Papers by Shandon Guthrie
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Dec 18, 2023
Religions, Jul 1, 2022
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative... more This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
International journal of philosophy and theology, 2017
Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons ar... more Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons are (possibly) responsible for at least some natural evils (including animal suffering) prior to the creation of the first human beings. Theologian Gregory Boyd utilizes this approach in what he calls a " warfare theodicy " wherein such beings are construed as originating causes of (some) natural evils. Other thinkers, such as C. S. Lewis and Michael Murray, have pointed to such a theodicy as a mere possibility in blunting the problem of animal suffering as an instance of the problem of natural evil. In this paper, I challenge the warfare theodicy qua theodicy on inductive grounds and argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a warfare theodicy) to think that this appeal is justified since evil spirits likely do not directly interact with the physical universe in the ways necessary for a warfare theodicy to handle such natural evils.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, Nov 16, 2021
Religions
There are few academics today who actively argue against demonic realism. Much of this is perhaps... more There are few academics today who actively argue against demonic realism. Much of this is perhaps due to the fact that there are comparably few defenders of such. This has created a vacuum for critics to comfortably object to the existence of demons without sophistication (for it is only in the professional exchange of ideas do bad arguments get weeded out and good arguments gain vitality). Add to this the common perception of demonology as an anti-intellectual superstition and we end up with a threshold for the success of anti-realist arguments to be set quite low. In this paper, I shall survey three of the most familiar objections to demonic realism to arise out of this skeptical intellectual environment: First, and most ambitiously, there is the impossibility of justified belief objection that proffers that belief in demons cannot even in principle be justified no matter how much (scientific) evidence there is. Alternative explanations are always to be preferred. Second, there is...
Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted the existence of intermediary b... more Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted the existence of intermediary beings or, in more familiar terms, angels and demons. According to Christianity, God, angels, demons, and human souls are all thought to share a common nature, namely ‘spirit.’ This ‘spirit’ is thought to signify immateriality. Yet each is said to interact with the physical world. God, who is conceived of as omnipotent, can interact with the world simply at will. Human souls are paired with bodies which provides them the equipment to interact with the world. Angels receive special assistance from God by which they interact with the world. But demons, unlike angels, are not likely to benefit from any special assistance from God (unlike angels), nor are they themselves omnipotent (unlike God), nor are they paired with bodies (unlike humans). However, demons are believed to interact occasionally with this physical world. But how can an immaterial demon interact with a material world? Any app...
Certain features of explanation-seeking science have caught our attention in the past century, is... more Certain features of explanation-seeking science have caught our attention in the past century, issues of explanation in such fields as cosmology, astrophysics, quantum physics, and, more recently, neurophysiology. This has prompted philosophers of science to attempt to define what exactly is an explanation. Indeed, if one were to ask a general quorum of scientists what exactly counts as an explanation, the responses would be quite mixed. Although science itself entails numerous formulas concerning explanation, we will only be concerned with the explanatory theory of reductionism and how it fails to explain the existence of a soul. (1) As a preliminary, it is unimportant to presuppose the scientific realist (2) position in order to advance arguments concerning reduction as explanation. That is, it will be unimportant to question the veridical nature of realism, nonrealism, or nonrealistic interpretations of explanation in order to validate this thesis. Further, all other scientific v...
Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, 2017
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology (IJPT), 2017
Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons ar... more Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons are (possibly) responsible for at least some natural evils (including animal suffering) prior to the creation of the first human beings. Theologian Gregory Boyd utilizes this approach in what he calls a " warfare theodicy " wherein such beings are construed as originating causes of (some) natural evils. Other thinkers, such as C. S. Lewis and Michael Murray, have pointed to such a theodicy as a mere possibility in blunting the problem of animal suffering as an instance of the problem of natural evil. In this paper, I challenge the warfare theodicy qua theodicy on inductive grounds and argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a warfare theodicy) to think that this appeal is justified since evil spirits likely do not directly interact with the physical universe in the ways necessary for a warfare theodicy to handle such natural evils.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion
Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons ar... more Some Christian philosophers and theologians contend that an actual Satan along with his demons are (possibly) responsible for at least some natural evils (including animal suffering) prior to the creation of the first human beings. Theologian Gregory Boyd utilizes this approach in what he calls a " warfare theodicy " wherein such beings are construed as originating causes of (some) natural evils. Other thinkers, such as C. S. Lewis and Michael Murray, have pointed to such a theodicy as a mere possibility in blunting the problem of animal suffering as an instance of the problem of natural evil. In this paper, I challenge the warfare theodicy qua theodicy on inductive grounds and argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a warfare theodicy) to think that this appeal is justified since evil spirits likely do not directly interact with the physical universe in the ways necessary for a warfare theodicy to handle such natural evils.
Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted the existence of intermediary b... more Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted the existence of intermediary beings or, in more familiar terms, angels and demons. According to Christianity, God, angels, demons, and human souls are all thought to share a common nature, namely ‘spirit.’ This ‘spirit’ is thought to signify immateriality. Yet each is said to interact with the physical world. God, who is conceived of as omnipotent, can interact with the world simply at will. Human souls are paired with bodies which provides them the equipment to interact with the world. Angels receive special assistance from God by which they interact with the world. But demons, unlike angels, are not likely to benefit from any special assistance from God (unlike angels), nor are they themselves omnipotent (unlike God), nor are they paired with bodies (unlike humans). However, demons are believed to interact occasionally with this physical world. But how can an immaterial demon interact with a material world? Any appeals to the same explanations for how other immaterial beings (viz. humans, angels, or God) interact with the physical world will not do. I propose a solution that is consonant with their being purely immaterial creatures and yet does not rely on such an ad hoc manoeuvre. I argue that they actually never do interact with the physical world apart from their exploitation of human beings as proxies. I propose to explain their interaction in terms of their basic ability to cognitively interact with embodied souls. I call this sustaining affirmation of their immateriality along with this particular relationship they have with the world through human beings psychodynamic immaterialism.
(Paper read at the April 10th, 2015 meeting of the mid-western regional meeting of the Evangelica... more (Paper read at the April 10th, 2015 meeting of the mid-western regional meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society).
Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted that Satan and the demons are responsible for some or even all natural evils (including animal suffering). This is what I call a “diabolical theodicy.” Clearly a diabolical theodicy implies that Satan and the demons must be capable of directly interacting with the physical world. But how clear is it that they have this power? According to Christianity, demons are immaterial spirits or souls and so lack a “natural” ability to interact with a material world. God, who is an omnipotent spirit, can interact with the world simply at will. Angels receive special assistance from God by which they can interact with the world. Human spirits, upon being created by God, are paired with bodies which provides them the equipment to interact with the world. But demons are not omnipotent (unlike God), nor are they likely to benefit from any special assistance from God (unlike angels), nor are they paired with bodies (unlike humans). The only other way to make a diabolical theodicy work is to suppose that demons have a special psychokinetic power. I shall argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a diabolical theodicy) to think that Satan and the demons have such a psychokinetic power. Consequently a diabolical theodicy cannot be made to work.
Conference Presentations by Shandon Guthrie
Semidivine persons are, according to Christian tradition, nonhuman persons such as angels. Angels... more Semidivine persons are, according to Christian tradition, nonhuman persons such as angels. Angels are traditionally believed to be discarnate, incorporeal spirits created by God in service to humankind. Also, according to tradition, they have the power physically interact with the material world in a variety of ways. In this paper, I argue that semidivine persons likely cannot do anything of their own accord outside of mentation and cognitive interaction with other (homologous) beings. And I shall argue this on the basis of three reasons involving an a priori relation between the material and the immaterial and what Scripture says of both good and fallen angels.
