
Luciana Samamé
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Papers by Luciana Samamé
reconoce el especismo o carnismo como un problema; incluso, más aún, la cuestión resulta invisibilizada. Desde esta constatación, planteamos argumentos a favor de la impugnación del especismo a partir de la noción de sintiencia, la cual nos impone el deber de considerar moralmente y no dañar a ningún ser con capacidad de sentir. A partir de este supuesto, avanzamos hacia el reconocimiento de que los animales no-humanos son portadores de derechos, y respetarlos es imprescindible para el “buen vivir”. Dicha tesitura podría encontrar mayor sustento en el marco de una ética medioambiental que hace lugar a los denominados "derechos de la naturaleza", cuestión a la que este trabajo hace también alusión. Para finalizar, nos detenemos en la singularidad de una escena escolar que interpretamos en clave de ideología carnista, y desde nuestros estudios sobre pedagogía de la (contra)crueldad, planteamos la necesidad de una formación docente que visibilice lógicas de crueldad instaladas en la cultura escolar, a los fines de producir transformaciones que propicien relaciones de compasión y empatía.
The aim of this paper is to support a statement that could seem problematic and even paradoxical at a first glance: the claim according to which Schopenhauer´s ethics possesses an eudaimonistic character. This claim might strike us as puzzling, given Schopenhauer´s own criticisms to eudaimonism and his sharp distinction between morality and happiness. Nevertheless, the way in which he structures his ethical system as well as his particular view on eudaimonism, allow us to interpret his theory from an eudaimonitic perspective. In my opinion, there are two strong arguments that support this interpretation, both of which can be reconstructed in the frame of Schopenhauer´s discussion of asceticism.
Abstract: " Acquired Character, Self-Control and Morality: Towards a Comprehensive View of Schopenhauerian Practical Philosophy ". Among the wide range of issues that have drawn Schopenhauer's attention, the issue of character undoubtedly plays a decisive role. In this paper, I will focus on an essential concept for his practical philosophy: the concept of " acquired character. " In Schopenhauer's view, to acquire character is a matter of prudence rather than morality. Despite of this assertion, I will attempt to challenge Schopenhauer's statement, by arguing that acquiring character actually involves moral meaning. This moral implication arises from a point of view that is internal to Schopenhauer's practical philosophy taken as a whole. Consequently, I will try to make his account consistent by appealing to his own arguments.
In this paper I will be offering a critique on recent thought about an issue within the domain of Virtue– Jurisprudence which establishes a close connection between the concepts of empathy and justice. According to this idea, a judge´s ability to impart justice is dependent on whether or not she possesses empathy. Both Michael Slote and John Deigh defend this opinion, though in different ways. Nevertheless, I think both positions are subject to criticisms. Even when it seems appropriate to incorporate a reflection on emotions within the judicial realm, it does not seem correct to incorporate the concept of empathy. I will attempt to offer reasons why this is so. After addressing these criticisms, I will suggest what could count as a promissory way of incorporating emotions in the legal sphere.
reconoce el especismo o carnismo como un problema; incluso, más aún, la cuestión resulta invisibilizada. Desde esta constatación, planteamos argumentos a favor de la impugnación del especismo a partir de la noción de sintiencia, la cual nos impone el deber de considerar moralmente y no dañar a ningún ser con capacidad de sentir. A partir de este supuesto, avanzamos hacia el reconocimiento de que los animales no-humanos son portadores de derechos, y respetarlos es imprescindible para el “buen vivir”. Dicha tesitura podría encontrar mayor sustento en el marco de una ética medioambiental que hace lugar a los denominados "derechos de la naturaleza", cuestión a la que este trabajo hace también alusión. Para finalizar, nos detenemos en la singularidad de una escena escolar que interpretamos en clave de ideología carnista, y desde nuestros estudios sobre pedagogía de la (contra)crueldad, planteamos la necesidad de una formación docente que visibilice lógicas de crueldad instaladas en la cultura escolar, a los fines de producir transformaciones que propicien relaciones de compasión y empatía.
The aim of this paper is to support a statement that could seem problematic and even paradoxical at a first glance: the claim according to which Schopenhauer´s ethics possesses an eudaimonistic character. This claim might strike us as puzzling, given Schopenhauer´s own criticisms to eudaimonism and his sharp distinction between morality and happiness. Nevertheless, the way in which he structures his ethical system as well as his particular view on eudaimonism, allow us to interpret his theory from an eudaimonitic perspective. In my opinion, there are two strong arguments that support this interpretation, both of which can be reconstructed in the frame of Schopenhauer´s discussion of asceticism.
Abstract: " Acquired Character, Self-Control and Morality: Towards a Comprehensive View of Schopenhauerian Practical Philosophy ". Among the wide range of issues that have drawn Schopenhauer's attention, the issue of character undoubtedly plays a decisive role. In this paper, I will focus on an essential concept for his practical philosophy: the concept of " acquired character. " In Schopenhauer's view, to acquire character is a matter of prudence rather than morality. Despite of this assertion, I will attempt to challenge Schopenhauer's statement, by arguing that acquiring character actually involves moral meaning. This moral implication arises from a point of view that is internal to Schopenhauer's practical philosophy taken as a whole. Consequently, I will try to make his account consistent by appealing to his own arguments.
In this paper I will be offering a critique on recent thought about an issue within the domain of Virtue– Jurisprudence which establishes a close connection between the concepts of empathy and justice. According to this idea, a judge´s ability to impart justice is dependent on whether or not she possesses empathy. Both Michael Slote and John Deigh defend this opinion, though in different ways. Nevertheless, I think both positions are subject to criticisms. Even when it seems appropriate to incorporate a reflection on emotions within the judicial realm, it does not seem correct to incorporate the concept of empathy. I will attempt to offer reasons why this is so. After addressing these criticisms, I will suggest what could count as a promissory way of incorporating emotions in the legal sphere.
de importancia que no haya dedicado parte de sus esfuerzos
a pensar distintos aspectos de esta rama de la filosofía. La
posibilidad de concebir hechos morales objetivos, la incidencia de las perspectivas naturalistas en el razonamiento
moral, la dimensión metafísica de la moral son solo algunos
de los tantos temas que demandan un ámbito de reflexión
específico en el que convergen, junto con la ética, áreas de
la filosofía tales como la filosofía del lenguaje, la metafísica,
la epistemología, e incluso la psicología moral. Estos cruces
constituyen el ámbito propio de la metaética, rama de la
ética contemporánea que ha experimentado un gran crecimiento en los últimos años y que convoca la atención de
algunos de los más relevantes especialistas de la filosofía
moral de la actualidad.
Aunque importante en el panorama de las discusiones
filosóficas, la metaética todavía no ha tenido, en nuestro
medio, la atención que merece.
La metaética puesta a punto pretende contribuir a saldar
esta deuda al poner a disposición del público de habla hispana el tratamiento de algunos de los temas de esta área del
pensamiento ético. Los capítulos que lo componen se
dirigen a estudiantes e investigadores en el área de las
humanidades interesados en la discusión moral y los cruces
que pueden surgir a partir de ella.