Papers in English by Boran Berčić
HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022
Author argues that statements of the form X is the best, but I prefer Y are not contradictory or ... more Author argues that statements of the form X is the best, but I prefer Y are not contradictory or self-refuting. To show that, one has to distinguish values from preferences. The relation X is better than Y is understood as purely objective two-place relation, while the relation A prefers X to Y is understood as three-place relation with an irreducibly subjective element. Author rejects the idea that values should be inferred from preferences. Author also discusses context relativity and sortal relativity of preferences.
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2021
In this article author contrasts possibilism (the view that art is about the logically possible a... more In this article author contrasts possibilism (the view that art is about the logically possible and that it cannot be about the impossible) with impossibilism (the view that art can be and sometimes is about the logically impossible as well). Author argues in favor of possibilism. The main insight is that since impossible objects are necessarily non-existent art cannot be about them, it has to be about something that can exist. Also, author formulates fi ve more detailed views about the issue. Further, author discusses related notions like imaginability and conceivability. Author holds that Hume's insight that an object cannot be conceived as non-existent counts in favour of possibilism. Besides, author introduces the distinction between real and apparent content of the work of art, believing that this distinction can be relevant in the discussion between possibilism and impossibilism. In the rest of the article author analyzes several prima facie counterexamples to possibilism (Jean-Luc Picard, Anna Karenina, paradox of patricide, Escher's graphics) and tries to explain them away.
Prolegomena, 2019
In this article author discusses the problem of the future contingents. He wants to show that the... more In this article author discusses the problem of the future contingents. He wants to show that the same problem holds for a number of related cases like decisions, promises, beginnings, birth dates, moral luck, post-mortal harms, etc. The focus of the article is on the question of when and how statements about the future acquire their truth values. Author argues that truth is a relational property that statements acquire when the events that they talk about occur. For this reason, the meanings of statements like I was right! or I knew! should not be taken at their face value but rather reinterpreted according to the proposed theory. Also, several other accounts are criticised and rejected: causal determinism, thin red line, eternalism and realism about the future.
Perspectives on the Self, 2017
Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said... more Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said that: “Such a statement, which does not express anything itself, cannot in any sense serve as the basis of anything.” (Schlick 1934: 218) He argued that it was a mere pseudostatement. Hans Reichen- bach believed that Cogito “is one of the landmarks on the blind alley of traditional philosophy.” (Reichenbach 1938: 261). No other philosophical movement ever criticized Descartes’ Cogito so fiercely as logical positivists did. They criticized it on every occasion they could. (Schlick 1918: 85, 161; Carnap 1928: 261; Carnap 1932: 74; Schlick 1934: 218; Ayer 1936: 62, 187; Weinberg 1936: 184; Schlick 1936: 166; 184; Reichenbach 1938: 261; Von Mises 1939: 173; Reichenbach 1951: 35) This is understandable because they were radical empiricists. They firmly believed that no factual knowledge can be obtained a priori, by reason alone, and Descartes’ Cogito was seen as a raw model of rationalistic philosophy, perhaps of philosophy in general.
Thought Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević, 2017
The idea that nations are social constructs can also be spelled out, so to speak, from the indivi... more The idea that nations are social constructs can also be spelled out, so to speak, from the individual perspective. We can say that:
X is an A, iff he declares himself as an A.
Where x is an individual, A is a nation, and the relation x is an A stands for individual x is of nationality A, or individual x belongs to a nation A, or x is an A. ... This definition can be further developed in the following way:
X is an A iff:
(1) X believes he is an A.
(2) Others believe that x is an A.
(3) X believes that others believe that he is an A.
Etica & Politica, 2016
In his book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies Elvio Baccarini discusses (and u... more In his book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies Elvio Baccarini discusses (and ultimately rejects) the argument that genetic engineering might deepen the inequalities in the society. However, this argument is grounded on the implicit assumption that financially successful people have certain characteristic C that explains their financial success, and that the lack of this characteristic explains why financially unsuccessful people are financially unsuccessful. This assumption is widely accepted, by Nagel, Rawls, Nozick, and many others. In this article I try to show that this implicit assumption is simply false. There is no such characteristic C. There is no independently identifiable single capability, talent, or asset that explains why rich people are rich and why poor people are poor. Social inequalities cannot be explained as effects of the inegualities in talents.
