Papers by Cheryl (C.E.) Abbate
Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 2022
Animal welfare theorists tend to assume that most animals in captivity—especially those living in... more Animal welfare theorists tend to assume that most animals in captivity—especially those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—can, with sufficient care and environmental enrichment, live genuinely good lives. This misguided belief stems from the view that animal well-being should be assessed only in terms of the felt experiences of animals. Against this view, I argue that in assessing how well an animal’s life is going, we ought to consider two distinct kinds of welfare: experiential welfare and subject welfare. Once we take seriously the notion of subject welfare, which pertains to the non-sentient nature of animals, we will be forced to accept the unfortunate reality that most, if not all, animals in confinement—including those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—fare quite poorly and live lives that should be characterized as having overall ill-being.
Philosophical Studies, 2022
Those who claim to be committed to the moral equality of animals don’t always act as if they thin... more Those who claim to be committed to the moral equality of animals don’t always act as if they think all animals are equal. For instance, many animal liberationists spend hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars each year on food, toys, and medical care for their companion animals. Surely, more animals would be helped if the money spent on companion animals were donated to farmed animal protection organizations. Moreover, many animal liberationists feed their companion animals the flesh of farmed animals, and some let their cats roam outdoors, foreseeing that they will kill wildlife. Maybe these companion-animal loving animal liberationists are moral hypocrites. Or maybe their behavior is justified. I defend the latter claim. By developing an ethic that emphasizes the moral significance of life-meaning and recognizes the important role that companion animals play in giving meaning to human lives, I argue that there are stringent side-constraints that apply to companion animals, but not to other animals. Consequently, it isn’t hypocritical to prioritize companion animals over other animals. We can have (and value) our carnivorous companions and be animal liberationists too.
Routledge Handbook of Animal Welfare, 2022
What do we owe to non-human animals? How should we respond to the many injustices they face? Answ... more What do we owe to non-human animals? How should we respond to the many injustices they face? Answering these questions requires philosophical attention to complicated questions about moral reasoning, moral status, and ethical theory. This first part of this chapter provides an overview of what both good and bad moral reasoning look like in the context of discussions about animal ethics. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to moral status, including anthropocentric, rationality, and sentio-centric approaches. The third, and final, part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to ethical theory, including contractualism, rights theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics, as they apply to the moral treatment of other animals. And in its entirety, this chapter provides moral guidance to those who aim to protect animals in a world infested with animal injustices.
The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics., 2022
It’s often assumed that if white people have a sexual preference for other white people, they, wh... more It’s often assumed that if white people have a sexual preference for other white people, they, when using intimate dating platforms, have the right to skip over the profiles of Black people. As some argue, we have the right to act on our sexual preferences, including racialized sexual preferences, because doing so isn’t harmful, and even if it were harmful, this wouldn’t matter because either our “right” to act on our sexual preferences outweighs the harm and/or we cannot even control our sexual preferences. Against this view, I argue that (1) when white people act on anti-Black sexual preferences, white people harm Black people insofar as they reduce their objective welfare level, and (2) we can in fact, to some degree, control our racialized sexual preferences. Moreover, I argue that because white people who engage in racialized sexual discrimination against Blacks disrespect and demean Black people and we don’t have any kind of right to disrespect and demean persons, white people don’t have even a prima facie right to act on anti-Black sexual preferences. Indeed, white racialized sexual discrimination against Black people is always deeply wrong, not only because it wrongs Black people, but it also wrongs the discriminators themselves.
Acta Analytica, 2021
In response to my defense of house-based, free-roaming cats, Bob Fischer : 463–468, 2020) argues ... more In response to my defense of house-based, free-roaming cats, Bob Fischer : 463–468, 2020) argues that cat guardians have a duty to permanently confine their felines to the indoors. His main argument is that house-based cats cause an all-things-considered harm to the animals they kill and that this harm is not outweighed by the harm cats endure as a consequence of feline imprisonment. He moreover claims that while we can justify the restriction of feline liberty because cats are not “full agents” and are under our care, we cannot justify restricting the liberty of “full agents” who are not under our care. Against Fischer, I argue that even if cats cause an all-things-considered harm to wildlife, the harm of permanent confinement is a greater harm. Moreover, I challenge Fischer’s claim that cats are not full agents and his claim that we can justify permanently confining creatures under our care. Thus, as I previously argued, cat guardians have a duty to, under certain conditions, provide outdoor access to their felines.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Friendship, 2022
Many human-animal relationships closely resemble parent-child relationships. Yet, as I argue in t... more Many human-animal relationships closely resemble parent-child relationships. Yet, as I argue in this chapter, normatively speaking, parenting is not the kind of practice we should strive to mirror in our loving relationships with companion animals. Rather, we should strive to form friendships with animals. This is because friendships, unlike parent-child relationships, are characterized by mutuality, choice, equality, and respect for differences, and these are ideals we should try to foster in our loving relationships with all animals (human and nonhuman).
