Gestures Approaches, Uses, and Developments, edited by Bella, Ferrucci, Maddalena, Santarelli, 2024
In this chapter, I wish to draw scholars’attention to Frank Lorimer, amuch overlooked figure with... more In this chapter, I wish to draw scholars’attention to Frank Lorimer, amuch overlooked figure within Pragmatism, by arguing that he provided an in-sightful contribution to the“naturalism of continuity with difference”supportedby Dewey (Bernstein 2020). Lorimer suggested a continuistic account of the ori-gins of human reason out of previous forms of organic intelligence through thetransformation of the latter brought about by the development of human lan-guage. Secondly, he worked out a naturalistic interpretation of language develop-ment, primarily from an ontogenetic point of view. Particularly insightful are hisconception of organic intelligence, his idea of a primarily affective-aesthetic fab-ric of speech, his thesis about the birth of nomination out of the continuous flowof speech, and the claim that grammar and logic are ultimately grounded in thestructures of organic life within a given environment and continue to developwithin a symbolic and socially shared medium. Such suggestions prove to be stillrelevant in the current philosophical debate on naturalism, the intertwining ofexperience and language in the human world, and the specificities of human cog-nition with reference to other forms of sense-making.
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Papers by Roberta DREON
uninteressiert/Interesselosigkeit; Sp. desinteressado/desinterés. The concept of “aesthetic
disinterest” first emerged in the eighteenth century with the rise of aesthetics as an autonomous
discipline. It is generally regarded as a distinctive feature characterizing the aesthetic attitude
toward natural and/or artistic beauty, i.e. a kind of aesthetic experience involving peculiar
features and differing from ordinary kinds of experience. Hence, the negative prefix (di-/de-/un-)
or the privative proposition (without, ohne, senza) plays a structural role in defining the aesthetic
by distinguishing it from other experiential dimensions. As such, “aesthetic disinterest” includes a
variety of meanings, depending on the background (cognitive, practical, or moral) from which it is
seen to stand out: it can involve a kind of attention focused on the mere form of the object,
independently from the cognitive content included within the concept; it can mean an attitude
excluding any practical concern; it can imply the absence of moral concern and the idea that
aesthetic pleasure cannot be assessed through ethical criteria. The term does not usually involve
significant references to any kind of altruistic action or practice, although it does entail a
disregard for private reasons in appreciating an object. Frequently, it overlaps or is strictly
associated with similar concepts, such as “aesthetic distance”, “detachment”, “abstraction”, and
“contemplation”, and is opposed to “utility” and “purposiveness”.
the word “aesthetic” or “esthetic” in Dewey and James,
highlighting the continuity between Dewey’s interpretation of the “esthetic” and James’s uses of the term. More
importantly, the paper defends the claim that both philosophers attributed a basically naturalistic meaning to
“aesthetic/esthetic”: Dewey saw experience as basically
esthetically or qualitatively characterized, insofar it is
connected to the biological conditions of life in an environment that directly affects the very existence of organisms. James primarily used the term “aesthetic” in connection to pain and pleasure, i.e., to refer to a living being’s
physiological predisposition to feel and select certain
features of the surrounding world, by assuming specific
attitudes toward given situations. Moreover, both authors
conceived of the aesthetic in a narrower sense, i.e., in
relation to the arts, as the development, enhancement or
refinement of the naturally aesthetic features of human
experience, denying any a priori distinction between the
two spheres.
After clarifying the meanings of the word “esthetic” in
Dewey’s work in relation to his theory of experience and
aesthetic qualities, the paper explores the uses of the
word “aesthetic” in James’s texts, particularly with reference to his theory of temperament and his conception of
emotions. The last section focuses on the influence exercised on James’s vocabulary by the work of Alexander Bain
and suggests the risky yet plausible hypothesis that Edmund Burke’s physiological aesthetics may have played a
role in the way James approached the word, although the
term “aesthetic” is missing in Burke’s text.
The first part of this paper will explore the different meanings of the term as it is used within the debate on environmental aesthetics, either in support of or against the adoption of a disinterested attitude toward the environment. I will suggest drawing a distinction between an ontological meaning of aesthetic interest and the idea of engagement as fully embodied and embedded perception, which is to say between a strong and a weak conception of aesthetic engagement within the debate.