Anthropology & Philosophy, 2015
In this article author tries to answer a notorious question What is Philosophy? Author argues tha... more In this article author tries to answer a notorious question What is Philosophy? Author argues that philosophy is a reflection about the way in which we justify our beliefs and actions. A normative person inevitably poses a question Am I right? And this is seen as a source of philosophy. Sceptic and amoralist do not have to exist as real people, they are only didactical means. Therefore, philosophy is seen as an meta activity, normative in its nature.
Unpublished, 2015
The main point author wants to show in this article is that the Idle argument for fatalism is uns... more The main point author wants to show in this article is that the Idle argument for fatalism is unsound because its premises are either irrelevant or false. If premises are understood as necessary truths of logic, they fall into bare tautologies or at best into vacuous conceptual truths, while a conclusion is, or at least is supposed to be, a substantial claim about our alleged inability to influence the course of events. In that case premises are irrelevant for the truth of conclusion. On the other hand, if they are understood as empirical claims, they seem to be simply false. Also, author (i) tries to show that in the original Cicero's formulation fatalist begs the question; (ii) tries to precisely explain the difference between the Idle argument and the Sea-battle argument; (iii) wants to show that the Idle argument seems sound because of the ambiguity between empirical and logical reading of the premises; and (iv) show that the fatalism should be understood as an ultimately empirical claim.
Prolegomena 12, 2013
I wish to use this occasion to express gratitude to all the colleagues who participated at the Ja... more I wish to use this occasion to express gratitude to all the colleagues who participated at the Jam Session Conference, held in Rijeka on February 14th and 15th 2013. Since the occasion for the Conference was publication of my book, I feel obliged to comment these interesting and valuable works. In the following comments I will try to point out and comment the central claims of these papers, clarify my own views, and, to the extent it is possible, answer to critiques.
Russell IV, Conference in Philosophy, 2008, Healdsburg, CA, 2008
Proponents of the deontological ethics put special stress on the motives of moral action; moral a... more Proponents of the deontological ethics put special stress on the motives of moral action; moral action, in order to be really moral, must be motivated by moral reasons; my action X can be moral only if it is motivated by my insight that I have to do X. 1 According to this picture, the bare insight that I have to do X is what motivates me to do X; my belief that I have to do X ipso facto is a motive for me to do X. This is the reason why this position is called internalism about moral motivation; motive for doing X is embedded in the belief that that I have to do X; moral motive is internal part of moral belief. 2 The main problem for this position is that it is not clear how beliefs, taken by itself, can be motives for doing anything; what is needed to move us to action are desires or wishes. Beliefs and desires are two completely different sorts of mental states; the essence of a belief is that it corresponds to the world, while the essence of the desire is that the world corresponds to it; they have opposite "direction of fit"; beliefs are directed from world to us, while desires are directed from us to the world. 3 It is often said that beliefs are cognitive states, while desires are conative states. 4 Therefore externalists about moral motivation hold that moral belief can not be a motive for moral action and that we can be moved only by desire, that is, something that is external to a belief, that's why their position is called externalism. The point of externalist critique of internalism is simple and clear; what motivates me to take an aspirin is not a belief that
Croatian Journal of Philosophy VI, 2006
Biennial of Quadrilateral, 2006
In this article author criticially examines the thesis of relativism. He wants to show that the e... more In this article author criticially examines the thesis of relativism. He wants to show that the examples which apparently support relativism do not really support relativism as a normative thesis about truth, knowledge and moral norms; these examples rather support weaker thesis of descriptive relativity. Although we may agree that our knowledge is relative to a certain degree, the really interesting question is whether it should be relative. Several different reactions to the factual relativity are compared: realistic, relativistic, skeptic, and dogmatic. Author tries to show that the realistic response is the only adequate response.