Synthese, 2021
The claim that epistemic oughts stem from the “role” of believer is widely discussed in the epist... more The claim that epistemic oughts stem from the “role” of believer is widely discussed in the epistemological discourse. This claim seems to stem from the common view that, in some sense, epistemic norms derive from what it is to be a believer. Against this view, I argue that there is no such thing as a “role” of believer. But there is a role of knower, and this is the role to which some epistemic norms—epistemic role oughts—are attached. Once we conceive of epistemic role oughts as attaching to the role of knower (and not the “role” of believer) we can better understand the nature of epistemic obligation and doxastic control. In advancing a new epistemic role ought approach that recognizes knowers as the subjects of epistemic role oughts, I explain why many epistemic oughts—epistemic role oughts—have normative force and presuppose voluntary control.
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective , 2020
In a recent paper I published in Social Epistemology, “The Epistemology of Meat-Eating,” I advanc... more In a recent paper I published in Social Epistemology, “The Epistemology of Meat-Eating,” I advanced an epistemological theory that explains why so many people continue to eat animals, even after they encounter anti-factory farming arguments.[1] I began by assuming that our beliefs influence our moral behavior, and noted that this entails that the meat-eating behavior of moral agents is influenced by their beliefs about the morality of eating animals. Because meat-eating is seriously immoral, meat-eaters must either (1) believe that eating animals isn’t seriously immoral, or (2) believe that meat eating is seriously immoral (and thus they must be seriously immoral). I argued that most meat-eaters aren’t seriously immoral; rather, they lack the true belief that eating animals is seriously immoral. In particular, I argued that standard meat-eaters don’t believe that eating animals is seriously immoral because either they don’t believe that meat-eating causes serious and systematic harm to farmed animals, or they believe that meat-eating causes serious and systematic harm to farmed animals, but they don’t believe that this harm is unnecessary. Perhaps, for instance, they think that it’s necessary to factory farm animals in order to feed a growing population. In a response titled “Are Meat-Eaters Epistemically Unlucky?”, Bob Fischer presents five important objections to my epistemic theory and concludes by providing a suggestion for further thought. In what follows, I offer responses to each of Fischer’s thought-provoking objections and develop his insightful suggestion that, according to my epistemic theory, animal protectionists are victims of epistemic injustice.
Animal Studies Journal, 2020
In a recent article, Corey Wrenn argues that in order to adequately address injustices done to an... more In a recent article, Corey Wrenn argues that in order to adequately address injustices done to animals, we ought to think systemically. Her argument stems from a critique of the individualist approach I employ to resolve a moral dilemma faced by animal sanctuaries, who sometimes must harm some animals to help others. But must systemic critiques of injustice be at odds with individualist approaches? In this paper, I respond to Wrenn by showing how individualist approaches that take seriously the notion of group responsibility can be deployed to solve complicated dilemmas that are products of injustice. Contra Wrenn, I argue that to adequately address injustice, acting individually, often within groups, is significantly more important than thinking systemically.
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, 2020
A widely accepted view in epistemology is that we do not have direct control over our beliefs. An... more A widely accepted view in epistemology is that we do not have direct control over our beliefs. And we surely do not have as much control over our beliefs as we have over simple actions. For instance, you can, if offered $500, immediately throw your steak in the trash, but a meat-eater cannot, at will, start believing that eating animals is wrong to secure a $500 reward. Yet, even though we have more control over our behavior than we have over our beliefs, some of our behavior, especially moral behavior, is heavily influenced by our beliefs. Meat-eating is one example. So, if we do not have direct control over our beliefs and our beliefs influence our moral behavior, it’s no wonder meat-eaters aren’t immediately boycotting Burger King and lining up for the Beyond Burger after hearing about the mistreatment of farmed animals. So, how, or can we, inspire meat-eaters to change their beliefs regarding the moral significance of meat-eating and, consequently, their animal-eating behavior? I propose an answer to this difficult question.
