Felice Masi
I was born forty-eight years ago, I am married and have three children. I teach Theory of Knowledge at BA Philosophy (undergraduate) and for some time I have been dealing with phenomenological epistemology. I studied the connection, sometimes controversial, between Neo-kantianism and Phenomenology, in the belief that it was a case study about thesame philosophy and its use of reflection. I have an ancient and never dormant interest in the notions of space and measure, which I have studiedlooking not only at geometry and physics, but also at architecture and law. I hope, in the short term, to be able to give a more organic form to a phenomenological logic, by comparing Husserl and contemporary literature,especially on syntax, existential sentences, theory of concepts, modal semantics and the theory of truth.The proof of the pudding is in the eating!
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symbolic writing and reading. In the fourth part, I will show the different uses of writing for the achievement of the evidence of clarity and the evidence of distinction and why the latter is also could be defined as computational evidence.
algebra is mentioned for the first time, and the 1895 lectures on the history of contemporary logic. In the second, I will go back to the 1887-88 manuscripts on the history and philosophy of mathematics (in which Kant and, above all, Hume are discussed), then follow their development in 1896, when logic as a theoretical discipline is included, and in 1908, where an early reference to the Stoic theory of lektòn appears. In the third section, I will address the connection between the 1913 reduction of logic with the historical-critical analysis of the apophantic-formal analytic of 1923-24 and the distinction between rationalisation, comprehension and logification of the same years, through which the problem of the ideal
genesis of the idea of rigorous science is posed. In section four, however, I will address the brief history of logic that Husserl composes in 1929, within Formal and Transcendental Logic, in which the link between Stoics and Viète, i.e. between symbolic knowledge and algebra, is now explicit, and in which the historical problem of logic is intimately connected to that of rationality as a praxis of responsibility and control, and the link between the documentation of the sciences and the creation of communities
professionally concerned with truth is evident. Finally, in the conclusions, I will try to show how and why, in Crisis, the order of historical prominence goes from physical geometry to modern logic, and not vice versa.
does the transition from one to the other consist of?
Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism
from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation.
The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the
connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations,
testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of
phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify
what kind of empiricism phenomenology is.
That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted
from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and
empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to
psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954).
What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the
choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its
its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a
contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the
resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a
verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from
the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of
hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to
determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory,
with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly
foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of
phenomenological accessibility.
phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus
about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.
symbolic writing and reading. In the fourth part, I will show the different uses of writing for the achievement of the evidence of clarity and the evidence of distinction and why the latter is also could be defined as computational evidence.
algebra is mentioned for the first time, and the 1895 lectures on the history of contemporary logic. In the second, I will go back to the 1887-88 manuscripts on the history and philosophy of mathematics (in which Kant and, above all, Hume are discussed), then follow their development in 1896, when logic as a theoretical discipline is included, and in 1908, where an early reference to the Stoic theory of lektòn appears. In the third section, I will address the connection between the 1913 reduction of logic with the historical-critical analysis of the apophantic-formal analytic of 1923-24 and the distinction between rationalisation, comprehension and logification of the same years, through which the problem of the ideal
genesis of the idea of rigorous science is posed. In section four, however, I will address the brief history of logic that Husserl composes in 1929, within Formal and Transcendental Logic, in which the link between Stoics and Viète, i.e. between symbolic knowledge and algebra, is now explicit, and in which the historical problem of logic is intimately connected to that of rationality as a praxis of responsibility and control, and the link between the documentation of the sciences and the creation of communities
professionally concerned with truth is evident. Finally, in the conclusions, I will try to show how and why, in Crisis, the order of historical prominence goes from physical geometry to modern logic, and not vice versa.
does the transition from one to the other consist of?
Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism
from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation.
The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the
connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations,
testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of
phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify
what kind of empiricism phenomenology is.
That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted
from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and
empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to
psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954).
What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the
choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its
its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a
contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the
resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a
verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from
the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of
hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to
determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory,
with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly
foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of
phenomenological accessibility.
phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus
about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.