books edited by Giancarlo Marchetti

The Ethics Epistemology and Politics of Richard Rorty, 2023
This book features fourteen original essays that critically engage the philosophy of Richard Rort... more This book features fourteen original essays that critically engage the philosophy of Richard Rorty, with an emphasis on his ethics, epistemology, and politics. Inspired by James’ and Dewey’s pragmatism, Rorty urged us to rethink the role of science and truth with a liberal-democratic vision of politics. In doing so, he criticized philosophy as a sheer scholastic endeavor and put it back in touch with our most pressing cultural and human needs. The essays in this volume employ the conceptual tools and argumentative techniques of analytic philosophy and pragmatism and demonstrate the relevance of Rorty’s thought to the most urgent questions of our time. They touch on a number of topics, including but not limited to structural injustice, rule-following, Black feminist philosophy, legal pragmatism, moral progress, relativism, and skepticism. This book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars across disciplines who are engaging with the work of Richard Rorty.
Papers by Barry Allen, Michael Bacon and Nat Rutherford, Rosa Calcaterra, Sharin Clough, William Curtis, Susan Dieleman, Raff Donelson, Mariane Janack, Douglas Lind, Sabina Lovibond, Carol Rovane, Shannon Sullivan and Chris Voparil
Giancarlo Marchetti, 2015

This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationsh... more This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics, sociology and law. Reviews "The concept of normativity spans a series of interrelated dichotomies that lie at the heart of philosophical inquiry: fact and value, is and ought, the objective and the subjective, causes and reasons, the natural world and human sensibilities. Much philosophical effort has been devoted to accentuating the gaps between the concepts juxtaposed by each of these pairs, and the fallacies involved in their conflation. This volume, however, seeks to bridge these gaps. The papers collected here—all written expressly for this volume—set out to show that normative discourse must be sensitive to the facts, and that reasoning about facts is inherently value

L’idea che vi sia una netta dicotomia tra fatti e valori è uno dei dogmi dell’empirismo. Secondo ... more L’idea che vi sia una netta dicotomia tra fatti e valori è uno dei dogmi dell’empirismo. Secondo questa concezione, i giudizi fattuali, in quanto verificabili o falsificabili empiricamente, riguardano le aree di razionalità «pura» e omogenea e sono ancorati naturalisticamente al mondo. Gli enunciati di valore, invece, sarebbero da relegare nella sfera di ciò che è semplicemente «soggettivo», emotivo, irrazionale. Questo assunto, che ha dominato per molto tempo le scienze e la filosofia, è stato messo in dubbio dai pragmatisti e da alcuni dei più influenti pensatori contemporanei, che, intervenendo al dibattito sull’oggettività dell’etica, hanno mostrato come la presunta eterogeneità tra giudizi descrittivi e giudizi valutativi sia ormai insostenibile. Sulla scia della prospettiva inaugurata da questi pensatori, gli autori di questo libro mostrano come la dicotomia fatto/valore abbia corrotto il nostro pensiero, impedendoci di rivolgere l’attenzione alle intersezioni, le sinergie e le relazioni che esistono tra processi cognitivi e coefficienti valutativi, tra scienza e etica.
INDICE
FATTI E VALORI DELLA CONOSCENZA. FINE DI UNA DICOTOMIA di Giancarlo Marchetti
LA DICOTOMIA FATTO/VALORE E IL FUTURO DELLA FILOSOFIA di Hilary Putnam
PRAGMATISMO: FATTI, TEORIE E VALORI di Vivian Walsh
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI di Donald Davidson
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI FEMMINISTI E IL LORO RUOLO NELLA SCIENZA di Sharyn Clough
RIFLESSIONI SULL’OGGETTIVITÀ MORALE di Ruth Anna Putnam
SCETTICISMO DARWINIANO E REALISMO MORALE di David Copp
COME ESSERE UN VERO RELATIVISTA di Kenneth A. Taylor
RICONOSCERE LE VALUTAZIONI di Barry Stroud

