Abstract: People are often recommending popular fiction to each other to provide “insight” into, ... more Abstract: People are often recommending popular fiction to each other to provide “insight” into, say, what life is like in a contemporary Jamaican village. But given that such stories are fictional, what does that insight really consist in? In this paper I will argue that such works of fiction can provide understanding, rather than knowledge. I’ll also talk about some things we need to be cautious about with this type of understanding
Undertaking an internal or international migration while pregnant, miscarrying, and/or raising a ... more Undertaking an internal or international migration while pregnant, miscarrying, and/or raising a child often entails complex personal, political and moral challenges. For instance, for migrants, on a personal level, the physical and emotional stress associated with certain migration experiences may lead to negative pregnancy outcomes like miscarriage, low birth-weight, stillbirth and gestational diabetes. Politically speaking, birthright citizenship, or the right to become a citizen of the country in which one was born regardless of the citizenship status of one's parents, has been attacked relentlessly by anti-immigrant groups in places like the United States, Ireland, and New Zealand, leading to its controversial repeal in the latter two countries. Meanwhile, some of the most morally troubling instances of recent migrant abuse have involved the recent, ongoing separations of migrant children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite the obvious social and political importance of these questions of "maternity and migration," there is not yet a distinguishable and robust philosophical literature that addresses them directly. There is, however, ample empirical literature and a small set of philosophical articles on this topic, and, additionally, a considerable amount of philosophical work that could be employed to consider the relevant questions from a normative point of a view. My aim in this essay is to provide a summary of this work with a view toward motivating new philosophical research in this important area. "Maternity and migration" is, I hope to show, a topic worthy of sustained philosophical attention, and many conceptual resources are, in fact, already available for doing this work. However, I shall suggest that this (philosophically) under-explored topic indicates a need for alternative approaches to mainstream immigration ethics. 2. Friday, September 27 3:00pm, BEH 113 "Is It All Because of a Story?"
Coaches and athletes often talk about 'mental abilities' that improve athletic performance in a w... more Coaches and athletes often talk about 'mental abilities' that improve athletic performance in a way distinct from physical talents. But the existence of distinct mental abilities in sport is prima facie implausible since (dualists aside) all mental states are physical states of the brain, and all physical bodily movements are the results of mental guidance. Yet it still seems useful and important to talk about a distinctly 'mental' aspect of athletic performance. In this paper, I try to clarify what a distinctly mental realm of sports would be and discuss how we can talk about it in ways that can help athletes improve.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la doctrine de l'individualisme methodologique, affir... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la doctrine de l'individualisme methodologique, affirmant que tous les phenomenes sociaux doivent etre compris en termes de dispositions comportementales des individus, est fausse en ce sens qu'une interpretation individualiste des faits sociaux fondee sur les notions de desirs et de choix n'est pas preferable a une interpretation non-individualiste fondee sur les notions collectiviste d'integration sociale et de realisabilite multiple
Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive account... more Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term "explanation" is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, "versions" and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.
Terms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social ... more Terms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social science, and throughout everyday conversation, to describe certain types of behaviors. Yet it is not very clear what people mean by them. In this paper, I try to make clearer what is meant by these terms and what makes the behavior they describe possible.
While it seems trivially true that adding additional scholars to study something should increase ... more While it seems trivially true that adding additional scholars to study something should increase our knowledge, it is not clear exactly how they do so. Why should we think that something like ‘swarm’ scholarship would be successful? In this essay, I identify three basic ways in which studying a domain using a group of scholars could enhance our knowledge in ways traditional epistemologists could appreciate. One way is when each of number of individuals adds to the number of beliefs (or justification of beliefs) so the total amount of justified true beliefs we have increases. A second family is when something combines the beliefs claimed by different individuals into some kind of superior synthesis. A third family is when group members do things to help other group members add justified beliefs, creating a kind of multiplier effect.
In a recent paper in Social Epistemology, Reza Lahroodi discussed whether and how social groups c... more In a recent paper in Social Epistemology, Reza Lahroodi discussed whether and how social groups can have epistemic virtues such as open‐mindedness. On the one hand, we seem to talk as though they c...