College Ethics, 2020
It’s certainly wrong for employers to accept applications from only white people. Universities th... more It’s certainly wrong for employers to accept applications from only white people. Universities that open admissions to only white people surely act wrongly. But do people who date, or consider dating, only white people do something wrong? Many people say that racialized attraction is just a matter of personal preference. Against this view, it will be argued that it often constitutes wrongful discrimination.
Utilitas, 2020
In his influential article on the ethics of eating animals, Alastair Norcross argues that consume... more In his influential article on the ethics of eating animals, Alastair Norcross argues that consumers of factory raised meat and puppy torturers are equally condemnable because both knowingly cause serious harm to sentient creatures just for trivial pleasures. Against this claim, I argue that those who buy and consume factory raised meat, even those who do so knowing that they cause harm, have a partial excuse for their wrongdoings. Meat eaters act under social duress, which causes volitional impairment, and they often act from deeply ingrained habits, which causes epistemic impairment. But puppy torturers act against cultural norms and habits, consciously choosing to perform wrongful acts. Consequently, the average consumer of factory raised meat has, while puppy torturers lack, a cultural excuse. But although consumers of factory raised meat aren’t blameworthy, they are partially morally responsible for their harmful behavior – and for this, they should feel regret.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter... more Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs.
Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy , 2020
An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals (human or nonhuman) to promot... more An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals (human or nonhuman) to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it's justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research.
Philosophia, 2020
Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient e... more Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.
Acta Analytica, 2019
There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats s... more There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats should be permanently kept indoors. Against this view, I argue that cat guardians have a duty to provide their feline companions with outdoor access. The argument is based on a sophisticated hedonistic account of animal well-being that acknowledges that the performance of species-normal ethological behavior is especially pleasurable. Territorial behavior, which requires outdoor access, is a feline-normal ethological behavior, so when a cat is permanently confined to the indoors, her ability to flourish is impaired. Since cat guardians have a duty not to impair the well-being of their cats, the impairment of cat flourishing via confinement signifies a moral failing. Although some cats assume significant risks and sometimes kill wild animals when roaming outdoors, these important considerations do not imply that all cats should be deprived of the opportunity to access the outdoors. Indeed, they do not, by themselves, imply that any cat should be permanently kept indoors.
Routledge Handbook of Animal Ethics, 2019
This is a chapter written for an audience that is not intimately familiar with the philosophy of ... more This is a chapter written for an audience that is not intimately familiar with the philosophy of animal consumption. It provides an overview of the harms that animals, the environment, and humans endure as a result of industrial animal agriculture, and it concludes with a defense of ostroveganism and a tentative defense of cultured meat.
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , 2019
Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havo... more Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. But this argument works only if the following claims are true: (1) all humans have access to roadkill, (2) roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don't themselves consume it, (3) it's impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, (4) the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and (5) the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each claim is deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats.
Animals, 2019
Simple Summary: According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), "invasive" speci... more Simple Summary: According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), "invasive" species are "alien" or non-native species "whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health". On this basis, many state agencies encourage the eradication of invasive species. We argue that this constitutes wrongful discrimination against members of endangered species. Although there may well be cases where it is permissible to kill them, the reasons that these agencies provide often do not justify the killing. More importantly for our purposes, the killing is not the only injustice here. Additionally, it is wrong to categorize animals as invasive, and we show how to reach this conclusion by borrowing from Deborah Hellman's account of wrongful discrimination. Abstract: It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as "invasive". We argue that the classification of any species as "invasive" constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals-assuming that conservationists "kill equally". It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who dies.
Animal Sentience, 2019
Marino & Merskin's review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodolog... more Marino & Merskin's review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodology has some shortcomings. I describe five problems with reviewing only the academic and scientific literature and suggest how one might provide an even more compelling case for the complexity of sheep minds.
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Papers by Cheryl (C.E.) Abbate
https://animalethicsfromthemargins.com/
On this page you will find:
(1) a bibliography of articles and books, with a special focus on early career researchers who are members of historically marginalized groups,
(2) a list of seminal texts (or “classics”) about animals written by women,
(3) videos (interviews, lectures, etc.) of animal scholars from the margins, and
(4) a news section, which will be updated daily to reflect recent accomplishments (e.g., new publications) of animal ethicists from the margins.