Department of Political Sciences

This article argues that voters of the Italian Lega Nord have been radicalized in recent years, shifting from an intermediate ‘centrist’ position to the extreme right. Data from both national and European mass surveys (e.g. Italian National Election Studies and European Electoral Studies) provide additional support for this shift from left to right and the accompanying changes in criteria (i.e. immigration, democracy, civil rights, European integration, and politics), indicating that Lega Nord voters have evolved into a body that fits the new extreme-right concept well.

France and Portugal have the same form of semi-presidential government. Even though the powers of their respective presidents and their political systems have been extensively investigated, the literature on the role of government operations is less comprehensive. This article analyses the organization of the government, focusing on how semi-presidential governments function and highlighting the recruitment and background of ministers, as well as the role of the president and prime minister. Semi-presidential governments function differently according to the degree of concordance between the presidential and the parliamentary majorities -in other words, whether or not there is cohabitation. The organization of government can be hierarchical or collegial, depending on the balance of power between the two heads of the executive.

Sebastián Piñera's presidential victory marks the end of the institutional transition process that began in 1989, and the electoral alternation clearly demonstrates that the Chilean democracy has matured. Nevertheless, some systematic problems still persist, for example the term limits on incumbent presidents from seeking another term arguably deprives citizens the right to re-elect an esteemed president. Moreover, the presidential and congressional majorities from different coalitions remain the distinctive feature of Chilean political and institutional system. The binominal electoral system significantly reduces the possibility of minor parties to be represented in Parliament, yet at the same time, the bipolar system is greatly weakened by intra-coalition fragmentation (because coalitions allow minor parties the possibility to overcome voting thresholds and get representation in parliament). At the institutional level the relationship between the executive and the legislature causes the president to confront the parties. The struggle between these actors could produce a stalemate. The article analyses the 2010 presidential and congressional elections, and furnishes many elements to enlighten the functioning of a distinctive party system, which operates through a unique electoral system in a highly centralized institutional framework.

Abstract: Sebastián Piñera's presidential victory marks the end of the institutional transition process that began in 1989, and the electoral alternation clearly demonstrates that the Chilean democracy has matured. Nevertheless, some systematic problems still persist, for example the term limits on incumbent presidents from seeking another term arguably deprives citizens the right to re-elect an esteemed president.

Parliamentary elections are due to be held in Italy on 24-25 February. As part of EUROPP's series of articles previewing the election, Gianluca Passarelli assesses the prospects of one of Italy's most controversial parties: Lega Nord. He notes that the party, which advocates regional autonomy for much of Northern Italy, has experienced a substantial increase in support over the last three years, but that infighting and leadership disputes have threatened to undermine its electoral gains.

Starting the analysis of two semi-presidential governments having in mind this higlithing “definition” by one of most heminent scholars of Government is certainly encouranging in facing difficulties. Nevertheless, I cannot and I dont want move away from both stressing and explaining similarities and differencies in the government organization and structure. The better way in trying to do it still remains the comparison [Blondel 2005]. France and Portugal have the same form of government: semi-presidential.

This article deals with voter turnout and the economic crisis, and focuses on the results of the 2013 parliamentary elections in Italy. A consolidated tradition of studies has attested to the impact of a negative economic cycle, unemployment and various issues related to the economy, on the decision whether or not to vote, although the results remain controversial. Some scholars have asserted that, during a period of crisis, voters react positively, using their collective voice to demand more attention to their interests. Others argue that negative circumstances distance citizens from the electoral arena bringing a higher rate of abstention as a consequence. The peculiarity of the political situation in the period leading up to the 2013 election in Italy (the unexpected end of Berlusconi’s government in 2011, the period of transition under Monti’s technocratic government and the rise of the Five Star Movement [MoVimento Cinque Stelle, M5S] as a new competitor) strongly influenced voters’ evaluations of how political parties were going to compete and whether, or for whom, they would vote. Survey results show that discontented voters largely used abstention as a strategy to express their resentment, but that the most politically engaged preferred to choose a radical party (M5S), rather than refusing to vote.

The article focuses on the 2013 Italian general elections, which are indicative of the political and electoral effects that the different electoral reforms have produced in Italy since 1993. The Italian political system has in fact seen three electoral reforms in the last twenty years, after quite a stable period from 1948 to 1993. Following the "classic" approach that links electoral laws and political outcomes, we present data on the effects of the various electoral systems over the past two decades. Detailed information on the number of (effective) parties, representation, party size, government durability, the nationalization of the vote, seats to the two biggest parties, etc. will be presented. Upon illustrating the technicalities of the electoral systems and the related reforms approved in the last twenty years, the expectations of the political players will then be presented too. The data illustrated furnishes a good starting point for deeper analyses and the theoretical consequences that arise. The Italian scenario represents a crucial case in verifying the hypothesis related to the causal effects of the electoral laws on the outcomes of political and party systems. Some counter-intuitive results will also be highlighted.

This book considers why the level of party presidentialization varies from one country to another, and how constitutional structures and party genetics affect both the level and the degree it is present.

Presenting an international collection of case studies from the US, Latin America, Australia, Japan and Europe, including France, Italy, Germany, Poland and the Ukraine, it examines how the presence of presidential features in political parties varies in terms of the constitutional framework.

Highlights the importance of institutions in political life, the case studies provide empirical evidence that no stable presidentialization is possible outside regimes where a presidential dynamic is introduced by the institutions.