Many philosophers have claimed that intentional ascription is not possible if alien peoples are t... more Many philosophers have claimed that intentional ascription is not possible if alien peoples are truly radically different from ourselves. At the same time, many anthropologists have claimed that the people they study think very differently from the way that we do. I claim that it is possible for both the anthropologists and the philosophers to be right. Giving intentional descriptions is problematic for people unlike ourselves, but anthropologists can, and do give good descriptions of alien mental states using descriptions not unlike those given in certain formulations of cognitive psychology.
In my critique of interpretive social science, I argued that interpretivists’ lax epistemological... more In my critique of interpretive social science, I argued that interpretivists’ lax epistemological standards resulted in their positing descriptions of native belief systems that are arbitrary, uninformative, and untrue. Dan Segal takes issue with my argument for arbitrariness. In his view, arbitrary interpretations are avoided by (1) numerous constraints interpretivists impose on their interpretations and (2) a rigorous refereeing process. Let me begin by saying that I agree with Segal that there are many constraints guiding interpretivists. I don’t believe, as Segal thinks I do, that interpretivists don’t offer reasons why a particular interpretation should be accepted. Interpretivists often offer reasons for and constraints on their interpretations. What I take issue with is whether their reasons are good enough reasons for accepting their interpretations. If arbitrariness is construed as I explicitly defined it in my essay—“when the characteristics of what we are describing are equally or more consistent with other alternative descriptions, yet we persist in advocating or privileging a particular one” (Jones 1998, 45)—then I maintain that interpretivist descriptions certainly tend to be arbitrary. Nothing Segal says in his rejoinder shows anything to the contrary. Consider the evidence Sherry Ortner (1978) speaks of as her two main lines of support for her interpretation that the tiger and rider sende effigy in the Sherpa do dzongup ritual represents the rich of Sherpa society. These lines mentioned by Segal constitute shockingly meager evidence for Ortner’s claims. One of her lines comes to this: the tiger is a representation of the rich because the rich are sort of like the gods, and the gods are sometimes represented as riding wild animals. This sort of reasoning—ascribing symbolic association based on chains of resemblance and contiguity—is commonly found throughout interpretivist writing. The reason that tracing such chains of potential association tells us little is that one can connect anything to any other thing via such chains. Give me any two items, and via a
In this article, I argue that norms and customs, despite frequently being described as being caus... more In this article, I argue that norms and customs, despite frequently being described as being causes of behavior in the social sciences and ordinary conversation, cannot really cause behavior. Terms like “norms” and the like seem to refer to philosophically disreputable disjunctive properties. More problematically, even if they do not, or even if there can be disjunctive properties after all, I argue that norms and customs still cannot cause behavior. The social sciences would be better off without referring to properties like norms and customs as if they could be causal.
Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropolo... more Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropological theory of Yanomami warfare but that a unification theory of explanation cannot. I argue that a unification theory can explain such an account, in a manner similar to Hempel's view of explanation in history. I go on to argue that the unification theory allows for different explanations of specific and general social circumstances.
P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of sc... more P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of scientific explanation that is inconsistant with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this appearance is illusory. The existence of multiply realizable generalizations enable the unification theory to also count many high-level accounts as explanatory.
Commonsense psychology has fallen on hard times. Under the influence of Fodor and others, many ph... more Commonsense psychology has fallen on hard times. Under the influence of Fodor and others, many philosophers have become convinced that commonsense psychology proceeds by attributing representational states to organisms, and then explaining the behavior of ...
: Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the... more : Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many scholars consider reductionism a sign of “intellectual naivete and backwardness.” This article makes three points about the proper status of antireductionism: First, reduction is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, nevertheless, reasons why we want science to discover properties and explanations other than reductive physical ones.
: Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like “custom” and “norm”... more : Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like “custom” and “norm” often tend to be situations in which many other kinds of explanations (for example, biological, psychological, economic, historical) seem plausible as well. Do these other explanations compete with the custom or norm explanations, or do they complement them? We need to consider this question carefully and not just assume that various accounts are all permissible at different levels of analysis. In this article I describe two families of noncompeting accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts that seem to differ but are really different parts or versions of the same underlying explanation. I argue that while many types of apparent competitors don't really compete with norms, there are usually some that do. These competing accounts will usually undermine the norm account.