Rationality in Belief and Action, 2006
In this article author critically examines Nozick's view on the nature and method of philosophy. ... more In this article author critically examines Nozick's view on the nature and method of philosophy. Although Nozick believes that philosophy is continuous with science, he nevertheless claims that philosophy differs from science. Author tries to show that this difference should not be understood as difference in kind, but only as difference in degree. Consequently, author tries to show that philosophical theories and explanations share the same nature with scientific ones.
Croatian Journal of Philosophy V, 2005
Synthesis Philosophica 19, 2004
Synthesis Philosophica 29-30, 2000
The author examines a well-known argument against the Principle of verifiability. According to th... more The author examines a well-known argument against the Principle of verifiability. According to the argument, since the Principle itself is neither analytical nor empirically verifiable, it should be rejected as a piece of metaphysical nonsense. The author argues that the argument is not valid; there is no reason why the Principle could not be regarded as definition or as empirical generalization. Also, the fact that we can not decide its logical status can not count as a reason against accepting it. Several related questions are strictly separated; Is the Principle as a matter of fact accepted? If it is accepted, is it accepted as a definition or as an empirical generalization (its logical status)? Why should we accept it (its justification)? Related argument that the Principle can not have normative force because it eliminates norms is discussed and rejected as well. The question about the normative force of the Principle is a question of its justification and should be discussed independently of the question about its logical status.
Acta Analytica 13, 1995
This paper has two main parts. In the first part author exposes two formulations of the alleged p... more This paper has two main parts. In the first part author exposes two formulations of the alleged paradox of tolerance. After the analysis, he draws the conclusion that there is nothing paradoxical in the concept of tolerance. Author also argues that there is no such thing as a "principle of tolerance". In the second part of the paper, three general strategies for the justification of the tolerance are discussed; relativistic, sceptic and falibilistic. It is argued that these strategies are either necessarily untenable or useless.
Realizam, Relativizam, Tolerancija, 1995
Scientific knowledge is usually seen as much better grounded than ethical one. However, in the la... more Scientific knowledge is usually seen as much better grounded than ethical one. However, in the last decade (this paper is written in 1995) a number of authors argue that ethical knowledge is equally well grounded as scientific one. They argue that the realist program in the philosophy of science serves equally well for ethical purposes too; that the very same reasons which are forcing us to interpret scientific claims as literally descriptive are forcing us to interpret moral claims as literally descriptive too. Consequently, scientific realism is seen as a tenable philosophical position iff moral realism is tenable. I shall try to show that their view is thoroughly mistaken; that the reasons for accepting scientific realism are not ipso facto (are not at all) reasons for accepting moral realism.
There are philosophers who call themselves moral realists naturalists (MRNs). Their opponents call them new wave moral realists. New wave moral realists claim that: (1) there are moral facts; (2) we don't have to be now in possession of correct reductive definitions of moral terms; (3) moral claims can be tested against reality; (4) one is justified in assuming the truth of a moral theory; (5) explanations which appeal to moral facts are more general than those which don't; (6) there is independent evidence for moral claims; (7) there are moral observations; (8) theory ladeness of moral claims is not a vicious one; (9) there are moral observations which could confirm moral theory; (10) moral facts can and should be a posteriori identified with nonmoral ones; (11) moral facts are supervenient upon nonmoral ones; (12) moral properties can be conceived on analogy with secondary properties; (13) moral epistemology can be naturalised; (14) moral facts can motivate; (15) the fact that the science itself is value loaded supports the view that there are moral facts. I shall argue that all these claims are false.
Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru 7, 1991
The fundamental idea of Platonism is that any such-and-such thing is such-and-such because it par... more The fundamental idea of Platonism is that any such-and-such thing is such-and-such because it participates in the Form of a such-and-such thing. There are a lot of arguments against this view. Four of these arguments arc of regress ad infinitum from. One of these arguments is famous "The third man" argument. In this paper author argues that none of these four arguments is valid. Therefore, platonistic ontology is immune to arguments of this form.
Books in English by Boran Berčić
HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022
This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Ph... more This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Philosophy Department. He has been working on human rationality for over 25 years. Consequently, articles in this collection are either directly or indirectly related to this subject matter.
In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (Editors)
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Papers in English by Boran Berčić
X is an A, iff he declares himself as an A.