In the second part, I will defend two claims: firstly, the term ‘interest’ has many meanings, including not only negative meanings—primarily self-interest and instrumentalism—but also positive ones—being involved and engaged in something, taking care of and feeling responsible for something. Hence, we should distinguish between different interests at stake, instead of assuming a (quasi)transcendental point of view, conceived of as allegedly immune to any interest. Secondly, we should develop an anthropological theory of interest, by connecting it to a conception of sensibility as the constitutive exposure to an environment characterizing organic beings, and by taking into account the feedback actions on human interests elicited by the specific linguistic-cultural structure of the human niche.
the Pragmatists’ approach to the continuity between language and experience in the
human world as a concept that can provide a significant contribution to the current
debate within Enactivism. The first part of the paper explores some new conceptual
tools recently developed by enactivist scholarship, namely linguistic bodies, enlanguaged
affordances, and languaging. In the second part, the notion of enlanguaged
experience is introduced as involving two main interrelated ideas. The first is the
idea that human experience is contingently, yet irreversibly, embedded from each
person’s birth within contexts made up of linguistic practices that contribute to continuously
redefining what happens. Consequently, the development of individuals’
motor, perceptual, affective, selective, and cognitive capacities does not take place
in a silent vacuum, but in a context of linguistic practices that are already there: such
practices already operate in, and are shared by, the human groups in which individuals
begin their experiences. The second key idea is that enlanguaged experience
implies the claim that humans primarily meet language as part of their experience of
the world, rather than as an independent system of words and grammar. In the third
part of the paper, I argue that the conception of human experience as enlanguaged
can fruitfully contribute to the enactivist debate, particularly with reference to three
main points: firstly, the idea of a circular continuity, which is to say the claim that
the advent of language in human life caused a re-configuration of previously existing
forms of sensibility both ontogenetically and phylogenetically; secondly, an ecological
view of language, according to which humans find themselves embedded in
already operating linguistic practices and habits that are a constitutive part of their
naturally social world; and, thirdly, a richer view of language “in the wild”, capable
of retrieving the qualitative, affective, or aesthetic components of human enlanguaged
experience.
Roberta Dreon's Lectures at the ENS Paris/Translitterae - Republique des Savoirs organized by Mathias Girel
- 11 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 17 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle de Conférence, 46 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 25 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 1er juin 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
uninteressiert/Interesselosigkeit; Sp. desinteressado/desinterés. The concept of “aesthetic
disinterest” first emerged in the eighteenth century with the rise of aesthetics as an autonomous
discipline. It is generally regarded as a distinctive feature characterizing the aesthetic attitude
toward natural and/or artistic beauty, i.e. a kind of aesthetic experience involving peculiar
features and differing from ordinary kinds of experience. Hence, the negative prefix (di-/de-/un-)
or the privative proposition (without, ohne, senza) plays a structural role in defining the aesthetic
by distinguishing it from other experiential dimensions. As such, “aesthetic disinterest” includes a
variety of meanings, depending on the background (cognitive, practical, or moral) from which it is
seen to stand out: it can involve a kind of attention focused on the mere form of the object,
independently from the cognitive content included within the concept; it can mean an attitude
excluding any practical concern; it can imply the absence of moral concern and the idea that
aesthetic pleasure cannot be assessed through ethical criteria. The term does not usually involve
significant references to any kind of altruistic action or practice, although it does entail a
disregard for private reasons in appreciating an object. Frequently, it overlaps or is strictly
associated with similar concepts, such as “aesthetic distance”, “detachment”, “abstraction”, and
“contemplation”, and is opposed to “utility” and “purposiveness”.
the word “aesthetic” or “esthetic” in Dewey and James,
highlighting the continuity between Dewey’s interpretation of the “esthetic” and James’s uses of the term. More
importantly, the paper defends the claim that both philosophers attributed a basically naturalistic meaning to
“aesthetic/esthetic”: Dewey saw experience as basically
esthetically or qualitatively characterized, insofar it is
connected to the biological conditions of life in an environment that directly affects the very existence of organisms. James primarily used the term “aesthetic” in connection to pain and pleasure, i.e., to refer to a living being’s
physiological predisposition to feel and select certain
features of the surrounding world, by assuming specific
attitudes toward given situations. Moreover, both authors
conceived of the aesthetic in a narrower sense, i.e., in
relation to the arts, as the development, enhancement or
refinement of the naturally aesthetic features of human
experience, denying any a priori distinction between the
two spheres.
After clarifying the meanings of the word “esthetic” in
Dewey’s work in relation to his theory of experience and
aesthetic qualities, the paper explores the uses of the
word “aesthetic” in James’s texts, particularly with reference to his theory of temperament and his conception of
emotions. The last section focuses on the influence exercised on James’s vocabulary by the work of Alexander Bain
and suggests the risky yet plausible hypothesis that Edmund Burke’s physiological aesthetics may have played a
role in the way James approached the word, although the
term “aesthetic” is missing in Burke’s text.