Il De casu diaboli, scritto da Anselmo tra il 1080 e il 1085, è una piccola opera teologica in cu... more Il De casu diaboli, scritto da Anselmo tra il 1080 e il 1085, è una piccola opera teologica in cui il futuro arcivescovo di Canterbury (allora Priore di Bec) indaga il mistero del male (mysterium iniquitatis), spiegato come distacco originario di un’intelligenza angelica dal Sommo Bene, cioè da Dio. Con il De veritate e il De libertate arbitrii, il trattato fa parte di una trilogia sul tema della libertà: in particolare, il De casu diaboli tratta il problema della rettitudine e della libertà in relazione alla caduta del Diavolo; Satana è caduto per non aver voluto perseverare nella rettitudine e nella giustizia; e non perseverò nella rettitudine perché volle essere simile a Dio, anteponendogli la propria volontà, e fu giustamente punito. I capitoli finali riprendono il problema del male, precisando che esso è sempre sofferenza: alcune volte è nulla, come la cecità; altre volte invece è qualcosa, come la tristezza e il dolore. Per questa ragione noi, nell’udire il nome male, non temiamo il male che è nulla, ma il male che è qualcosa, in quanto conseguenza dell’assenza del bene.
Italian translation with in front of Latin text

Twenty-four critical essays, including a substantial introduction, written by the most distinguis... more Twenty-four critical essays, including a substantial introduction, written by the most distinguished international scholars, make up this volume, that reflect the wide-ranging interests of Graziella Federici Vescovini.
The essays offer by far the most thorough and thoughtful discussion of relationship between ratio and superstitio, beginning with medieval reflections and ending with “modern” speculation. The unifying themes of these contributions is the spectrum between different forms of reason and superstition. The essays show the tortuous and complex path of philosophical thinking as aiming at truth and discoveries yet previously unknown. This path has not privileged itineraries, but it proceeds by integrations that modify the perspectives continuously, now demonstrating illusory what previously seemed certain, now recuperating in different contexts what was formerly rejected. So what we, the children of modern scientism, might call the foolishness of an epoch (as, for example, medieval judiciary astrology), could well be the scientific wisdom of that epoch. The volume is a broad and suggestive analysis that altogether opens a wide tear in the volume's themes, demonstrating how some authors and some texts have to the modern reader a sense that was not recognized in their time.
Anyone with a serious interest in Medieval, Renaissance and “Modern” philosophy will enjoy this invaluable collection.
Original essays by: F. Barocelli, J. Biard, F. Bottin, C. Burnett, G. Cacciatore, F. Cambi, G. D‚Onofrio, J. Hackett, M. McVaugh, G. Marchetti, G. Mari, P. Morpurgo, J. North, A. Pieretti, D. Pingree, O. Pluta, R. Rashed, V. Sorge, F. Tessitore, C. Trottmann, C. Vinti, O. Weijers, P. Zambelli, M. Zanatta.
Papers by Giancarlo Marchetti
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2021
The concept of "limit-situation" (Grenzsituation) is developed by Karl Jaspers primarily in

Cogito, 1997
Which are the topics on which you feel more in the same way as pragmatism? Hilary PUTNAM-Three to... more Which are the topics on which you feel more in the same way as pragmatism? Hilary PUTNAM-Three topics. My wife and I worked together, especially on the connections between Dewey's ethics, his view of scientific method, and his philosophy of education: our papers on pragmatism will be published by Harvard in 2016. But Rorty also influenced me-to combat Rorty. We were not enemies, we loved each other, but we differed very much, and differences were stimulating. I think I clarified my own positions in my head by seeing where I disagreed with Rorty. M. B. & A. B.-You and Rorty have contrasting but also complementary positions. For instance when he tries to read James and Dewey as anti-realists, and you say "No!" Hilary PUTNAM-Fidelity to texts was not one of Dick Rorty's strengths. M. B. & A. B.-It is interesting to have these different ways of approaching pragmatism. Which are the themes of pragmatism towards which you feel more distant?

Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, 2011
The master concept of modern and contemporary epistemology, namely, the idea that thoughts, state... more The master concept of modern and contemporary epistemology, namely, the idea that thoughts, statements, and beliefs have content in virtue of their capacity to represent reality accurately, 1 has attracted the admiration and attention of many philosophers throughout the ages. Typifi ed historically by Descartes, Locke, Kant, Frege, Russell, Tarski, Carnap, and the early Wittgenstein, this line of thought is so profoundly rooted in the tradition that it is hard to conceive of any alternative to it. Yet one prominent countertradition common to Hegel, 2 Husserl, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, the later Heidegger, 3 Quine, Rorty, Dennett, and Davidson has shown us how to avoid representationalism, suggesting a new way of describing knowledge and inquiry. Davidson, in particular, has given a renewed impulse to antirepresentationalism through his critique, in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 4 of the foundations of the scheme-content dichotomy. This dualism, which Davidson reconnects to the Cartesian dualism of the objective and the subjective, is grounded in the conception of the "mind with its private states and objects," and in the idea that truth consists in the correct mirroring of facts. 5 In the wake of Davidson's critique, and without recourse to the schemecontent dichotomy, it is diffi cult to conceive of knowledge in terms of representational relations between language and world. The abandonment of representationalism, namely, the demolition of what Davidson calls the "myth of subjective," brings with it a refusal of the notion of correspondence between language and world, between sentences and facts-a refusal of the idea that statements and beliefs correspond or are " made true by facts ." 6 Davidson's refutation of the representational model begins with both Tarski's semantic conception, and Frege's argument, called by Barwise and Perry the "slingshot argument," 7 which gives us reason for rejecting facts as such. 8
conditions a priori de la possibilité de l'expérience; 4. La contingence de certaines des conditi... more conditions a priori de la possibilité de l'expérience; 4. La contingence de certaines des conditions a priori de l'expérience; 5. Conclusion.