In this paper, I defend the eschatological doctrine of annihilationism over the doctrine of everl... more In this paper, I defend the eschatological doctrine of annihilationism over the doctrine of everlasting conscious torment. By drawing upon insights over the current debates about capital punishment, I argue that, even though we may grant certain assumptions that underscore ECT, additional principles warrant annihilationism as the preferred model of God's punitive justice.
The mainstream Christian church supposes that demons are purely immaterial beings. But it also s... more The mainstream Christian church supposes that demons are purely immaterial beings. But it also supposes that demons can enact extraordinary things such as materializing, causing diseases, manipulating nature, and even affecting cosmological changes. I argue that the demons’ power is likely very limited. The only way demons can interact with the world is through their interactions with human minds. In other words, I argue that all of their intra-worldly activity is all in your head. As such, they likely cannot do all of the things often attributed to them.
Drafts by Shandon Guthrie
In a paper published recently in an anthology, David Kyle Johnson argues that no one can have jus... more In a paper published recently in an anthology, David Kyle Johnson argues that no one can have justification for believing in the existence of diabolical entities like demons either on the basis of personal experience or on the basis of evidence. He argues that not only do testimony and evidence never adequately justify such beliefs, but that they in principle could never do so. In this paper I isolate three distinct arguments he offers in support of this. First, he argues that the hypothesis of demonic realism is itself incoherent. Second, he argues that the fact-gathering process cannot provide any reliable data in support of the diabolical. And, third, when one contrasts naturalistic alternatives to demonic realism, the former always accords better with the virtues of explanatory reasoning. While it is legitimate to wonder whether the deliverances of explanatory reasoning and our doxastic practices can offer up reliable beliefs in things like demons, I argue that all of Johnson’s arguments leading to his negative conclusion about the diabolical fail miserably. I conclude by arguing that the demonic realist actually has a sensible route to the possibility, if not also the probability, of a justified belief in the diabolical.
Uploads
Papers by Shandon Guthrie
Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted that Satan and the demons are responsible for some or even all natural evils (including animal suffering). This is what I call a “diabolical theodicy.” Clearly a diabolical theodicy implies that Satan and the demons must be capable of directly interacting with the physical world. But how clear is it that they have this power? According to Christianity, demons are immaterial spirits or souls and so lack a “natural” ability to interact with a material world. God, who is an omnipotent spirit, can interact with the world simply at will. Angels receive special assistance from God by which they can interact with the world. Human spirits, upon being created by God, are paired with bodies which provides them the equipment to interact with the world. But demons are not omnipotent (unlike God), nor are they likely to benefit from any special assistance from God (unlike angels), nor are they paired with bodies (unlike humans). The only other way to make a diabolical theodicy work is to suppose that demons have a special psychokinetic power. I shall argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a diabolical theodicy) to think that Satan and the demons have such a psychokinetic power. Consequently a diabolical theodicy cannot be made to work.
Conference Presentations by Shandon Guthrie
Drafts by Shandon Guthrie
Many philosophers throughout Christianity’s history have asserted that Satan and the demons are responsible for some or even all natural evils (including animal suffering). This is what I call a “diabolical theodicy.” Clearly a diabolical theodicy implies that Satan and the demons must be capable of directly interacting with the physical world. But how clear is it that they have this power? According to Christianity, demons are immaterial spirits or souls and so lack a “natural” ability to interact with a material world. God, who is an omnipotent spirit, can interact with the world simply at will. Angels receive special assistance from God by which they can interact with the world. Human spirits, upon being created by God, are paired with bodies which provides them the equipment to interact with the world. But demons are not omnipotent (unlike God), nor are they likely to benefit from any special assistance from God (unlike angels), nor are they paired with bodies (unlike humans). The only other way to make a diabolical theodicy work is to suppose that demons have a special psychokinetic power. I shall argue that there is no reason (outside of an ad hoc attempt to protect a diabolical theodicy) to think that Satan and the demons have such a psychokinetic power. Consequently a diabolical theodicy cannot be made to work.