Papers by Matteo Morganti
Foundations of Physics
In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological c... more In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.
Th is paper looks at quantum theory and the Standard Model of elementary particles with a view to... more Th is paper looks at quantum theory and the Standard Model of elementary particles with a view to suggesting a detailed empirical implementation of trope ontology in harmony with our best physics.
Lebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience, 2014
This essay aims to discuss a potential conflict between two intuitions about material objects: a ... more This essay aims to discuss a potential conflict between two intuitions about material objects: a 'pluralist' one, according to which every object belongs (or may belong) to more than one kind, and a 'reductionist' one, according to which there is only one fundamental type of things, i.e., material things. The former view threatens to translate a merely subjective matter of fact into an ontological fact, while the latter naturally leads to an outdated form of physicalism. What then? How to satisfy both the request for a precise ontology and the need to make sense of the richness of our experience of things? The paper reconstructs the general structure of the issue, and explores two ways of solving it via the formulation of an intermediate view.
Philosophy in review, 2009
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philo... more This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling...
Philosophy Compass, 2020
This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosoph... more This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label ‘fundamental physics’ should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory should be considered fundamental; (4) what should be regarded as fundamental according to particular theories of physics; and (5) what indications come from contemporary physics concerning the fundamental structure of reality.
Einstein vs. Bergson, 2021
This paper discusses the view according to which time is not an objectivefeature of reality,i nde... more This paper discusses the view according to which time is not an objectivefeature of reality,i ndependent of the knowing subject. Rather than attemptingt op rovide an exhaustive historical reconstruction of the debate concerning the (un)reality of time, we will proceed by looking at two paradigmatic and rather different arguments to the effect that time is an illusion: awell-known, purelyphilosophical argument due to McTaggart,and an argument (or,m aybe better,afamilyof considerations) comingf rom contemporary research in physics,i np articular quantum gravity.I nteresting common aspects will be emphasized and, in closing,af ew more general considerations will be made.¹ 1I ntroduction One of the keyfeatures of our commonsense perception of the world is no doubt its being temporal. It seems simply obvious to anyone that time passes, and that everything is affected by this.² Similarly,p hilosophersa nd scientists alike often take for granted the existenceoftime, at least as long as they inquireinto other aspectso ft he world. However,u pon reflection, it turns out that it is not at all obvious thatt ime is an objective feature of reality,i ndependent of the knowing subject. Indeed, arguments have been provided by both philosophers and physicists in favorofantirealism about time,i.e., the thesis that time is an illusion, a mere by-product of our experienceo fat imeless reality.While there are several such arguments in the literature,h ere we willd iscuss in some detail two of them: one due to the British idealist philosopher John McTaggart,t he other based on very recent research in physics,a nd formulatedi naparticularlyp erspicuous wayb yp hysicist Julian Barbour.The rationale behind this is twofold. On the one hand,proceeding in this waymakes it possible to see that antirealism The author gratefullyacknowledgest he financial support receivedb yt he MIUR,I talian Ministry of Education, University and Research, throughthe PRIN 2017 project "The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image"-grant number 2017ZNWW7F. It also appears undisputable that thereisanobjective,globaldistinction between whatispresent and what is futureo rp ast,b ut this is not the issue that interests us here.
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2019
The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to wh... more The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both (a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and (b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between (a) and (b) can be neutralized.
Synthese, 2019
In this paper, it is argued that Aristotelian hylomorphism can supply a useful and informative ac... more In this paper, it is argued that Aristotelian hylomorphism can supply a useful and informative account of composite entities as these are described by physical theory. In particular, a hylomorphic account of quantum entangled systems is defined in detail, and compared to other alternatives currently on offer-in particular, ontic structural realism. In closing, it is suggested that the view of entanglement outlined here meshes well with a recently proposed 'coherentist' conception.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018
We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled... more We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated. 1Introduction2Quantum Dependence 2.1From entanglement to dependence2.2Relations of dependence3Structuralism and Holism4Against Structuralism5Against Holism6Coherentism 6.1Coherentism: The account6.2Coherentism: The best of both worlds?7Conclusion
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018
This paper explores alternatives to metaphysical foundationalism, the view that grounding relatio... more This paper explores alternatives to metaphysical foundationalism, the view that grounding relations determine vertical chains that terminate in something fundamental and ungrounded. Rather than offering an exhaustive taxonomy or wide-ranging claims about metaphysical structure per se, the goal is to offer an initial investigation of non-conventional models of the metaphysical architecture of reality. Examples are provided with a view to illustrating that, and how, physics may avail itself of both ‘infinitist’ and ‘coherentist’ models—the former dropping the idea of a fundamental level, the latter abandoning the view that the world must have a hierarchical structure.
Istituto Lombardo - Accademia di Scienze e Lettere - Incontri di Studio, 2019
In the present paper, I aim to point out the shortcomings of those rather popular ‘radical’ natur... more In the present paper, I aim to point out the shortcomings of those rather popular ‘radical’ naturalistic approaches to philosophy (especially metaphysics) according to which the latter can either be made dependent on, or altogether eliminated in favour of, science (especially physics). Based on a case study concerning the ontology of quantum entities, I will argue that – since metaphysical and scientific hypotheses are equally underdetermined by the empirical data – a moderate naturalistic approach is preferable, whereby metaphysics and physics are to be intended as complementary activities.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2018
The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, sy... more The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental-especially in quantum physics-are best understood not in terms of physical relations being fundamental, but rather in terms of 'metaphysical coherentism'-the view according to which object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The coherentist perspective is developed in some detail and contrasted with extant varieties of structuralism and holism.
Theoria, 2017
The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison bet... more The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literaturein particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons.
Philosophy, 2016
This paper examines the discussion concerning temporal vacua, originated by Shoemaker's famou... more This paper examines the discussion concerning temporal vacua, originated by Shoemaker's famous 1969 paper, in connection to relationism about time – roughly, the view that time is nothing over and above a network of relations between things. A novel solution to the problem allegedly constituted by temporal vacua is presented, which turns out to call for, and support, a formulation of relationism that differs from the usual ones. In particular, it is argued that relationism requires neither actual nor merely possible modifications in the qualities or positions of things, and can be made entirely independent of the notion of change.
Synthese, 2016
The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-defla... more The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.
In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes an allegedly new way of conceiving of individuatio... more In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes an allegedly new way of conceiving of individuation in the context of the bundle theory of object constitution. He suggests that allowing for distance relations to individuate objects solves the problems with worlds containing indiscernible objects that would otherwise affect the theory. The aim of the present paper is i) To show that Demirli"s proposal falls short of achieving this goal and ii) To carry out a more general critical assessment of the issue by appraising the costs and benefits of Demirli"s view as well as of existing alternatives.
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Papers by Matteo Morganti