Abstract: People are often recommending popular fiction to each other to provide “insight” into, ... more Abstract: People are often recommending popular fiction to each other to provide “insight” into, say, what life is like in a contemporary Jamaican village. But given that such stories are fictional, what does that insight really consist in? In this paper I will argue that such works of fiction can provide understanding, rather than knowledge. I’ll also talk about some things we need to be cautious about with this type of understanding
Undertaking an internal or international migration while pregnant, miscarrying, and/or raising a ... more Undertaking an internal or international migration while pregnant, miscarrying, and/or raising a child often entails complex personal, political and moral challenges. For instance, for migrants, on a personal level, the physical and emotional stress associated with certain migration experiences may lead to negative pregnancy outcomes like miscarriage, low birth-weight, stillbirth and gestational diabetes. Politically speaking, birthright citizenship, or the right to become a citizen of the country in which one was born regardless of the citizenship status of one's parents, has been attacked relentlessly by anti-immigrant groups in places like the United States, Ireland, and New Zealand, leading to its controversial repeal in the latter two countries. Meanwhile, some of the most morally troubling instances of recent migrant abuse have involved the recent, ongoing separations of migrant children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite the obvious social and political importance of these questions of "maternity and migration," there is not yet a distinguishable and robust philosophical literature that addresses them directly. There is, however, ample empirical literature and a small set of philosophical articles on this topic, and, additionally, a considerable amount of philosophical work that could be employed to consider the relevant questions from a normative point of a view. My aim in this essay is to provide a summary of this work with a view toward motivating new philosophical research in this important area. "Maternity and migration" is, I hope to show, a topic worthy of sustained philosophical attention, and many conceptual resources are, in fact, already available for doing this work. However, I shall suggest that this (philosophically) under-explored topic indicates a need for alternative approaches to mainstream immigration ethics. 2. Friday, September 27 3:00pm, BEH 113 "Is It All Because of a Story?"
Coaches and athletes often talk about 'mental abilities' that improve athletic performance in a w... more Coaches and athletes often talk about 'mental abilities' that improve athletic performance in a way distinct from physical talents. But the existence of distinct mental abilities in sport is prima facie implausible since (dualists aside) all mental states are physical states of the brain, and all physical bodily movements are the results of mental guidance. Yet it still seems useful and important to talk about a distinctly 'mental' aspect of athletic performance. In this paper, I try to clarify what a distinctly mental realm of sports would be and discuss how we can talk about it in ways that can help athletes improve.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la doctrine de l'individualisme methodologique, affir... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la doctrine de l'individualisme methodologique, affirmant que tous les phenomenes sociaux doivent etre compris en termes de dispositions comportementales des individus, est fausse en ce sens qu'une interpretation individualiste des faits sociaux fondee sur les notions de desirs et de choix n'est pas preferable a une interpretation non-individualiste fondee sur les notions collectiviste d'integration sociale et de realisabilite multiple
Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive account... more Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term "explanation" is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, "versions" and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.
Terms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social ... more Terms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social science, and throughout everyday conversation, to describe certain types of behaviors. Yet it is not very clear what people mean by them. In this paper, I try to make clearer what is meant by these terms and what makes the behavior they describe possible.
While it seems trivially true that adding additional scholars to study something should increase ... more While it seems trivially true that adding additional scholars to study something should increase our knowledge, it is not clear exactly how they do so. Why should we think that something like ‘swarm’ scholarship would be successful? In this essay, I identify three basic ways in which studying a domain using a group of scholars could enhance our knowledge in ways traditional epistemologists could appreciate. One way is when each of number of individuals adds to the number of beliefs (or justification of beliefs) so the total amount of justified true beliefs we have increases. A second family is when something combines the beliefs claimed by different individuals into some kind of superior synthesis. A third family is when group members do things to help other group members add justified beliefs, creating a kind of multiplier effect.
In a recent paper in Social Epistemology, Reza Lahroodi discussed whether and how social groups c... more In a recent paper in Social Epistemology, Reza Lahroodi discussed whether and how social groups can have epistemic virtues such as open‐mindedness. On the one hand, we seem to talk as though they c...
