Papers by Francesca Forlè
Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019
In this paper, I will focus on the process of constitution of oneself as an embodied being and, m... more In this paper, I will focus on the process of constitution of oneself as an embodied being and, more precisely, on the specific way in which one can experience oneself not just as an embodied self, but rather as the actual embodied person he/she is. I will start by describing the most basic way in which our embodied self is constituted, that is as a felt-feeling body and as the zero-point of orientation of all our sensations and perceptions. Then, I will show how our body can be constituted for us also as an instrument for action, leading to the experience of what Husserl called "I-can" (Husserl 1952, 159-160). I will argue that, even though in this latter form of body awareness we can experience some traits of our own personality, a further dimension of our embodied life - that is, the expressive one - allows us to have a more defined experience of the specific embodied persons we are. I will describe what "person" specifically means in my framework and, on this basis, I will show how the expressive dimension of our body can account for my experience of myself not just as an embodied self, but as the embodied person I am.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2019
In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition (DP), foc... more In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition (DP), focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least some mental states of others through their bodily expressions. I will investigate the way we should consider expressions and their relations to mental phenomena in order to defend DP. In order to do so, I will present Krueger and Overgaard’s idea of expressions as constitutive proper parts of the mental phenomena expressed and I will show how this position can support DP. Then, I will present the way in which the authors seem to construe the relation of parthood between expressions and mental states – that is in terms of components (or, pieces, as I will argue) of integral wholes, and I will introduce the possible issues that derive from this strategy. I will propose a different way to understand this parthood relation, referring to Husserl’s notion of moments as distinct from that of pieces (Husserl 1900-1901). I will narrow my analysis to expressions of feelings, and I will try to argue that they can be described more aptly as moments of the feelings expressed. Finally, I will show how this account can support DP.
Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2019
This paper deals with phenomenological distinctions concerning empathy with real persons and empa... more This paper deals with phenomenological distinctions concerning empathy with real persons and empathy with fictional characters.
We will introduce both contemporary accounts of our perception of others and Edith Stein’s account of empathy. These theories will turn out to be fruitful in defending our main thesis, i.e. that the differences between empathy with real people and empathy with fictional characters are not structural but just qualitative. We will argue that in both cases empathy is a direct act of perceiving others and their lived experience. However, stemming from Stein’s work, we will underline that empathy with real persons is in principio more vivid and intense than empathy with fictional characters.
In order to identify similarities and differences between empathy de vivo and empathy in fiction, we will focus on the following issues: the quality of perception; the motivational context and the “life-world context”; the ontological status of persons vs. characters.
Urge for Engagement: Conditions of social change, 2019
Phenomenology and Mind, 2018
Being a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools deals with aesthetic experience as a crucial ob... more Being a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools deals with aesthetic experience as a crucial object of inquiry. Indeed, it offers several interesting insights into what aesthetic experience is and how we should (or should not) account for it. However, some aspects of Noë's analysis raise questions, both about the act and about the object of aesthetic experience itself. In this paper, I will discuss these issues highlighting a potential conflict in the author's analysis of aesthetic experience and providing some hints about the objective correlate of such an experience. keywords aesthetic experience, enactive perception, tertiary qualities
Rivista di Estetica, 2017
In this paper, I will try to integrate Joel Krueger's enactive theory of music perception with so... more In this paper, I will try to integrate Joel Krueger's enactive theory of music perception with some of Erwin Straus' reflections on different forms of experiencing spatiality and movement. maintains that music perception is a form of active perception, in which our body and our ability to move with music act as vehicles to draw out certain features of the piece and to respond to the affordances it presents. However, the author does not specify what kind of movements are involved in the enactment of music perception. I will propose such a specification, using Straus' distinction between goal-directed and expressive movements (Straus 1930).
Quaderni della Ginestra, 2017
delle esperienze più comuni è quella di essere fisicamente coinvolti dal brano che stiamo ascolta... more delle esperienze più comuni è quella di essere fisicamente coinvolti dal brano che stiamo ascoltando. Possiamo ovviamente esserlo in grado maggiore o minore: possiamo battere distrattamente il tempo, ma possiamo anche lasciarci trasportare in una danza vorticosa, in un continuum di livelli di coinvolgimento.
Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2016
In this paper I shall attempt to give an enactive account of the dynamic qualities of music. Star... more In this paper I shall attempt to give an enactive account of the dynamic qualities of music. Starting from Krueger's account of musical experience, I will highlight how music's qualities of movement are constituted in the horizon of an embodied consciousness -that is, an embodied subject who can virtually or actually bodily entrain with music and then follow the musical profile. I will argue that the common rythmòs-structure of both music and movement makes such an enactive constitution possible. In this sense, the perception of music's rythmòs -that is, the perception of its teleological tendency -will turn out to be the condition of possibility for the enaction of music dynamic qualities. But if so, music's quality of being teleologically-structured will remain unexplained by the discussed enactive account and will need another description of how it is constituted in the horizon of consciousness.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 2015
When it comes to the debate about the constitutive, supervenience basis for cognition and cogniti... more When it comes to the debate about the constitutive, supervenience basis for cognition and cognitive processes, two theoretical positions are often opposed to each other. The first is the intracranialist one, exemplified by Adams and Aizawa's idea that cognition has its supervenience basis just within the boundaries of the brain. The second is the transcranialist one, exemplified by Noë's and Clark and Chalmers's theses that the constitutive basis of cognition and the mind can span the brain, the body and the environment. In this paper, I want to maintain that Adams and Aizawa's main intracranialist argument against transcranialism does not hold. In this sense, the authors do not go any step further towards intracranialism and against transcranialism.
Phenomenology and Mind, 2013
What does it mean to say that a particular melody is cheerful rather than melancholic, or that a ... more What does it mean to say that a particular melody is cheerful rather than melancholic, or that a musical rhythm is anxious and nervous rather than peaceful and calm? Which kind of qualities are these? In this paper we will give an overview of musical expressive qualities, trying on the one hand to describe them as tertiary or value-qualities and, on the other, to understand their expressiveness by means of a phenomenological analysis of rhythm and rhythm perception.
Phenomenology and Mind, 2013
What we see depends on how we move.
Books by Francesca Forlè
FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2017
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Papers by Francesca Forlè
We will introduce both contemporary accounts of our perception of others and Edith Stein’s account of empathy. These theories will turn out to be fruitful in defending our main thesis, i.e. that the differences between empathy with real people and empathy with fictional characters are not structural but just qualitative. We will argue that in both cases empathy is a direct act of perceiving others and their lived experience. However, stemming from Stein’s work, we will underline that empathy with real persons is in principio more vivid and intense than empathy with fictional characters.
In order to identify similarities and differences between empathy de vivo and empathy in fiction, we will focus on the following issues: the quality of perception; the motivational context and the “life-world context”; the ontological status of persons vs. characters.
Books by Francesca Forlè
We will introduce both contemporary accounts of our perception of others and Edith Stein’s account of empathy. These theories will turn out to be fruitful in defending our main thesis, i.e. that the differences between empathy with real people and empathy with fictional characters are not structural but just qualitative. We will argue that in both cases empathy is a direct act of perceiving others and their lived experience. However, stemming from Stein’s work, we will underline that empathy with real persons is in principio more vivid and intense than empathy with fictional characters.
In order to identify similarities and differences between empathy de vivo and empathy in fiction, we will focus on the following issues: the quality of perception; the motivational context and the “life-world context”; the ontological status of persons vs. characters.