N-Back, number sequence problems, and anagrams), and a mixture of online and lab-based settings we find that aversion to effort remains stable reg...
Proposed psychological mechanisms generating non-instrumental information seeking in humans can b... more Proposed psychological mechanisms generating non-instrumental information seeking in humans can be broadly categorised into two competing accounts: the maximisation of anticipating rewards versus an aversion to uncertainty. We compare three separate formalisations of these theories on their ability to track the dependency of information seeking behaviour on increasing levels of cue-outcome delay as well as their sensitivity to outcome valence. Across three experiments using a variety of different stimuli, we observe a flat to monotonically increasing pattern of delay dependency and minimal evidence of sensitivity to outcome valence––patterns which are better predicted, qualitatively and quantitatively, by an uncertainty aversion information model.
People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision.... more People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion. Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced, but they differ in their explanation of information preference at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series of experiments involving both primary and secondary reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental information even at long cue-outcome delays and no evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes. This pattern appears to provide more support for the uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation.
42nd Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 2020
People tend to place value on information even when it does
not affect the outcome of a decision.... more People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion. Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced, but they differ in their explanation of information preference at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series of experiments involving both primary and secondary reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental information even at long cue-outcome delays and no evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes. This pattern appears to provide more support for the uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation
The philosophical and scientific reasons why Koestler's arguments for parapsychological phenomeno... more The philosophical and scientific reasons why Koestler's arguments for parapsychological phenomenon are nothing more than pseudoscience, rather than his acclaimed scientific phenomenon.
Humans are often termed “cognitive misers” for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outsi... more Humans are often termed “cognitive misers” for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outside the laboratory people often show preference for low-effort tasks and are willing to forgo financial reward to avoid more demanding alternatives. Mental effort, however, does not seem to be ubiquitously avoided: people play crosswords, board games, and read novels, all as forms of leisure. While such activities undoubtedly require effort, the type of cognitive demands they impose appear markedly different from the tasks typically used in mental-effort research (e.g., N-Back, demand selection tasks, vigilance tasks). We investigate the effect disparate demands such as rule discovery compared to rule implementation have on people’s aversion to or preference for increased mental effort. Across four experiments using three different tasks (i.e., N-Back, number sequence problems, and anagrams), and a mixture of online and lab-based settings we find that aversion to effort remains stable reg...
Proposed psychological mechanisms generating non-instrumental information seeking in humans can b... more Proposed psychological mechanisms generating non-instrumental information seeking in humans can be broadly categorised into two competing accounts: the maximisation of anticipating rewards versus an aversion to uncertainty. We compare three separate formalisations of these theories on their ability to track the dependency of information seeking behaviour on increasing levels of cue-outcome delay as well as their sensitivity to outcome valence. Across three experiments using a variety of different stimuli, we observe a flat to monotonically increasing pattern of delay dependency and minimal evidence of sensitivity to outcome valence––patterns which are better predicted, qualitatively and quantitatively, by an uncertainty aversion information model.
People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision.... more People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion. Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced, but they differ in their explanation of information preference at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series of experiments involving both primary and secondary reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental information even at long cue-outcome delays and no evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes. This pattern appears to provide more support for the uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation.
42nd Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 2020
People tend to place value on information even when it does
not affect the outcome of a decision.... more People tend to place value on information even when it does not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion. Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced, but they differ in their explanation of information preference at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series of experiments involving both primary and secondary reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental information even at long cue-outcome delays and no evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes. This pattern appears to provide more support for the uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation
The philosophical and scientific reasons why Koestler's arguments for parapsychological phenomeno... more The philosophical and scientific reasons why Koestler's arguments for parapsychological phenomenon are nothing more than pseudoscience, rather than his acclaimed scientific phenomenon.
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Papers by Jake R Embrey
not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing
accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental
information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of
anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion.
Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced,
but they differ in their explanation of information preference
at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series
of experiments involving both primary and secondary
reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The
results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental
information even at long cue-outcome delays and no
evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes.
This pattern appears to provide more support for the
uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation
Drafts by Jake R Embrey
not affect the outcome of a decision. Two competing
accounts offer explanations for such non-instrumental
information seeking. One account foregrounds the role of
anticipation and the other focusses on uncertainty aversion.
Both accounts make similar predictions for short cueoutcome delays and when outcomes are positively valenced,
but they differ in their explanation of information preference
at long delays with negative outcomes. We present a series
of experiments involving both primary and secondary
reinforcers that pit these accounts against each other. The
results indicate a consistent preference for non-instrumental
information even at long cue-outcome delays and no
evidence for information avoidance with negative outcomes.
This pattern appears to provide more support for the
uncertainty-aversion account than one based on anticipation