Many philosophers have claimed that intentional ascription is not possible if alien peoples are t... more Many philosophers have claimed that intentional ascription is not possible if alien peoples are truly radically different from ourselves. At the same time, many anthropologists have claimed that the people they study think very differently from the way that we do. I claim that it is possible for both the anthropologists and the philosophers to be right. Giving intentional descriptions is problematic for people unlike ourselves, but anthropologists can, and do give good descriptions of alien mental states using descriptions not unlike those given in certain formulations of cognitive psychology.
In my critique of interpretive social science, I argued that interpretivists’ lax epistemological... more In my critique of interpretive social science, I argued that interpretivists’ lax epistemological standards resulted in their positing descriptions of native belief systems that are arbitrary, uninformative, and untrue. Dan Segal takes issue with my argument for arbitrariness. In his view, arbitrary interpretations are avoided by (1) numerous constraints interpretivists impose on their interpretations and (2) a rigorous refereeing process. Let me begin by saying that I agree with Segal that there are many constraints guiding interpretivists. I don’t believe, as Segal thinks I do, that interpretivists don’t offer reasons why a particular interpretation should be accepted. Interpretivists often offer reasons for and constraints on their interpretations. What I take issue with is whether their reasons are good enough reasons for accepting their interpretations. If arbitrariness is construed as I explicitly defined it in my essay—“when the characteristics of what we are describing are equally or more consistent with other alternative descriptions, yet we persist in advocating or privileging a particular one” (Jones 1998, 45)—then I maintain that interpretivist descriptions certainly tend to be arbitrary. Nothing Segal says in his rejoinder shows anything to the contrary. Consider the evidence Sherry Ortner (1978) speaks of as her two main lines of support for her interpretation that the tiger and rider sende effigy in the Sherpa do dzongup ritual represents the rich of Sherpa society. These lines mentioned by Segal constitute shockingly meager evidence for Ortner’s claims. One of her lines comes to this: the tiger is a representation of the rich because the rich are sort of like the gods, and the gods are sometimes represented as riding wild animals. This sort of reasoning—ascribing symbolic association based on chains of resemblance and contiguity—is commonly found throughout interpretivist writing. The reason that tracing such chains of potential association tells us little is that one can connect anything to any other thing via such chains. Give me any two items, and via a
In this article, I argue that norms and customs, despite frequently being described as being caus... more In this article, I argue that norms and customs, despite frequently being described as being causes of behavior in the social sciences and ordinary conversation, cannot really cause behavior. Terms like “norms” and the like seem to refer to philosophically disreputable disjunctive properties. More problematically, even if they do not, or even if there can be disjunctive properties after all, I argue that norms and customs still cannot cause behavior. The social sciences would be better off without referring to properties like norms and customs as if they could be causal.
Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropolo... more Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropological theory of Yanomami warfare but that a unification theory of explanation cannot. I argue that a unification theory can explain such an account, in a manner similar to Hempel's view of explanation in history. I go on to argue that the unification theory allows for different explanations of specific and general social circumstances.
P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of sc... more P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of scientific explanation that is inconsistant with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this appearance is illusory. The existence of multiply realizable generalizations enable the unification theory to also count many high-level accounts as explanatory.
Commonsense psychology has fallen on hard times. Under the influence of Fodor and others, many ph... more Commonsense psychology has fallen on hard times. Under the influence of Fodor and others, many philosophers have become convinced that commonsense psychology proceeds by attributing representational states to organisms, and then explaining the behavior of ...
: Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the... more : Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many scholars consider reductionism a sign of “intellectual naivete and backwardness.” This article makes three points about the proper status of antireductionism: First, reduction is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, nevertheless, reasons why we want science to discover properties and explanations other than reductive physical ones.
: Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like “custom” and “norm”... more : Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like “custom” and “norm” often tend to be situations in which many other kinds of explanations (for example, biological, psychological, economic, historical) seem plausible as well. Do these other explanations compete with the custom or norm explanations, or do they complement them? We need to consider this question carefully and not just assume that various accounts are all permissible at different levels of analysis. In this article I describe two families of noncompeting accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts that seem to differ but are really different parts or versions of the same underlying explanation. I argue that while many types of apparent competitors don't really compete with norms, there are usually some that do. These competing accounts will usually undermine the norm account.
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