Papers by Alessandra Melas
In Le Hasard et La Nécessité, one of the most influential books in the story of Biology, Jacques ... more In Le Hasard et La Nécessité, one of the most influential books in the story of Biology, Jacques Monod presents his non-teleological evolutionary biological theory. Starting from the ideawhich someone ascribes to Democritusthat everything existing in the Universe is the fruit of chance and necessity, Monod maintains that each alteration in the DNA happens by chance. Hence, chanceaccording to Monodis the origin of every novelty happening in the biosphere, and then the driving force of the evolution. But which conception of chance is at the core of Monod's non-teleological theory? According to Monod, chance events are the result of the intersection between different processes that belong to independent causal chains. These accidental events are called "absolute coincidences". Despite its importance, this coincidental notion of chance is quite neglected in contemporary literature and it seems to eschew a precise definition. This study takes into proper consideration this conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, the main attempt of this survey is to endorse the idea that Monod's coincidental notion of chance is ontic, that is it does not depend only on our practical impossibility to have a complete knowledge about the phenomena observed. A central role in the discussion will be given to the independence between the intersecting causal chains, which is at the centre of this conception of chance. As I will show, the typology of the independence plays an important part in providing a distinction between an ontic notion of coincidences and a methodological one.
Axiomathes, 2017
According to Antoine Augustine Cournot, chance events are the result of the intersection between ... more According to Antoine Augustine Cournot, chance events are the result of the intersection between independent causal chains. This coincidental notion of chance is not a new one, but-as Cournot remarks-it comes from Saint Thomas Aquinas, Boethius, and more probably from Jean de La Placette. Such a conception of chance phenomena seems to be very important, not only because it is closely related to the Principle of Causality, but also since it grounds Cournot's theory of objective probability. Starting from Martin's work (Probabilités et Critique Philosophique selon Cournot. Vrin, Paris, 1996), the main attempt of this survey is to endorse the idea that Cournot's coincidental notion of hasard is objective, that is it is ontic (i.e. it comes from some real feature of the world) and it does not dependin some sense-on our degree of knowledge. In order to do that, a central role in the discussion will be given to the meaning of the independence between the intersecting causal chains and to Cournot's conception of causation.
In Le Hasard et La Nécessité, one of the most influential books in the story of Biology, Jacques ... more In Le Hasard et La Nécessité, one of the most influential books in the story of Biology, Jacques Monod presents his non-teleological evolutionary biological theory. Starting from the idea – which someone ascribes to Democritus – that everything existing in the Universe is the fruit of chance and necessity, Monod maintains that each alteration in the DNA happens by chance. Hence, chance – according to Monod – is the origin of every novelty happening in the biosphere, and then the driving force of the evolution. But which conception of chance is at the core of Monod's non-teleological theory? According to Monod, chance events are the result of the intersection between different processes that belong to independent causal chains. These accidental events are called “absolute coincidences”. Despite its importance, this coincidental notion of chance is quite neglected in contemporary literature and it seems to eschew a precise definition. This study takes into proper consideration thi...
Axiomathes, Sep 17, 2020
It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, accor... more It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called ''coincidences.'' The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré's view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by ''epistemic'' we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations, relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite-for example-Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod's view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable.
Axiomathes, 2020
It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, accor... more It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences.” The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré’s view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by “epistemic” we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations, relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of t...
According to a particular view, chance events are not uncaused but they are simply the result of ... more According to a particular view, chance events are not uncaused but they are simply the result of intersecting causal lines. More precisely, the intersections between different processes that belong to independent causal chains are the origin of accidental events, called absolute coincidences. This paper provides a new account devoted to showing the strong relation between absolute coincidences and Salmon's interactive fork criterion, in an attempt to endorse the idea that coincidences can be shaped in terms of a causal model.
Axiomathes, 2022
It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, accor... more It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called ''coincidences.'' The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré's view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by ''epistemic'' we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations , relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite-for example-Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod's view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable.
Mathesis. Dialogo tra saperi, 2017
Axiomathes, 2017
According to Antoine Augustine Cournot, chance events are the result of the intersection between ... more According to Antoine Augustine Cournot, chance events are the result of the intersection between independent causal chains. This coincidental notion of chance is not a new one, but—as Cournot remarks—it comes from Saint Thomas Aquinas, Boethius, and more probably from Jean de La Placette. Such a conception of chance phenomena seems to be very important, not only because it is closely related to the Principle of Causality, but also since it grounds Cournot’s theory of objective probability. Starting from Martin’s work (Probabilités et Critique Philosophique selon Cournot. Vrin, Paris, 1996), the main attempt of this survey is to endorse the idea that Cournot’s coincidental notion of hasard is objective, that is it is ontic (i.e. it comes from some real feature of the world) and it does not depend—in some sense—on our degree of knowledge. In order to do that, a central role in the discussion will be given to the meaning of the independence between the intersecting causal chains and to Cournot’s conception of causation.
According to a particular view, chance events are not uncaused but they are simply the result of ... more According to a particular view, chance events are not uncaused but they are simply the result of intersecting causal lines. More precisely, the intersections between different processes that belong to independent causal chains are the origin of accidental events, called absolute coincidences. This paper provides a new account devoted to showing the strong relation between absolute coincidences and Salmon's interactive fork criterion, in an attempt to endorse the idea that coincidences can be shaped in terms of a causal model.
Chapter in a book by Alessandra Melas
Editings by Alessandra Melas
Alessandra Melas, 2020
A cura di ALESSANDRA MELAS
Talks by Alessandra Melas
rom the depths of the Mediterranean Sea comes philosopher Alessandra Melas with an exuberant riff... more rom the depths of the Mediterranean Sea comes philosopher Alessandra Melas with an exuberant riff on the fundamental elements of coincidences. What is real? How does your mind operate on the two independent event lines intersecting? What emotions are evoked in you? How is the coincidence relevant to you? What meanings do you extract? Join us in this delightful interchange!
Alessandra Melas, 2019
Interview for the programme "Connecting with Coincidences, with Dr. Bernie Beitman MD".
Books by Alessandra Melas
It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, accor... more It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences”. Firstly, this book explores this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. Such a view has been defended by authors like Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod. Second, a relevant alternative is provided by those accounts that, instead of acknowledging an intersection among causal lines, claim to track coincidences back to some common cause. Third, starting from Herbert Hart and Anthony Honoré’s view of coincidences (Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959). This book provides a more detailed account of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, which is the intersection between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects, including but not limited to, access to information, expectations, relevance, significance, desires, which in turn are psychological aspects.
The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. This book aims to introduce and discuss recent work in psychology concerning one’s judgment about coincidences; this data offers further materials and reasons to reflect upon our understanding of coincidences and to refine our hybrid conception.
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Papers by Alessandra Melas
Chapter in a book by Alessandra Melas
Editings by Alessandra Melas
Talks by Alessandra Melas
Books by Alessandra Melas
The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. This book aims to introduce and discuss recent work in psychology concerning one’s judgment about coincidences; this data offers further materials and reasons to reflect upon our understanding of coincidences and to refine our hybrid conception.
The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. This book aims to introduce and discuss recent work in psychology concerning one’s judgment about coincidences; this data offers further materials and reasons to reflect upon our understanding of coincidences and to refine our hybrid conception.