The first part of this paper will explore the different meanings of the term as it is used within the debate on environmental aesthetics, either in support of or against the adoption of a disinterested attitude toward the environment. I will suggest drawing a distinction between an ontological meaning of aesthetic interest and the idea of engagement as fully embodied and embedded perception, which is to say between a strong and a weak conception of aesthetic engagement within the debate.
In the second part, I will defend two claims: firstly, the term ‘interest’ has many meanings, including not only negative meanings—primarily self-interest and instrumentalism—but also positive ones—being involved and engaged in something, taking care of and feeling responsible for something. Hence, we should distinguish between different interests at stake, instead of assuming a (quasi)transcendental point of view, conceived of as allegedly immune to any interest. Secondly, we should develop an anthropological theory of interest, by connecting it to a conception of sensibility as the constitutive exposure to an environment characterizing organic beings, and by taking into account the feedback actions on human interests elicited by the specific linguistic-cultural structure of the human niche.
the Pragmatists’ approach to the continuity between language and experience in the
human world as a concept that can provide a significant contribution to the current
debate within Enactivism. The first part of the paper explores some new conceptual
tools recently developed by enactivist scholarship, namely linguistic bodies, enlanguaged
affordances, and languaging. In the second part, the notion of enlanguaged
experience is introduced as involving two main interrelated ideas. The first is the
idea that human experience is contingently, yet irreversibly, embedded from each
person’s birth within contexts made up of linguistic practices that contribute to continuously
redefining what happens. Consequently, the development of individuals’
motor, perceptual, affective, selective, and cognitive capacities does not take place
in a silent vacuum, but in a context of linguistic practices that are already there: such
practices already operate in, and are shared by, the human groups in which individuals
begin their experiences. The second key idea is that enlanguaged experience
implies the claim that humans primarily meet language as part of their experience of
the world, rather than as an independent system of words and grammar. In the third
part of the paper, I argue that the conception of human experience as enlanguaged
can fruitfully contribute to the enactivist debate, particularly with reference to three
main points: firstly, the idea of a circular continuity, which is to say the claim that
the advent of language in human life caused a re-configuration of previously existing
forms of sensibility both ontogenetically and phylogenetically; secondly, an ecological
view of language, according to which humans find themselves embedded in
already operating linguistic practices and habits that are a constitutive part of their
naturally social world; and, thirdly, a richer view of language “in the wild”, capable
of retrieving the qualitative, affective, or aesthetic components of human enlanguaged
experience.
Roberta Dreon's Lectures at the ENS Paris/Translitterae - Republique des Savoirs organized by Mathias Girel
- 11 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 17 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle de Conférence, 46 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 25 mai 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
- 1er juin 2023, 14-16h, Salle des Résistants, ENS, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris 5e
Summary
The first work to offer a comprehensive pragmatist anthropology focusing on sensibility, habits, and human experience as contingently yet irreversibly enlanguaged.
Human Landscapes works out a pragmatist anthropology which the Classical Pragmatists never put together in a comprehensive form—despite the many insights on the topic to be found in Dewey's, James's, and Mead's texts. Roberta Dreon retrieves and develops this material in its astonishing modernity concerning current debates on the mind as embodied and enacted, philosophy of the emotions, social theory, and studies about the origins of human language. By assuming a basic continuity between natural developments and human culture, this text highlights the qualitative, pre-personal, habitual features of human experience constituting the background to rational decision-making, normativity, and reflection. The book rests on three pillars: a reconceptualization of sensibility as a function of life, rather than as a primarily cognitive faculty; a focus on habits, understood as pervasive features of human behaviors acquired by attuning to the social environment; and an interpretation of human experience as "enlanguaged," namely as contingently yet irreversibly embedded in a linguistic environment that has important loop effects on human sensibility and habitual conduct.
"Human Landscapes offers a novel pragmatist version of philosophical anthropology that has much to say about contemporary issues, including issues pertaining to embodied-enactive philosophy." — Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis
"Stylistic fluency and both theoretical and historiographical thoroughness make this book quite important for the advancement of the current debate on human sensibility. The pragmatist point of view intersects with cognitive psychology and neuroscience, offering the map of a new philosophical anthropology that escapes inveterate dichotomies such as those of objective-subjective, natural-cultural, qualitative-quantitative, and cognitive-affective." — Rosa Calcaterra, Roma Tre University
Roberta Dreon is Associate Professor of Aesthetics at Ca' Foscari University in Italy.
Workshop dottorale "Le varietà del naturalismo".
14-15 marzo 2018.