Alla luce dei contributi dell’epistemologia pragmatista e analitica, il volume esamina le più rec... more Alla luce dei contributi dell’epistemologia pragmatista e analitica, il volume esamina le più recenti concezioni della verità e dei valori e il ruolo che esse svolgono nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo. Si affronta inizialmente la revisione della nozione di verità come «rappresentazione accurata» della realtà e se ne desume il rifiuto della concezione della verità come corrispondenza, per accogliere una concezione antirappresentazionalista e antifondazionalista. Si procede quindi ad una valutazione di tale accezione della verità attraverso un confronto con le posizioni pragmatiste. La seconda parte è volta alla ricostruzione dei presupposti teorici che sottendono l’abituale contrapposizione fatto/valore, per sostenere come la presunta eterogeneità tra giudizi descrittivi e giudizi valutativi appaia ormai insostenibile. In un’ottica pragmatista si evidenzia come non sia possibile concepire questa frattura nei termini di un’opposizione binaria tra la cognizione e la valutazione. Pur riconoscendo che si tratta di due ambiti epistemici differenziabili, i pragmatisti propongono di superare «l’opposizione» tra fatti e valori per mezzo di strumentalità logico-linguistiche che mostrano come essi risultino sempre più interdipendenti o addirittura convergenti.
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books edited by Giancarlo Marchetti
Papers by Barry Allen, Michael Bacon and Nat Rutherford, Rosa Calcaterra, Sharin Clough, William Curtis, Susan Dieleman, Raff Donelson, Mariane Janack, Douglas Lind, Sabina Lovibond, Carol Rovane, Shannon Sullivan and Chris Voparil
INDICE
FATTI E VALORI DELLA CONOSCENZA. FINE DI UNA DICOTOMIA di Giancarlo Marchetti
LA DICOTOMIA FATTO/VALORE E IL FUTURO DELLA FILOSOFIA di Hilary Putnam
PRAGMATISMO: FATTI, TEORIE E VALORI di Vivian Walsh
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI di Donald Davidson
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI FEMMINISTI E IL LORO RUOLO NELLA SCIENZA di Sharyn Clough
RIFLESSIONI SULL’OGGETTIVITÀ MORALE di Ruth Anna Putnam
SCETTICISMO DARWINIANO E REALISMO MORALE di David Copp
COME ESSERE UN VERO RELATIVISTA di Kenneth A. Taylor
RICONOSCERE LE VALUTAZIONI di Barry Stroud
Italian translation with in front of Latin text
The essays offer by far the most thorough and thoughtful discussion of relationship between ratio and superstitio, beginning with medieval reflections and ending with “modern” speculation. The unifying themes of these contributions is the spectrum between different forms of reason and superstition. The essays show the tortuous and complex path of philosophical thinking as aiming at truth and discoveries yet previously unknown. This path has not privileged itineraries, but it proceeds by integrations that modify the perspectives continuously, now demonstrating illusory what previously seemed certain, now recuperating in different contexts what was formerly rejected. So what we, the children of modern scientism, might call the foolishness of an epoch (as, for example, medieval judiciary astrology), could well be the scientific wisdom of that epoch. The volume is a broad and suggestive analysis that altogether opens a wide tear in the volume's themes, demonstrating how some authors and some texts have to the modern reader a sense that was not recognized in their time.
Anyone with a serious interest in Medieval, Renaissance and “Modern” philosophy will enjoy this invaluable collection.
Original essays by: F. Barocelli, J. Biard, F. Bottin, C. Burnett, G. Cacciatore, F. Cambi, G. D‚Onofrio, J. Hackett, M. McVaugh, G. Marchetti, G. Mari, P. Morpurgo, J. North, A. Pieretti, D. Pingree, O. Pluta, R. Rashed, V. Sorge, F. Tessitore, C. Trottmann, C. Vinti, O. Weijers, P. Zambelli, M. Zanatta.
Papers by Giancarlo Marchetti
Papers by Barry Allen, Michael Bacon and Nat Rutherford, Rosa Calcaterra, Sharin Clough, William Curtis, Susan Dieleman, Raff Donelson, Mariane Janack, Douglas Lind, Sabina Lovibond, Carol Rovane, Shannon Sullivan and Chris Voparil
INDICE
FATTI E VALORI DELLA CONOSCENZA. FINE DI UNA DICOTOMIA di Giancarlo Marchetti
LA DICOTOMIA FATTO/VALORE E IL FUTURO DELLA FILOSOFIA di Hilary Putnam
PRAGMATISMO: FATTI, TEORIE E VALORI di Vivian Walsh
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI di Donald Davidson
L’OGGETTIVITÀ DEI VALORI FEMMINISTI E IL LORO RUOLO NELLA SCIENZA di Sharyn Clough
RIFLESSIONI SULL’OGGETTIVITÀ MORALE di Ruth Anna Putnam
SCETTICISMO DARWINIANO E REALISMO MORALE di David Copp
COME ESSERE UN VERO RELATIVISTA di Kenneth A. Taylor
RICONOSCERE LE VALUTAZIONI di Barry Stroud
Italian translation with in front of Latin text
The essays offer by far the most thorough and thoughtful discussion of relationship between ratio and superstitio, beginning with medieval reflections and ending with “modern” speculation. The unifying themes of these contributions is the spectrum between different forms of reason and superstition. The essays show the tortuous and complex path of philosophical thinking as aiming at truth and discoveries yet previously unknown. This path has not privileged itineraries, but it proceeds by integrations that modify the perspectives continuously, now demonstrating illusory what previously seemed certain, now recuperating in different contexts what was formerly rejected. So what we, the children of modern scientism, might call the foolishness of an epoch (as, for example, medieval judiciary astrology), could well be the scientific wisdom of that epoch. The volume is a broad and suggestive analysis that altogether opens a wide tear in the volume's themes, demonstrating how some authors and some texts have to the modern reader a sense that was not recognized in their time.
Anyone with a serious interest in Medieval, Renaissance and “Modern” philosophy will enjoy this invaluable collection.
Original essays by: F. Barocelli, J. Biard, F. Bottin, C. Burnett, G. Cacciatore, F. Cambi, G. D‚Onofrio, J. Hackett, M. McVaugh, G. Marchetti, G. Mari, P. Morpurgo, J. North, A. Pieretti, D. Pingree, O. Pluta, R. Rashed, V. Sorge, F. Tessitore, C. Trottmann, C. Vinti, O. Weijers, P. Zambelli, M. Zanatta.
Purpose and Aims of the Research Project
Today it is appropriate to speak at all of Human being as a question that in different ways has been debated since antiquity and has deeply affected Western philosophy and has been a theme of great interest, a particular focus of research both historical and contemporary, to historians and philosophers.
A distinguished network of scholars with a high reputation for work in the field of anthropological philosophy, who have already published extensively on aspects of this debate will explore this theme in the outworking of evolutionary processes.
It seems important to re-open the debate for two, although not exclusively, reasons:
1. The first one is that the contemporary debate has been massively limited to an analytical point of view and that the richness and subtlety of non causalist interpretations, belonging to other traditions, have been unduly ignored.
2. The second one is that the reductionist perspective is currently facing important difficulties.
3. The idea to be worked out is that this renewed confrontation with other traditions should substantially contribute to the job.
After a preliminary introduction, the initial step will consist in the attempt to set up the context of the anthropological discourse.