Where x is an individual, A is a nation, and the relation x is an A stands for individual x is of nationality A, or individual x belongs to a nation A, or x is an A. ... This definition can be further developed in the following way:
X is an A iff:
(1) X believes he is an A.
(2) Others believe that x is an A.
(3) X believes that others believe that he is an A.
There are philosophers who call themselves moral realists naturalists (MRNs). Their opponents call them new wave moral realists. New wave moral realists claim that: (1) there are moral facts; (2) we don't have to be now in possession of correct reductive definitions of moral terms; (3) moral claims can be tested against reality; (4) one is justified in assuming the truth of a moral theory; (5) explanations which appeal to moral facts are more general than those which don't; (6) there is independent evidence for moral claims; (7) there are moral observations; (8) theory ladeness of moral claims is not a vicious one; (9) there are moral observations which could confirm moral theory; (10) moral facts can and should be a posteriori identified with nonmoral ones; (11) moral facts are supervenient upon nonmoral ones; (12) moral properties can be conceived on analogy with secondary properties; (13) moral epistemology can be naturalised; (14) moral facts can motivate; (15) the fact that the science itself is value loaded supports the view that there are moral facts. I shall argue that all these claims are false.
Books in English by Boran Berčić
In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (Editors)
X is an A, iff he declares himself as an A.
Where x is an individual, A is a nation, and the relation x is an A stands for individual x is of nationality A, or individual x belongs to a nation A, or x is an A. ... This definition can be further developed in the following way:
X is an A iff:
(1) X believes he is an A.
(2) Others believe that x is an A.
(3) X believes that others believe that he is an A.
There are philosophers who call themselves moral realists naturalists (MRNs). Their opponents call them new wave moral realists. New wave moral realists claim that: (1) there are moral facts; (2) we don't have to be now in possession of correct reductive definitions of moral terms; (3) moral claims can be tested against reality; (4) one is justified in assuming the truth of a moral theory; (5) explanations which appeal to moral facts are more general than those which don't; (6) there is independent evidence for moral claims; (7) there are moral observations; (8) theory ladeness of moral claims is not a vicious one; (9) there are moral observations which could confirm moral theory; (10) moral facts can and should be a posteriori identified with nonmoral ones; (11) moral facts are supervenient upon nonmoral ones; (12) moral properties can be conceived on analogy with secondary properties; (13) moral epistemology can be naturalised; (14) moral facts can motivate; (15) the fact that the science itself is value loaded supports the view that there are moral facts. I shall argue that all these claims are false.
In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (Editors)
The occasion for the volume was a conference on The Self held on March 31 and April 1 2016 at The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka, Croatia. This collection is the end product of the activities of a group of philosophers from the Rijeka Department of Philosophy and colleagues who have worked with them. The activity of this group started in the autumn of 2010 as an informal weekly seminar on identity. Philosophers made up the core of the group, although colleagues from the departments of Psychology and Literature also took part.
1) Mi činimo X.
2) X je ono što nas čini onima koji jesmo.
3) Ako ne budemo činili X nećemo biti oni koji jesmo. 4) Ne biti onaj koji jesi isto je kao i ne biti.
5) Ako prestanemo činiti X prestat ćemo postojati.
6) Hoćemo biti, nećemo ne biti.
7) Zbog toga, da bismo opstali mi moramo činiti X.
U ovom argumentu može se ukazati na barem osam grešaka: 1) trivijal- nost, 2) pretpostavka da su sva svojstva esencijalna, 3) pretpostavka da moraju postojati esencijalna svojstva, 4) brkanje numeričkog i kvalita- tivnog identiteta, 5) pretpostavka da razlika u numeričkom identitetu ovisi o razlici u kvalitativnom identitetu, 6) brkanje epistemičkog i ontološkog identiteta, 7) brkanje stereotipa i esencije, 8) pretpostavka da je gubitak identiteta ravan prestanku postojanja.
- Meaning of Life
- Death
- Destiny
- Free Will
- Moral Responsibility
- Ethics
- Social Contract
- Values
- Knowledge
- Reality
- Mind
- God